A cosmopolitan republican in the French revolution : the political thought of Anacharsis Cloots by POULSEN, Frank Ejby
  
A Cosmopolitan Republican in the French 
Revolution: 
The Political Thought of Anacharsis Cloots 
Frank Ejby Poulsen 
 
Thesis submitted for assessment with a view to 
obtaining the degree of Doctor of History and Civilization 
of the European University Institute 
Florence, 23 March 2018 

 European University Institute 
Department of History and Civilization 
A Cosmopolitan Republican in the French Revolution: 
The Political Thought of Anacharsis Cloots 
Frank Ejby Poulsen 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Thesis submitted for assessment with a view to 
obtaining the degree of Doctor of History and Civilization 
of the European University Institute 
Examining Board 
Professor Martin van Gelderen, EUI (Supervisor) 
Professor Ann Thomson, EUI (Second Reader/Internal Examiner) 
Professor Richard Whatmore, University of Saint Andrews (External Examiner) 
Professor Reidar Maliks, University of Oslo (External Examiner) 
  
© Frank Ejby Poulsen, 2018 
No part of this thesis may be copied, reproduced or transmitted without prior 
permission of the author 
 
  
 
Researcher declaration to accompany the submission of written work  
Department of History and Civilization - Doctoral Programme 
I Frank Ejby Poulsen certify that I am the author of the work A Cosmopolitan 
Republican in the French Revolution: The Political Thought of Anacharsis Cloots I 
have presented for examination for the Ph.D.  at the European University 
Institute.  I also certify that this is solely my own original work, other than where I 
have clearly indicated, in this declaration and in the thesis, that it is the work of 
others. 
I warrant that I have obtained all the permissions required for using any material 
from other copyrighted publications. 
I certify that this work complies with the Code of Ethics in Academic Research 
issued by the European University Institute (IUE 332/2/10 (CA 297). 
The copyright of this work rests with its author. Quotation from it is permitted, 
provided that full acknowledgement is made. This work may not be reproduced 
without my prior written consent. This authorisation does not, to the best of my 
knowledge, infringe the rights of any third party. 
I declare that this work consists of 101074 words. 
 
Statement of inclusion of previous work: 
I confirm that the introduction was the result of previous study for a master's 
degree I undertook at the University of Copenhagen. 
 
Statement of language correction: 
This thesis has been corrected for linguistic and stylistic errors.  I certify that I have 
checked and approved all language corrections, and that these have not affected the 
content of this work.   
 
Signature and date: 
 
 
 
 
9 March 2018  
 
 
A C O S M O P O L I TA N R E P U B L I C A N I N T H E
F R E N C H R E VO L U T I O N

A C O S M O P O L I TA N R E P U B L I C A N I N T H E F R E N C H
R E VO L U T I O N
The Political Thought of Anacharsis Cloots
fr ank ejby poulsen
Department of History and Civilization
European University Institute
Florence, 23 March 2018
colophon
This document was typeset on LATEXwith the font EBGaramond using the
typographical look-and-feel classicthesis developed by André Miede.
The style was inspired by Robert Bringhurst’s seminal book on typography
The Elements of Typographic Style.
classicthesis is available for both LATEXand LYX:
http://code.google.com/p/classicthesis/
Frank Ejby Poulsen. A Cosmopolitan Republican in the French Revolution:
The Political Thought of Anacharsis Cloots. © 2018.
Front page image source: Portrait by H. Rousseau (graphic designer), E.
Thomas (engraver) in Augustin Challamel and Désiré Lacroix, Album du
centenaire : grands hommes et grands faits de la Révolution française (1789–
1804), 5th ed. (Paris: Librairie Furne : Jouvet, 1889), public domain.
Signature in Léonard Gallois, Histoire des journaux et des journalistes de la
révolution française (1789–1796) (Paris: Bureau de la Société de l’industrie
fraternelle, 1845), public domain.
A B S T R AC T
Republicanism has been on scholars’ research agenda since the 1970s,and several studies on eighteenth-century French republicanism have
linked it to the Atlantic republican tradition. A central question that has
puzzled intellectual historians studying republicanism is how this concept
considered as antiquated or only adapted to small city-states became the
concept of choice for a large modern nation such as France.
The works of Pocock, Skinner, and Pettit launched a vast a research pro-
gramme on Atlantic republicanism as a theory of liberty understood as
‘non-domination’. Focusing on eighteenth-century France and the French
revolution, historians such as Baker, Hammersley, Monnier, Spitz, What-
more, and Wright have argued against Furet, Ozouf, Maintenant, Nicolet,
and Vovelle that this republicanism existed before and during the revolu-
tion as a language of opposition based on classical Greek and Roman au-
thors. In particular, Edelstein has shown how the two languages of republic-
anism and nature collided to form a ‘natural republicanism’ that pervaded
during the revolution and intellectually explains the Terror. Hammersley,
on the other hand, has shown how English republican texts provided an-
swers to the fundamental question for early modern republicans: how re-
publican institutions and practices (securing liberty) could be made work-
able in the context of a large nation-state?
However, these studies on classical republicanism and natural republic-
anism have overlooked or insufficiently explained the universalist side of
the language of republicanism in the French revolution: how could repub-
licanism be made workable for the world, and how could it be argued that
humankind formed a nation? This thesis provides an answer to how a ‘uni-
versal republic’ could be theorised in the French revolution by examining
the writings of Anacharsis Cloots (1755–1794). It argues that Cloots was
one of the leading proponents of ‘cosmopolitan republicanism’. The thesis
uses Cloots’s entire corpus of works, which have been published in a three-
volume collection entitledŒuvres, as well as a collection of all his revolution-
ary writings inEcrits révolutionaires. This thesis uses Skinner’s contextualist
method to present an interpretation of Cloots’s writings by setting them in
their political, social, and intellectual contexts.
The introduction presents a critical review of studies on Cloots from the
nineteenth century to the present. Vilified or lauded, Cloots was considered
a founding figure of cosmopolitanism by nineteenth-century authors, a
fame that faded in the twentieth century. Agreeing with contemporary his-
torians presenting Cloots as ‘cosmopolitan republican’, this study seeks to
vii
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identify what was cosmopolitanism in the eighteenth century. Based on a
1770 pamphlet entitled Le cosmopolisme, this study argues that an under-
standing of a political community of mankind tentatively emerged around
several themes: classical republicanism, science and reason as exemplifies
with the Encyclopédie, sentiment and humanity, and nature and natural
law. It is around these themes that the thesis is organised in analysing Clo-
ots’s political thought in context.
Chapter one presents a brief biography of the life of Cloots from his
childhood in Prussia to his death in France after Robespierre’s indictment
of espionage. It sums up the significant events in Cloots’s life such as his
education at collège du Pléssis-Sorbonne in Paris and Académie des Nobles
in Berlin, his intellectual affinity with his uncle the philosopher Cornelius
de Pauw, and his early ambition to enter the Parisian intellectual salons with
his first book presenting a deist argument against religions. It then focuses
particularly on his revolutionary career as a pamphleteer and publicist, and
his engagement in the revolution as the beginning of a universal revolution
propagating the principles of the Déclaration des droits de l’Homme to the
world.
Chapter two proposes an overview of Cloots’s body of works, focusing
particularly on his revolutionary writings and presenting his ‘system’ of a
‘universal republic’ in a Wolffian paradigm. It argues that his choice of writ-
ing pamphlets over treatises was a revolutionary custom, and may explain
why he has been overlooked by political philosophers. It presents the main
elements in Cloots’s universal republic that will then be analysed in the fol-
lowing chapters.
Chapter three starts with an analysis of Cloots’s republicanism by look-
ing at his self-appointed title of ‘Orator of the human race’, and his change
of first name from Jean-Baptiste to Anacharsis. Looking at the educational
context that Cloots received, it argues that his title of ‘orator’ was directly
linked to classical republican works, which defined the orator as an import-
ant actor in a civis: at the same time a philosopher using reason (ratio) in
search for the truth or sapientia with a scientia civilis, and a speaker who
communicates the truth through the use of rhetoric (elocutio). Related to
this ‘title’, the revolutionary context explains his unbaptising himself and
choosing the name of a philosopher from Greek antiquity— Anacharsis—
made famous in a best-selling historical novel published a few years prior,
thereby self-fashioning himself as this foreign philosopher in the world cap-
ital of philosophy.
Related to this function of orator communicating a true scientia civilis
obtained through ratio, chapter four presents the intellectual context of
eighteenth-century philosophy to explain why Cloots referred to his uni-
versal republic as ‘system’, and why he considered it universally applicable.
Cloots’s understanding of reason was in line with the Enlightenment, but
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he used the expression ‘cosmopolitan reason’ rather than ‘universal reason’:
a limited version of reason prevails if local disagreements proved it as not
universal. The scientia civilis in Cloots’s writings is the ‘science of man’ as
defined in theEncyclopédie in a Baconian fashion: just as nature can be stud-
ied scientifically for its physical phenomena it can equally be studied for its
political and moral phenomena.
Building on this understanding of ‘science of man’ as an observation
of nature, chapter five presents the intellectual background of the philo-
sophies of nature, natural law, and natural rights. Cloots’s opposition to
religion replaced God with nature, but also with humankind, creating a
system of natural law where nature and humankind are both the supreme
moral authority. Negating a passage from nature to society, and invoking a
‘legal despotism’ from the general will applied to the human race, Cloots’s
thought is part of what Edelstein called ‘natural republicanism’.
Chapter six presents the intellectual context for considering humankind
and individuality. Cloots considered that there was a single human race,
even if he acknowledged its diversity. The human race is only composed
of individuals, all vested with the same natural rights, and as such forming
the single ‘nation of the human race’.
Chapter seven analyses republicanism in Cloots’s thought after present-
ing a brief overview of the historiographical controversy around republic-
anism in France before the revolution. As so many other revolutionaries,
Cloots was not openly anti-monarchist before the revolution, but a clas-
sical republican. After the revolution Cloots switched from a republicanism
with a puppet king to an anti-monarchist ‘universal republic’ aligned with
‘natural republicanism’.
The concluding chapter argues that Cloots’s ‘universal republic’ is bet-
ter interpreted as ‘cosmopolitan republicanism’. It then goes on to define
what this cosmopolitan republicanism was in Cloots’s political thought.
The combination of modern science with classical antiquity may explain
why the concept of republicanism became applicable to large nation states
since it was considered a solution to the whole world.
This thesis is the first contextual analysis of Anacharsis Cloots’s political
thought and the first to offer a definition of ‘cosmopolitan republicanism’,
with which other scholars have labelled his work. Thereby, this thesis con-
tributes to studies of the Atlantic tradition of republicanism by proposing
to study a new type of republicanism: ‘cosmopolitan republicanism’. Re-
discovering these eighteenth-century discussions on cosmopolitan republic-
anism sheds new light on contemporary ones regarding global governance:
how can we improve democratic representation and participation in de-
cisions affecting the whole of humankind without imposing certain views
on others? While contemporary philosophers ask if cosmopolitan republic-
anism is the answer, this thesis sheds light on its origins in the French re-
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volution with Cloots. But he was not an isolated case: Condorcet, Thomas
Paine, and Volney were other major authors with a republican vision that
can be characterised as ‘cosmopolitan republicanism’, and this deserves fur-
ther research.
Dedicated to the loving memory of my father, Karl Ejby Poulsen
21 April 1948, København – 20 July 2011, Paris
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P RO L O G U E
Salle du Manège des Tuileries, Paris, the Assemblée nationale constitu-antewas discussing the organisation of the first celebration of the storm-
ing of the Bastille, the fête de la Fédération, when the doors opened to let in
a curious delegation of thirty-six men dressed in folk costume representing
varying nationalities. The Salle du Manège was previously used as a royal
riding hall next to the Tuileries, but it had been de facto let out for private
use, even if it still belonged to the King. The Assemblée moved there in
1789 from the previous Salle des Menus-Plaisirs in Versailles. One should
imagine a long rectangular room lit by huge high windows perched under
an arched ceiling, almost dominating the ceremonies. The room had been
built for horse shows, and it was a show that the new revolutionary politics
continued to provide to the spectators installed in tribunes above the two
facing ranks of seats. On each side, the various constituted factions sat. In
the middle, the president chaired under a majestic two-panel Déclaration
des droits de l’homme et du citoyen. To his left, the constitutionals. To his
right the monarchists. People were coming to listen to their favourite depu-
ties, each battling for attention with their oratory skills. In an anonymous
pamphlet, the most popular ones were quickly nicknamed after and asso-
ciated with horses such as: ‘le Pétulant’ Mirabeau, ‘l’Étonnant’ Barnave,
‘l’Intrépide’ Abbé Grégoire, etc.1
On this particular day, 19 June 1790, the audience was not disappointed
by the spectacle. The leader of the colourful delegation introduced himself
as the ‘ambassador of the human race’, but his name was already known
in the intellectual circles and to the readers of the newly created newspa-
pers where he contributed profusely. He was the Prussian born aristocrat
Jean-Baptiste Cloots, baron du Val-de-Grâce, nephew of the renown philo-
sopher, canon at St Victor’s cathedral in Xanten, and diplomat to the court
of Frederic II of Prussia, Cornelius de Pauw. Perhaps the amused audience
tried to identify each nationality by their costume and playfully tried to find
a breed of horse to associate with each nationality: the ‘Arabian horse’, the
‘Belgian horse’, the ‘Icelandic horse’, etc.
There is no doubt, however, that the delegation had a scenic intention
designed to make a visual impact on the audience in this ‘political theatre’,2
and, considering the polemic that ensued, it worked. Many wrongly ac-
1. Anonymous, Les chevaux au manège, ouvrage trouvé dans le porte-feuille de monsei-
gneur le prince de Lambesc, grand-écuyer de France (Paris: s.n., 1789).
2. Simon Schama, Citizens: A Chronicle of the French Revolution (New York, NY: Vin-
tage Books, 1989), 473.
1
2 prologue
cused Cloots of having hired unemployed actors to wear costumes, rather
than his delegation genuinely representing oppressed peoples; a view later
dismissed by historians.3 However, this ‘stunt’ was more than mere trivia.
It had a deep message, in line with all the Enlightenment philosophy that
fed the young baron and the 1789 Déclaration des droits de l’homme et du
citoyen. The ‘ambassador’ gave a speech on behalf of the human race, asking
that the first celebration of the storming of the Bastille include foreigners so
it ‘… ne sera pas seulement la fête des Français, mais encore la fête du genre
humain’.4 Their presence as well as their message was political and consti-
tuted a paradigm-shift as it placed the individual, the citizen, at the centre of
the concept of sovereignty, rather than the state. Cloots expressed the view
that the events of 1789 were not only French, happening in the Kingdom
of France, but universal in their essence and impact. The sovereign is the
people, each individual possesses a fragment of sovereignty, not the king.
The people — now free in France — were waiting to be freed everywhere
else:
Jamais ambassade ne fut plus sacrée ; nos lettres de créance ne
sont pas tracées sur le parchemin, mais notre mission est gra-
vée en chiffres ineffaçables dans le cœur de tous les hommes ;
& grace aux auteurs de la Déclaration des droits, ces chiffres
ne seront plus inintelligibles aux tyrans. Vous avez reconnu
authentiquement, Messieurs, que la souveraineté réside dans
le peuple : or le peuple est par-tout sous le joug de dictateurs
qui se disent souverains, en dépit de vos principes. On usurpe
la dictature, mais la souveraineté est inviolable, & les ambas-
sadeurs des tyrans ne pourroient honorer votre fête auguste,
comme la plupart d’entre nous, dont la mission est avouée ta-
citement par nos compatriotes, par des souverains opprimés.5
Cloots expressed the idea that if sovereignty belonged to each human be-
ing, and if the rights of Man were universally applicable, then it was not only
the French people that ought to be free and sovereign, but all the peoples
of the world: the human race. A few years later, this ambassador named
himself ‘Orator of the human race’, was granted French citizenship and got
elected at the Assemblée Constituante where he developed the project for
a universal republic based on the sovereign nation of the human race. His
ideas will, however, be as short-lived as his own head. Robespierre launched
a cabal against foreigners in the revolution and ordered his execution. The
guillotine struck his neck on 24 March 1794. He was 39.
3. See chapter on Cloots’s life.
4. Anacharsis Cloots,Œuvres, ed. Albert Soboul, vol. 3 (München; Paris: Kraus Reprint;
EDHIS, 1980), 55.
5. Ibid., 23.
I N T RO D U C T I O N
The merit of the ‘Orator of the
Human Race’ consists in his
having been the first to
formulate Cosmopolitanism as a
principle…
Bax, 18911
Who was Cloots? And how can his ideas be qualified? Cloots was notan obscure figure during the French Revolution; he was well-known
during his life-time as he sparked controversies, while his name lived on
throughout the nineteenth century. His fame transcended borders. A Ger-
man study presented him as one of the ‘Helden der französischen Revo-
lution’ who had an unfortunate fate despite loving and fighting for his
chosen second homeland.2 His fame even crossed the Atlantic into the Eng-
lish speaking world as Herman Melville in his classic novel Moby Dick, as
well as in two other successive novels, used the name Cloots for his descrip-
tions of human diversity. He described Captain Ahab’s crew as: ‘Anacharsis
Clootz [sic] deputation from all the isles of the sea, and all the ends of the
earth…’.3 In French ‘popular culture’, a vaudeville comedy entitledAthènes
à Paris, ou le nouvel Anacharsis staged a German baron and his son, both
crazy about Ancient Greece.4 They are tricked into learning French, whilst
being told they are actually learning ‘modern Greek’, and traveling to Paris
instead of Athens. There, the young baron meets a woman reading Voy-
age du jeune Anacharsis en Grèce (a reference to Barthélémy’s book that
inspired Cloots to change his first name).5 The whole play is an obvious ref-
erence to Cloots, and a chauvinist mockery of the Germans: ‘Ah ! J’avre été
attrapé comme un véritable Allemand’, says Anacharsis when he discovers
the supercherie.6
1. Ernest Belfort Bax, ‘The Orator of the Human Race’, chap. 1 in Outlooks From the
New Standpoint (London: S. Sonnenschein & co., 1891), 1–37.
2. Karl Richter, Anacharsis Clootz (Berlin: Julius Springer, 1865), 10.
3. Wyn Kelley, A companion to Herman Melville (Oxford: Blackwell, 2006), 113, 282;
Herman Melville,Moby-Dick; or, TheWale (New York, NY: Harper & Brothers, 1851), 133.
4. Thomas Sauvage, Michel-Nicolas Balisson de Rougemont and Gabriel de Lurieu,
Athènes à Paris, ou le Nouvel Anacharsis, comédie-vaudeville en 1 acte [Paris, Variétés, 1er
décembre 1821.] (Paris: Pollet, 1821).
5. Jean-Jacques Barthélemy, Voyage du jeune Anacharsis en Grèce, dans le milieu du
quatrième siècle avant l’ère vulgaire, 4 vols. (Paris: Chez De Bure l’aı̂ né, 1788).
6. Sauvage, Balisson de Rougemont and Lurieu, Athènes à Paris, 36.
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It is during the twentieth century that historians started to ignore or play
down Cloots’s role in the revolution, despite one study at the start of the
century.7 That Cloots is not well-known is true for the history of cosmo-
politanism— where Kant is the uncontested eighteenth-century founding
figure. It is also true, even more curiously, for the history of the French Re-
volution. A look at Furet’s history of the French Revolution, for instance,
shows no mention of Cloots.8 No mention either in the Dictionnaire cri-
tique.9 François Furet ignores him all together, whilst Mona Ozouf and Al-
lan Forrest mention him in Furet and Ozouf’s dictionary.10 Cloots is equally
absent in different interpretations of the Revolution.11 He is also absent
from a study in which he should be a centre piece.12 Most studies of the Re-
volution mention him in passing13 —some with a negative tone,14 and some
more positive.15 Only recent studies with a global perspective or a study of
the international system mention Cloots profusely.16
When the historiography of the French Revolution does mention Cloots,
it seems that historians have difficulties with how to evaluate him due to the
reputation that precedes him. For instance, Ikni wrote in his article on Clo-
ots in the Dictionnaire Historique de la Révolution Française: ‘Cloots sou-
vent entraîné par ses visions fumeuses développa une activité brouillonne
7. Selma Stern, Anacharsis Cloots der Redner des Menschengeschlechts: ein Beitrag zur
Geschichte der Deutschen in der französischen Revolution (Berlin: Emil Ebering, 1914).
8. François Furet, La Révolution française (Paris: Gallimard, 2007).
9. François Furet and Mona Ozouf, eds., Dictionnaire critique de la Révolution
française (Paris: Flammarion, 1992).
10. François Furet, La Révolution : De Turgot à Jules Ferry (1770–1880), Histoire de
France Hachette (Paris: Hachette, 1988); Furet and Ozouf, Dictionnaire critique de la Ré-
volution française.
11. Bailey Stone, Reinterpreting the French Revolution: A Global-Historical Perspective
(Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2002); Colin Lucas, ed., Rewriting the French
Revolution (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1991).
12. Donald Sutherland, The French Revolution and Empire: The Quest For A Civic
Order (Oxford: Blackwell, 2003).
13. Peter McPhee, The French Revolution, 1789–1799 (Oxford: Oxford University Press,
2002), 103, 145; Jacques Godechot,Les révolutions (1770–1799), 3rd ed., L’histoire et ses prob-
lemes : 36 (Paris: Presses Universitaires de France, 1970), 198, 336; Colin Jones, The Long-
man companion to the French Revolution (London: Longman, 1988), 35, 181, 183, 184, 192,
251, 264, 266, 267, 334.
14. William Doyle, The Oxford History of the French Revolution (Oxford: Oxford Uni-
versity Press, 1989), 160, 172, 178, 194, 270; Guy-Robert Ikni, ‘Cloots, Jean-Baptiste, dit
Anacharsis Cloots’, inDictionnaire historique de la Révolution française, ed. Albert Soboul
(Paris: Presses universitaires de France, 1989), 233–234.
15. Ian Coller, ‘The Revolutionary Mediterranean’, in A companion to the French Re-
volution, ed. Peter McPhee (Chichester: Wiley-Blackwell, 2013), 424–426; Annie Jourdan,
La Révolution, une exception française? (Paris: Flammarion, 2004), 167, 222, 226.
16. Suzanne Desan, Lynn Hunt and William Max Nelson, eds., The French Revolution
in Global Perspective (Ithaca: Cornell University Press, 2013).
studies on cloots 5
qui masque mal un cynisme de nanti’.17 Bronisław Baczko considers Cloots
as one of the ‘sub-products… of the Enlightenment’.18 In theHistoire et dic-
tionnaire de la Révolution française, only a few acerbic lines are consecrated
to him.19
Cloots seems to have been accepted as a left-wing figure. His name stands
on the website, ‘Marxists Internet Archive’, which published Mitchell Abi-
dor’s translation of three of his speeches into English.20 A dated biography
by Georges Avenel has been re-printed by a left-wing publishing house.21
This parti pris may be the result of the nineteenth-century polarisation bet-
ween a republican pro-revolutionary left, and a monarchical anti-revolu-
tionary right; each tried to find heroes and foes in the French Revolution.
This thesis reappraises Cloots’s political thought and seeks to restore him
to his rightful-deserved place among Enlightenment thinking and revolu-
tionary politics. In this introduction I will first present how nineteenth-cen-
tury historians saw Cloots as a proponent of cosmopolitanism, but with a
nineteenth-century understanding of cosmopolitanism as opposed to na-
tionalism. I will then look at contemporary studies on Cloots’s political
thought, which also consider him as part of cosmopolitanism, but more
specifically a ‘cosmopolitan republicanism’, without a precise understand-
ing of the notion. I will then present a short study of what was understood
as ‘cosmopolitan’ and ‘cosmopolitanism’ in the eighteenth century, in or-
der to argue that Cloots’s political thought should be understood as ‘cosmo-
politan republicanism’, understood as a language combining the language
of nature and natural law, Enlightenment conceptions of truth, science and
reason, humanity, and the language of republicanism. Cloots’s thought is
thus akin to what Edelstein has identified as ‘natural republicanism’, but it
is a particular branch that is more rightly called ‘cosmopolitan republican-
ism’.
studies on cloots
Regarding Cloots’s ideas, nineteenth-century historians were clear that Clo-
ots was the foremost proponent of cosmopolitanism. For better or worse.
17. Albert Soboul, Dictionnaire historique de la Révolution française (Paris: Presses uni-
versitaires de France, 1989), 234.
18. Bronisław Baczko, ‘Il cosmopolitismo illuminista e le sue frontiere’, in La frontiera
da stato a nazione: il caso Piemonte, ed. Carki Ossola, Claude Raffestin and Mario Ricciardi
(Roma: Bulzoni, 1987), 364.
19. Jean Tulard, Jean-François Fayard and Alfred Fierro, Histoire et dictionnaire de la
Révolution française: 1789–1799, Bouquins (Paris: Robert Laffont, 1998), 654.
20. https://www.marxists.org/history/france/revolution/cloots/index.htm. Last
accessed 30 January 2017.
21. Georges Avenel, Anacharsis Cloots, l’orateur du genre humain (Paris: Ivrea, 1977
[1865]).
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For his advocates he was a visionary, and, because of his fate, a martyr. For
his opponents he was a mere madman, and, perhaps even worse in their
eyes, a German. However, they all agreed that his ideas represented the first
and best example of cosmopolitanism as a political theory. An analysis of
nineteenth-century conceptions of cosmopolitanism could be interesting
to understand why Cloots was then identified as a proponent of cosmo-
politanism, but this is not the subject of this thesis. The author’s political
leaning often indicates whether Cloots is represented as a cosmopolitan vis-
ionary and martyr or a cosmopolitan madman and German. The French
Revolution, after all, did not end with Napoleon, but lasted well into the
nineteenth century as intellectuals and politicians fought over its legacy and
over the restitution of monarchy or the foundation of the republic.22
Nineteenth Century
On the one side, left-wing or republican historians are very sympathetic
to Cloots, who is recuperated in its republican fight against monarchism,
and its socialist fight against liberalism. The first historian to publish a por-
trait of Cloots, with a sympathetic view, was Léonard Gallois (1789–1851)
in his Histoire des journaux et des journalistes de la révolution, noting that
Cloots was famous.23 French historian Georges Avenel (1828–1876) pub-
lished a flamboyant panegyric as an historical biography of Cloots. It is,
nonetheless, the most comprehensive nineteenth-century biography of Clo-
ots. His two-volume monograph has been reprinted by a Parisian publish-
ing house, Éditions du Champ Libre, which is mainly publishing works
from the far-left and communist tradition.24 His biography is written with
a narrative technique conjuring up to an heroic style, whilst his sources are
mainly Cloots’s own writings and confessions throughout his work. The
tone is dithyrambic, and much akin to Cloots’s own lyrical expressionism—
although the latter’s was in line with eighteenth-century revolutionary har-
angues, and the former’s was in touch with nineteenth-century romanti-
cism. In many respects, Cloots is restored favourably in Avenel’s biography
due to an appreciation for his personality and thoughts.
Jean Jaurès (1859–1914) attributed a great role to Cloots.25 In his ground-
breaking Socialist History of the French Revolution Jaurès wrote enthusi-
22. Furet, La Révolution.
23. Gallois,Histoire des journaux et des journalistes de la révolution française (1789–1796) ,
375–384.
24. Avenel, Anacharsis Cloots.
25. Jean Jaurès, Histoire socialiste : 1789–1900, ed. Jean Jaurès, vol. 3: La convention na-
tionale (Paris: Jules Rouff, 1901); Jean Jaurès, Histoire socialiste : 1789–1900, ed. Jean Jaurès,
vol. 4: La Convention II, 1793–1794 (9 Thermidor) (Paris: Jules Rouff, 1901); Jean Jaurès,
Histoire socialiste de la Révolution française, ed. Albert Mathiez, vol. 5: La révolution en
Europe (Paris: Librairie de l’Humanité, 1922).
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astically about Cloots and his system, seeing him as a visionary, a political
thinker superior to the other revolutionaries, combining Rousseau, Adam
Smith, Diderot, Humboldt, Helvetius, and Spinoza.26 There is no doubt
that Jaurès contributed to Cloots’s reputation as a left-wing thinker, with-
out the Marxist’s stages of history in human development:
Il n’est pas vrai de dire avec les économistes que le libre échange
des produits fera tomber les antagonismes nationaux. Il n’est
pas vrai de dire avec les révolutionnaires que la propagande
de la liberté fera tomber les antagonismes économiques. Il y a
là deux aspects liés et inséparables de la guerre. Et l’harmonie
ne sera vraiment instituée que quand la libre communication
des produits et l’exercice politique de la liberté se produiront à
l’intérieur d’un seul État, d’un État unique enveloppant toutes
les activités humaines. J’ose dire que Cloots a admirablement
posé le problème ; j’ose dire que l’histoire, dont le travail infi-
niment complexe paraît convenir si peu au schéma simple de
Cloots, se meut en ce sens : … elle tend à constituer, en effet,
sous l’apparente diversité des nations et sous la violence persis-
tante des antagonismes, l’État unique, l’État humain, expres-
sion de la civilisation générale.27
Jaurès praises Cloots’s analysis, but he tempers it with its shortcoming for
jumping directly to the goal, notwithstanding Marxist historical material-
ism and the different steps leading to a unique state; the current step being
nationalism. Cloots’s faith in the people, the sans-culottes, is readapted as a
socialist view of the growing strength of the proletariat. Jaurès added:
Le nationalisme fragmentaire, le nationalisme national ne s’é-
largira pas d’emblée en nationalisme humain : il passera par
des formes « d’internationalisme » et une de ces formes sera
la fédération des États.28
Jaurès approves of Cloots’s analysis, but considers that he is too enthusiastic
and too optimistic. The nation-state is the necessary step before interna-
tionalism, and finally the unity of humankind. Interestingly, Jaurès uses the
terms of ‘national nationalism’ and ‘human nationalism’. Jaurès had a non-
nationalist approach to nationalism and understood what Cloots meant by
the ‘nation of the human race’.29 Ernest Belfort Bax (1854–1926), English
26. Jean Jaurès, Histoire socialiste de la Révolution française, ed. Albert Soboul, vol. 6
(Paris: Éditions sociales, 1972), 66–87.
27. Ibid., 78–79.
28. Ibid., 80.
29. See chapter on concepts of community infra for an explanation of these concepts.
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barrister, socialist and anti-nationalist philosopher, historian, and journal-
ist, was another example of an author who recognised Cloots as a cosmo-
politan thinker: ‘The merit of the “Orator of the Human Race” consists in
his having been the first to formulate Cosmopolitanism as a principle…’.30
However, not all socialist historians are favourable to Cloots. Albert Math-
iez (1874–1932), another French historian specialised in the revolution and
famous for his Marxist interpretation, sketched a derisive portrait of Clo-
ots, stressing that he was ‘universal’ with quotation marks.31 More interest-
ingly, Mathiez presented Cloots as someone who wanted to ‘suppress the
nations’, sarcastically noting that he believed that the human race was one
despite the differences of colours, languages, and mores.32 Even if Mathiez
did not appreciate Cloots, he recognised in him an anti-nationalist, and a
universalist.
However, the view of Cloots as a left-wing figure should be nuanced. On
the one hand, it is true that Cloots favoured a highly democratic and egal-
itarian view of society; for instance, Cloots’s letter to Burke asking him to
witness in person how enlightened the people of Paris were, to his motion
defending the right to vote of servants, and the establishment of his system
as the culmination of the march of history into a world society without war
and without inequalities.33 On the other, Cloots did favour a libertarian
approach to capitalism considering that the end of national rivalries would
lead to a fruitful redistribution of wealth through unbridled trade, without
the need for much governmental regulation. Moreover, Cloots was adam-
ant regarding the necessity to defend property:
La propriété est la base de tout régime social ; quiconque y
porte atteinte aura contre lui tous ceux qui possèdent, et la
majorité de ceux qui ne possèdent pas.34
On the other side, non-socialist historians questioned his sanity, calling
him a ‘madman’, and mostly wrote his name ‘Clootz’ instead of ‘Cloots’,
in an attempt to accentuate his Prussian origins and extraneity to the Fre-
nch Revolution, as well as exacerbating nineteenth-century French nation-
alism and opposition to Germany. This is the reason why Barbey d’Aurevil-
ly (1808–1889) criticised Avenel. Barbey d’Aurevilly was catholic, partisan of
absolute monarchy, and a romantic novelist, who theorised his own dandy-
ism in Paris. His criticism is not against Avenel’s method, but against what
he perceives as a new trend to rehabilitate the least glorious deeds and actors
30. Bax, ‘The Orator of the Human Race’.
31. Albert Mathiez, La Révolution et les étrangers (Paris: La Renaissance du livre, 1918),
48–57.
32. Ibid., 55.
33. See chapter 1.
34. Anacharsis Cloots, ‘La République universelle ou adresse aux tyrannicides’, inEcrits
révolutionnaires, 1790–1794 (Paris: Editions Champ libre, 1979 [1792]), 313.
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of the revolution. Least of them all Cloots! According to Barbey d’Aurevilly,
no one had ever thought of writing a biography celebrating
… ce jocrisse allemand, pesant comme trois jocrisses français,
et qui s’était intitulé lui même, avec la solennité d’un fou dans
sa loge : l’Orateur du genre humain ! 35
Not particularly informed about Cloots, Barbey d’Aurevilly’s knowledge
seems to be based on what had previously been disseminated about this
‘madman’ by Cloots’s opponents during the revolution. His behaviour, re-
portedly, was nothing more than ridiculous, if not the the very definition
of ridicule:
… Anacharsis Cloots était, lui, non pas ridicule, mais le ridicule
en soi ; et sans la goutte de sang de Louis XVI qui lui tâcha la
main, il serait le ridicule tout seul, le ridicule le plus complet et
le plus pur de la Révolution française !36
Another reason, according to Barbey d’Aurevilly, for not holding Cloots
in high historical esteem was that he was German. And a Frenchman like
Barbey d’Aurevilly knows how idiotic being a German means. Even Voltaire,
whom Cloots idolised, would have mocked such a German, who could ven-
ture to believe that one can change nationality like breeches:
… Cloots resta Prussien et mourut tel, avec son utopie dans la
tête, comme tout bon Allemand doit mourir. Rien n’y fit !
Ni sa parenté maternelle qui était hollandaise, ni ses trente
quatre ans passés en France pour se faire vif et Français, ni son
adoption par deux départements français qui l’envoyèrent à la
Convention, ni ses livres écrits dans cet enthousiaste langage
tudesque que sa tête et son oreille allemande croyaient bonne-
ment du français, ni son culte à deux genoux et à plat ventre
pour Voltaire, qui se serait, lui, le Français, diablement mo-
qué d’un pareil Prussien s’il l’avait connu ! Cloots resta, sous
pavillon bonnet, ou cocarde étrangers, l’incommutable Alle-
mand primitif qu’il était. Il n’y a qu’un Allemand, et un Alle-
mand d’excellente race encore qui puisse croire sérieusement
qu’on peut se dépouiller de sa nationalité, comme on ôte sa cu-
lotte, pour marcher dans la beauté de la nature nu et superbe
humanitaire au conspect méprisé des nations.37
35. Jules-Amédée Barbey d’Aurevilly, Portraits politiques et littéraires (Paris: A. Lemerre,
1897), 225.
36. Ibid., 226.
37. Ibid.
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But Barbey d’Aurevilly’s main intention appeared to be ridiculing Cloots
and thereby Avenel’s work. His absolutist monarchism and extreme nation-
alism may explain his opposition to a biography of Cloots.
François Laurent (1810–1887), a Belgian administrator, legal scholar, and
historian also presented Cloots as the main proponent of eighteenth-cen-
tury cosmopolitanism. Kant is not mentioned under cosmopolitanism, but
instead studied under ‘liberal protestantism’ and for his views on ‘law and
perpetual peace’, where Laurent argues that his understanding of a repub-
lican regime is a regime under the rule of law.38
Pourquoi donnons-nous une place dans des études sur l’his-
toire de l’humanité à un homme qui frise la folie ? C’est que
l’orateur du genre humain prêchant la république universelle
nous montre l’écueil du cosmopolitisme qui enthousiasma le
dix-huitième siècle et qui donna à la Révolution cette ardeur
immodérée de propagande dont Anacharsis est le représen-
tant le plus exagéré. Or c’est un devoir pour l’historien de si-
gnaler les erreurs qu’il rencontre sur son chemin quand elles
ont égaré d’illustres penseurs et une grande nation.39
This was, of course a different time, when history served as a guide for
policy-making. Today, the historian may adopt Skinner’s view on ‘the duty
of historians’: ‘don’t write history like that!’ It is equivalent to foreclosing
before even knowing one had to foreclose a whole gamut of explanations.
Declaring a belief to be false and giving a causal explanation for what led
to this delusion is solely the work of imagination and it is more likely to be
wrong than historical.40
Contemporary Studies
During the nineteenth century, therefore, Cloots was not only still well-
known, but he was known as a central figure of cosmopolitanism. This
notoriety and this identification with cosmopolitanism disappeared dur-
ing the twentieth century, except for a PhD thesis on Cloots and ‘French
cosmopolitanism’.41 It is only recently that Cloots has reappeared from the
38. François Laurent, Histoire du droit des gens et des relations internationales, vol. 18:
La philosophie de l’histoire (Paris: Librairie Internationale, 1870), 616–19.
39. François Laurent, Histoire du droit des gens et des relations internationales, vol. 15:
L’Empire (Paris: Librairie Internationale, 1869), 186.
40. See Skinner’s paper presented at the conference on intellectual history: Quentin
Skinner, ‘Belief, Truth, and Interpretation’, in Ideengeschichte. Traditionen und Perspekt-
iven (Bochum: Ruhr-University Bochum, November 2014).
41. John Christopher Stevens, ‘Anacharsis Cloots and French Cosmopolitanism: The
Death of an Idea’ (PhD diss., University of Arkansas, 1954).
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footnotes of history to the footnotes of cosmopolitan political theory.42 A
couple of studies are devoted to him. Bevilacqua and Cheneval have written
articles on his political thought.43 Cavallar has briefly compared his ideas
with Kant’s in a study on a history of international law, while Kleingeld has
dedicated a whole chapter to him equally comparing his ideas with Kant’s.44
Israel has also mentioned Cloots as part of these French Revolutionaries
that were inspired by what he calls the ‘Radical Enlightenment’.45 How-
ever, this study will demonstrate that this is a gross generalisation of Cloots’s
thought.
Intellectual historians who have studied Cloots have labelled him under
different categories. Firstly, I would like to distance myself from Israel’s
labelling Cloots as part of the ‘Radical Enlightenment’. Israel argues that
Cloots is among the revolutionary leaders who derived their egalitarian and
democratic concepts from the ‘Radical Enlightenment’.46 By ‘Radical En-
lightenment’, Israel designates the intellectual movement that stems from
Spinoza and the underground philosophical movement known as Spinoz-
ism that succeeded it, which, according to Israel, influenced the revolution-
ary rhetoric of Robespierre and the Jacobins, more than the English repub-
lican tradition.47 Israel considers Cloots as criticising Frederick notably for
condemning monarchy and aristocracy, and for his ‘unenlightened’ intoler-
ance of Jews.48 However, this study will show that Cloots praised Frederick
in his pre-revolutionary writings. It is true to argue that Cloots defended
the Jews, and that may be a ‘radical theme’, but it is a rather thin connection
to the thesis of ‘Radical Enlightenment’.49 Israel also includes Cloots with
42. See Daniele Archibugi, The Global Commonwealth of Citizens: Toward Cosmopol-
itan Democracy (Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press, 2008), 83; H. Patrick Glenn,
The Cosmopolitan State, Oxford Constitutional Theory (Oxford: Oxford University Press,
2013), 174; James D. Ingram, Radical Cosmopolitics: The Ethics and Politics of Democratic
Universalism, New Directions in Critical Theory (New York, NY: Columbia University
Press, 2013), 38–39.
43. Alexander Bevilacqua, ‘Conceiving the Republic of Mankind: The Political
Thought of Anacharsis Cloots’,History of European Ideas 38, no. 4 (December 2012): 550–
569; Francis Cheneval, ‘Der kosmopolitische Republikanismus: Erläutert am Beispiel Ana-
charsis Cloots’, Zeitschrift für philosophische Forschung 58, no. 3 (2004): 373–396.
44. Georg Cavallar, Imperfect Cosmopolis: Studies in the History of International Legal
Theory and Cosmopolitan Ideas (Cardiff: University of Wales Press, 2011); Pauline Klein-
geld, Kant and Cosmopolitanism: The Philosophical Ideal of World Citizenship (Cam-
bridge: Cambridge University Press, 2012).
45. Jonathan I. Israel, Democratic Enlightenment: Philosophy, Revolution, and Human
Rights 1750–1790 (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2011).
46. Ibid., 26.
47. Jonathan I. Israel,Radical Enlightenment: Philosophy and theMaking ofModernity
1650–1750 (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2001), 22; Jonathan I. Israel, Enlightenment
Contested: Philosophy, Modernity, and the Emancipation of Man 1670–1752 (Oxford: Ox-
ford University Press, 2006), 43–60.
48. Israel, Democratic Enlightenment, 29, 277.
49. Ibid., 495.
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Mirabeau, Sieyès, Condorcet, Volney, Brissot, Paine, Maréchal, and Mer-
cier for being in favour of ‘representative democracy’, but Cloots’s thought
was to have all countries to send a representative to the national assembly
in Paris, a rather unique proposition even if it had affinities with Volney,
Paine, and Condorcet to some extent.50 Moreover, Cloots is perhaps closer
to Maréchal and Mercier when it comes to the ‘natural republican’ tradi-
tion, but closer to Paine and Condorcet when it comes to the ‘cosmopolitan
republican’ tradition, as this study hopes to demonstrate. In general, Israel
puts Cloots in a group with other revolutionaries concerning very vague po-
sitions such as being anti-philosophes, or against kings and monarchy itself.51
That is true to some extent, but this is a very wide category, and again, Clo-
ots had different ideas of what a republic without kings should be, and, like
many others, was not opposed to kings before the revolution. It is wrong
to affirm that Cloots ‘openly disdained the multitude for their ignorance
and addiction to “superstition”’.52 As this thesis will argue, Cloots fought
superstition, but believed in the progress of reason among the population
as Parisians showed with the revolution; as explained previously, Cloots was
even mocked by Burke for praising so highly the commoners of Paris in their
philosophical knowledge.53
Cheneval was the first to label Cloots’s political thought as ‘cosmopol-
itan republicanism’.54 Cheneval fleshed out many of the elements that this
thesis will analyse in order to qualify Cloots’s system as ‘cosmopolitan re-
publicanism’. Cheneval notes the foundational role of the 1789Déclaration
des droits as a ‘primitive contract’ in Cloots’s system and how liberty gran-
ted by nature gives every individual sovereignty. Cheneval also notes how
Cloots dismisses climate theory and Montesquieu in order to justify the uni-
versality of individual liberty, and how Cloots uses Rousseau’s concept of
general will dismissing the need for a small population in any political as-
sociation for the same reason that corporations should not exist. Cheneval
very rightly explains Cloots’s concept of ‘nation unique du genre humain’
by noting how the concept of ‘nation’ was not yet nationalist and was used
to express a revolutionary cosmopolitanism. Cheneval also notes the ten-
sion in such a view with the imperialism that followed the French Revolu-
tion after Cloots’s death, whilst emphasising how Cloots’s system is toler-
ant and inclusive of the diversity of religions and opinions. Cheneval also
notes Cloots’s praise for a global liberal economic order, and how this goes
hand in hand with world peace, albeit in a very different scheme than what
other eighteenth-century peace projects had devised. This thesis analyses all
of these elements in more detail. However, Cheneval does not give a defini-
50. Israel, Democratic Enlightenment, 644.
51. Ibid., 942.
52. Ibid., 915.
53. See chapter 1.
54. Cheneval, ‘Der kosmopolitische Republikanismus’.
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tion or an understanding of what cosmopolitanism is, or at least not directly
and explicitly, even if he compares Cloots’s thought with contemporary cos-
mopolitan theories such as ‘cosmopolitan communautarianism’.55
Cavallar argues that Cloots’s thought ‘can be labelled cosmopolitan re-
publicanism or republican cosmopolitanism’.56 By that, Cavallar identifies
Cloots together with other thinkers who tried to ‘reformulate republican-
ism with a focus on large states’, and classifies them into two categories: par-
tisans of an alliance of republics, on the one hand, and Cloots, who is in
favour of a world republic without states, on the other, because the ‘social
contract should be global’.57 In a way, Cavallar is right in his description of
Cloots. However, as the previous chapters have shown, there is much more
to it, because there is much less to it: the republicanism that Cloots adopts
is close to the natural republicanism of the Jacobins that Edelstein has iden-
tified. Cloots’s republicanism is actually the absence of any state and even
government on the world scale. Moreover, it is wrong to see Cloots as be-
ing in favour of a global social contract. Again, the natural republicanism in
which his thought emerges denies the existence of a state of nature that has
been left through a social contract to join a state of society. Society is nat-
ure, and we all live in the state of nature, which is society. Unfortunately,
humankind did not follow the natural order in which there are no borders.
These divisions were, for Cloots and the Jacobins, the work of monarchs
and priests, a result of centuries of wrong thinking and superstition. The
French Revolution marked, for Cloots, the beginning of a new era under
the sign of science and the application of the ‘science of man’. Finally, it is
misreading Cloots and the revolutionaries to state that he represented cos-
mopolitanism as opposed to nationalism. It is debatable whether nation-
alism and cosmopolitanism could be said to exist at the time, and equally
debatable whether they are opposed to one another.
Bevilacqua does not explicitly refers to Cloots’s system as ‘cosmopolitan
republicanism’, but he does refer to it as ‘a chapter in the history of cosmo-
politan thought’ and as articulated in the context of a ‘republican experi-
ment’.58 Bevilacqua is also right in considering Cloots as articulating several
political concepts in his own original way. However, as can be inferred from
this present study, Bevilacqua is taking a limited view of the context of Clo-
ots’s thought to characterise his system as the abolition of the state system
for a world state and the abolition of politics, in order to situate Cloots as
a precursor of anarchism. It is true that Cloots’s system considers the disap-
pearance of the state system, but it is not exactly his identified purpose, as it
would be the purpose for an anarchist. It is more rightly a consequence of
55. Ibid., 391–392.
56. Cavallar, Imperfect Cosmopolis, 103.
57. Ibid.
58. Bevilacqua, ‘Conceiving the Republic of Mankind’, 550, 569.
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his analysis regarding nature and universality; as will be argued, a thought
closer to the physiocrats and their view that obeying nature leads to the
good functioning of society, and hence dispenses for the need of adminis-
tration. By the same token, Bevilacqua states that Cloots professed the end
of politics, and in a way this is true, but, again, this is the result of Cloots’s
analysis regarding nature and natural law: only through unity, which is ob-
served everywhere in nature, will conflicts seize between peoples, and the
respect of the laws of nature should render an executive government unne-
cessary.
Kleingeld considers Cloots’s thought in the second chapter, ‘Kant and
Cloots on global peace’, of her account of Kant’s cosmopolitanism.59 How-
ever, the chapter is more an analysis and praise of Kant’s federalist plan as op-
posed to a perceived imperialistic imposition of a despotic world state that
Cloots is supposed to represent. The mere use of the terms ‘world republic’
and ‘world state’ to Cloots’s thought is already problematic: Cloots never
used those expressions. ‘République du genre humain’, ‘république uni-
verselle’, ‘république régénératrice’, ‘république des hommes’, ‘république
des individus unis’, ‘république des droits de l’homme’, or ‘république des
sans-culottes’, those are some of the expressions Cloots employs, but not
‘république du monde’ or ‘république mondiale’, and even less ‘État mon-
dial’ since he rarely mentions the concept of ‘state’ at all. Once, Cloots
does write: ‘L’Univers formera un seul État, l’État des Individus-Unis, …
la République-universelle’,60 but Cloots is hardly advocating a World State
the same way Kleigeld sees it, as I hope to argue convincingly by the end
of this thesis. Kleingeld’s analysis is not an historical analysis of Cloots’s
thought, but a philosophical appraisal of Kant’s, and, as such, misconstrues
Cloots’s thought not only historically but also philosophically. Perhaps the
first and biggest issue with Kleingeld’s view of Cloots is that she considers
him as founding his ‘world-state cosmopolitanism’ on a Rousseauian social
contract theory.61 As this thesis shows, Cloots moved intellectually away
from Rousseau through the years. In his revolutionary writings, if Cloots
mentions positively Rousseau and the Social Contract, it is in his answer
to Burke for justifying equality among men, and thus popular sovereignty,
from which the king’s authority derives, and leads Cloots to deride the at-
titude of the king’s brother claiming a right of passage, so to speak, the pre-
eminence of his royal coach over others in the streets of Paris.62 Otherwise,
Cloots is critical of Rousseau’s views on religion that he considers intoler-
ant, and characterised Rousseau’s small republics as a mistake, not only be-
59. Kleingeld, Kant and Cosmopolitanism, 40–71.
60. Anacharsis Cloots, Écrits révolutionnaires, 1790–1794 (Paris: Editions Champ libre,
1979), 396.
61. Kleingeld, Kant and Cosmopolitanism, 40.
62. Anacharsis Cloots, ‘Adresse d’un Prussien à un Anglais’, in Ecrits révolutionnaires,
1790–1794 (Paris: Champ Libre, 1979 [1790]), 45.
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cause of their size, but also because of their multiplicity. Most importantly,
Cloots rejects any notion of a transition from a state of nature to a state
of society, and hence rejects the existence of a social contract. If contract at
all, Cloots mentions a ‘primitive contract’ of the human race, which grants
moral authority to humankind, thus conflicting with the moral authority
of nature as argued in the chapter on nature and natural law.
Another troubling reading of Cloots by Kleingeld is that she seems to
equate Cloots’s position with France in general concerning the revolution-
ary wars. It is especially puzzling to mention ‘Cloots’ military exploits’.63
Even though Cloots was educated at the Académie des nobles, he was not a
soldier. First, Kleingeld seems to dismiss the fact that Cloots was originally
against the war, subtitling the République universelle, adresse aux tyranni-
cides with a case that the pen (in this instance the quill) is mightier than the
sword, thus as the populations become enlightened they will rise by them-
selves against their kings and queens. Secondly, if it is true that Cloots was
subsequently in favour of the war with Austria and then Prussia, it is also
true that he was arrested at the end of 1793 and executed in 1794. Should
he be held responsible for the next two decades of European turmoil? As
argued in this thesis, Cloots was against a monarch, a single person holding
executive power, and especially a head of state in charge of armies. There-
fore, it is very unlikely that Cloots would have looked kindly on Napoleon’s
actions, had he been alive to witness them.
Kleingeld also reads the last pages of Bases constitutionnelles, citing pp.
40–42, as Cloots’s ‘paternalism’ for, she alleges, wanting to coerce the inclu-
sion into the ‘World Republic’ on the ground that the judgement of pop-
ulations living under a monarch is impaired.64 It may be page 39 instead
that Kleingeld had in mind, in which, indeed, Cloots does advocate inter-
vention to overthrow the ‘tyrants’ and liberate the populations that are not
considered capable of freeing themselves on their own. However, Cloots
does not include the coercive inclusion into his ‘universal republic’, but be-
lieves in all good faith in the veracity of his ‘system’ based on the Declar-
ation, which no one would reasonably reject according to him. So Cloots
believes that the ‘freed’ populations would join by their own volition. It is
not known what Cloots would have to say if the populations would have
denied joining the ‘universal republic’, but based on his concept of ‘cos-
mopolitan reason’, as argued in this thesis, it is possible to speculate that
he would accept this position and either capitulate, or consider that it is a
matter of increasing the intellectual conversations to convince these popu-
lations. Kleingeld’s reading of Cloots resembles a straw man fallacy against a
63. Kleingeld, Kant and Cosmopolitanism, 55.
64. Ibid.
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contemporary theory of an imposed contractualist world state, which Clo-
ots did not defend.65
cosmopolitanism
In this thesis, I argue on the same line as Cavallar and Cheneval that Cloots’s
political thought should be called ‘cosmopolitan republicanism’. However,
unlike Cavallar and Cheneval, I argue in this thesis what we should under-
stand by ‘cosmopolitan republicanism’. What do we mean by ‘cosmopol-
itan’? If cosmopolitan refers to cosmopolitanism, so what do we mean by
‘cosmopolitanism’? It is here useful to separate this -ism into the signiﬁé and
the signiﬁant: cosmopolitanism as a mental representation, and cosmopo-
litanism as a word for describing this mental representation.66 It may then
be easy to look at eighteenth-century occurrences of ‘cosmopolitanism’ in
order to understand what that meant, and thus to describe Cloots’s ‘sys-
tem’ as either cosmopolitan, universal or imperial.67 However, cosmopoli-
tanism as a signiﬁant seems to appear under two denominations and not
very often: cosmopolitisme and cosmopolisme. Cosmopolisme appears once as
describing cosmopolitanism as a political thought before the revolution, as
will be shown below. After the revolution, cosmopolisme and cosmopolitisme
seem to be employed as derogatory terms to describe cosmopolitanism as
practiced during the revolution.
Cloots never uses the expression cosmopolitisme, and only once cosmopol-
isme. However, Cloots does use the word cosmopolite, but he seems to give
his own signiﬁé to the signiﬁant. Cloots also uses the expression ‘citoyen
du monde’, but only once during the revolution: ‘Le juif, avili dans le reste
du monde, est devenu citoyen français, citoyen du monde, par nos décrets
philosophiques’.68 Before the revolution, Cloots also used the expression
‘citoyen du monde’, but in a different understanding: ‘Messieurs, que nous
importe le gouvernement, à nous citoyens du monde, à nous qui formons
un cercle immense dont le centre est à Paris, mais dont les rayons pénètrent
65. Pagden also mentions Cloots among other thinkers of universal peace projects, but
unfortunately solely relies on Kleingeld’s reading of Cloots and is therefore not only mis-
informed on biographical elements, but also on Cloots’s project. Anthony Pagden, The
Enlightenment: And Why it Still Matters (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2013), 290–
291.
66. Ferdinand (de) Saussure, Cours de linguistique générale (Paris: Payot, 1972), 97–103.
67. I have elsewhere argued about Cloots and the birth of cosmopolitanism, to which
this thesis presents a substantial revision. See Frank Ejby Poulsen, ‘Anacharsis Cloots and
the Birth of Modern Cosmopolitanism’, in Critique of Cosmopolitan Reason: Timing and
Spacing the Concept of World Citizenship, ed. Rebecka Lettevall and Kristian Petrov, New
Visions of the Cosmopolitan. Vol. 2 (Oxford: Peter Lang, 2014), 87–117.
68. Cloots, Ecrits révolutionnaires, 315.
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partout ?’69 Cloots expresses the view that the musée can work and meet
in Paris because its publications can overcome censorship by publishing in
Geneva, Neuchâtel, Bruxelles, or Maastricht.
Skinner has argued that a signiﬁé may exist even if a signiﬁant does not; a
concept is not necessarily based on a word, and a concept is not a necessary
prerequisite for understanding the correct application of a corresponding
term.70 Or, in Skinner’s own study, liberty can exist without liberalism, be-
fore liberalism.71 And liberalism may not necessarily be about liberty. What
that means for cosmopolitanism in eighteenth-century France is that, even
though the term rarely appears, it may exist nonetheless as a concept. In
fact, the rare occurrences of the words cosmopolisme and cosmopolitismemay
mark the beginning of the philosophical consciousness that such a thought
exists (signiﬁé), and hence needs a word to describe it (signiﬁant). What this
also means is that the term ‘cosmopolitan’ or ‘citizen of the world’ may or
may not be related to cosmopolitanism. Moreover, it also means that, by the
same token, the term nation may or may not be related to nationalism, and
patrie to patriotism, but they may be related to cosmopolitanism. This is a
position that some scholars have taken regarding cosmopolitanism, which
I also adopt here.
Historiography
‘Cosmopolitanism’ is not a word that appeared frequently in eighteenth-
century France, whereas ‘cosmopolitan’ was more popular. This would ex-
plain why some historians have rejected ‘cosmopolitanism’ as a significant
historical category of political thought. For instance, O’Brien states: ‘Cos-
mopolitanism is no longer a term much favoured by intellectual historians:
as an idea, it seems to lack intellectual content; as a category of political
thought, it has no referent’.72 Works of reference on the Enlightenment do
not mention cosmopolitanism. Neither the Cambridge History of Eight-
eenth-Century Political Thought nor the Cambridge History of Eighteenth-
Century Philosophy mention cosmopolitanism or the term cosmopolitan,
whereas they do mention either ‘patriotism’ or ‘nation’.73 Similarly, Kors’s
69. Anacharsis Cloots, Vœux d’un gallophile : Suivis de mêlanges ; & d’anecdotes sur
Stiépan-Annibal, soi-disant prince d’Albanie, ou supplément au livre des Liaisons dange-
reuses ; & d’un drame sur la mort de Voltaire (Amsterdam: s.n., 1786), 84–85.
70. Quentin Skinner, Visions of Politics, vol. 1: Regarding Method (Cambridge: Cam-
bridge University Press, 2002), 159.
71. Quentin Skinner, Liberty before liberalism (Cambridge: Cambridge University
Press, 1998).
72. Karen O’Brien, Narratives of Enlightenment: Cosmopolitan History from Voltaire to
Gibbon (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1997), 2.
73. Mark Goldie and Robert Wokler, eds., The Cambridge History of Eighteenth-
Century Political Thought (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2006); Knud
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Encyclopedia of the Enlightenment has an entry under ‘cosmopolitanism’
only to cross-refer to the entry on ‘sociability’.74 However, the entry on ‘so-
ciability’ is not explicit regarding cosmopolitanism. Alternatively, some his-
torians have undertaken a Begriffsgeschichte of the ‘citizen of the world’.75
Another related alternative is to write the history of supranational identities
during the Enlightenment.76
However, several historical studies have defined cosmopolitanism in the
Enlightenment. Cosmopolitanism is then seen as elitist, abstract, and uto-
pian.77 Schlereth for instance associates the following characteristics to cos-
mopolitanism:
… an aspiration of the elite intellectual class that Voltaire called
the world’s petite [petit] troupeau des philosophes; 78 … more
symbolic and theoretical than actual and practical;… a psycho-
logical construct that prompted many philosophes to replace
or to modify their attachment to their geographical region or
sphere of activity with a more expansive, albeit abstract, atti-
tude toward the whole world.79
Facing these conceptions of cosmopolitanism as elitist and abstract, other
historians have shown the contrary. Gauthier argues that natural law theory
produced the Déclaration des droits de l’Homme et du Citoyen of 1789; a
very concrete political result of Enlightenment cosmopolitan thinking.80
Belissa shows that a very concrete cosmopolitan policy, a ‘cosmopolicy’,
Haakonssen, ed.,Cambridge History of Eighteenth-Century Philosophy (Cambridge: Cam-
bridge University Press, 2006).
74. Alan Charles Kors, ed.,Encyclopedia of the Enlightenment, vol. 4 Sade-Zoology (Ox-
ford: Oxford University Press, 2003), 96-104.
75. Peter Coulmas, Weltbürger. Geschichte einer Menschheitssehnsucht (Reinbek: Ro-
wohlt, 1990); Sigrid Thielking, Weltbürgertum: kosmopolitische Ideen in Literatur und po-
litischer Publizistik seit dem achtzehnten Jahrhundert (München: Fink, 2000); Andrea
Albrecht, Kosmopolitismus. Weltbürgerdiskurse in Literatur, Philosophie und Publizistik
um 1800 (Berlin: Walter de Gruyter, 2005).
76. Margaret C. Jacob, Strangers Nowhere in the World: The Rise of Cosmopolitanism in
Early Modern Europe (Philadelphia, PA: University of Pennsylvania Press, 2006).
77. Harvey Chisick, Historical Dictionary of the Enlightenment (Lanham, MD: The
Scarecrow Press, 2005), 128; Willem Frijhoff, ‘Cosmopolitismo’, in L’Illuminismo: Dizion-
ario storico, ed. Vincenzo Ferrone and Daniel Roche, Manuali Laterza 248 (Bari–Roma:
Editori Laterza, 2007 [1997]), 21–22.
78. The expression can be found in Voltaire’s correspondance with d’Alembert: ‘Pour-
quoi faut-il que les fanatiques s’épaulent tous les uns les autres, et que les philosophes
soient désunis et dispersés? Réunissez le petit troupeau; courage’. In Voltaire, Œuvres com-
plètes de Voltaire, vol. 59 (Paris: chez Thomine et Fortic, 1822), 3293.
79. Thomas J. Schlereth, The Cosmopolitan Ideal in Enlightenment Thought, Its Form
and Function in the Ideas of Franklin, Hume, and Voltaire, 1694–1790 (Notre Dame, IN:
University of Notre Dame Press, 1977), xii–xiii.
80. Florence Gauthier, Triomphe et mort du droit naturel en Révolution 1789-1795-1802
(Paris: Presses Universitaires de France, 1998).
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with the law of nations existed. It is not a study of cosmopolitanism as a
philosophy, but Belissa identifies what he calls a ‘cosmopolitique du droit
des gens’:
Les pratiques diplomatiques et juridiques de l’Ancien Régime
sont soumises à une critique radicale qui permet l’élaboration
d’une nouvelle perspective politique que l’on pourrait nom-
mer une cosmopolitique du droit des gens, c’est-à-dire un projet
visant à la construction d’une société civile des nations, dans
laquelle le droit des gens cesse d’être une simple jurisprudence
positive de la guerre et des ambassades pour devenir le lien
éthique entre les peuples. La société civile des nations est la pro-
jection, dans la sphère des relations entre le peuples, de l’idée
d’État civil à l’intérieur d’une société particulière. La perspec-
tive de la cosmopolitique du droit des gens revient donc à celle
de l’organisation des droits de l’homme dans leur universa-
lité.81
The study of peace plans and of the law of nations is also a way of studying
the ‘cosmopolitan ideal’.82 By the same token, Toulmin argues that the idea
of a cosmopolis— understood as a will to unify the world around a Newto-
nian conception of nature— has been present in Western philosophy since
the seventeenth century, thus making it a key concept of modernity.83
Cosmopolitanism was perhaps not so abstract, but some scholars study-
ing cosmopolitanism have noted its opposition to nationalism and also of-
ten connected the view that the French Revolution represented a transition
from cosmopolitanism to nationalism: ‘Il cosmopolitismo politico si inscri-
ve in una prima fase di questa presa di coscienza, quella in cui la nazione è
messa al bando dall’elite intellettuale’.84 This narrative could be explained
by the fact that ‘methodological nationalism’ has prevailed over ‘methodo-
logical cosmopolitanism’ in the social sciences as a paradigm.85 The fields of
history, world history and global history have recently emerged as powerful
alternatives to national history. There is nonetheless a lack of reflection re-
garding the theorisation of the subject, which is even more crucial for intel-
lectual history. The triumph of the nation-state has become the dominant
81. Marc Belissa, Fraternité universelle et intérêt national (1713–1795) : les cosmopolitiques
du droit des gens (Paris: Kimé, 1998), 7.
82. Michael Scrivener, The Cosmopolitan Ideal in the Age of Revolution and Reaction,
1776–1832 (London: Pickering / Chatto, 2007).
83. Stephen Edelston Toulmin, Cosmopolis: The Hidden Agenda of Modernity
(Chicago, IL: University of Chicago Press, 1992).
84. Frijhoff, ‘Cosmopolitismo’, 23.
85. Ulrich Beck, Cosmopolitan Vision (London: Polity, 2006); Ulrich Beck, Power in the
Global Age: A New Global Political Economy (London: Polity, 2006).
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narrative, until globalisation requestioned this.86 However, one of the very
first studies in the history of cosmopolitanism, from an author paradoxic-
ally more famous for his history of the nation-state, contradicted the nar-
rative of an eclipse of eighteenth-century cosmopolitanism for nineteenth-
century nationalism:
The current view is that an epoch of cosmopolitan thinking
preceded the awakening of the national idea and of the idea
of the national state in our country also. If we should demon-
strate no more than that in this study, we shall have said noth-
ing new. However, this same view also sees cosmopolitanism
and national feeling as two modes of thought that mutually
exclude each other, that do battle with each other, and that
supplant each other. Such a view cannot satisfy the historical
mind that has a deeper awareness of circumstances and that
insists on a thoroughly detailed demonstration of every stage
in the evolution of ideas.87
Meinecke’s study of cosmopolitanism and nationalism rejected this Mani-
chaean opposition between the two. Somehow forgotten by cosmopolitan
thinkers, his views are indeed highly interesting for cosmopolitanism. Fo-
cusing on Germany during the Enlightenment and the nineteenth century,
his ‘main objective [is] to illuminate the true relationship of universal and
national ideals in the growth of the modern German idea of the national
state’.88 The concept of ‘humanitas’ could only grow out of the friction bet-
ween two nations. And inversely, a nation could only come out of universal
and cosmopolitan ideas.89 It is important not to understand cosmopolitan-
ism as opposed to nationalism in studying Cloots and other revolutionary
writers because it would otherwise not be possible to understand how Clo-
ots could speak of ‘nation of the human race’, or how French principles of
government are universal and not circumscribed to French borders.
Another historical study of the cosmopolitan by van den Heuvel equally
contradicts such a basic opposition between cosmopolitanism and nation-
alism. If the cosmopolite has no national prejudice, and equally social dif-
ference played no role in this Salon culture, then:
86. See Bartelson’s argument that the nation-state is more rightly a mere parenthesis
in the long history of political thought oriented towards achieving a world community,
in Jens Bartelson, Visions of World Community (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press,
2009).
87. Friedrich Meinecke, Cosmopolitanism and the National State, Weltbürgertum und
Nationalstaat: Studien zur Genesis des deutschen Nationalstaates, trans. Robert B. Kim-
ber (Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press, 1970 [1908]), 21.
88. Ibid.
89. Ibid., 20.
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Das Selbstverständnis des cosmopolite und die Auffassung
von dem, was cosmopolitisme sei, beinhaltete aber nicht ein
politisches Programm in dem Sinne, daß eine Überwindung
der noch kaum voll entwickelten Nationalstaaten angestrebt
wurde. „Kosmopolitismus” dokumentierte sich in einer An-
teilnahme am Fortschritt aller Nationen, war somit interna-
tional und nicht programmatisch anti-national orientiert.90
Kymlicka is also skeptical about this opposition as he takes Max Boehm’s
definition of cosmopolitanism: ‘the form which cosmopolitanism assumes
is in general conditioned by the particular social entity or group ideal from
which it represents a reaction’.91 Cosmopolitanism is thus defined as a ‘re-
action’, an alternative against the dominant form of social entity. Kymlicka
notes that the opposition between cosmopolitanism and nationalism is a
‘cliché’, and that the precise points of opposition are not clear. Cosmopo-
litanism according to Kylimcka assumes the assimilation of smaller ‘back-
ward’ national identities into a larger ‘more advanced’ group, until even-
tually forming a single cosmopolitan one. Cosmopolitans did not predict
any resilience of national identities because of the perceived lack of impos-
ition by any dominant group, but rather because it favours a rational in-
dividual choice of choosing this option in order to attain free and equal
citizenship. For Kymlicka, there are very limited disagreements between
the two and much more commonalities. The disagreement ‘concerns the
role of the state in protecting and affirming national identities …’.92 For En-
lightenment cosmopolitans the state is purely protecting individual liber-
ties and not national cultures or identities, whereas it is the legitimate pro-
tector of those for liberal nationalists. Furthermore, cosmopolitans argue
for the right of free mobility across borders, whereas liberal nationalists fa-
vour the right of the state to limit the numbers of immigrants. However,
they both share the same commitment to universal values of freedom and
equality. Therefore, it is preferable to say that ‘liberal nationalism involves a
redefinition of cosmopolitanism’.93 The same argument is made elsewhere,
that nationalism and cosmopolitanism are not only mutually compatible,
but their synthesis is necessary to build a stable world-order.94 On the same
line, Conversi also argues that
90. Gerd van den Heuvel, Rolf Reichardt and Eberhard Schmitt, ‘Cosmopolite, Cosmo-
poli(ti)sme’, in Handbuch politisch-sozialer Grundbegriffe in Frankreich 1680–1820, vol. 6
(München: Oldenbourg, 1986), 44.
91. Will Kymlicka, ‘From Enlightenment Cosmopolitanism to Liberal Nationalism’,
chap. 10 inPolitics in the Vernacular: Nationalism,Multiculturalism, and Citizenship (Ox-
ford: Oxford University Press, 2001), 204.
92. Ibid., 219.
93. Ibid., 220.
94. Brett Bowden, ‘Nationalism and cosmopolitanism: irreconcilable differences or pos-
sible bedfellows?’, National Identities 5, no. 3 (November 2003): 235–249.
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Cosmopolitanism and nationalism shared the same intellec-
tual foundations in the idea of natural rights, but, once ap-
plied to real life, their interests increasingly and inevitably di-
verged.95
By the same token, as Surrateau argues, the discussion on the supposed
contradiction between the concepts of patriotism and cosmopolitanism
must be informed by a clear separation and definition of connected terms
such as ‘nation’, ‘patrie’, and ‘cosmopolitan’.96
Moreover, the view then that cosmopolitanism is a united set of views
should be challenged. This means not only that there are different versions
of cosmopolitanism, as Kleingeld argues, but also that it should not ne-
cessarily be identified as ‘eighteenth-century cosmopolitanism’.97 Rather,
there could be something like an eighteenth-century political thought with a
cosmopolitan intent.
Dédéyan intended a study of cosmopolitanism in Enlightenment France
and Europe, but he is wrong when he argues that the word ‘cosmopolitisme’
did not exist in the eighteenth century and only appeared in 1863.98 As I
demonstrate below, one finds mention of it in 1756. However, he is prob-
ably right in his general assertion that cosmopolitanism as we understand
it today, as a signiﬁant securely fixed to a signiﬁé, appeared together with
nationalism in the nineteenth century. This research is however out of the
scope of the present work, but should be investigated in future studies. This
would also explain why some historians have studied ‘cosmopolitanism’ in
eighteenth-century French political thought with a contemporary under-
standing of cosmopolitanism, a negative view of an elitist, abstract, and uto-
pian project, without being troubled by the rare apparitions of the word at
the time. This understanding is of course opposed to nationalism as popu-
lar, concrete, and real, even though it was just as elitist, abstract, and utopian
in the late 1780s and early 1790s. For other scholars, the conceptualisation of
cosmopolitanism remained constricted to the concept of travelling without
feeling attached to one particular country. As such, it was perceived as neg-
ative, an excess of travels is potentially dangerous for the soul or for public
health in general. As van den Heuvel et al. note, the expression ‘cosmopol-
isme’ appeared together with ‘cosmopolitisme’.99 The fact that both words
appear during the same period, and that they did not get any mention in
95. Daniele Conversi, ‘Cosmopolitanism and Nationalism’, inEncyclopaedia of Nation-
alism, ed. Athena Leoussi and Anthony D. Smith (Oxford: Transaction Books, 2000), 35.
96. Jean-René Suratteau, ‘Cosmopolitisme et patriotisme au siècle des Lumières’, An-
nales historiques de la Révolution française 253, no. 1 (1983): 364–389.
97. Pauline Kleingeld, ‘Six Varieties of Cosmopolitanism in Late Eighteenth-Century
Germany’, Journal of the History of Ideas 60, no. 3 (1999): 505–524.
98. Charles Dédéyan, Le cosmopolitisme européen sous la Révolution et l’Empire (Paris:
Société d’édition d’enseignement supérieur, 1976), 3.
99. Heuvel, Reichardt and Schmitt, ‘Cosmopolite, Cosmopoli(ti)sme’.
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dictionaries goes to show that neither was the signiﬁé of cosmopolitanism
fixed nor was there any agreement on what the signiﬁant was. Both words
denote the existence of a will to create a neologism, and hence the existence
of a conscience that such a thing exists. But what exactly did these neolo-
gisms convey?
In our present study of Cloots’s thought it is necessary to take these stud-
ies into consideration with the following lessons: cosmopolitan and cosmo-
politanism are not necessarily related; by the same token nationalism and
nation are not necessarily related, in that nation can be a concept used in
cosmopolitanism, and that cosmopolitanism is not necessarily opposed to
nationalism; finally, these two -isms are mainly products of the nineteenth
century, and should therefore be approached contextually in the eighteenth.
Regarding Cloots, this leaves us to look at how he used the words ‘cosmo-
polite’, ‘citoyen du monde’, and how cosmopolitanism can be understood
in his thought. As this thesis will show, Cloots used the concept of nation
in his political thought, which can be called ‘cosmopolitanism’ in a revolu-
tionary French context. Cloots was also not opposed to nationalism if we
understand nationalism as the political congruence of nation and state, and
if we understand sovereignty as belonging to humankind ultimately.
‘Cosmopolite’, ‘Cosmopolitain’
Fink’s account of cosmopolitanism during the Enlightenment starts dir-
ectly with the definition of the word ‘cosmopolite’ being defined in Fure-
tière’s Dictionnaire universel in 1690 indirectly under the article ‘patrie’:
‘Un philosophe est partout en sa patrie’. A clear reference to the stoic tra-
dition.100 According to Hazard, the word ‘cosmopolite’ appears in French
during the sixteenth century, but it is really during the eighteenth century
that the word becomes popular.101 In the 1721 edition of the Dictionnaire
de Trévoux, the article ‘cosmopolitain, cosmopolitaine’ explains from the
Latin root:
COSMOPOLITAIN, aine.s.m. & f.Cosmopolita,Cosmopoli-
tanus. On dit quelquefois en badinant, pour signifier un hom-
me qui n’a pas de demeure fixe, ou bien un homme qui nulle
part n’est étranger. Il vient de κόσμος, le monde, & πόλις, ville,
& signifie un homme dont tout le monde est la ville, ou la pa-
trie. Un ancien Philosophe étant interrogé d’où il était, répon-
dit, Je suis Cosmopolitain. L’Auteur inconnu d’un excellent
Traité de Chymie, intitulé Lumen Chymicum, s’est donné le
100. Gonthier Louis Fink, ‘Cosmopolitisme’, in Dictionnaire européen des Lumières, ed.
Michel Delon, Quadrige (Paris: Presses Universitaires de France, 2007), 320–323.
101. Pierre Hazard, ‘Cosmopolite’, in Mélanges d’histoire littéraire générale et comparée
offerts à Fernand Baldensperger (Paris: Librairie ancienne Honoré Champion, 1930).
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nom de Cosmopolitain.
Quelques-uns disentCosmopolite ; mais comme on dit Neapo-
litain & Constantinopolitain, & non pas Constantinopolite,
& Neapolite, l’analogie demande qu’on dise Cosmopolitain.102
The philosopher in question is Diogenes of Sinope, as mentioned by
Diogenes Lærtius.103 The word embodied at the same time the idea of a
traveller who could mingle easily in different cultures, and a philosoph-
ical stance about being a citizen of the whole world. It is probably for lex-
icographical reasons that the author suggested the adjective cosmopolitain
rather than cosmopolite. This hesitation between cosmopolitain and cosmo-
polite shows the novelty of the word and the difficulties in fixing a good us-
age of the adjective. The French grammar had not yet incorporated a new
understanding and usage of the existing cosmopolite.
The reference in this definition to the unknown author of a textbook
on chemistry who signed as ‘Le cosmopolite’ is the Scottish alchemist Alex-
andre Seton (Alexander Sethon), who died in 1603, and whose pen name
was later taken by Michał Sędziwój (Michael Sendivogius, Sędzimir) (1566–
1636), Polish alchemist, philosopher, and medical doctor.104 Seton was called
‘the Cosmopolite’ due to his travelling from city to city to show the work-
ings of alchemy. However, his story is a curious one since not much is
known of him apart from the 3 years he spent travelling from town to town
converting the skeptics to alchemy. It is not even known when he was born
or if his name was indeed Seton. As for being called ‘The Cosmopolite’,
was it only due to his travelling, or was there also a reference to the above
mentioned philosopher, in search of truth?
The word ‘cosmopolite’ took a cultural meaning—became embedded in
culture— in the popular novel of a colourful cynic (both in a philosophical
and pejorative sense) named Louis-Charles Fougeret de Monbron (1706–
1760). He famously opens his novel Le cosmopolite ou le citoyen du monde
with a sentence resonating as a kind of motto, which Lord Byron actually
quoted later as epigraph in Childe Harold’s Pilgrimage:105
L’univers est une espèce de livre, dont on n’a lu que la première
page quand on n’a vu que son pays. J’en ai feuilleté un assez
grand nombre, que j’ai trouvé également mauvaises. Cet exa-
men ne m’a point été infructueux. Je haïssais ma patrie. Toutes
102. Dictionnaire universel françois et latin, vol. 2, Coma–Fyonie (Paris: Florentin De-
laulne, Hilaire Foucault, Michel Clousier, Jean-Geoffroy Nyon, Estienne Ganeau, Nicolas
Gosselin, 1721), 270.
103. Diogenes Laërtius,Lives of Eminent Philosophers, ed. Tiziano Dorandi (Cambridge:
Cambridge University Press, 2013), Liber VI, 420–56.
104. Eric John Holmyard, Alchemy, Reprint (Mineola, NY: Dover Publications, 2012
[1957]), 314–33.
105. George Gordon Byron, Childe Harold’s Pilgrimage, a Romaunt: and Other Poems,
5th ed. (London: John Murray, 1812).
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les impertinences des peuples divers, parmi lesquels j’ai vécu,
m’ont réconcilié avec elle. Quand je n’aurais tiré d’autre béné-
fice de mes voyages que celui-là, je n’en regretterais ni les frais,
ni les fatigues.106
In this first paragraph that serves as the introduction to his travelling
memories in Le cosmopolite, one can sum up everything that Fougeret un-
derstands by ‘cosmopolitan’ and ‘world citizen’. It is an individualistic rela-
tion to communities, and a cynic understanding of the term. To be certain,
a few lines later he ascertains that he was looking in his travels for ‘Diogenes’
man’. In other words, one is only born in a community by accident. It is but
a fate, and one is free to change it if one feels like it. Visibly, France, and es-
pecially Paris was boring to the eyes of Fougeret, and therefore he wanted
to find another community. Hence the travels. He was not travelling only
for the sake of being open-minded, but also to find this homeland, patrie,
where he could declare as in the epigraph of the book ‘patria est ubicum-
que est bene’ (‘the homeland is wherever it is fine’). It turned out that after
all his travels, this homeland was France. One should note here that Cloots
uses a similar Latin quotation as epigraph to one of his books: ‘ubi bene ibi
patria’.107 But the journey was necessary, and epitomised the supposed ab-
sence of attachment of cosmopolitans, as well as their individualistic refusal
of allegiance to a particular fatherland.
This cynical cosmopolite who despises his own homeland is also contras-
ted by a positive understanding of the cosmopolitan, in legal and political
theory, especially by those considering theories of jus gentium (the law of
nations), and other attempts in natural law theory to defend the individual
human being against societies.
For example, Rousseau was highly influenced by the Projet de paix per-
pétuelle et universelle of the Abbé de Saint-Pierre. So much so, that Rous-
seau re-edited his project. A position that provoked Voltaire’s mocking re-
mark in the parody of a letter by the Chinese Emperor, asking to be a mem-
ber of this so-called ‘universal’ project, which was in fact eurocentric.108
Thus, it is this spirit that Rousseau praises ‘quelques grandes âmes cosmo-
polite’ in his Discours sur l’origine de l’inégalité parmi les hommes (1755):
Le droit civil étant ainsi devenu la règle commune des citoyens,
la loi de nature n’eut plus lieu qu’entre les diverses sociétés où,
sous le nom de droit des gens, elle fut tempérée par quelques
106. Jean-Louis Fougeret de Montbron, Le cosmopolite, ou Le citoyen du monde (Lon-
don: [s.n.], 1753), 3–4.
107. Cloots, Vœux d’un gallophile.
108. Voltaire, ‘Rescrit de l’empereur de Chine à l’occasion du projet de paix perpétuelle’,
in Voltaire : Mélanges, ed. Jacques van den Heuvel, Bibliothèque de la Pléiade (Gallimard,
1961 [1761]), 157–202.
26 introduction
conventions tacites pour rendre le commerce possible et sup-
pléer à la commisération naturelle, qui, perdant de société à
société presque toute la force qu’elle avait d’homme à homme,
ne réside plus que dans quelques grandes âmes cosmopolites
qui franchissent les barrières imaginaires qui séparent les peu-
ples et qui, à l’exemple de l’être souverain qui les a créées, em-
brassent tout le genre humain dans leur bienveillance.109
As for the Academy, it is only in the fourth edition of the dictionnaire
de l’Académie (1762) that the word ‘cosmopolite’ appears, although with a
negative connotation and very close to Voltaire’s definition of patrie: ‘Celui
qui n’adopte point de patrie. Un cosmopolite n’est pas un bon citoyen’.110
From 1760 on, the word has acquired a wide-spread use, also as a syn-
onym to what we would today call ‘transnational’. It is this transnational
dimension that gives a negative dimension to cosmopolitans as citizens. My
contention here is that since political thought moved towards a democratic
republican understanding, a citizen had to ‘love’ his patrie in order for the
Republic to function — as Montesquieu famously argues in L’Esprit des
lois.
According to Montesquieu ‘virtue’ is the principle of a republic, under-
stood as ‘l’amour de la loi et de la patrie’.111 If the cosmopolitan is under-
stood as in Fougeret’s meaning— an individualistic traveller— then he can-
not be a good citizen in a republic since he is likely to lack the virtue neces-
sary for its functionning.
This would explain why Rousseau seemingly ‘changes’ his mind about
these ‘cosmopolitans’ when he writes in Émile, I (1762):
Défiez-vous de ces cosmopolites qui vont chercher loin dans
leurs livres des devoirs qu’ils dédaignent de remplir autour
d’eux. Tel philosophe aime les Tartares, pour être dispensé d’ai-
mer ses voisins.112
However, the use of ‘cosmopolite’ was also positive in tending towards a
position above any identity— the above mentioned philosopher in search
of a universal objective point of view, the truth, on national or interna-
tional matters. One finds several examples of this throughout the century
in pamphlets that seek to re-establish, in the view of their author, the truth
109. Hazard, ‘Cosmopolite’, 358–359.
110. Ibid., 360.
111. Charles-Louis de Secondat baron de La Brède et de Montesquieu, De l’Esprit des
loix, ou du Rapport que les loix doivent avoir avec la constitution de chaque gouvernement,
les moeurs, le climat, la religion, le commerce, &c, 2 vols. (Genève: Chez Barillot, & fils,
1748–1750), Part I, book III, chapter III.
112. Jean-Jacques Rousseau, ‘Émile’, in Œuvres complètes de Jean-Jacques Rousseau, vol. 2:
La Nouvelle Héloı̈ se, Émile (Paris: Houssiaux, A., 1852–1853 [1762]), 401.
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about a social or political matter. In order to do so, they signed the pamph-
let as ‘cosmopolite’ or using other similar names. Explaining this general
phenomenon of ‘cosmopolitan monikers’, Rosenfeld argues that the Re-
public of Letters enabled the existence of some ‘transnational space’ for ex-
pression, in which authors deliberately placed themselves in an unrooted
position:
the idea of political engagement was not yet necessarily de-
pendent on one’s sense of belonging to a distinctive subgroup
of humanity. Rather‚ public action often depended upon the
opposite: deliberate deracination and namelessness on the part
of the individual subject.113
The rhetorical stance is to present oneself both as a singular individual
and as a representative member of a boundaryless community of human-
kind. This served several purposes. It ‘opened up a space for a new kind of
non-nationally-specific political identity and engagement’, and it ‘rendered
feasible a new type of secular political vision outside the related frameworks
of both the nation-state and the locality’.114
In a way, this rhetorical position created a sense of cosmopolitan iden-
tity because of its reference to universal values and characteristics — be it
conceptions of human rights or physical conceptions of the true laws of
morality. Many of the uses of the monikers were associated not only with
a sense of cosmopolitan identity and a-national positioning on political af-
fairs, but also a certain claim of truth. This claim of truth is made possible
by a century seeing morals and politics as a ‘science’ on the same level as the
natural sciences that can be deduced by reason from nature and man. Hu-
mans obey rules of nature, be they physical or moral. By claiming the status
of a ‘cosmopolitan’ speaker or writer, it is possible to assert an alleged uni-
versal truth. However, one has to note that the greatest thinkers of morals
as a science did not use a pseudonym. Those who did use the title ‘cosmo-
polite’ or any other claim to speak for humankind did so with a claim to
philosophical wisdom and truth to make their point, which makes it imme-
diately as suspicious as any company claiming to offer the best product in
the world. This is related to the fact that the word ‘cosmopolite’ at the time
had a dual meaning grammatically, and philosophically. Proof of the suc-
cess of the word, some authors abused it to remain anonymous and exploit
the potential ‘objectivity’ behind the term ‘cosmopolitan’.
For instance, an anonymous pamphlet published around 1750 is simply
entitled Réﬂexions d’un cosmopolite. It starts with this definition of the au-
113. Sophia Rosenfeld, ‘Citizens of Nowhere in Particular: Cosmopolitanism, Writing,
and Political Engagement in Eighteenth-Century Europe’, National Identities 4, no. 1
(2002): 27.
114. Ibid., 32.
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thor, the cosmopolite, thus establishing his trustworthy persona in a rhetor-
ical fashion:
Habitant du Monde entier, & versé un peu dans la connois-
sance des affaires du monde, je suis autant que l’homme le
peut-être, exempt de ces preventions qui influent tirannique-
ment sur les Jugements ; Libre de tous engagements, isolé de
toutes les sortes d’attachements, je ne me passione ny pour, ny
contre aucune Puissance du Monde : je respecte la Personne
des Princes, & crois pouvoir librement loüer ou blâmer les
operations de leurs Ministres selon qu’elles me paroissent al-
ler au bien public, ou s’en écarter ; D’ailleurs j’ay assez leu &
vecu pour entreprendre de parler de bien des évenements di-
vers qui m’ont accoutumé à réfléchir sur les questions de po-
litique. J’avoüe que ces matieres étant souvent de pure specu-
lation, elles peuvent avec plausibilité donner lieu de disputer
in utramque partem ; Cependant il me semble qu’il est en ce
genre comme en tout autre, certaines veritez presque incontes-
tables auxquelles on ne peut pas se refuser, & selon les quelles
il faut rediger ses idées pour ne point tomber dans la fausseté,
l’erreur, ou la vision.115
The self-proclaimed ‘cosmopolite’ is a sort of philosopher in search of truth,
detached from any obligation, any government, power, or culture, and who
ponders questions of interest to the benefit of humankind free from any
interference. The ‘cosmopolite’ travels the world and hence knows about
world politics. Referring to Ciceronian rhetoric, the author argues that he
can take an opponent’s point of view (in utramque partem), anticipate them
in order to refute them in advance. In this sense the ‘cosmopolite’ is a disin-
terested philosopher whose only goal is to reach the truth.
Another example is the Lettre d’un cosmopolite à l’ombre de Calas in
1765.116 The author does not explicitly explain who he is as a ‘cosmopolite’,
but a few elements come out from this short épître. It is a poem dedicated to
the defence of a ‘victim’ of the ‘furors of fanatism’ in the ‘most philosoph-
ical century’, which should scare the ‘reasonable reader’. Calas deserves the
‘truth’ against ‘errors and prejudices’, and his name is to be associated with
the one of Socrates. The point of view taken by the anonymous author is
the one of ‘reason’ in order to debunk ‘truth’ and vanquish ‘errors and pre-
judices’. In this sense, the ‘cosmopolite’ has little to do with the traveller
or the ‘bad citizen’ of the dictionary. The ‘cosmopolite’ is the defender of
truth, armed with reason and philosophy against superstitions, lies, and pre-
115. Reﬂexions d’un cosmopolite (s.l.: s.n., ca. 1750), 1.
116. Bernard-Louis Verlac de La Bastide, Lettre d’un cosmopolite à l’ombre de Calas (s.l.:
s.n., 1765).
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judices. In another letter, which may be from the same author,117 the writer
named ‘cosmopolite’ claims his ‘patriotism and attachment for the sover-
eign’, but also his ‘love for truth and respect for the reader’.118 The author
condemns the ‘injustice’ committed against Joly de Fleury, and against rea-
son. Interestingly, another anonymous pamphlet backing ‘Le cosmopolite’
in his logic and use of reason against ‘sophisms’ was written by ‘un docteur
de la sapience’.119 This ‘docteur de la sapience’ posits a claim to knowledge
regarding all prosecutors and judges in order to denounce their power, and
how they occupy all the three estates.
This is not an isolated case of political discussion on states’ policies. An-
other example, Le caffé politique d’Amsterdam by Pellissery, is a political
pseudo-discussion between a Frenchman, an Englishman, a Dutchman and
a ‘Cosmopolite’ on foreign policy in Europe. In reality the ‘cosmopolite’
serves to deliver Pellissery’s own views, as former French minister, develo-
ped into long self-gratifying soliloquies on the state of affairs in these three
countries.120 In other words, the ‘cosmopolite’ here is not necessarily a genu-
ine philosopher, objective, looking for truth, but he is taking this assumed
narrative claim by calling himself ‘cosmopolite’. This goes to show that this
understanding was already culturally accepted among readers of pamphlets
on state affairs.
This understanding of ‘cosmopolite’ is even taken and confused with the
use of ‘cosmopolisme’ by an anonymous author commenting on the after-
math of the affair between Johann Friedrich Struensee (1737–1772), a Dan-
ish statesman of German origins, and the queen of Denmark Caroline Mat-
ilda (1751–1775), known as ‘of Great Britain’. Struensee was subsequently
arrested and executed. The anonymous author writes to a friend in York,
claiming that he was a visual witness of the event, and expressing his disgust
regarding a pamphlet published against the queen,Mémoires d’une reine in-
fortunée. Although stating that he is Danish and was a witness of the events,
the author claims ‘… mon impartialité par ce Cosmopolisme que m’ont ac-
117. Antoine Alexandre Barbier, Dictionnaire des ouvrages anonymes et pseudonymes,
composés, traduits ou publiés en français et en latin: avec les noms des auteurs, traducteurs et
éditeurs, accompagné de notes historiques et critiques, vol. 2 (Paris: Barrois l’ainé, 1823), 246,
note 9671.
118. Abbé Fardeau, Lettre d’un cosmopolite sur le réquisitoire de M. Joly de Fleury et sur
l’Arrêt du parlement de Paris, du 2 [21] janvier 1764, qui condamne au feu l’Instruction
pastorale de M. l’archevêque de Paris du 28 octobre 1763 (Paris: chez Romain Constant, à
l’image de S.-Athanase, 1765), 4.
119. Abbé Dazès, L’esprit des magistrats philosophes : ou, Lettres ultramontaines, d’un
docteur de la sapience à la Faculté de droit de l’Université de Paris (Tivoli: Chés l’auteur,
1765).
120. Roch Antoine de Pellissery, La caffé politique d’Amsterdam: ou Entretiens familiers
d’un François, d’un Anglois, d’un Hollandois, et d’un cosmopolite, sur les divers intérêts
économiques & politiques de la France, de l’Espagne, & de l’Angleterre (s.l.: s.n., 1778), 211.
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quis mes voyages…’.121 And a little further, the author states: ‘Ce n’est pas
ici le Danois qui va parler, c’est l’homme, et l’homme vrai et impartial, dont
l’unique but est de mettre simplement les choses dans leur propre jour’.122
Cloots uses the term cosmopolite several times with different meanings
related to those above described. Cloots uses as the meaning given in the
definition for ‘cosmopolitain’ — someone for whom the whole world is a
homeland — when stating that Europeans do not want to be French, and
cosmopolitans do not want to be Europeans, implying therefore that ‘cos-
mopolitan’ is related to cultural identities, and a citizen of the world should
not be forced to be European.123 The same meaning juxtaposed to other
‘nationalities’ is to be found elsewhere.124 According to Cloots, his univer-
sal republic should satisfy everyone. Regarding this cosmopolitan identity,
Cloots also notes that the sans-culottes are cosmopolitans as opposed to aris-
tocrats: ‘L’aristocratie est fédéraliste, locale, isolée : la sans-culotterie n’est ni
française, ni anglaise ; elle est cosmopolite, universelle’.125 This is interesting
in the context of federalism in France in 1793; Cloots opposes aristocracy as
‘federalists’ to sans-culottes as ‘cosmopolitans’, meaning not only universal-
ity and unity, but also liberty and equality as an identity above cultural and
local ones— which do not disappear at all, but matter less than the passion-
ate bond of liberty and equality to form the universal republic.
Elsewhere, Cloots uses ‘cosmopolitan’ with the meaning of someone em-
bracing universality and humanity, but the use is also connected to the re-
public, thus making it close to a citizen of the world, or free world to be
exact. Cloots writes about Paris in these terms:
La métropole du monde libre, le point de ralliement du cos-
mopolite, veillera, ainsi que le moindre hameau, sur le main-
tien de l’universalité, sans laquelle point de paix permanente
parmi les hommes : vérité-mère qu’on peindra sur toutes les
bannières de la république !126
Paris is also several times called ‘cosmopole’. Cloots also describes the Na-
tional Assembly and its members as ‘cosmopolitan’: ‘Représentants de la
France, dépositaires de la liberté universelle, législateurs cosmopolites’.127
Cloots expresses here the idea that the French representatives are cosmo-
politan in the sense that they make laws for the whole world, again the free
121. Christian Lovencrone,Lettre d’un Danois impartial au ChevalierMéanwell à Yorke.
En forme de replique à un libelle infame, intitulé Mémoires d’une reine infortunée (Bréda:
chez Pierre Telltruth, 1776), 3.
122. Ibid., 9–10.
123. Cloots, Ecrits révolutionnaires, 443.
124. Ibid., 510.
125. Ibid., 642.
126. Ibid., 177.
127. Cloots, ‘La République universelle’, 251.
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world, as they are the trustees of universal liberty for the time being. Cloots
uses again the expression ‘cosmopolitan legislature’ for the future assembly
of the universal republic.128 By the same token, Cloots mentions ‘l’innocence
cosmopolite’ that had been trampled by so many crimes going unpunished
due to the international system.129 This should no longer be the case in the
universal republic where criminals would have no safe haven to escape to,
and criminal justice would apply everywhere.
Moreover, there is in my view a very important notion that Cloots uses
and is related to how he understands the ‘cosmopolitan’. This notion will
be introduced in the chapter on nature with the opposition of ‘théos’ and
‘cosmos’. Wherever Cloots uses the term cosmos, it is in opposition to théos.130
Moreover, Cloots also mentions the terms ‘théocratie’, ‘théocrate’, and ‘théo-
cratique’ as in ‘système théocratique’, as the system of the ancien régime
portrayed by the revolutionaries: monarchism as a divine representation
of God’s sovereign power on earth. The théos and ‘theocratic system’ is the
religious system based on faith and ‘superstitions’ that goes together with
monarchy. For instance, Cloots binds together ‘universal theocracy’, which
he sees as opposed to reason, with ‘universal monarchy’, which he sees as
opposed to liberty, and then opposes them to the ‘universal republic’.131
The universal republic is thus opposed to universal theocracy and to uni-
versal monarchy, for Cloots. This forms the basis for my argument that
Cloots’s thought should be called cosmopolitan republicanism, with the
understanding of Cloots’s concept of cosmos.Cosmos is nature, the universe,
outside any metaphysical consideration of creation by God.Cosmos is ruled
by laws, which are the laws of nature, physical and moral. It is the task of the
revolution to re-instate the natural order of the cosmos, and respect these
natural laws, which can be scientifically discovered through reason. Cosmos
is nature, science, reason, knowledge, natural law and natural rights, hu-
manity. Théos is God, metaphysics, belief, superstition, arbitrary laws and
the negation of liberty, inhumanity. As Cloots writes: ‘… avec le seul mot
cosmos nous pulvérisons la théocratie…’.132 And this understanding of cos-
mos opposed to théos and of the universal republic opposed to ‘universal
theocracy’ leads us to the question of ‘cosmopolitanism’ and Rémi’s defin-
ition of cosmopolisme.
128. Cloots, Ecrits révolutionnaires, 394.
129. Ibid., 391.
130. Ibid., 177, 251, 306, 495, 496, 642.
131. Anacharsis Cloots, ‘Bases constitutionnelles de la république du genre humain’, in
Écrits révolutionnaires, 1790–1794 (Editions Champ libre, 1979 [1793]), 488.
132. Cloots, Ecrits révolutionnaires, 306.
32 introduction
‘Cosmopolisme’, ‘Cosmopolitisme’
The earliest eighteenth-century record of ‘cosmopolitisme’ I could find is
in a 1756 critique of Rousseau’s Discours sur l’inégalité by Italian mathem-
atician and astronomer Giovanni Francesco Mauro Melchiorre Salvemini
di Castiglione (1708–1791). It is not exactly clear what the author means by
‘cosmopolitisme’ as it is referred to in passing:
Je ne m’arrêterai point à détailler les avantages de la commu-
nauté des biens. Ce sujet a été traité par plusieurs auteurs es-
timables, lesquels l’homme corrompu par les richesses n’a re-
proché qu’une pauvreté vertueuse & un cosmopolitisme trop
profondément raisonné.133
This excerpt is taken from a general discussion about ownership. It seems
that, in this context, this ‘cosmopolitisme’ is a consideration about the gen-
eral equality among men in the state of nature, which would justify a ‘com-
munity of goods’ to some philosophers, against whom even a corrupt man
would only reproach a ‘virtuous poverty’ and a ‘too deeply reasoned cos-
mopolitanism’. It may be a direct reference to Rousseau’s mention of ‘les
grandes âmes cosmopolites’ as quoted below in hisDiscours sur l’inégalité.134
In a medical book written in 1775 about bathing waters, the authors write
the expression ‘cosmopolitisme’ in italics because it did not exist in the dic-
tionary, in order to describe the action of travelling. The authors warn
against the potential risks of excessive travelling and lack of any restraint
in experiencing new things, as the exact opposite of the fears, superstitions
and restraints of the past, which surrounded the use of bath waters and pre-
vented medical research to see their benefits on health. ‘Notre liberté, notre
fureur d’aller, notre cosmopolitisme en tout genre, peuvent devenir excessifs
& entraîner bien des inconvéniens’.135
The word ‘cosmopolitisme’ with the meaning of a conscious understand-
ing of a political project for the world only appears in 1799, in several works
linking the French Revolution with conspiracy theories. French journalist
Jacques Mallet du Pan (1749–1800), who defended the royalist cause not-
ably in Mercure de France, emigrated to England where he continued the
133. Johann von Castillon, Discours sur l’origine de l’inegalité parmi les hommes : Pour
servir de réponse au Discours que M. Rousseau, citoyen de Géneve, a pub. sur le même sujet
(Amsterdam: Chez J. F. Jolly, 1756), 164.
134. Jean-Jacques Rousseau,Discours sur l’origine et les fondemens de l’inégalité parmi les
hommes (Amsterdam: Chez Marc-Michel Rey, 1755), 138–139.
135. Théophile de Bordeu, Antoine de Bordeu and François de Bordeu, Recherches sur
les maladies chroniques, leurs rapports avec les maladies aiguës, leurs périodes, leur nature,
et sur la manière dont on les traite aux eaux minérales de Barèges et des autres sources de
l’Aquitaine, vol. 1, Contenant la théorie générale des maladies et l’analyse médicinale du
sang (Paris: Ruault, 1775), 65.
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publication retitled Mercure britannique. He uses the expression ‘cosmo-
politisme’ to describe the process of exchanges around the world between
nations.136 Mallet du Pan’s argument, when using this expression, is that the
eighteenth century saw a rise in exchanges of communication, movements
of goods and people, access to education, science and philosophy, and distri-
bution of wealth among the population that led to new social distinctions.
It is not to contest the progress of philosophy, but the French Revolution
and its republicanism that Mallet du Pan uses the term ‘cosmopolitisme’;
what he contests is that the revolution was a destruction of the ancien ré-
gime, when it was rather a displacement to a different elite in power.
In the other two works, the word ‘cosmopolitisme’ is used as designat-
ing a political thought. In the 1799 French translation of Scottish physicist
and mathematician John Robison’s (1739–1805) book Proofs of a Conspir-
acy, published in 1797, the term ‘cosmopolitisme’ is used five times in this
translation of the original ‘cosmopolitism’ in a negative sense: ‘Milles faits
semblables prouvent que la semence du cosmopolitisme licencieux avait
pris de forte racines, & que quoiqu’on eut souvent fauché cette plante perni-
cieuse on ne l’avait nullement arrachée’.137 Again, later in the book Robison
writes: ‘Il n’est point douteux que les Illuminés & d’autres sociétés cosmo-
politiques n’ayent beaucoup contribué à opérer la Révolution Française, ou
du moins à l’accélérer’.138 The author notes how a certain foreigner named
‘Campe, Illuminé’ participated in the early days of the revolution by prais-
ing the revolutionaries of their ‘… vrai cosmopolitisme…’.139 Again later, the
sect ‘Les chevaliers du soleil’ and their ‘cosmopolitisme universel’.140 Of
course, the whole conspiracy of cosmopolitanism would have been nothing
without Cloots, ‘un des apôtres les plus fanatiques du cosmopolitisme’:
Il s’abandonna tout d’un coup aux plus grandes extravagances,
& ne parla plus d’autre langue que le jargon de l’Illumination.
Citoyen du monde— liberté & égalité— les droits imprescrip-
tibles de l’homme — la morale, la chère morale — les Rois &
les Prêtres des êtres inutiles, n’étant que des despotes & des
corrupteurs &c. &c.141
And most importantly, German philosopher and founder of the Order of
the Illuminati, Johann Adam Weishaupt (1748–1830) ‘zélé du cosmopolit-
isme’. To Robison, cosmopolitanism is thus the doctrine of the Illuminati,
136. Jacques Mallet du Pan, Mercure britannique; ou, Notices historiques et critiques sur
les affaires du tems, vol. 4, 25–31 (London: W. et C. Spilsbury, 1799), 461.
137. John Robison, Preuves de conspirations contre toutes les religions et tous les gouverne-
ments de l’Europe, ourdies dans les assemblées secrètes des Illuminés, des francs-maçons et
des sociétés de lecture, vol. 2 (London: J. Cadell & Davies, 1799), 7.
138. Ibid., 111.
139. Ibid., 112.
140. Ibid., 128.
141. Ibid., 176–177.
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based on liberty and equality and destined to be spread everywhere since
the French Revolution by some ‘citizens of the world’.
The French publicist and Jesuit priest Abbé Augustin Barruel (1741–
1820) also develops his conspiracy theory about the French Revolution, and
the ‘Jacobins illuminés’, who had disciples throughout Europe. Concerning
Prussia he writes:
Enfin en Allemagne, il est une autre espèce de Jacobins, qui
font aujourd’hui les plus grands progrès. Ceux-ci sont les dis-
ciples du Dieu Kant, sorti de ses ténèbres & du chaos de ses
cathégories, pour nous dévoiler les mystères de son soi-disant
Cosmopolitisme.142
A satirical caricature follows of Kant’s thought as developed in Die Idee
zu einer allgemeinen Geschichte in weltbürgerlicher Absicht, from a transla-
tion into French published in Spectateur du Nord in April 1798. In partic-
ular, Barruel mocks Kant’s idea of replacing all European monarchies with
republics.
A word that appears in parallel with ‘cosmopolitisme’ is ‘cosmopolisme’,
which had equally two meanings attached to it. The relation between trav-
elling, the act of ‘cosmopoliter’, and potential health risks are reiterated with
the expresion ‘cosmopolisme’ as the psychological condition of confused
identity that the all too frequent traveller would fall victim of:
Cosmopolisme. Il faut aimer un lieu ; l’oiseau lui-même qui
a en partage le domaine des airs, affectionne tel creux d’arbre
ou de rocher. Celui qui est atteint de Cosmopolisme, est privé
des plus doux sentimens qui appartiennent au cœur de l’hom-
me.
Qui croirait que l’on peut exercer à Paris le Cosmopolisme, en-
core mieux que dans le reste de l’univers.
Cosmopoliter. Parcourir l’univers.143
However, this use does not have anything to do with a philosophical
and political conception of cosmopolitanism, but it may explain the rejec-
tion towards it since the action of cosmopolitanism is perceived as a dis-
ease. In another work similar to the above mentioned ones on cosmopol-
itisme, a ‘citoyen J. Lachapelle’ wrote some Considérations philosophiques
sur la révolution française, in which Cloots is mentioned for his ‘cosmopol-
isme ridicule’.144 The author is not sympathetic to Cloots and accumulates
142. Augustin Barruel, Mémoires pour servir à l’histoire du jacobinisme, vol. 4 (Ham-
bourg: Chez P. Fauche, 1799), 245.
143. Louis-Sébastien Mercier,Néologie ou vocabulaire de mots nouveaux, à renouveler, ou
pris dans des acceptions nouvelles, vol. 1 (Paris: Moussard ; Maradan, 1801), 131.
144. J. Lachappelle,Considérations philosophiques sur la Révolution Française (Paris: Chez
l’Auteur. Et chez Fuchs, Benoist, Deroi, Paris, Belin, 1797), 181.
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false statements about him, some of which have already been mentioned
above (‘intolerant atheism’, ‘foreigner’, ‘possessed’). It is not explicit what
is meant by ‘cosmopolisme’, but it comes with the mention of Cloots’s ‘uni-
versal republic’ and Paris as capital of the world.
The first formulated conception of cosmopolitanism written explicitly
in an -ism form is Le cosmopolisme by Joseph-Honoré Rémi (1738–1782),
priest in Toul, Meurthe-et-Moselle, and lawyer at the Parlement de Paris.
Rémi participated to the first volume on ‘Jurisprudence’ of theEncyclopédie
méthodique, project which was meant as an extension to Diderot and d’A-
lembert’s Encyclopédie.145 Le cosmopolisme is a pamphlet that Rémi wrote
on the occasion of the wedding of Louis XVI. There are several relevant
excerpts for cosmopolism, which I will here quote and comment:
Pourquoi le Cosmopolisme est-il donc si rare sous cette pla-
nette ? A peine a-t-il un sens parmi nous : la plupart de nos
langues si riches en mots honteux & barbares, n’ont rien qui
peigne les premiers sentimens de l’homme social. Un sourire
risiblement dédaigneux est la récompense de quiconque ose
parler d’humanité aux nations. Noble & touchante humanité !
à ton foyer s’allume & s’épure dans nos ames le feu sacré des
vertus privées & des vertus politiques (6) ; mais on t’abandon-
ne, on te méprise, on t’insulte avec orgueil, on encense d’odieux
Simulacres, & tes temples sont déserts. Nous avons des Maîtres
pour enseigner à nos enfans les langues des nations qui n’exis-
tent plus ; en est-il un seul destiné à leur apprendre celle de la
nature ?146
The endnote (6) is explained later in the book with a quotation of Féne-
lon:
(N°.6.)Page 25. « J’aime mieux ma famille que moi-même ; j’ai-
me mieux ma patrie que ma famille ; mais j’aime encore mieux
le genre humain que ma famille [sic: patrie] ». Telle étoit la
morale de ce Fénélon, qui dans une Cour où l’égoïsme natio-
nal étoit honoré des plus glorieux titres, osa prêcher éloquem-
ment le Cosmopolisme, & érigea à l’humanité un monument
digne du siécle de l’Encyclopédie. Le sentiment associé à la rai-
son, n’a jamais rien produit d’aussi noble & d’aussi attendris-
sant que le Télémaque.147
145. s.n., Encyclopédie méthodique. Jurisprudence, vol. 1 (Paris: Chez Panckoucke, 1782).
146. Joseph-Honoré Rémi, Le cosmopolisme, publié à Londres à l’occasion du mariage de
Louis-Auguste, Dauphin de France (Amsterdam, Paris: Chez Valade, 1770), 24–25.
147. Ibid., 73–74.
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‘Cosmopolism’ is, for Rémi, related to the ‘first sentiments of social man’,
which is to say that when man in the state of nature meets another man, he
experiences a feeling, which is one of humanity for meeting with another
human being. This feeling of humanity is about recognising one another
as members of the same species, the same community of human beings.
Rémi juxtaposes thus this feeling of love towards humanity, ‘cosmopolism’,
to another feeling, negative this one, of egoism towards one’s nation. Na-
tion should here be understood as ‘state’, or more rightly ‘kingdom’. This
‘national egoism’ proclaims the superiority of advancing national interest
at the cost of human interest. What Rémi alludes to here with ‘national
egoism’ are the wars led by Louis XIV in the name of absolutism, whose
policies Fénelon criticised. This feeling of humanity, for Rémi, warrants
virtues— ‘private virtues’, and ‘political virtues’. According to the diction-
ary, virtue is a disposition of the soul to do good and avoid evil.148 So, for
Rémi, ‘cosmopolism’ is the doctrine of doing what is good and avoiding
what is bad for humanity, both in the private and public (political) spheres.
Fénelon is cited as a leading figure of this movement of thought with his
work Telemachus, combining sentiment and reason, that is to say human-
ity as a feeling and a rational argument for the love of other fellow human
beings in the world.Telemachus is ‘worthy of the century of theEncyclopae-
dia’, the work of reference for reason.149 This may be for Rémi a reference
to how Telemachus, in the novel, fights morally, thanks to his wisdom, the
excess of passions — both his and others’ — that leads kings to wars and
destroys the lives of his and other’s peoples. Mentor helps him throughout,
but leaves him with the freedom of choice over his actions, and the novel is
therefore perceived as an ode to liberty.150
The reference to Télémaque in a pamphlet published for the wedding
of Louis XVI, who was then fifteen, is certainly a way of hoping that the
young king will follow the pedagogical advice set in the book that Féne-
lon intended for the education of the dauphin of France, Louis Duke of
Burgundy (1682–1712). In search of his father, Telemachus goes to hell and
visits Tartarus where he sees bad kings agonising; he then visits the Elysian
Fields, where good kings, who govern their people wisely, rest in bliss.151
Telemachus was considered a work of ‘republican monarchism’ because it
148. Dictionnaire de l’Académie Française, 4th ed. (Paris: Chez la Veuve B. Brunet, 1762),
2: 927.
149. François de Salignac de La Mothe- Fénelon,Les avantures de Télémaque, ﬁls d’Ulysse,
1st ed., 2 vols. (Paris: Chez Jacques Estienne, 1717).
150. See: Charles Dédéyan,Télémaque ou la liberté de l’esprit (Paris: Nizet, 1991); François-
Xavier Cuche, Le Télémaque de Fénelon entre père et mer (Paris: Honoré Champion,
1994).
151. Fénelon, Télémaque, vol.2 book XIX, 395.
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‘combines monarchial rule with republican virtues’.152 It is a ‘classical repub-
licanism’ that Fénelon develops in Telemachus, that is to say republican vir-
tues from Ancient Greece and Rome. These republican virtues are the in-
terest for the common good and disinterest for riches, or selfish and artifi-
cial gains and rewards by the court. In general the ‘country’ is opposed to
the ‘court’ in classical republicanism, as noted by Pocock.153 In Telemachus,
Fénelon displays similar ‘classical republican’ virtues. Bétique (Boetica in
English) is a country described in book seven. There, the inhabitants are
free and equal, live in accordance with nature, and are disinterested in the
amounts of gold and silver that abound since they would not be of any use
for the common good or can even provoke corruption. Edelstein’s interpret-
ation of Boetica is that it is not an ‘utopian’ place in the same sense as More’s
Utopiaor Bacon’sNewAtlantisbecause it is meant to be an example for con-
temporary society, and is not thought in isolation but with international
contacts and with the prospect of perpetual peace.154 Moreover, Edelstein
argues that it is a republican state because the basic political structure is par-
ticipative, the inhabitants are free and equal, they are ready to fight to de-
fend their liberty, and they shun luxury and corruption in favour of peace,
union, and liberty, by wisely using their ‘right reason’.155
Considering Rémi’s argument, it seems that a relevant passage in Féne-
lon’s Télémaque is in book 9, when Mentor adresses various Greek kings
after they decided to make peace and avoid waging war:
Tout le genre humain n’est qu’une famille dispersée sur la face
de toute la terre. Tous les peuples sont freres, & doivent s’aimer
comme tels. Malheur à ces impies qui cherchent une gloire
cruelle dans le sang de leurs freres, qui est leur propre sang.
La guerre est quelquefois nécessaire, il est vrai : mais c’est la
honte du genre humain qu’elle soit inévitable en certaines oc-
casions. … Quiconque préfére sa propre gloire aux sentimens
de l’humanité, est un monstre d’orgueil, & non pas un hom-
me : il ne parviendra même qu’à une fausse gloire ; car la vraye
gloire ne se trouve que dans la modération & dans la bonté.156
152. Patrick Riley, ‘Fénelon’s “Republican” Monarchism in Telemachus’, chap. 4 inMon-
archism in theAge of Enlightenment: Liberty, Patriotism, and the CommonGood, ed. John
Christian Laursen Hans Blom and Luisa Simonutti (Toronto: University of Toronto Press,
2007), 78.
153. J. G. A. Pocock, The Machiavellian Moment: Florentine Political Thought and the
Atlantic Republican Tradition, with a foreword by Richard Whatmore, Princeton Classics
(Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press, 2016 [1975]), 401-422.
154. Dan Edelstein,The Terror of Natural Right: Republicanism, the Cult of Nature, and
the French Revolution (Chicago, IL: University of Chicago Press, 2009), 58.
155. Ibid., 59–60.
156. Fénelon, Télémaque, 1: 230.
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Shortly after, Mentor suggests that the Greek kings meet in an assembly
every three years to renew their alliance and discuss matters of common in-
terest. Mentor emphasises that being united is the only way to make Greece
prosper inside and stronger outside.157 In other words, Mentor suggests that
the kings organise a sort of commonwealth or res publica.
Fénelon makes another direct reference to a ‘universal republic’ in book
17. Mentor advises king Idoménée of how to settle an international dispute
between him and another king using arbitration. Mentor then takes a hypo-
thetical example of a republic that the king would consider with horror if
there were no laws and no legal institutions, but where each family would
use violence against their neighbours to make their own justice, and asks
Idoménée rhetorically:
croyez-vous que les Dieux regardent avec moins d’horreur le
monde entier, qui est la République universelle, si chaque
peuple qui n’y est que comme une grande famille, se croit en
plein droit de se faire par violence justice à soi-même sur toutes
ses prétentions contre les autres peuples voisins?158
Through Mentor, Fénelon argues for a ‘universal republic’, which does not
mean a world state with a republican democratic government, but a state of
law in international affairs, the same way there is a state of law inside a given
‘republic’. It is an argument against absolutism in that Fénelon emphasises
that kings are not above the law, not even regarding internal state affairs.
Fénelon’s argument is as much the need for legal settlement in international
affairs — and thereby the reduction of wars — as it is the observation that
the human race is one ‘family’ and therefore ought to be under a common
law.
To Rémi, cosmopolisme is associated with the language of nature, of the
very first feelings that men had when becoming social creatures. In other
words, in the golden age of the state of nature before the social contract was
formed, as described in natural law theories:
Cet heureux sentiment que la Nature inspire aux Individus de
même espece ; Instinct sacré dont le Législateur des Chrétiens
voulut faire un mérite à l’homme, en l’érigeant en vertu, & la
plaçant à la tête de son code immortel ; la Fraternité combat-
tue par les maximes de l’intolérance, & avilie par le fanatisme
du zèle, n’a commencée à rentrer dans ses droits que depuis la
renaissance des Lettres. Elle doit la gloire dont elle jouit, aux ef-
forts des Cosmopolites. Ramenée par eux dans l’Europe, sous
les noms de Bienveillance & d’Humanité, cette vertu pourra
157. Fénelon, Télémaque, 1: 231.
158. Ibid., 2: 483–484.
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s’annoncer à nos neveux comme la fille du malheur & de la
Philosophie.159
Fraternity— the feeling of being related and belonging to the same fam-
ily— is a natural instinct that God— the legislator for Christians— inscri-
bed as the first and most important law. Rémi is here referring to love as
God’s law, particularly love towards fellow man: ‘you shall love your neigh-
bour as yourself’.160 Rémi then goes on to argue that intolerance and fanat-
icism have been the enemies of fraternity, and it is only with the ‘renaissance
of letters’ and the ‘efforts of the cosmopolites’ that fraternity was brought
back. There is no doubt that Rémi refers here to the Republic of Letters,
and the fight by ‘la petite troupe des philosophes’ led by Voltaire against reli-
gious intolerance, revealed religions, and in favour of humanitarian consid-
erations. It is also exactly the same meaning of the word ‘cosmopolites’ that
Rousseau used when writing about ‘quelques grandes âmes cosmopolites’,
as seen above.161 Rémi writes about the same as Rousseau: state wars that
entail murders and other atrocities that are revolting to reason and nature,
and that, nonetheless, are rewarded with the highest state honours. It is in
that sense that Rémi concludes that this virtue of fraternity, which the cos-
mopolites brought back in Europe under the names of ‘benevolence’ and
‘humanity’, is the ‘daughter’ of ‘misery’ and ‘philosophy’. The ‘cosmopol-
ites’, the philosophers, reflected upon the calamities of wars due to ‘national
egoism’, to produce works of morality and ethics for humankind.
I think that there are several elements that can be taken from Rémi’s writ-
ings on what seems to constitute cosmopolism for him: nature, humanity,
reason, sentiment, the Encyclopaedia, liberty, fraternity, individuality, be-
longing to the same human species, a sense of equality, and elements of
classical republicanism. ‘Cosmopolism’, for Rémi, is the doctrine that ‘cos-
mopolites’ professed, that is to say the rationally argumented natural feel-
ing of fraternity among individuals because they belong to the same species
against any divisive passions or thoughts, such as national egoism, intoler-
ance, or fanaticism.
Regarding Cloots, there is no record showing that he had read or knew
this work. However, Cloots cites Fénelon several times as one of the great
thinkers, and in particular his Télémaque once.162 There are many similarit-
ies between Cloots’s system and Rémi’s ‘cosmopolisme’; most importantly,
the emphasis on humanity and the human race as a single species on the
planet, reason, and nature.
159. Rémi, Le cosmopolisme, 19–20.
160. Matthew 22:39.
161. Jean-Jacques Rousseau,Discours sur l’origine et les fondemens de l’inegalité parmi les
hommes (Dresde: Chez Marc-Michel Rey, 1755), 101.
162. Anacharsis Cloots, ‘Résumé historique de la révolution française’, in Écrits révolu-
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If in Rémi’s view, there is sufficient material to form an -ism out of cos-
mopolitan views on the international order, this does not mean that there
was a widely accepted view that ‘cosmopolisme’ actually existed. As Mer-
cier’s Néologie, ou vocabulaire des mots nouveaux shows, ‘cosmopolisme’
was a new word even as late as 1801. It is not possible to ascertain historically
a fixed understanding of ‘cosmopolisme’ or ‘cosmopolitisme’ in the eight-
eenth century. It is however possible to witness in eighteenth-century writ-
ings the rise of a philosophical consciousness of cosmopolitanism. Rémi’s
general cosmopolitan sympathy is however not offering any concrete sys-
tem to achieving this goal, besides an appeal to the king’s good will in for-
eign affairs, and a prayer to God to enlighten kings.163
Cloots himself uses the word ‘cosmopolisme’ in a speech at the Conven-
tion on 17 November 1793: ‘Je dois à mes voyages continuels, à mon cos-
mopolisme indépendant, d’avoir échappé à la vengeance des tyrans sacrés et
profanes’.164 Cloots does not use the word in the same sense as Rémi does,
and it seems to be related with the act of travelling in Mercier’s understand-
ing. However, it has to be taken in the context of the whole speech. The
paragraph preceding was a plea by Cloots for the Convention to circulate
his Certitude, which the Assembly had cancelled on the recommendation
of the bishop of Calvados. Cloots then reminds his audience of how philo-
sophy, by attacking revealed religion, sowed on fertile grounds in France
and gave rise to the revolution. Cloots then argues that he was a part of
this philosophical movement before the revolution with his books, faithful
to his own motto ‘veritas atque libertas’ (‘truth and freedom’), which, he
claims, his enemies did not forgive him. But thanks to his travels, his ‘in-
dependant cosmopolism’, he escaped prison in Paris and death in Lisbon.
Finally, the revolution broke out and allowed Cloots to come back and live
in his
élément naturel ; car c’est la liberté, non le lieu, qui fait le ci-
toyen, comme l’a fort bien dit Brutus et comme l’a très fort
oublié votre rapporteur sur la loi contre les étrangers. Et moi
aussi, j’ai eu l’ingratitude d’oublier mon berceau natal, pour
ne songer qu’au berceau de la République universelle, si tou-
tefois c’est oublier son pays natal que de propager les lumières
dans le chef-lieu du globe.165
We can see several elements of Rémi’s understanding of ‘cosmopolisme’ in
the semantical context of Cloots’s mention of ‘cosmopolisme’: truth and li-
berty, the idead that liberty is what makes a citizen and not the country,
reference to classical republicanism. Cloots, however, does not have an ex-
plicit awareness that his political ‘system’, which I will present in this thesis,
163. Rémi, Le cosmopolisme, 64.
164. Cloots, Ecrits révolutionnaires, 617.
165. Ibid., 618.
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is a cosmopolitan system, that is related to cosmopolitanism as Rémi for-
mulated it. It needs therefore to be proven, which this thesis will attempt.
It would be interesting to continue this history of the uses of the terms
‘cosmopolitisme’ and ‘cosmopolisme’ in the nineteenth century and exam-
ine the correlation between royalists and republicans vis-à-vis their concep-
tions of cosmopolitanism. However, the study must stop here. After the
revolution the term is used by opponents of the revolution as a derogative
term. Also, the use of the word ‘cosmopolisme’ tends to disappear through-
out the nineteenth century leaving only ‘cosmopolitisme’.
This present study shows that cosmopolitanism as a political thought
was a vague ideal that few authors uttered explicitly with this word during
the eighteenth-century. It was however identified as the philosophy uttered
by the ‘cosmopolites’, that is philosophers in the Republic of Letters, who
pondered questions of tolerance and peace between nations. From Rémi’s
pamphlet, one may tease out several themes attached to this ‘cosmopolism’:
nature, humanity, reason and science, moral and ethics from antiquity,
and nature. After the revolution, several authors attached cosmopolitanism
to the revolution itself as a political project. Although, these are negative
views, they show an understanding of the French Revolution as a cosmo-
politan project. Cloots is identified as one of its central proponents. But
only Rémi’s writings seem to offer a guide as to what one should under-
stand as eighteenth-century French cosmopolitanism. These themes will
guide this present study of Cloots: science and reason, nature and natural
law, humanity, and republicanism.
conclusion: cosmopolitan republicanism
This thesis argues that Cloots formed part of what can be labelled ‘cosmo-
politan republicanism’, which is the term used explicitly by Cheneval and
Cavallar, and implicitly by Bevilacqua. However, unlike them, this thesis
will provide a precise understanding of what is to be understood as ‘cosmo-
politan’ and what form of ‘republicanism’ Cloots expressed.
Kant is still today considered the main figure of modern Western cosmo-
politanism, not Cloots, nor any other revolutionaries such as Condorcet
or Thomas Paine.166 This may be so because historians and political theor-
ists take for granted that if one speaks of ‘cosmopolitan’ or ‘citizen of the
world’, one ought to be speaking of cosmopolitanism. Kant used the expres-
sion ‘Weltbürgerrecht’ or ‘law of world citizenship’.167 But is that enough to
166. See for instance a critique of the ‘mainstream’ historical account of cosmopolitan-
ism from the Stoics and culminating with Kant in Gilbert Leung, ‘A Critical History of
Cosmopolitanism’,Law, Culture and the Humanities 5, no. 3 (September 2009): 370–390.
167. Immanuel Kant, Zum ewigen Frieden. Ein philosophischer Entwurf (Königsberg:
bey Friedrich Nicolovius, 1795), 40–46.
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qualify as a theory of cosmopolitanism? On the other hand, Cloots used
sporadically the expressions ‘citizen of the world’ or ‘cosmopolite’, and once
‘cosmopolisme’; is that why so few have been interested in studying Cloots as
a figure of cosmopolitanism rather than Kant? This is rather curious given
the relative brevity of Zum ewigen Frieden compared to how more theor-
etically developed Cloots’s ‘system’ is in three works of roughly the same
length —L’orateur du genre humain, La république universelle, Bases con-
stitutionnelles de la république du genre humain.168 Another reason why
Cloots may not have been studied as a figure of cosmopolitanism may also
have to do with him writing pamphlets and deliberately choosing a non-
academic style of writing in order to reach a wider audience.
Recently, however, the influence of French philosophers— Rousseau in
particular—and the French Revolution on Kant’s thought has been a topic
of investigation.169 Indeed, during the French Revolution, and inspired by
French philosophers, another important tradition that focused on individu-
als as sovereigns rather than states developed in Paris during the French Re-
volution with ‘cosmopolitan republicanism’. This intellectual movement
has not been much researched by historians, although contemporary polit-
ical theorists try to develop it.170
While other studies were limited to articles or chapter-size analyses, this
thesis is the first in-depth analysis of the political thought of Anacharsis
Cloots. In order to do so this study is adopting a contextualist approach, as
developed by Skinner.171 The aim of the thesis is to situate Cloots’s political
thought within the intellectual context in which it was formed. To what
debates in moral and political philosophy did Cloots contribute? What
did Cloots do when he wrote? What was Cloots’s overall political ‘system’?
What did Cloots mean by ‘nation of the human race’? What did he mean
by ‘republic of the united individuals’? What was he doing when he called
himself ‘Orator of the human race’?
168. Anacharsis Cloots, L’orateur du genre-humain, ou, Dépêche du Prussien Cloots, au
Prussien Hertzberg (Paris: Desenne, 1791); Anacharsis Cloots, La république universelle;
ou, Adresse aux tyrannicides (Paris: Chez les marchands de nouveautés, 1792); Anacharsis
Cloots, Bases constitutionnelles de la république du genre humain (Paris: De l’imprimerie
nationale, 1793).
169. Reidar Maliks, Kant’s Politics in Context (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2014);
Georg Cavallar, Kant’s Embedded Cosmopolitanism: History, Philosophy, and Education
for World Citizens (Boston, MA: De Gruyter, 2015).
170. James Bohman, ‘Cosmopolitan Republicanism: Citizenship, Freedom, and Global
Political Authority’,Monist 84, no. 1 (January 2001): 3–21; James Bohman, ‘Cosmopolitan
Republicanism and the Rule of Law’, chap. 2 inLegal Republicanism: National and Inter-
national Perspectives, ed. Samantha Besson and José Luis Martı́ (Oxford: Oxford Univer-
sity Press, 2009), 60–77; Cécile Laborde, ‘Republicanism and Global Justice’, European
Journal of Political Theory 9, no. 1 (2010): 48–69.
171. Skinner, Visions of Politics 1.
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Studying Cloots is not only interesting because he has been overlooked,
and his thought has not been closely analysed; it is also interesting because
his conception of ‘universal republic’ sheds light on why republicanism,
otherwise considered an antiquated concept, came to be used for large na-
tions.
The reader will be led through several contexts of philosophical and polit-
ical debates after introducing a short biography of Cloots in the first chapter,
and a presentation of his works in the second. The next two chapters present
the context of self-fashioning and rhetoric, then truth and science, in order
to explain his self-proclaimed title of ‘Orator of the human race’, why he
referred to classical authors and tropes, and why he claimed the universal-
ity of his principles. The next chapter examines the main key context of
eighteenth-century political thought: natural law. This chapter considers
the question of God, materialism, and nature in discussions regarding the
legitimate sovereign. These questions lead to a parallel in the next chapter
on the nature of humankind and individuality for explaining Cloots’s em-
phasis on the individual as the sole political unit, and the human race as the
sole political group. Finally, the context of republicanism will be addressed
in the last chapter, in order to explain how there can be a ‘universal repub-
lic’. The thesis argues that Cloots was the main defender of what I call a
‘cosmopolitan republicanism’ in the French Revolution. This ‘cosmopol-
itan republicanism’ is a variant of what Edelstein identified as ‘natural re-
publicanism’ among the Jacobins.172 The concluding chapter presents why
Cloots’s political thought should be considered ‘cosmopolitan republican-
ism’ and what it entailed.
172. Edelstein, The Terror of Natural Right.

1 T H E L I F E O F C L O O T S
Citizens of the jury, enter!
Sit down. Take off your coats.
Men, I am Jean Baptiste du Val
De Grace, Baron de Cloots.
Citizens of the jury, enter!
Sit down. Take off your boots.
I think you have known me better
As Anacharsis Cloots.
You pale… No, you don’t pale.
What, no one? Ah, Posterity,
What crimes I’ve committed in your name!
What crimes! And you’ve forgiven me?
Ah so! Not even some anecdotes?
But out there, the Republic’s flag still floats.
Well floated, floater! next world, I raise goats…
To have bawled through life’s long witenagemots,
To have ground the axes for a hundred throats,
To have traded friends for jobs, and trust for votes—
This is to die in life, and live in footnotes.1
Randall Jarell’s poem epitomises three characteristics of Cloots. Firstly,he is forgotten by history, he ‘live[s] in footnotes’. Secondly, when he
is not forgotten, his reputation precedes him as a not so commendable fig-
ure. And thirdly, should his name be pronounced Cloots as in coats, or Clo-
ots as in boots? Actually, being a Dutch name, it should be the former. Also,
it must be noted that the name Cloots is not affiliated to the Yiddish klots
that gave klutz in North American English, meaning an awkward, clumsy,
and foolish person— despite, what Cloots’s detractors may think of him.
Cloots is, nowadays, not a well-known figure; he was more famous in the
nineteenth century. His name has been forgotten, even if, rather curiously,
it survived in the world of French indie punk-rock music as a band decided
to name itself ‘Anacharsis Cloots’.2
1. Randall Jarell, probably 1941, Stephen Burt, ‘Two Poems by Randall Jarrell’, The
New York Review of Books, December 2002,
2. See http://www.youtube.com/watch?v=x34VFxqy_9A. Last accessed 29 January
2017.
45
46 the life of cloots
One of the consequences, or reasons, of this posthumous anonymity is
the numerous epithets wrongly attached to his name. ‘Utopian’, Cloots,
who admired Machiavelli and saw in him a guide for ministers of State: ‘Un
Etat ne saurait faire vie qui dure sans la science du profond Machiavel’ in
Chronique de Paris, 27 July 1791.3 Cloots had also stated the following ‘real-
ist’ view on politics: ‘Il suffit de connaître les éléments de la politique, pour
ne pas ignorer que la morale y est étrangère’.4 ‘Mad’ or ‘insane’, the author
of a thick and erudite first book compiling all the eighteenth century’s liter-
ature on the question of religion, and hammering home his argument, not
without a certain sense of humour and derision?
There is no space here for an exhaustive biography of Anacharsis Cloots,
and this is not the subject of this study either. Two excellent biographies are
already dedicated to Cloots’s life, and I will here only highlight the most im-
portant moments.5 While Mortier’s biography has the quality of being well-
written and amusingly narrated, a thorough referencing of sources is some-
times lacking. Labbé’s work is a good supplement and contains systematic
referencing as well as a comprehensive analysis of Cloots and where he lived.
Indeed, this text actually empirically verifies many of Mortier’s assertions.
There are also a few ‘portraits’ of Cloots in works of biographical refer-
ence.6 Cheneval, who wrote on the history of cosmopolitanism, studied in
particular Cloots’s ‘cosmopolitan republicanism’ with some biographical
elements, as mentioned previously.7 A book chapter on Cloots as the other
‘citoyen du monde’ appeared in a study on Thomas Paine.8 There was a
book published on the occasion of an exhibition on Cloots in Cleves.9 Ad-
3. François Labbé, Anacharsis Cloots, le Prussien francophile (Paris: L’Harmattan,
1999), 107, footnote 213.
4. Anacharsis Cloots, ‘L’Orateur du genre humain, ou, Dépêche du Prussien Cloots
au Prussien Hertzberg’, in Ecrits révolutionnaires, 1790–1794 (Paris: Editions Champ libre,
1979 [1791]), 108.
5. Labbé,Anacharsis Cloots; Roland Mortier,Anacharsis Cloots, ou, L’utopie foudroyée
(Paris: Stock, 1995).
6. Albert Soboul,Portraits de révolutionnaires (Paris: Messidor, Editions sociales, 1986);
Claude Manceron and Anne Manceron, La Révolution française : dictionnaire biogra-
phique (Paris: Renaudot, 1989), 165–67.
7. Francis Cheneval, Philosophie in weltbürgerlicher Bedeutung. Über die Entstehung
und die philosophischen Grundlagen des supranationalen und kosmopolitischen Denkens
der Moderne (Basel: Schwabe, 2002); Cheneval, ‘Der kosmopolitische Republikanismus’;
Francis Cheneval, La Cité des peuples : Mémoires de cosmopolitismes (Paris: Cerf, 2005).
8. Madeleine Rebérioux, ‘Anacharsis Cloots, l’autre citoyen du monde’, in Thomas
Paine, citoyen du monde, ed. Georges Kantin and la Ligue des Droits de l’Homme (Pa-
ris: Creaphis, 1990), 31–44.
9. Bernd Schminnes, ed., Anacharsis Cloots: der Redner des Menschengeschlechts
(Kleve: Boss, 1988).
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ditional short biographical elements in relation to Cloots’s political thought
have been published recently.10
Cloots had a tragic destiny. His uncompromising truthfulness to his own
ideals and ideas led him to a certain death under the reign of terror. Born a
Prussian aristocrat, and inheriting his father’s fortune at the age of twelve,
he could have lived the life of a high civil servant in the Prussian bureaucracy
under the ‘Enlightened despot’ Frederick the Great, whom he admired be-
fore the French Revolution. But he had intellectual ambitions that led him
to Paris, the centre of philosophy and Lumières, in his eyes, the new Athens
of Ancient Greece. In the French Revolution he saw the beginning of the
end to tyranny on earth, and the accomplishment of the French Enlighten-
ment ideas led by his intellectual idols Voltaire, and Rousseau. He dedicated
his life and fortune to the French revolution, only to die from suspicion re-
lated to his Prussian origin.
But Cloots left a rich legacy. His writings can be considered as one of
the elaborate examples of pushing the logics of Enlightenment and the Fre-
nch Revolution to a conclusion; what the universality of the rights of man
meant to the concept of sovereignty— sovereignty of the human race. His
intelligence, his wit, and his style should make his readers tolerant towards
his equally prominent ego and sense of self-promotion. In a way, at a time
when public opinion reigned in a new democracy led by freedom of expres-
sion, he invented and made himself his own public relation agent.
family and youth
Anacharsis Cloots was born on 24 June 1755 in the family castle of Gnaden-
thal (Val-de-Grâce in French) near Cleves (Kleve in German), a town near
the Prussian border with the Netherlands.11 He was baptised and given the
Latin names of Joannes Baptista Hermannus Maria, and the family name
Klootz (later spelled Cloots in French), as recorded in the family register.12
His family was of Dutch origins. His father, Thomas François Klootz,
was a rich Dutch merchant from Amsterdam. He acquired the castle and
property of Gnadenthal in Prussia as well as the title of baron. Cloots’s bio-
graphers do not know why he settled in Gnadenthal, but it is probably be-
cause it was the only available property that suited both his ambition and
the interest of Frederic II in having new devoted subjects and servants at the
Prussian borders.13 Cloots’s father was made a member of King Frederic II’s
10. Bevilacqua, ‘Conceiving the Republic of Mankind’; Kleingeld, Kant and Cosmopo-
litanism.
11. Labbé, Anacharsis Cloots, 37 citing the Royal Archives of Zwolle (Acte 66).
12. Ibid., 37.
13. Mortier, Anacharsis Cloots, 22.
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Council, Geheimrat, in 1748, and acquired Gnadenthal shortly after.14 He
obtained the title of baron in 1756. He died on 31 December 1767, at the age
of 47, of unknown cause.
The maiden name of Cloots’s mother was de Pauw. Her brother, Ana-
charsis’s uncle, was the philosopher and canon of Xanten, Cornelius de
Pauw (born 1739 in Amsterdam, deceased 1799 in Xanten). He is famous for
writing Recherches philosophiques sur les Américains, an influential study
rejecting travellers’ accounts of native American populations in favour of
a more ‘scientific’ anthropology.15 De Pauw inspired Anacharsis, who al-
ways had a great admiration for his works, and maintained a correspond-
ance with him throughout his life. Cloots was six years old when de Pauw
became canon of Xanten, a village in the vicinity of Gnadenthal. Cloots’s
father procured this position for de Pauw in Xanten, and de Pauw’s pres-
ence was certainly beneficial to Cloots’s education.16 De Pauw spent most
of his life in Cleves.
According to Cloots’s biographers very little is known about his child-
hood, and what is known stems from his own account, scattered through
his work and correspondance.17 The Cloots were a typical bourgeois fam-
ily desiring to climb the Prussian social ladder and become an aristocratic
family. Anacharsis had an older brother, Egide, who died on 18 May 1766,
making him the only heir of the family.
Cloots’s education was in French, but he also spoke French at home —
a necessity for social advancement— even though his father did not speak
it with ease. From the tender age of childhood to his coming of age, Clo-
ots’s entire upbringing had been in French. In addition, Cloots knew both
Dutch and German, but there are no writings from him in these languages.
This is inferred by Labbé from his correspondance as he received letters
written in these languages, as well as from his library of German and Dutch
books.18 We know that some of his writings were translated, but not by him,
so it is fair to assume that, if he knew Dutch and German enough to read
and talk to Dutch and German foreigners during the revolution, he was
probably not confident and fluent.
Cloots never married and, to the best of his biographers’ knowledge,
never had any children. It is not even known if he had any lover, nor of
14. For the Dutch ties with the Duchy of Cleves see Volker Seresse,Politische Normen in
Kleve–Mark während des 17. Jahrhunderts. Argumentationsgeschichtliche und herrschafts-
theoretische Zugänge zur politischen Kultur der frühenNeuzeit, Frühneuzeit-Forschungen,
12 (Epfendorf/Neckar: Bibliotheca Academica, 2005).
15. Cornelius de Pauw, Recherches philosophiques sur les Américains, ou Mémoires inté-
ressants pour servir à l’histoire de l’espèce humaine: avec une Dissertation sur l’Amérique
& les Américains par Don Pernety et la Défense de l’auteur des Recherches contre cette
Dissertation, vol. 1 (Berlin: Chez George Jacques Decker, Imp. du Roi, 1770).
16. Labbé, Anacharsis Cloots, 39.
17. Mortier, Anacharsis Cloots, 25; Labbé, Anacharsis Cloots, 38.
18. Labbé, Anacharsis Cloots, 37–38.
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which gender. Cloots was discreet regarding his private life in his writings,
besides the occasional boasting for his public feats. The little he did write
about it was his ability to remain chaste. Mortier mentions that in the very
first intimate letter written by his own hand to his uncle Adriaan Joan Clo-
eting van Westenappel about the death of a certain Miss Van de Mortel,
Cloots sighed when he remembered her: ‘elle était mon appui sur la terre ;
elle sera mon appui dans le ciel’.19 Mortier speculates that she may have been
a governess, and, reading between his elegantly written lines, his lover: ‘…
une gouvernante qui aurait pris soin de lui et qui, malgré une foi sincère,
aurait failli aux yeux des hommes’. Labbé has the same suspicion quoting
Avenel, who may have been in possession of documents that have, today,
disappeared and who even wrote about a daughter they may have had to-
gether.20 There are two curious mentions of a wife in John Adolphus’s Bio-
graphical Memoirs of the French Revolution. This wife of Cloots allegedly
‘proposed that a statue should be decreed to the first priest who had abjured
christianity, and that the present æra should be denominated the reign of
Nature’.21 However, checking a reference to the source of this statement,
there does not appear to be any mention of a wife.22
One may add to this that in a letter ‘A mon frère unique’ in January 1793,
Cloots wrote about his life away from Paris in the country side, where he
found some relaxation: ‘Je mène la vie d’un curé gros décimateur, avec de
bonnes fermes et de jolies fermières’.23 He compared himself humouristic-
ally with a parson, décimateur, the one who holds the right to levy a tax
called dîme, a tax in nature levied by the Church on agricultural produc-
tions. The reference to the parson who levies a tax in nature on the farms
and the mention of beautiful female farmers do not leave much doubt
about his sexual orientation and his libertine nature. It was not uncom-
mon in the eighteenth century to mock the hypocrisy of the clergy for its
promiscuous life-style— famous examples being Diderot or Thérèse philo-
sophe.24 This may be the case here with ‘la vie d’un curé gros décimateur’.
This letter, addressed to Cloots’s ‘brother’, is rather curious since his only
brother died when he was very young in 1766. However, the letter wished
him, his wife, and his children a happy new year. It may simply be a very
close friend of his, who lived in Gnadenthal.
19. Mortier, Anacharsis Cloots, 278.
20. Labbé, Anacharsis Cloots, 124.
21. John Adolphus, Biographical Memoirs of the French Revolution, vol. 1 (London: T.
Cadell, Jun. & W. Davis, in the strand, 1799), 295, 486.
22. Philippe-Edme Coittant, Tableau des prisons de Paris, sous le regne de Robespierre:
pour faire suite à l’Almanach des prisons, contenant différentes anecdotes sur plusieurs pri-
sonniers, avec les couplets, pièces de vers, lettres et testamens qu’ils ont faits, vol. 1–4 (Paris:
Chez Michel, rue Haute, 1794–95).
23. Cloots, Ecrits révolutionnaires, 456.
24. Jean-Baptiste de Boyer marquis d’Argens [?], Thérèse philosophe, ou mémoires pour
servir à l’histoire du Père Dirrag et de Mademoiselle Éradice (La Haye: s.n., 1748).
50 the life of cloots
education
Anacharsis Cloots was sent on 26 June 1764, at the age of 9, to Brussels to a
Catholic boarding school, Les Pères de Bruxelles, together with his brother.
The boarding school was in the city centre, near the Saint Gudula Cathed-
ral. Its director was a member of the clergy, father De Lannoy. Cloots was
then sent to the Jesuits in Mons, probably before the death of his brother.25
At 11, and at his request, he moved to the Jesuit collège du Pléssis-Sorbonne in
Paris probably because friends of the family, the Vandenyvers, had recently
moved to Paris and could receive and lodge the young Jean-Baptiste.26 It is
at their place that he became acquainted for the first time with members of
the Parisian intellectual society, although it is not known who exactly. Philo-
sophising on religion and its rituals, Cloots mentions in his Lettres philo-
sophiques (added to Certitude des preuves) with pride an episode that got
him into trouble: defiantly eating a bacon omelette on a Saturday, which
was considered as a jour maigre (lean day: meat was not allowed).27 Cloots
argued that uncertainty prevailed over how that dogma applied also to chil-
dren, and that, accordingly, one should not consider something uncertain
as prohibited in general.
Collège du Pléssis-Sorbonne
At thePléssis-Sorbonne college, Cloots’s education was based on the study of
rhetoric (argumentation and syllogism) and classical culture.28 Not much is
known precisely about the curriculum there. One work by Marie-Madeleine
Compère on the history of all the collèges in France from the sixteenth
to eighteenth centuries lists all the existing secondary works and archives
on the collège.29 She notes, however, that there are few documents con-
cerning the pupils. There is, however, no bibliographical reference on the
Collège du Plessis. Regarding the actual curriculum, there are very few doc-
ument regarding the time that Cloots spent there. His school fellows were,
among others, future famous actors of the French Revolution such as La
Fayette, as well as antiquary Millin de Grandmaison (1759–1818) and Ant-
oine Joseph Gorsas (1752–1793), future publicist,30 but also the future law-
yer Pierre Victurnien Vergniaud (1753–1793) and future politician Pierre
25. Labbé, Anacharsis Cloots, 41.
26. Ibid., 42.
27. Anacharsis Cloots, La certitude des preuves du Mahométisme: ou, Réfutation de
l’examen critique des apologistes de la religion Mahométane (London: s.n., 1780), 574–75.
28. Mortier, Anacharsis Cloots, 27.
29. Marie-Madeleine Compère, Les Collèges français : 16e–18e siècles (Paris: Institut Na-
tional de Recherche Pédagogique, 2002).
30. Labbé, Anacharsis Cloots, 43.
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Gaspard Chaumette (1763–1794).31 It was during his stay in Paris that his
father died in Brussels.
Académie militaire des nobles
The idea of establishing a specific institution for the education of military
officers came to Frederic II after the Seven Years’ War in 1763.32 He con-
sidered Sulzer for the chair of professor of mathematics and wrote to him to
present his project and to invite him to Berlin. According to Sulzer, Frederic
II changed his mind and asked him to teach philosophy at the academy in
1764.33 Frederic also asked Sulzer to search and select the professor of his-
tory and the professor of law.34 It may therefore be argued that the Acadé-
mie was very Sulzerian in these areas. It may also be argued that Frederic’s
ambition with the academy was representative of his own contradictions. It
is well-known that Frederic would be present on the battlefields, and that
waging wars did not stop his scholarly pursuit as he brought a library with
him. On the one hand, Frederic wanted to modernise the army and educate
officers to become not only good officers, but also to make sure that the no-
bility would be faithful to him. On the other, Frederic also wanted to offer
the best education possible, to educate gentlemen. It is therefore not a coin-
cidence that he chose some of the best professors and best minds to teach at
the academy, but this contradiction between academic excellence and the
formation of soldiers surfaced with the animosity between the director, a
career officer, and the faculty, career scholars.
The place chosen was the property of an well-established family in Berlin
named Mathias. Michael Mathias developed the Brandenburg postal ser-
vice, which he directed until his death in 1684. The family house was on
Burgstraße 19 on the bank of the Spree river, opposite the royal palace. A
few meters from the house stood the Joachimsthalsche Gymnasium, where
Sulzer taught mathematics. Situated between the two bridges Friedrichs-
brücke andLange Brücke, a special bridge was built to connect theSpreeinsel
and the palace to the Burgstraße and the Académie: the Kavalierbrücke.35
Pupils, governors, and their servants had their accommodation in this build-
31. Edmond Biré, Journal d’un bourgeois de Paris pendant la Terreur, vol. 4 (Paris: Perrin,
1897–1899), 330.
32. Johann George Gebhard, Über den Einﬂuß Friedrichs des Zweiten auf die Aufklä-
rung und Ausbildung seines Jahrhunderts (Berlin: bei Friedrich Maurer, 1801), 105.
33. Johann Georg Sulzer, Lebensbeschreibung (Berlin: Stettin, 1809), 38.
34. Ibid., 42.
35. Beschreibung der Königlichen Residenzstädte Berlin und Potsdam, aller daselbst be-
ﬁndlicher Merkwürdigkeiten, und der umliegenden Gegend: 2 Beschreibung der König-
lichen Residenzstädte Berlin und Potsdam, aller daselbst beﬁndlicher Merkwürdigkeiten,
und der umliegenden Gegend, 3rd ed., vol. 2 (Berlin: bei Friedrich Nicolai, 1786), 721.
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ing, whilst the professors lodged in the building behind it, but connected,
on Geiststraße.36
After the financial questions were settled, Frederic wrote his Instruction
regarding the curriculum, the general organisation, and the objectives of
the académie.37 The primary objective was to educate cohorts of 15 pupils
aged around 12 and picked among the Kadettencorps by Major general Bud-
denbrock. Frederic’s idea was also to operate a ‘monarchisation of the nobil-
ity’ by binding the army with himself.38 Johann von Buddenbrock (1707–
1781) came from a military family and was already overseeing the Kadetten-
corps when Frederic made him director of the Académie des nobles. Each co-
hort was supposed to study for six years, unless some pupil’s progress was
deemed unsatisfying and they were sent back to the Cadettes, or unless they
died, which happened, albeit rarely.
The Académie opened on 1st March 1765, and this date marked the an-
niversary of the institution with a ceremony and speeches every year.39 One
example of these, and which coincided with the parting of the first cohort
in 1761, is Toussaint’s Discours sur le fruit des bonnes études. Eight pupils
had finished their education and were sent to the army and placed by Bud-
denbrock according to their abilities.40 This speech shows the importance
that professors gave to their teaching and forming young minds to become
‘philosophers’, rather than soldiers. In his speech, Toussaint insists on the
value of discipline and studies against laziness and any waste of time.41 Tous-
saint urges the former pupils in their future professional life to keep their
passion for the sciences because they elevate the man and soften his mores.42
Man is made in the image of God, but his soul must be fed with culture
and profund and frequent meditations.43 Even though the pupils, and most
pensionaires, will become officers in the army, Toussaint praises the philo-
sopher who fights prejudices, false opinions, and superstitions.44 The philo-
sophers, the scientists have calmer and softer mores because of their passion
for honest principles discovered through tranquility and meditation.45 Sci-
36. Beschreibung der Königlichen Residenzstädte Berlin und Potsdam, 721.
37. Frédéric II de Prusse, ‘Instruction pour la direction de l’académie des nobles à Berlin’,
in Œuvres de Frédéric le Grand, ed. Johann D. E. Preuss, vol. 9 (Berlin: Rudolph Ludwig
Decker, 1848 [1765]), 87–98.
38. Horst Erlich, Die Kadettenanstalten. Strukturen und Ausgestaltung militärischer
Pädagogik im Kurfürstentum Bayern im späteren 18. Jahrhundert (München: Herbert
Utz, 2007), 6.
39. Gottlieb Friedländer, Die Königliche Allgemeine Kriegs-Schule und das höhere
Militair-Bildungswesen 1765–1813 (Berlin: E.S. Mittler & Sohn, 1854), 82.
40. Ibid., 86–88.
41. Dieudonné Toussaint, Discours sur le fruit des bonnes études. Prononcé à l’Académie
des nobles, le 2. mars 1771 (Berlin: George Jacques Decker, 1771), 3–4.
42. Ibid., 6–7.
43. Ibid., 7–8.
44. Ibid., 10.
45. Ibid., 12–16.
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ences not only soften the mores, but also make them purer: the discipline of
the mind dedicated to knowing and understanding leads to a better appreci-
ation of arts and nature, and thus the highest form of pleasure.46 Toussaint
finishes then with this invitation: ‘On vous dira que vous n’êtes pas faits
pour devenir des Docteurs, des Académiciens ou des Professeurs. Laissez
dire, & meublez toujours votre tête’.47
Toussaint died the next year and was replaced by Jean-Alexis Borelly
(1738–1810), upon D’Alembert’s suggestion.48 According to Friedländer, Bo-
relly also made a speech entitled Discours sur l’objet de l’institution on 2
March 1773, which was published by Decker, but is nowhere to be found.49
In this speech, according to Friedländer, Borelly rejected the idea that the
Académie was only a military school that educates officers in the art of war,
but also to prepare for political administration. To this end, Borelly sug-
gested to reinforce the teaching of French and Latin, and to teach all discip-
lines to the same extent, in order to form ‘des hommes universels’ according
to Frederic’s wish.50 Just as Thiébault had difficulties with Buddenbrock,
so did Borelly. It seems that there was a conflict between the professors
and the director of the school regarding the curriculum and the pedagogy,
which may have been related to their different professional backgrounds.
Buddenbrock was a soldier, and so was Boaton, whilst Sulzer, Thiébault,
Toussaint, and Borelly were scholars. Boaton wrote about the importance
of obeying orders.51 Sulzer wrote about the importance of questioning au-
thority to seek the truth, as will be shown below. Thiébault wrote about
this power struggle with Buddenbrock, which resulted in many exchanges
with Frederic, and resulted in Thiébault’s taking charge of the teachings.52
As for the curriculum of the Académie, Frederic set the guidelines of
which disciplines should fill the young heads, but it is detailed in the Plan
détaillé d’enseignement. ThisPlanwas published in 1779 after Cloots’s time,
but it is the only source about the curriculum at the Académie and the or-
ganisation of the education.53 Since it is based on Frederic’s Instructions, and
since it is likely that it is Thiébault’s work, it has to be assumed that it was
46. Ibid., 17–28.
47. Ibid., 29.
48. Friedländer, Die Königliche Allgemeine Kriegs-Schule, 90.
49. Ibid., 91.
50. Ibid., 92.
51. Pierre-François de Boaton,Épitre sur l’obéissance. Amessieurs les éleves de l’Académie
royale militaire des nobles. Par un ancien Capitaine d’Infanterie, Gouverneur dans cette
Académie (Berlin: George Jacques Decker, 1777).
52. Dieudonné Thiébault, Mes souvenirs de vingt ans de séjour a Berlin, vol. 5, Frédéric,
son Académie, ses écoles et ses amis littérateurs et philosophes (Paris: Buisson, 1805), 198–
216.
53. Plan détaillé d’enseignement pour l’académie royale des gentilshommes fait d’après
l’instruction générale du Roi par ordre de son excellence Mr. de Buddenbrock lieutenant
général d’infanterie des armées du roi &c. (Berlin: George Jacques Decker, 1779).
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more or less the same organisation and curriculum in the years 1770–1773,
when Cloots was there. It states that the fifteen pupils are chosen from the
age of twelve and are supposed to stay for six years, as mentioned in the In-
structions.54 These six years are divided into three classes of two years each,
with four semesters of increasing difficulty, where the third class is the one
pupils start with at 12, and the first is the last one they attend when they
leave at 18.55 Pupils have exams at the end of each semester, but these exams
are only meant to monitor the progress of pupils for the professors and the
king.56
The disciplines studied during these six years are French, German, and
Latin, arithmetics for ordinary use, ancient and modern history, geography,
rhetoric and eloquence with a short course on poetry (principally in Fre-
nch), a short history of fine arts, practical geometry for the foundations of
the study of civil and military architecture, elementary geometry, mechan-
ics and astronomy, logic, a course on moral theory, modern and ancient
history of philosophy, a short course on law (natural law, law of nations,
public law, and the Code Frederic).57 Languages are taught with the object-
ive that the pupils can write with style in all three and can express themselves
correctly and with good diction in the first two.58 Moreover, French is also
studied for the course on rhetoric and eloquence.
The beginners’ class, or third class, focuses mainly on languages, with
a little bit of history and geography, and elementary arithmetics and geo-
metry, but its purpose is to prepare for the two other classes.59 Languages
are taught with the objective of ‘développer les facultés de l’esprit et du
cœur’; for that purpose, the maîtres have two sets of notebooks in which
what must be read in different languages and what sentences must be lear-
ned by heart are written respectively.60 It seems that professors do not teach
this class as it is taught by ‘masters’ (maîtres).
The ‘classe moyenne’ offers the following courses for the next four sem-
esters: French, German, Latin, arithmetics, geometry, history, geography,
rhetoric, logic, moral, and elements of civil and military architecture.61 The
guideline for the language courses is to choose works of literature that dem-
onstrate the genius of each language and can show principles of style and
diction.62 The pupils are asked to make a translation from each language
54. Plan détaillé d’enseignement, 3.
55. Ibid., 4.
56. Ibid., 5.
57. Plan détaillé d’enseignement, 6–7; Friedländer, Die Königliche Allgemeine Kriegs-
Schule, 97.
58. Plan détaillé d’enseignement, 6.
59. Ibid., 9–23.
60. Ibid., 14.
61. Ibid., 25.
62. Ibid.
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into the other one, except for Latin that is translated only into French.63 The
course of history deals with the history of occidental and oriental emperors
until the partition of empires, and then a focus on the German empire from
Charlemagne to Charles V with notions of Roman law and German pub-
lic law.64 Rhetoric and logic are limited to elementary notions in order to
introduce the pupils to these arts with principles, definitions, and some ex-
ercises.65 The course on moral philosophy starts with an exposition of the
first principles of moral and notions of the morality of actions, obligations,
and duty. It aims at teaching the pupils the enthusiasm for and necessity of
virtue.66
The first class is the last one for each cohort. There are no more courses in
German. Latin is devoted to the study of Titus Livius and Quintus Curtius
Rufus’ speeches, Cæsar’s Commentaries on the Gallic War, Virgil’s Aeneid,
and some chosen passages of Horace’sOdes.67 The course in French emphas-
ises style and diction, and the reading of the best authors with exercises in
the same genre.68 Equally in French, the course on eloquence proposes to
read and analyse the best orators in the three genres: demonstrative, delib-
erative, and judiciary. In the last semester it is replaced by a course on po-
etry and a short history of fine arts.69 History and geography focus on the
time of Charles V until the present day with an emphasis on new European
states and the House of Brandenburg. The course in mathematics is divided
into one semester for trigonometry, two semesters for mechanics and hy-
drostatics, and one semester on astronomy.70 The course on civil and milit-
ary architecture teaches castrametation and fortification. The course on the
history of philosophy exposes the doctrines and opinions of the most fam-
ous schools of thoughts, both ancient and modern ones, whilst presenting
their strengths and weaknesses. The last semester is devoted to a summary
of Locke’s work on Human Understanding.71 The course in law presents
‘notions préliminaires’ based on Grotius: the first two semesters discuss the
different rights and obligations attached to particular acts of law (natural,
convention, or promisse). The third semester focuses on the application of
natural law to different social states (economic, civil, public, and law of na-
tions) in order to give the pupils an idea of the rights of the citizen, of the
rights of a people, and the rights of a monarch. The fourth semester is de-
63. Ibid., 26–31.
64. Ibid., 33–34.
65. Ibid., 35.
66. Ibid., 36.
67. Ibid., 38.
68. Ibid., 40.
69. Ibid., 41.
70. Ibid., 43–44.
71. Ibid., 45.
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voted to Frederick the Great’s Prussian Civil Code, and perhaps public law
and law of the empire.72
Cloots was admitted as élève pensionnaire number 16 on 15 August 1770,
and left on 1 May 1773.73 That means that his family paid for his education
at the Académie, but that he followed the same courses as regular pupils.
However, that also means that Cloots did not have any obligation to join
Frederic’s army afterwards, or be employed in the Prussian administration,
although that was the purpose of the school.
Cloots only stayed three years instead of the regular six years. Given the
fact that Cloots had previously studied at the collège du Pléssis-Sorbonne, it
is likely that he received a dispensation and only had to follow half of the reg-
ular schooling time. Thiébault mentioned that normally new pupils were
placed in the beginner’s class unless the professors deemed them advanced
enough to be in a superior class.74 In thePlan détaillé, it is specified that the
first class pupils join at the age of 12 is dedicated to learning French, German,
and Latin correctly, before moving to learn the other disciplines.75 There is
no doubt that Cloots knew French and Latin very well, but may have had
issues with German, since he claims that he never really knew his ‘mother
tongue’ well (as seen previously).76 It is not possible to know exactly what
courses Cloots was enrolled in, nor which class. Looking at the other pen-
sionnaires, one may note that they mostly stayed for one or two years, and
some three years, while staying four or five years was uncommon, and the
whole six years extraordinary.
It was not uncommon for the pensionnaires to leave the Académie with-
out entering the service in the army, or becoming a diplomat, but it was the
exception. A useful table shows what became of all the pupils and pension-
naires from 1765 to 1813.77 Out of the 69 pupils to enter, 2 died, and 6 were
sent back, which left 61 pupils to finish their education at the Académie
in total; 58 of them entered the army after finishing their education, whilst
only 3 entered the administration as civil servants. Of the 71 pensionaires,
one died and none were sent back; 46 of the 70 who left the school entered
the army, whilst 24 did not. Out of these 24, 9 left to become ‘Landedel-
leute’, one of which was Cloots; 2 went to university, 2 went ‘back home’,
and 2 went to ‘Liegnitz’. Only 5 went to serve in ‘fremde Dienste’, and 4 in
‘Hofdienste’. Therefore, almost all the pupils entered the army, and about
two thirds of the pensionnaires also joined the army. Cloots was not the only
one to leave and become an ‘Landedelleute’, but these were few. If one be-
lieves a story that Cloots tells in one of his speeches, it does not seem that
72. Plan détaillé d’enseignement, 45–46.
73. Friedländer, Die Königliche Allgemeine Kriegs-Schule, 336–337.
74. Thiébault, Frédéric, son Académie, 182.
75. Plan détaillé d’enseignement, 10.
76. Cloots, ‘La République universelle’, 246.
77. Friedländer, Die Königliche Allgemeine Kriegs-Schule, 46.
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it was well perceived. In his December 1793 Appel au genre humain, one of
his last writings before the guillotine, Cloots wrote about Prussian minister
Goltz, who apparently knew that, prior to the revolution, a ‘bad subject of
the king’ was travelling around Europe without the king’s permission:
Le ministre vraiment prussien crut m’insulter en publiant qu’-
il n’avait jamais vu ma figure. En effet, dix ans auparavant,
Goltz dit à un voyageur de ma connaissance, qu’il n’ignorait
pas qu’un Cloots, mauvais sujet du roi, roulait le monde sans
permission ; mais que par égard pour le célèbre philosophe
Pauw, mon oncle, il ne m’envoyait pas à Berlin, pieds et poings
liés.78
Even though the whole passage is meant to give elements of Cloots’s revolu-
tionary credentials by emphasising his lack of commitment to the Prussian
king and his noble background, there is no reason to doubt the veracity
of this anecdote. Wilhelm Bernhard von der Goltz (1736–1795) was ambas-
sador of Prussia in Paris. According to Avenel’s biography of Cloots, after
Goltz left Paris in 1792, he gave Cloots as example of traitor to the king, who
ordered his effigy to be burned in front of his soldiers laying camp in Fra-
nce.79 Goltz and Cloots had an indirect exchange through the newspaper
La gazette universelle in 1791. Someone had claimed in a supplement en-
titled les Jacobins toujours Jacobins to the Journal de la Cour & de la Ville
that Cloots was reporting to Goltz about the Jacobins as a Prussian spy.80
An anonymous reader wrote a letter to the newspaper denying that Goltz
and Cloots had any relations, claiming that Goltz and Prussia did not care
enough about the Jacobins to send a spy, and Cloots should be cleared of
these suspicions in front of his colleagues.81 A friend of Goltz’s (or Goltz
himself using a pseudonym) wrote to state that Goltz did not know Clo-
ots, and attacked Cloots for being an ‘enraged revolutionary’, opposite of
Goltz’s character.82 Cloots answered sarcastically in the Gazette Universelle,
on 8 September 1791, that indeed as a representative of oppressed popula-
tions he could not be more opposite in character to the representative of a
despotic king oppressing his population.83 There was therefore real anim-
osity between the two. It is very likely that Goltz, as military officer and
78. Anacharsis Cloots, ‘Appel au genre humain’, in Écrits révolutionnaires, 1790–1794
(Paris: Editions Champ libre, 1979 [1793]), 628.
79. Georges Avenel,Anacharsis Cloots. L’orateur du genre humain, vol. 1 (Paris: Librairie
internationale, 1865), 414–415.
80. s.n., ‘Les Jacobins toujours Jacobins’, Journal de la Cour et de la Ville Supplément,
no. 56 (Jeudi 25 Août 1791): 2–3.
81. s.n., Journal de la Cour et de la Ville, no. 60 (Lundi 29 Août 1791): 480–481.
82. Schmidt, ‘Aux Auteurs du Journal’, Journal de Paris Supplément au numéro 248,
no. 96 (Lundi 5 Septembre 1791): i–ii.
83. Cloots, Ecrits révolutionnaires, 212.
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diplomat, knew Cloots since he was a former noble pupil of the military
académie. It is also very likely that Glotz despised him for not entering the
army or the diplomatic corps afterwards, in accordance with Frederic’s plan
to ‘monarchise the nobility’.
Given the fact that Cloots stayed for three years and that there are no
other records than the Plan détaillé, it can only be assumed which classes
Cloots had to go to, and inferred from thisPlan, which courses he followed.
It is fair to assume that Cloots may have skipped the third class for begin-
ners entirely because he already received his education at Pléssis-Sorbonne.
As the Plan states, the beginners’ class only teaches French, German, Latin,
and some arithmetics; French and German with the goal of reaching correc-
tion and pure diction, and to write in a legible and elegant way, Latin with
the goal of reading the essential works, and arithmetics for ordinary use in
life.84 One can safely assume that Cloots after his time at Pléssis-Sorbonne
knew French and Latin at the level required, and that he had learned enough
arithmetics, geometry, history and geography for this level. His level of Ger-
man is less certain, however. As seen above, Cloots claimed that he never
knew his native tongue well.85 His education from the age of 9 to 15 was in
French (and Latin) in Bruxelles, Mons, and Paris, but not in German.
It can also be safely assumed that Cloots was intellectually and scholarly
good enough to follow the courses taught in Berlin without falling behind
or being kicked out. Therefore, one can assume that Cloots followed the
third class in its entirety, or two years divided in four semesters. There is
one year left, which can be assumed to be half of the middle class, i.e. the last
third and fourth semesters of the middle class. This would also make sense
when considering that the curriculum for the first two semesters are also
redundant for someone who had studied in Paris. Only courses in German
and on military architecture were different, and perhaps the one on morals.
The other ones, Cloots may already have studied: French grammar and writ-
ing, reading Cornelius Nepos, preparation to rhetorics, fundamental arith-
metics and geometry, history of Roman emperors, history and geography
of Western and Eastern empires, and catechism.86
I will here focus on the courses in philosophy and the course in law be-
cause Cloots wrote mainly on these topics. Frederic gave as instruction to
the professor of ‘metaphysics’ to teach two main disciplines. First, a short
course on moral philosophy. This course should insist on the necessity of
virtue in society and generate enthusiasm for virtue in the pupils; virtue be-
ing a state of ‘perfect disinterest’ (preferring honour over self-interest, the
general interest over the particular one, and the life of the patrie over one’s
84. Plan détaillé d’enseignement, 6–7.
85. Cloots, ‘La République universelle’, 246.
86. Plan détaillé d’enseignement, 24–37.
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own).87 Second, the history of human opinions from the Greeks to the con-
temporaries. For the Greeks, using Bayle and Cicero’s Tusculanes and De
natura deorum translated into French. For the contemporaries: Descarte,
Leibniz, Malebranche, and Locke, with an insistence on Locke as the end-
point of this history of philosophy.88 The professor should also make some
exercises in rhetoric after the lecture, by giving two students the opportun-
ity to take two opposite positions and argue against one another. He would
then sum up their arguments, show their weaknesses and what their reason
missed, as well as consequences.
In the Plan détaillé, moral philosophy is taught in the middle class.89 It
starts with a presentation of the first principles of moral, the explanation
of the first principles of the morality of actions, of obligation, of duty.90 It
develops further on the essential duties of man in the state of nature and
in the social state.91 There are no more instructions and no more sources re-
garding the content of this course. One must then extrapolate from Sulzer’s
own writings, and from the understanding of morality at the time.
The professor of law was according to Thiébault, ‘… un M. Stoss, gardien
du cabinet des curiosités du château, et adjoint au bibliothécaire du roi, bon
jurisconsulte d’ailleurs, et très digne confrère’.92 In his Instruction, Frederic
stated that it was not necessary to learn law at the level of a ‘jurisconsult’,
but the sufficient knowledge necessary to a ‘layman’.93 Principally based on
Grotius, the professor’s lessons should focus on ‘droit du citoyen’ (civil law),
‘droit du peuple et d’un monarque’ (public law), and ‘droit public’ (law of
nations), with the insistence that the law of nations lacks a political author-
ity to enforce it.94
Cloots seems to have good memories of his time in Berlin. Cloots men-
tions his education in his writings before and after the revolution. In Vœux
d’un gallophile, Cloots mentions Pierre-François de Boaton (1734–1794). In
Lettre sur les juifs, Cloots mentions Johann Georg Sulzer (1720–1779). In
contrast, Cloots did not mention any professor by name from his time at
Pléssis-Sorbonne. So, these two persons must have made an impression on
Cloots. It is my contention here that Sulzer, in particular, had an influence
on Cloots. During the revolution, Cloots mentions the Académie, but it is
difficult to assess the experience he had there.
On Boaton, Cloots writes:
87. Frédéric II de Prusse, ‘Instruction’, 93.
88. Ibid.
89. Plan détaillé d’enseignement, 36.
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91. Ibid.
92. Thiébault, Frédéric, son Académie, 169.
93. Frédéric II de Prusse, ‘Instruction’, 94.
94. Ibid., 94–95.
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Mr. de Boaton, ci-devant capitaine suisse au service de Sar-
daigne & mon ancien Mentor à l’académie royale des Nobles
à Berlin, jouit encore aujourd’hui de la confiance de Frédéric,
de l’estime de ses éleves & de la considération publique, par
les vertus du cœur & les talens de l’esprit, par des ouvrages en
prose & en vers marqués au coin du bon & du beau.95
The above quotation is taken from a general discussion about employing
Swiss soldiers in France. Cloots notes how ruinous this is for the country,
who should stop employing them. However, to prove that he has nothing
against the Swiss, he uses the example of his former mentor to show that
they were officers of excellent condition.
Boaton was employed as gouverneur, so it seems that he was Cloots’s gov-
ernor, or ‘mentor’ as he calls him. It may be that the mention of Boaton
was due to the close relation governors had with their pupils since they had
to stay with them outside of the classroom to educate them to be gentle-
men: check their homework, stand correctly, not fall into laziness. As the
Instructions states: ‘le gouverneur couche près d’eux; il doit avoir soin de
les accoutumer à la propreté, à la civilité et aux manières convenables à des
gens de condition. Il doit les reprendre des grossièretés, des mauvais pro-
pos, des manières basses et triviales, de la paresse, etc.’.96 The académie had
one governor for ‘trois et trois élèves’, according to Frederic’s instructions.
In 1770, when Cloots entered the académie, there were 7 governors, and 6
from 1771 to 1773, when Cloots left.97 There were 15 pupils, and about 15,
more or less, pensionnaires during Cloots’s time, so the instructions given
by Frederic must have been that each governor had three pupils and three
pensionnaires.
There is not much biographical information about Boaton besides Aca-
démieprofessor of mathematics de Castillon’sEulogy for his death.98 Boaton
was born in a huguenot family in Lingerod, Switzerland. He became a sol-
dier in Sardaigne, and retired in 1768 as lieutenant-capitaine. He was ap-
pointed gouverneur at the Académie des nobles that same year, and stayed
for ten years (or twelve, according to Castillon).99 Having a lot of time for
himself as gouverneur, Boaton learned painting, mathematics, history, and
German to the point that he could produce a translation of the Idyllen
Swiss poet Salomon Gessner (1730–1788).100 After leaving theAcadémie des
nobles, Boaton became the tutor to the son of a rich family, and published a
95. Cloots, Vœux d’un gallophile, 14.
96. Frédéric II de Prusse, ‘Instruction’, 95.
97. Friedländer, Die Königliche Allgemeine Kriegs-Schule, 327.
98. Frédéric de Castillon, ‘Éloge historique de Pierre François de Boaton’, in Mémoires
de l’Académie Royale des Sciences et Belles-Lettres, vol. 1796 (Berlin: Chez George Decker,
Imp. du Roi, 1799), 22–36.
99. Friedländer, Die Königliche Allgemeine Kriegs-Schule, 327; Castillon, ‘Éloge’, 29.
100. Castillon, ‘Éloge’, 27–28.
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translation into French of Wieland’s poems Oberon, and Gessner’s La mort
d’Abel.101 According to Castillon, it is the latter that opened the doors of the
Berlin Académie des sciences et des belles lettres to him in 1790.102 Travelling
to England with his wife, Boaton learned English enough to read English
authors, but they both contracted an illness there. His wife died in 1792,
after which Boaton returned to Germany and died in 1794.103
Castillon describes Boaton as ‘frank’, ‘sincere’, ‘honest’, and ‘straight’, a
man proud of his noble heritage, but not in a vain fashion — rather as an
obligation to be virtuous.104 Boaton wrote two speeches to the members of
the académie that were published after Cloots’s time there, but could serve
as a guideline to how Boaton felt about his pedagogical function. Cloots, as
he wrote, admired Boaton for his works of poetry, his virtuous heart, and
his talented mind.
From the above quotation, it does not seem that Boaton had a specific
influence on Cloots, besides a general admiration and affection for his mor-
ality, wit, and sense of literary aesthetic. However, it indicates that he ap-
preciated his education with Boaton and what role model Cloots took at
the Académie des nobles: a sense of morality inscribed in the heart of men
and a keen intellect, demonstrated through literary writings. One should
note that virtue and morality were pet peeves of Sulzer’s pedagogical philo-
sophy.105 But the point of agreement seems to stop on virtue and morality.
It is striking to see the difference between Sulzer and Boaton on reason and
the role of the mind. Boaton wrote a long speech in verses about the im-
portance of obeying: ‘Puissé-je … Au devoir d’obéir plier votre raison !’.106
Sulzer, on the other hand, considered that the youth should not only be
educated towards having rational and sound opinions — thus the ability
to form independant thoughts — but also that virtue comes through rea-
son.107
Sulzer was a Swiss philosopher and professor of mathematics who made
career in Berlin at the Academy of Sciences.108 In his Lettre sur les juifs, Clo-
101. Christoph Martin Wieland, Oberon. Poëme en quatorze chants, trans. Pierre-
François Boaton (Berlin: Chez Chrétien Sigismond Spener, 1784); Salomon Gessner, La
mort d’Abel. Poëme en cinq chants, trans. Pierre-François Boaton (Hamburg: Pierre Fran-
çois Fauche, 1791).
102. Castillon, ‘Éloge’, 32.
103. Ibid., 33.
104. Ibid., 35.
105. Johann Georg Sulzer, Pädagogische Schriften, ed. Willibald Klinke (Langensalza:
Beyer & Mann, 1922 [1746]), 83–93.
106. Boaton, Épitre sur l’obéissance, 4.
107. Sulzer, Pädagogische Schriften, 83–84.
108. For a short biography of Sulzer, see Elisabeth Décultot, ‘Johann Georg Sulzer – Le-
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ots reminisces about his professor of philosophy, Sulzer, when answering to
a polemic with Antoine Court de Gébelin (1725–1784) regarding this work
at the Musée:
L’exemple de M. de Gebelin me remet bien vivement dans
l’esprit les sages préceptes de l’illustre M. Sulzer, mon Pro-
fesseur de Philosophie à Berlin. En commentant Platon &
Cicéron, il nous recommandait de ne pas nous reposer sur
l’autorité d’autrui, & de ne l’en croire lui-même qu’après avoir
comparé ses paroles avec le dictamen de la raison.N’oubliez ja-
mais Messieurs que la voie d’autorité est une voie de perdition.
Cette maxime a germé chez moi, elle fait le bonheur de ma vie
& le désespoir de mes antagonistes.109
Sulzer was originally asked by Frederic to be professor of mathematics,
but became instead professor of metaphysics at the académie, meaning that
he taught moral philosophy and the history of philosophy. There is no way
to verify the accuracy of this statement and it can only be assessed if Sulzer
would likely have said that to his pupils at the Académie based on his writ-
ings. Based on his pedagogical and philosophical works it seems highly likely
that Sulzer indeed said that. This will be clear after analysing them in the
next section. It is not uncommon for an enthusiastic student to have fond
memories about an equally enthusiastic teacher, who opened one’s mind to
new ways of thinking and seeing the world. Often, one remembers vividly
a few sentences that struck a young mind’s imagination.
Sulzer’s method of teaching might explain why Cloots remembered him
and his lessons, and perhaps even Cloots’s intellectual fondness for him.
Sulzer’s method is oriented towards the child and following a child’s tem-
perament and way to learn.110 For Sulzer, it is not about how much the
child learns, but how he learns and how good he knows something. The
main goal of education is to enlighten the mind of the child and to form
solidly his judgement.111 For that purpose, education must be pleasant to the
child, and the teacher should make teaching pleasant and must appear trust-
worthy, friendly, and caring to the children in order to make them want to
learn.112 It cannot be known for certain how Sulzer taught at the Académie,
but his children-oriented pedagogical method and the emphasis on mak-
ing teaching pleasant in an atmosphere of trust, care, and friendliness, was
probably put into practice during his teaching. It is then no wonder that
Cloots remembered him, and perhaps with such fondness.
109. Anacharsis Cloots, Lettre sur les juifs, à un écclésiastique de mes amis, lue dans la
séance publique du musée de Paris, le XXI novembre 1782 (Berlin: s.n., 1783), 44.
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Frederic was very attached to the school and followed closely its develop-
ment and the progress of the pupils.113 Frederic knew individually each of
them and how well they performed. Frederic was aware of the importance
of education for the people, and it is interesting to wonder what pedago-
gical project he had in mind with the Académie. According to Friedländer,
Frederic’s correspondance shows that he had read Rousseau’s Émile ou De
l’éducation, but disliked it.114 Indeed, in a letter written on 10 February 1763
to the duchess Louise-Dorothée of Saxe-Gotha, Frederic writes that he is
reading Rousseau’s Émile, but only finds it unoriginal and lacking solid
reasoning to the point that he threw it away out of disgust.115 According
to Friedländer, Frederic was not influenced either by the encyclopédistes for
their pedagogical ideas, and instead theAcadémie was a product of the ped-
agogical environment of the time, which is to say Locke’s pedagogical the-
ory introduced in early 18th-century Germany by August Hermann Francke
(1663–1727).116 In any case, Frederic’s Instruction presents similarities with
Sulzer’s pedagogical ideas.
Sulzer considered in his Pädagogische Schriften: ‘Kinder zu ziehen ist ein
Werk eines Philosophen, und keines gemeinen Schulmeisters’.117 With this
motto, Sulzer developed his pedagogical philosophy and his methodolo-
gical programme for the education of the youth. The goal of education for
Sulzer is:
… die Kinder, die Kraft ihrer Geburt Menschen sind, zu ver-
nünftigen, tugendhaften, und wohl gefitteten Menschen ma-
chen, die im Stand und Amt, in welchen sie mit der Zeit ste-
hen werden, nach Würdigkeit zu leben wissen.118
The goal of education is to refine human beings for the purpose of happi-
ness: the intellectual education serves the education of the mind and the
will. This education comes in three parts, for Sulzer: first, the ‘Vernunfts-
und Verstandesbildung’; second, the ‘Gemüts- und Willensbildung’; third,
the ‘Bildung zur äußerlichen Aufführung und zu guten Sitten’.
The foundational element in forming children’s mind is right thinking,
which only comes through clear concepts. A clear concept is the notion of
a thing that is sufficient to distinguish that thing from all other things, and
the capability to give the reason for this difference.119 Clear concepts are ac-
quired through attention and investigation, which are two qualities that
113. Thiébault, Frédéric, son Académie, 186.
114. Friedländer, Die Königliche Allgemeine Kriegs-Schule, 125–126.
115. Frédéric II de Prusse, Œuvres de Frédéric le Grand, ed. Johann D. E. Preuss, vol. 18
(Berlin: Rudolph Ludwig Decker, 1851), 249–250.
116. Friedländer, Die Königliche Allgemeine Kriegs-Schule, 123–125.
117. Sulzer, Pädagogische Schriften, 43.
118. Ibid., 50.
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must be taught to children.120 Aufmerksamkeit andNachforschen are neces-
sarily time consuming, they require time and toil. Reason must be trained
therefore, according to Sulzer, in order to focus its attention on things, and
investigate them for hidden properties. It is a questioning by the mind in
order to attain a ‘clear concept’. Moreover, children must be taught how to
reach rational and sound opinion: to question in order to form their own
opinion.121 Would that not involve, then, questioning authority and con-
cepts and opinions bestowed by authority? Quite opposite to Boaton and
Buddenbrock’s vision of the soldier destined to obeying the chain of com-
mand.
Sulzer also considered as part of education to make children virtuous and
well-mannered. Reason and virtue are closely connected for Sulzer, but if
some people have reason and opinion, they sometimes lack virtue, which
can only come from a good education during the youth.122 This is why chil-
dren must not only learn and know virtue, but love virtue. Sulzer defines vir-
tue as the skill that enables to reach freedom of action following pre-written
rules.123 It necessitates two things: an enlightened reason with clear concepts
of human obligations, and a good will that can lift obstacles to virtue.124
Sulzer considers as the inclinations and qualities of virtue: love of virtue,
love of order, love of real honour, love of fellowmen, frankness to self and
others, will to work, steadfastness and patience, and a good spirit.125
As for the content of this education, Sulzer emphasises that memory is
an important quality of the soul as it gives elements to form one’s opin-
ion, one’sVerstand: Strengthening memory through exercises help form the
mind, which also serves the moral life.126 The content of education, the cur-
riculum, is therefore important in forming young minds and hearts. Sulzer
emphasises particularly the importance of language for this purpose. Pupils
must learn their mother tongue in school: pronunciation, spelling, gram-
mar, and the understanding of the power of words and metaphors.127 It
is also important to learn languages, Greek and Latin in particular, and to
translate from the one to the other in order to form taste for a language.128
Another subject that must be taught to children is history, which should be
taught from original Greek and Roman historians, and geography, which
should be limited to learning to read maps.129 Other Schön Wissenschaft
should teach about beauty, nature, and greatness, through the best writers
120. Sulzer, Pädagogische Schriften, 54.
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and poets to build a sense of beauty and taste.130 Of course higher sciences
should also be part of the curriculum with mathematics, as they form the
basis for others such as calculus, mechanics, astronomy, etc., and physics.131
Sulzer also adds to the list the necessity to know about moral and natural
laws, insisting on the value of making a strong impression on children about
the social importance of moral concepts for the functioning of society.132
Finally, theology should be taught, but no catechism for children under 12;
what matters is to teach natural theology first.133
Comparing this curriculum in Sulzer’s pedagogical work with the actual
curriculum at the Académie as set by Frederic, it seems clear that Frederic
was influenced by Sulzer’s ideas. It is not the object of this paper to delve on
Sulzer’s pedagogical ideas in the context of his time, so it is not possible to
assess here the extent of this Sulzerian influence on Frederic as opposed to
other education projects.134 Sulzer was himself influenced by Wolff, known
for his critical rationalism, which got him extradited from Halle, only to be
re-instated in 1740 by Frederic II. It seems that Frederic II had the same ped-
agogical objective of rationalism and criticism as superior than catechism.
Frederic in his instruction noted that the professors’ teaching to the pupils
had to: ‘remplir la mémoire de connaissances utiles’, ‘cultiver la raison’, ‘for-
mer le jugement’, and ‘faire des idées nettes et précises des choses’.135 Follow-
ing Sulzer, Frederic instructed the professor at the Académie as such:
Il pourra leur faire un petit cours de poésie pour leur former le
goût. Homère, Virgile, quelques odes d’Horace, Voltaire, Boi-
leau, Racine, voilà les sources fécondes dans lesquelles il peut
puiser ; ce qui ornera l’esprit des jeunes gens, et leur donnera
en même temps du goût pour les beaux-arts.136
For the course in history, Frederic did not recommend using primary sour-
ces, unlike Sulzer, but he insisted on how history could serve as a basis for
the professor to encourage them to think about historical events and form
independant thinking: ‘… il fera accoucher leur esprit de réflexions soit mo-
rales, soit politiques, soit philosophiques …’.137 Finally, Frederic also con-
sidered, like Sulzer, that morality was an important part of the pupils’ edu-
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cation: ‘… sans vertu la société ne saurait subsister’; ‘il tâchera de faire de ses
élèves des enthousiastes de la vertu’.138
Cloots also shared personal memories from his time at the Académie des
nobles. They are mostly positive, but he then changed his tone to a negative
one regarding the army after the war against Prussia broke out in 1792.
In Adresse d’un Prussien à un Anglais, Cloots writes in a footnote to a
letter to Edmund Burke:
J’ai constamment aimé la France, quoique mon berceau fût
troublé, mon patrimoine rançonné, mes foyers ravagés par les
armées françaises. J’écrivis mes Vœux d’un Gallophile en 1784 ;
je les publiai en 1785, et les réimprimai en 1786. Mes derniers
voyages et la révolution actuelle ont infiniment ajouté à cet
amour presque inné, à cet instinct du beau et du bon, qui date
de ma sortie du collège du Plessis-Sorbonne, et de mon entrée
à l’école militaire de Berlin.139
In this passage, Cloots refers to the beauty and culture that Paris has to of-
fer, which he loved so much and pleased him ever since he left the collège
du Plessis-Sorbonne. One should note how Cloots dates this ‘instinct’ bet-
ween his leaving Paris and moving to Berlin: Paris was the centre of taste
and cultural refinement.
There is a very short mention of his time at the Académie in L’orateur
du genre humain considering the prescriptions of Doctor Tissot regarding
masturbation. Cloots writes:
J’ai été élevé par des prêtres à Bruxelles, par des jésuites à Mons,
par des ecclésiastiques à Paris, par des militaires à Berlin, et j’ai
retrouvé Lesbos partout. Mais grâce à M. Tissot, je me suis pré-
servé de l’embrasement général : ce médecin suisse m’épouvan-
ta. Je voulais être grand et robuste, je voulais réussir au manège,
à la danse et au maniement des armes ; j’aimais passionnément
l’étude et l’exercice de la mémoire.140
Samuel-Auguste Tissot was a famous and influential Swiss physician who
wrote that masturbation had dire consequences on boys’ health: their stren-
gth, memory, vision, and reason.141 But what is interesting is that Cloots
writes how he wanted to be a good rider on horses, a good dancer, and a
good fencer, disciplines particularly taught at theAcadémie des nobles. And
also how he loved passionately to study and exercise his memory, faculties
138. Frédéric II de Prusse, ‘Instruction’, 93.
139. Cloots, ‘Adresse d’un Prussien à un Anglais’, 52.
140. Cloots, ‘L’Orateur du genre humain’, 125.
141. François-Auguste Tissot, L’onanisme. Dissertation sur les maladies produites par la
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that would be compromised by this solitary practice according to Tissot.
In this account, therefore, Cloots seems to have enjoyed his studies at the
Académie.
In La république universelle Cloots writes about his language being Fre-
nch, and how it was taught at the Académie des nobles:
Comme l’usage de la langue française, dans les pays étrangers,
est la marque d’une bonne éducation, on apprenait le français
par esprit d’aristocratie ; mais on l’apprendra désormais par es-
prit de démocratie. Beaucoup d’Allemands et d’autres septen-
trionaux affectent chez eux d’ignorer leur langue, pour se don-
ner du relief dans le beau monde. Frédéric le Grand poussa la
chose si loin, qu’on nous mettait en pénitence à l’école mili-
taire de Berlin, lorsque nous parlions l’idiome du pays. Je ne
risquai pas beaucoup, car je venais de faire mes humanités à
l’université de Paris : aussi n’ai-je jamais bien su ma langue na-
tale. Ce fut dans des livres français que j’appris à lire, dans le
Catéchisme historique de Fleury et dans l’Histoire de la barbe
bleue.142
It is not exactly certain whether Cloots indeed knew German very well. Cer-
tainly, all his education was in French from the age of 9, and his parents were
Dutch, so he may have spoken Dutch before that. However, his uncle, Cor-
nelius de Pauw, may have taught him, in which case it would have likely
been in French. At the Berlin Académie, as seen above, Cloots stayed three
years, and it seems that German was not taught for the last two years, so
he may have followed only one year in German. It is also possible that Clo-
ots minimises in this passage his knowledge of German because of the sus-
picions and accusations he faced during the revolution. He therefore em-
phasises that French and France are more familiar to him than German and
Prussia.
In ‘Recrutement de l’armée prussienne’, published inChronique de Paris
31 March 1792, Cloots writes about the Prussian army as a first-hand wit-
ness of its condition. Cloots first tells the story of how for a mother it is
considered a curse to have a son who is tall and in good physical condition;
this means he will be recruited as Prussian soldier. As a consequence, Cloots
claims that some injured themselves or committed suicide. Cloots notes:
Les garnisons prussiennes sont ravagées par le suicide ; et la
plupart des soldats qui périssent sur l’échafaud, ont commis
tout exprès un délit pour mourir chrétiennement. L’école mi-
litaire de Berlin est située sur la Sprée ; je voyais de ma fenêtre
des cadavres dans la rivière, c’étaient des soldats suicidés. Un
142. Cloots, ‘La République universelle’, 246.
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soir nous entendîmes une décharge de mousqueterie sur la
place d’armes ; c’étaient douze ou quinze braves légionnaires
qui, après avoir fait ensemble l’unique bon repas de leur vie, se
brûlèrent la cervelle aux oreilles du roi. Je n’entrerai pas dans
les détails lamentables du régime intérieur des casernes, du ré-
gime extérieur de la parade et des manœuvres. L’ennui et la
douleur dévorent ces prisonniers qui tiennent toute la nation
prisonnière.143
This was written a year after L’orateur, and it seems that his memory of
the Académie changed to a negative one. Are these anecdotes about sol-
diers committing suicide true? Or are these only motivated by the current
political events: the imminent war against Prussia after the Declaration of
Pillnitz and the unfruitful demand by the National Assembly that the Prus-
sian troops be removed from the French borders? It seems more likely to
be the latter and that Cloots tries here to reassure the French (and himself)
that the Prussian army would not be strong enough anyway. In his PhD
thesis, Sikora has analysed the extent of desertion and the harsh discipline,
and he seems to corroborate Cloots’s picture of distress among the Prus-
sian soldiers. Sikora cites a source, according to which mothers made their
male children work hard in order to make them malformed and inapt for
the army, although it may be a self-justification for child abuse and child
labour.144 It corroborates nonetheless Cloots’s writings about the curse of
a son in good physical condition. By the same token, a study on a Prussian
regiment in the year 1770–1771 shows that nine deserted and eight commit-
ted suicide.145 Another source reminiscing of his youth as soldier tells how
soldiers committed a murder in order to be sentenced to death, and how
they chose to murder children because they were believed to go directly to
heaven as innocent souls.146 However, it seems that suicide was an option
of last resort when desertion was not possible. An analysis of the army bet-
ween 1717 and 1728 shows that out of 16 965 soldiers 1542 died, out of which
only 45 from accident or suicide, whilst 8562 deserted.147
beginnings in paris
After finishing his education at the Berlin military academy, and being the
heir of the family’s vast fortune, Cloots chose to go back to Gnadenthal to
start working on a book that, from his own account, would occupy him
143. Cloots, Ecrits révolutionnaires, 332–333.
144. Michael Sikora, Disziplin und Desertion, Historische Forschungen 57 (Duncker &
Humblot, 1996), 66.
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for four years fifteen hours a day.148 The book was published a year later,
in 1780, when Cloots was twenty-five. La Certitude des Preuves du Ma-
hométisme is the title of this book, which Cloots claimed to contain the
definitive theist argument, which would put an end to theological debates
about the one true religion.149 As Mortier notes, the field had already been
widely covered and left little space for a beginner.150 The book compiles a
synthesis of what some Enlightenment authors had to say against any dom-
inant monotheism, in favour of a reconciling theism, but it is also an intro-
ductory guide to Islam. The title and the pseudonym used are a direct ref-
erence to the Abbé Bergier’s 1767 La certitude des preuves du christianisme,
in which Bergier argues that Christianity is the only true religion.151 Cloots
takes the pseudonym Ali-Gir-Ber, alfaqui and doctor in theology, who is
supposedly writing the book, which is translated and heavily annotated by
the editor, whose footnotes are what constitute most of the book and Clo-
ots’s own views. Ali-Gir-Ber is presenting the same arguments as Nicolas
Bergier, but replacing Christianity with Islam, and in the footnotes Cloots
refutes every single statement and argument under the cover of the editor
and translator, quoting many philosophers of the Enlightenment to make
his point (Bacon, Bayle, Blount, Collins, Hume, Leibniz, Locke, Mosheim,
Nicole, Taylor, Voltaire).152 Doing so, the book works on several levels and
the chosen narrative strategy allows Cloots to incorporate his arguments as
part of this narration. By pretending to be Ali-Gir-Ber and reproducing the
same argumentation as Bergier, but for Islam, Cloots demonstrates that Ber-
gier’s argument about the certainty and the proofs of the one true religion
being Christianity could be used similarly by any other revealed religion,
such as Islam, and is therefore refuted. In the footnotes commenting this
argument, there are many explanations of the Muslim faith and practice;
the book can therefore be read as a guide to Islam to European readers. But
most importantly, Cloots’s main argument in the footnotes is to refute Ber-
gier, and any monotheist religion: if indeed there is a God, then this God
would have intended his will to be accessible to everyone notwithstanding
their intelligence or competence. God’s will should be accessible to all, and
therefore no religion is necessary to translate His will. The argument is not
new, and is definitively theist in that it concludes that there is one God, but
that there is no one true religion; all religions could agree on the same ‘Su-
preme Being’, and should stop claiming to be the only true religion of God.
After the revolution, Cloots will declare himself an atheist, although his ‘sys-
148. Mortier, Anacharsis Cloots, 39–40; Cloots, Ecrits révolutionnaires, 617.
149. Cloots, Certitude des preuves.
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tem’ will be based on nature, as a sort of new divinity or ‘Supreme Being’,
as will be seen in the chapter on nature.
Cloots arrived in Paris in 1780 with his first publication as credentials. He
joined the Musée, an intellectual circle for discussions and learning, where
he remained a member from 1781 to 1791.153 The topic of religion occupied
him in a second and shorter book published in 1783 and entitled Lettre sur
les Juifs.154 With his characteristic tolerance and search for truth, Cloots re-
futed the rabbis who preached faith on ‘chimerical events’, but also refuted
the false prejudices against the Jews among the general population.155 This
created controversy with the president of the Musée, Antoine Court de Gé-
belin (1725–1784), which was published in the form of public letters at the
end of the Lettre sur les Juifs. Cloots’s book discussed the reason for which
the Jewish people had not been exterminated despite several attacks against
them. Contrary to his ‘ecclesiastical friend’, who argued that God’s will had
saved the Jews, Cloots argued that it was trade that saved them. Gébelin cri-
ticised Cloots for not only stating a truism regarding the Jews and trade, but
also for being ignorant of religion in general and Judaism in particular—an
ignorance, he notes, due to the passions that the philosophes of the répub-
lique des lettres feel when discussing religion, confusing ‘truth’ with their
one-sided theistic view.156 Cloots answered by denouncing the duplicity of
Gébelin, who had previously praised his dissertation. Cloots defended him-
self against Gébelin’s attacks by stating that he had not obviously pretended
to claim that he was the first to link the Jews with commerce.
The same year, Cloots joined another intellectual club, the Lycée français
of Pilâtre de Rozier, who was the first to fly in a hot air balloon above
Paris on 21 November 1783 together with the Marquis François Laurent
d’Arlandes. It is in the Lycée that he met Gabriel Brizard (1744–1793), also
known as ‘l’abbé Brizard’. He was named abbé due to his poor background
that left him with only one option of receiving a catholic education. In real-
ity he was not at all a member of the Church, but one of the philosophes of
the république des lettres with whom he shared anti-clericalism. Cloots and
Brizard became very close friends and their mutual admiration for Rous-
seau — if not sheer idolisation — sent them on a pilgrimage to Ermenon-
ville, a commune in the Oise département in northern France, where Rou-
153. On the musées and lycées as intellectual circles of socialisation and education, see
Hervé Guénot, ‘Musées et lycées parisiens (1780–1830)’,Dix-huitième Siècle 18, no. 1 (1986):
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sseau was buried. Rousseau had reached the status of adulation only saints
enjoyed among believers. His fiends came to visit his grave. The owner of
the property where Rousseau spent his last days, René Louis de Girardin
(1735–1808), made it clear in his guide that the place was open to anyone
who wished to visit. Girardin had designed the landscape of the garden at
Ermenonville inspired by Rousseau’s philosophy, which was largely built
by 1776. In this garden, he built Rousseau’s house, where he left copies of
his last manuscriptsLes confessions andRêveries du promeneur solitaire. The
highlight of the pilgrimage was visiting the small island with poplars, where
Rousseau’s grave stood. Many people came to do the pilgrimage, including
Marie Antoinette.157 Girardin wrote a guide for the visitor,158 whilst another
guide mentioned Rousseau’s grave.159
In Ermenonville, the two friends bought objects that supposedly were in
Rousseau’s possession—some philosophical relics. They interviewed many
of the town’s inhabitants about Rousseau. At the end of their pilgrimage,
they burned works attacking Rousseau on his tomb— a form of cathartic
expiation. In his later writings, Cloots distanced himself from Rousseau
and preferred Voltaire.160 Nonetheless, he later acquired a farm and lands in
the same département of Oise, where he was subsequently elected as a rep-
resentant to the Convention in 1792. Brizard was editing and publishing the
complete works of Rousseau from 1788 until 1793 when he died in poverty
and oblivion.
Cloots frequented other intellectual circles such as the salons, thanks to
his immense fortune that opened all doors easily.161 According to Avenel, he
attended the salons of Madame Helvétius, madame de Cheminot, Julie Tal-
mat, and Fanny Talmat.162 In particular, he frequented the salon run by the
countess of Beauharnais, which was frequented by Louis-Sébastien Mercier
(1740–1814) and Nicolas Edme Restif de La Bretonne (1734–1806).163
In 1784, Cloots started his grand tour of Europe. He spent the summer
of 1784 in London, where he met Lord Shelburne, and Edmund Burke.
They socialised at the time, but later Burke famously wrote his Reﬂections
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on the Revolution in France arguing against it.164 This opus was meant as a
reply to Dr Richard Price’s sermon to the Revolution Society in the United
Kingdom.165 Cloots responded with a letter that he subsequently published
in May 1790, urging Burke to see how enlightened the Parisian crowd was
and to forgive the ‘few’ barbaric acts that were to be put on the account of
centuries of oppression.166 Burke answered in French with some mistakes,
but good enough to give a hint of his sarcastic tone when he stated that he
would be delighted to meet the enlightened crowd in question.167 There is
however no proof that this unfinished letter was sent to Cloots or that he
read it, but according to the editors of his correspondence, ‘the style Burke
used suggests that it too may have been intended for publication’.168 This
can be confirmed by what Cloots wrote himself inAnacharsis à Paris in Oc-
tober 1790: ‘M. Burke m’a promis une réfutation volumineuse que j’attends
encore’.169 In another letter— published this time— Burke clarified his po-
sition regarding ‘his old acquaintance’ Cloots, and joined his voice to the
many other ones regarding his embassy of the human race at the National
Assembly and subsequently at the fête de la fédération.170 Burke continued
his critique against the French Republic and Cloots’s delegation of the hu-
man race by expressing a rather sarcastic form of consolation:
Pity that Cloots had not had a reprieve from the Guillotine
’till he had compleated his work! But that engine fell before
the curtain had fallen upon all the dignity of the earth.171
In February 1786, Cloots was perusing some books in a library in Am-
sterdam when he met someone introducing himself as Castriotto — from
George Castriota, the great Prince of Albania, better known as Alexander
Beg, or Skanderbeg. In reality, the Prince was Stefano Zannowich (or Stje-
pan Zanović), son of a donkey driver, born in Montenegro. He was one
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of these many self-fashioned imposters of the second-half of the eighteenth
century who seemed to have read too many pretender novels depicting com-
moners parading as kings, and acted in real life as one of their protagon-
ists.172 Zanović actually used his alleged title of prince, not only to infiltrate
the circles of French aristocracy, but also to publish himself in the hope of
becoming an important author in the Republic of Letters.173 The most fam-
ous of all adventurers and, at times, pretenders— Casanova— mentioned
him in his memoirs, as the brother of ‘… Premislas Zanowitch, qui après
devint fameux comme son frère… Ces deux grands grecs [filous, fripons]
moururent mal tous les deux’.174 Cloots was the last victim of his impos-
ture as he was arrested for debt shortly afterwards.175 Zannowich had previ-
ously taken the false identity of a rich merchant from Dalmatia, deceiving
merchants in Amsterdam. He slit his wrists in detention.176
Cloots related this encounter in 1786 in Les vœux d’un gallophile, his
second major book mixing his analysis of the political economy of France,
and elements of his personal life, with one common denominator: his love
for France.177 It also contained a small satyrical play with Voltaire playing a
last trick on a priest called to his deathbed,Voltaire ou les prêtres déçus. Inter-
estingly, Cloots mentions influential authors that he read at that time, such
as Bayle, Collins, Bolinbroke, Hume, Helvétius, Fréret, Boulanger, Voltaire,
Rousseau, Robinet.178 During the summer of 1786 Cloots visited Vienna,
Buda, Italy, and Switzerland. Cloots was traveling throughout North Africa,
Spain and Portugal when the news of the storming of the Bastille and the
revolution reached him. He rushed immediately back to Paris.
public career
In the context of the print explosion of 1789, and particularly newsprint
from July 1789, Cloots is one of those who benefited, and he started a new
career as a journalist and political commentator.179 He changed his mind re-
172. Richard Maxwell, The Historical Novel in Europe, 1650–1950 (Cambridge: Cam-
bridge University Press, 2012), 124.
173. See Stjepan Zanović,Œuvres choisies du prince Castriotto d’Albanie contenant Le por-
trait caractéristique du Prince héréditaire de Prusse (Frédéric-Guillaum)..., une lette au
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garding his publishing strategy after the French revolution broke out. Rat-
her than writing thick treatises of philosophy, read by just a few intellec-
tuals, he considered the shorter genre of brochures and articles to be best
suited for the dissemination of his ideas. As long as an idea is philosophic-
ally sound in his view it does not need long treatises.180
Cloots was careful to remain independent and to reach as wide and varied
a readership as possible. He thus wrote for many of the newspapers that
appeared in the new public sphere, such as la Chronique de Paris, la Gazette
Universelle, le Moniteur, le Patriote Français, la Révolution de France et de
Brabant, les Annales Patriotiques et Littéraires, le Courrier de Paris et des
83 départements, le Journal des Jacobins, and le Batave. As Cloots wrote
himself in 1793 in his Adresse aux Français:
En écrivant mes articles, je disais en voici un pour la flasque
Chronique ; en voici un pour le réservé Moniteur ; en voici un
pour la Gazette hermaphrodite, avant l’époque de sa perver-
sion totale ; en voici un autre pour le lourd Patriote, un autre
pour le trivial Gorsas ; un autre pour le mâle Carra. Je me ser-
vais de tous les carrosses, voire même des casse-cou et des tape-
culs, pour faire voyager la vérité bien ou mal à son aise.181
Mortier notes that Cloots was one of the great journalists of the French
Revolution, and he enjoyed real popularity among a large audience.182 Clo-
ots made his opinion known. He wrote against the French émigrés, in fa-
vour of the separation of Church and state. However, he was not yet anti-
monarchist as he still praised Frederic II’s Enlightened despotism in Prussia.
In December 1790, he became a member of the Jacobins Club and wrote in
favour of the return of the king to Paris (leaving Versailles), and against the
king as head of armies because Cloots feared a potentially charismatic mil-
itary chief who could overshadow the legislative power.183 A fear eminently
prophetic.
One of the most well-known actions that made Cloots instantly (in)fam-
ous is his ‘mediatic coup’ — so to speak — performed on 19 June 1790 at
the National Assembly, as sketched in the opening paragraph of this thesis.
Self-proclaimed ‘ambassador of the human race’, Cloots led a delegation of
thirty five foreigners in their vernacular costumes representing the diversity
of humanity to the French Assembly. The object of this mise-en-scène was
to draw the members’ attention to the universality of the Declaration of
the Rights of Man, and thereby the universality of the French Revolution,
which was to be celebrated for the first time on the first anniversary of the
180. See the chapter on self-fashioning and rhetoric for further details.
181. Cloots, Ecrits révolutionnaires, 449.
182. Mortier, Anacharsis Cloots, 114–115.
183. Ibid., 115–16.
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Bastille-day, 14 July 1790. As Mortier notes, this shows, already before the
publication of the Universal Republic, Cloots’s commitment to the people
as the only legitimate sovereign, rather than the monarch or head of state.184
In his Discours prononcé à la barre de l’Assemblée Nationale Cloots in-
sisted that this celebration ‘… ne sera pas seulement la fête des Français, mais
encore la fête du genre humain’.185 Therefore, he asked that some foreigners
be admitted to the celebration:
Un nombre d’étrangers de toutes les contrées de la terre de-
mandent à se ranger au milieu du Champ de Mars; & le bon-
net de la liberté qu’ils élèveront avec transport, sera le gage de
la délivrance prochaine de leurs malheureux concitoyens.186
A vast polemic ensued about the authenticity of the delegates, which
would last well into the nineteenth century, and even to the present days.187
Contemporary historians such as Roland Mortier, François Labbé, but also
Selma Stern in 1914, have investigated the case and all agree on the unfair
and polemical nature of the claim of inauthenticity of the delegates. It is
undeniable, according to the National Archive and authenticated at the
time by commissaires, that most of these representatives of the human race
were political refugees in France (the Italian painter Francesco Giuseppe
Casanova (1727–1803), Giacomo’s younger brother, was among them).188
Mortier describes the vast polemic about Cloots’s endeavour that mocked
unfairly the delegation for not being composed of real foreigners. In partic-
ular, a Turk was accused of being an actor in costume. In reality, he was
a Turkish specialist in Arabic literature at the Royal Library, and felt that
he had to write an answer to defend himself and Cloots’s embassy.189 This
Turk, it has to be said, had had the unfortunate idea to express himself in
what appeared to be an imperfect or unintelligible French, attracting the
ill-intended and mean-spirited sarcasms of the aristocrats and monarchists.
The other members of the delegation, according to Mortier, stemmed from
the intellectual, financial, and economic world.190
Cloots attended the celebration together with his delegation on the first
Fête de la Fédération, a rainy 14 July 1790. His idea of an ‘embassy’ of the
184. Ibid., 126.
185. Cloots, Ecrits révolutionnaires, 28.
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human race had much more importance in the evolution of Cloots’s polit-
ical thought. In his view, and also in his enemies’, each of these individu-
als represented (or were supposed to represent) their country of origin bet-
ter than official diplomats because the sovereign was not the monarch but
the people. At the Fête, the ‘real’ ambassadors from these countries were
equally present, and according to his own account, they did not seem very
pleased by Cloots’s delegation claiming to represent their country by repres-
enting their people rather than their kings.191 The answer given by the Pres-
ident of the National Assembly, none other than Emmanuel-Joseph Sieyès,
the theoretician of national sovereignty, was measured and cautious.192
Oui, Messieurs, la France s’honorera en vous admettant à la
fête civique dont l’assemblée nationale vient d’ordonner les
préparatifs ; mais pour prix de ce bienfait, elle se croit en droit
d’exiger de vous un témoignage éclatant de reconnoissance.
Après l’auguste cérémonie, retournez dans les lieux qui vous
ont vu naîtres ; dites à vos monarques, dites à vos adminis-
trateurs, quelques noms qu’ils puissent porter, que s’ils sont
jaloux de faire passer leur mémoire à la postérité la plus recu-
lée, dites-leur qu’ils n’ont qu’à suivre l’exemple de Louis XVI,
le restaurateur de la liberté Française.193
Diplomatically, the President reaffirmed that the king was the sovereign
who reinstalled liberty for the people, and not the people. The foreigners
were invited to go back to their native country to beseech their own mon-
arch to follow Louis XVI’s example.
Sieyès’s affirmation is in very striking contradiction with what is already
implied in Cloots’s thought, a bottom-up ‘regeneration’ of the people cre-
ating a revolution thereby freeing themselves, rather than a top-down grant
of liberty from the king. And to Cloots this ‘regeneration’ should be exten-
ded to other populations not yet ‘regenerated’.
191. Anacharsis Cloots, ‘Discours prononcé à la barre de l’Assemblée nationale, par M.
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In his chronicle of 15 July 1790 for the Chronique de Paris, Cloots wrote
about Holland and her geopolitical situation vis-à-vis Prussia.194 This mar-
ked the beginning of his thinking process on his ‘system’. He called it ‘nou-
veau système de la Gaule’, and introduced the idea of incorporating another
country— Holland— to the French Republic with representatives sent to
the Parliament.195 Cloots often insisted on the name ‘Gaul’ rather than ‘Fra-
nce’, showing a distinction to what he perceived as the embodiment of the
French monarchy. France is the name given after all to the original kingdom
‘Ile-de-France’, and history shows the will of succeeding French kings to in-
corporate other provinces into the ‘French’ kingdom. The name France is
thus tainted with the idea of monarchy. However, Cloots is not yet openly
showing signs of a commitment to republican ideas, as will be studied in the
chapter on republicanism. It is rather a re-appropriation of existing theses
regarding the Frankish origins of aristocracy and the Gauls as the original
people of ‘France’. Cloots mentioned the Franks who invaded Gaul to de-
prive its inhabitants of their liberty. Henri de Boulainvilliers (1658–1722)
popularised this narrative of a progressive alienation of political liberty, also
known as thèse nobiliaire against the thèse royale from royal apologists such
as Jean-Baptiste Dubos (1670–1742).196 In this thèse nobiliaire narrative, the
‘conquest’ of Gaul by the Franks is the centrepiece, and Boulainvilliers iden-
tifies this moment as the foundation of the nation française, with an egalit-
arian republican government led by a ‘national assembly’; but progressively
the French nation was stripped of its sovereignty through feudalism, leav-
ing it ultimately enslaved under ‘despotism’ enforced by the monarchy.197
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1790 is also the year that Cloots began his own regeneration. The ‘regen-
eration of man’ was a common theme of the revolution, developing a gen-
eral project of education of man as enslaved subject towards a free citizen, a
regeneration of the old world into a new one.198 Cloots undertook a similar
project with himself by changing his name and adding an epithet.199 In the
Chronique de Paris 15 March 1790, Cloots writes:
Je renonce à mon berceau tudesque et à mes titres gothiques
pour me revêtir de l’honorable qualité de bourgeois de Paris.
Article signé Cloots du Val de Grâce, baron en Allemagne, ci-
toyen en France.200
From February 1791 on, Cloots systematically signed his writings as the
‘Orateur du genre humain’. Since February 1790, Cloots had already rejec-
ted his Christian name Jean-Baptiste, and adopted instead the one of ‘Ana-
charsis’. According to Labbé, Cloots may have met the abbé Barthélémy,
who published in 1788 a novelised biography of the Scythian philosopher
Anacharsis.201 Voyage du jeune Anacharsis en Grèce was a best-seller at the
time.202 The book was a fiction based on historical erudition, and its success
was instantaneous, even if short-lived.203 As Labbé notes, it is highly likely
that Cloots identified himself with the Scythian Anacharsis since they both
travelled from their native North to the Southern capitals of philosophy of
their time—Athens and Paris. They both learned a second language in their
youth that was the language of Enlightenment at their time — Greek and
French. They both adopted this new country and witnessed the beginning
of a new Republic.204 One may add that Cloots compared in many of his
writings the current situation in France with classical Greece, and saw Paris
as the central capital of philosophy as Athens had once been.
On 13 October 1790, Cloots received an invitation to join the Cercle So-
cial for its first meeting at the Palais Royal. He attended the inaugural lec-
ture given by the self-proclaimed Procureur Général de la Vérité Claude
Fauchet (1744–1793) — a radical socialist priest, who was at Versailles be-
fore being expelled after violent sermons against the court. He was elected
deputy in 1791, and guillotined on 31 October 1793. Fauchet exposed his
views of a sort of Catholic socialism and theocratic ideas, explaining Rous-
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seau through the Bible in public lectures.205 This event at the Cercle Social
received large publicity, but Cloots did not express himself even if he dis-
agreed. It was only after Fauchet attacked Voltaire more directly that Cloots
decided to write against him on 28 October 1790 in the Courrier de Paris
dans les 83 départements. Until then, Cloots had been mainly a theist, as
expressed in Les Certitudes and Vœux d’un gallophile.206 Cloots affirmed
his now materialistic and atheist convictions, and attacked Fauchet on this
ground, and also for misusing and abusing Rousseau and Voltaire’s names
and ideas. However, after a personal encounter with Fauchet, Cloots presen-
ted his apologies and accepted Fauchet’s ideas as some kind of temporary
necessity, a transition to an eventual atheism and final liberation from re-
ligion.207 Nevertheless, the fight continued between Cloots and the Cercle
Social, especially after the Cercle’s expression of its view that only Freema-
sons should be elected to official positions.208 In the end, Cloots contin-
ued his attacks and wanted to organise a public debate between him and
Fauchet, which, disappointingly, could not take place as the two could not
agree to the conditions of the debate.209
This episode, and his later radicalisation from a theistic to an atheistic
position, probably is the reason why Cloots would later be dubbed ‘per-
sonal enemy of Jesus Christ’, a sentence often written in the short entries
in encyclopaedias. Mortier notes that the sentence that was later wrongly
and apocryphally attributed to Cloots— ‘Je me déclare l’ennemi personnel
de Jésus Christ’— is nowhere to be found in any of his writings, and consti-
tutes part of anti-revolutionary propaganda.210 One may add that it is quite
possible that this epithet originated from Riouffé’s Mémoires d’un détenu,
where he described Cloots as such: ‘L’orateur du genre humain, l’ennemi
personnel de Jesus-Christ, Cloots…’.211 What was meant as an apocryphal
semi-derisive addition to mark his atheism became part of his biography
afterwards.
Mortier considers Cloots to be one of the most significant political thin-
kers in the years 1791–92.212 Not only as a journalist, but also as a pamphlet-
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eer, Cloots wrote extensively on the subject that, already then, obsessed the
revolutionaries — the perils from abroad threatening the French Revolu-
tion. He put his education at the Berlin military Academy to use and his
knowledge of the country for his military and geopolitical analyses. Accord-
ing to Cloots, there was no threat from Prussia.213
On 20 April 1792, a decree declared war on Francis II, King of Hungary
and Bohemia, which was meant to avoid involving the German states. Clo-
ots appeared at the National Assembly:
C’est la crise de l’univers : le sort du genre humain est entre
les mains de la France. Nous combattons pour les droits de
l’homme, et nos victoires ajouteront un nouvel éclat à la di-
gnité humaine ; nous frapperons les despotes et nous délivre-
rons les hommes.214
Cloots also donated ‘12.000 livres qui serviront à équiper, habiller, armer
et solder 40.000 à 50.000 combattants’.215 Cloots added to this his new book
entitled La République Universelle. In this 1792 pamphlet, Cloots develo-
ped his idea that there only can be one sovereign on earth, the human race,
and that, therefore, the goal of the human race is to build a universal repub-
lic. The French Revolution is only the beginning of the universal revolution.
One could interpret this as yet another act of megalomania, or one could
interpret this as putting Machiavelli’s teaching into practice. Cloots was a
student of ‘la science du profond Machiavel’, who wrote and famously ad-
vocated the need for Florence to have its own army of citizens because a
polity’s own citizens fight better when they fight for their own land and
know why.216 In other words, according to Cloots, the French soldiers were
fighting for ‘the freedom’ other ‘oppressed sovereigns’, with the creation of
the universal republic in sight. Moreover, it was common practice for the
revolutionaries to enlighten the soldier. In the process of forming the repub-
lic, the revolutionaries needed to educate the youth and re-educate adults to
operate the ‘regeneration’ of the republic. As Hunt notes, ‘one of the most
important “Jacobin” schools was the army of 1792–94’, and they sent them
many newspapers and pamphlets as coursebooks.217 Cloots’s pamphlet was
therefore only one among many others, and far from a megalomaniac idea,
it was his attempt at spreading his ideas among the ‘pupils’ of the republic—
the soldiers.
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Cloots’s pamphlet provoked once more a violent critique from the rad-
ical left of the Assembly. In ‘L’Orateur du peuple’, Martel wrote that Cloots
was ‘un fou dangereux’, whose ‘folie surpasse celle de l’abbé Pierre ; il feint
d’ignorer les intrigues de la Cour…’. Cloots was suspected and openly ac-
cused of being a double agent: on the one hand, paying lip service to the
revolution while, on the other, serving foreign monarchies. The zeal with
which he pushed for war against these monarchies was perceived as a sinis-
ter plan to lead the French Revolutionary armies to a certain death. Martel
concluded in terms not so different from the way Sieyès as President of the
Assembly had answered Cloots’s embassy of the human race: ‘… que chacun
dans sa patrie écrase ses rois, et il n’y aura de guerre nul part’. But not be-
fore he added that Cloots was a ‘philosophe insensé’, struck with ‘démence’.
This political hatred vocalised in the form of a libel regarding Cloots’s san-
ity, and questioning his allegiance due to his foreign origins were already
expressed in violent terms. The same hatred was to resurface in 1794; by
then it was not solely limited to the rhetorical realm.
Cloots wrote an article entitled ‘Origine du mot « Ça ira »’ inChronique
de Paris, 4 May 1792, in which he expressed his belief that France would
eventually get rid of her enemies the way America got rid of England in Bo-
ston.218 He insisted on the liberation of Savoie, Valais, Vaud, Fribourg, Bern,
and Zurich, and presented his military tactics of mobility and harassment.
In this article, one can see how Cloots recycled widely shared arguments in
order to disseminate his own. Cloots added his own ideal of the liberation
of the whole of humankind to the argument of expanding France to her
‘natural frontiers’. All extensions of France were based on the argument of
‘unity’.219
In the Chronique de Paris on 29 May 1792, Cloots published, in a rare
public display of his private life, his mother’s letter and his own answer to
it. She implored him to find shelter in England as she was worried about
the hatred that the Jacobins created in the rest of Europe, but Cloots re-
fused. He was as much confident that the citizen-soldiers would prevail as
he was confident that the Prussian army would be defeated because, unlike
the French, Prussian soldiers were not treated right and had no personal
motivation in fighting. He firmly believed in what he perceived to be the
struggle for truth against tyranny. In a way, if ‘l’infâme’ was for Voltaire
religion, it is for Cloots religion and any other form of tyranny, in this mo-
ment represented by monarchy; the motto ‘écrasez l’infâme’ took a literal
turn.
During this period, Cloots became openly republican and anti-monarch-
ist. Previously, he still had been an admirer of Frederic II as ‘Enlightened
despot’. In his anti-monarchism, he found support in many others, and es-
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pecially the most famous of them all, Condorcet. He began collaborating
with Condorcet at the Chronique de Paris, and the two were on good per-
sonal terms.220
french citizenship and election
On 10 August 1792, the Tuileries — then centre of the executive power —
was taken by a group led by the National Guard of the Insurrectional Paris
Commune and revolutionary fédérés from Marseille and Brittany. When
the insurrection of 10 August 1792 and the massacre of September occurred,
Cloots was not yet engaged in political life, even if he considered — and
rightly so according to Mortier— that his writings contributed to prepare
the proclamation of the Republic.221
After these events, the Legislative Assembly decreed the king’s removal
and the convocation of a new ‘Constituante’ named ‘Convention’ on the
model of the American revolution. Its purpose was to draw up a new con-
stitution, after deliberation and vote for elected deputies. Elections were
called, but Cloots lamented that he was not eligible because of the rule
concerning ‘residency’. Cloots suddenly took pride again in being Prussian.
He explained that high ranked Prussian military officers were in favour of
the French Revolution, including Hertzberg— of whom he was highly crit-
ical in his 1791 Dépêche du Prussien Cloots au Prussien Hertzberg.222 Con-
sequently, Cloots asked for the incorporation of Prussian officers into the
French army.223 Condorcet supported his initiative. Mortier notes that Clo-
ots was well aware of the ongoing trends in German public opinion.224
The député Guadet took the initiative to promulgate a decree on 26 Au-
gust 1792 to grant French citizenship to foreigners ‘who served the cause
of liberty’.225 This honorific title was given to several foreigners, among the
most famous Priestley, Paine, Bentham, de Pauw, Washington, Hamilton,
Madison, and Schiller. This list was only honorific and did not have any
consequence except for Cloots and Paine, who were both elected member
of the Convention — and subsequently were both condemned to be guil-
lotined. However, Cloots did not have the same incredible twist of fate that
saved Paine.226
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Cloots was declared a French citizen on 26 August 1792, with effect on
6 September 1792.227 Cloots thanked the National Assembly on 27 August
1792, praising it for associating the ‘philosophes cosmopolites’ to the work
of the revolution, and swearing an oath ‘à la nation universelle, à l’égalité, à
la liberté, à la souveraineté du genre humain…’.228
Cloots wrote on 28 August 1792 Pétition des domestiques, which took
position against the law on the right to vote excluding those employed as
domestic servants, showing his egalitarian views on society. In this pamph-
let, Cloots defends universal suffrage for men and ask for household ser-
vants to be included. He later declared himself ‘sans-culotte’, and it is this
social egalitarianism that made him a personality of interest to nineteenth-
century socialist historians.
Cloots was elected to represent the Oise département, where he had bou-
ght a farm and land. He was elected at the second run with 279 votes out
of 452 voters. ‘Nous ne saurons jamais si c’est le vote de ses fermiers qui
aura été déterminant ou bien la préparation soignée des listes par les milieux
de la capitale’.229 He was elected as ‘Jean-Baptiste Cloots, citoyen français,
demeurant à Paris, connu sous le nom d’Anacharsis Cloots, orateur du genre
humain’.
Cloots accepted his election on 5 September 1792:
Mr le Président, j’accepte avec reconnaissance le poste hono-
rable et périlleux où mes concitoyens m’appellent. Et je jure
au nom du genre humain que le département de l’Oise ne se
repentira pas de son choix ….230
Cloots was also elected in the département of Saône-et-Loire, arrondisse-
ment Châlon-sur-Seine, where someone had added his name to the list.
However, Cloots chose the Oise because he had been elected there first. He
added that he swore ‘… de maintenir l’unité de l’empire français, en atten-
dant l’unité de la grande nation du genre humain’. Priestley was also elected,
but he declined the position, arguing that he did not speak French good
enough. Paine was equally elected in Oise, and also in Pas-de-Calais, which
he chose, even if he did not speak very good French either.
The events on 10 August 1792, and the massacres in September were
mostly due to the disaster of the war on the Eastern front for the French
armies.231 Paris believed in a quick and easy victory. This situation created
panic and an obsession of suspecting treason. The commune of Paris and
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the blood thirst that ensued provoked tortures and executions of the most
barbaric nature. The Girondins blamed the Montagnards, but many of
them chose to leave these terrible events behind after the victory at Valmy
on 20 September 1792. Condorcet was one of them.
Cloots did not take part in these events which occurred prior to his elec-
tion and, hence, political engagement. Nonetheless, Cloots chose to take re-
sponsibility for these acts and tried to tone them down by considering them
as catharsis by an oppressed population in a situation of crisis: ‘Salus populi
suprema lex’. As Mortier notes, in an attempt to explain the posthumous
propaganda surrounding Cloots: ‘Aussi est-ce sur lui, démuni de toute au-
torité politique, que l’histoire fera retomber le stigmate ignominieux d’un
crime qu’il n’a pas commis’.232
On 17 November 1792, Cloots published Ni Marat ni Roland.233 The
pamphlet expressed Cloots’s opinion regarding the aftermath of the Septem-
ber massacres and the political opposition between the Gironde and the
Montagne. Cloots denounced in this pamphlet what he viewed as populist
manœuvres by Marat, Roland, and Brissot, which manipulated popular
emotion created by the massacres. They were his former Girondin friends.
Instead, Cloots called for unity and for the people to rally around against
the divisions of the fédéralistes. Cloots repeated his argument expounded in
La république universelle regarding the unification of the human race. In
particular, he recalled a conversation he had with Brissot and Paine in which
Paine backed him in his view of a universal republic when Brissot thought
that even France was too big a territory to be an undivided republic. This po-
sitioning above political parties and siding with his philosophical principles
resulted in his isolation at the Convention. Ultimately, it garnered collect-
ive resentment, turning him into a scapegoat. In retrospect, the Girondin
Guadet, who suggested that Cloots be granted French citizenship, regretted
his motion.
As député de l’Oise, Cloots was very busy, but he did not care so much
about local politics and individual interventions. According to Labbé, Clo-
ots was not often present at the Convention.234 However, he participated
in the Commission particulière pour les Archives, in charge of evaluating the
state of national archives.
Concerning the King, Cloots, as many other revolutionaries, was initially
not against a parliamentary monarchy. In a pastiche letter by Louis XVI
to all the other kings on earth — ‘Le roi des Français à tous les rois de la
Terre, salut’ published in Chronique de Paris 2 March 1791— Cloots called
232. Mortier, Anacharsis Cloots, 308.
233. Anacharsis Cloots, Ni Marat, ni Roland. Opinion d’Anacharsis Cloots (Paris: De-
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all monarchs to imitate the French king and change their inherited ‘despotic
throne’ to a ‘throne over free men’.235
A year later, in his article ‘Monarchie sans roi’ published in Annales pat-
riotiques et littéraires 27 July 1792, Cloots pleaded for a monarchy without a
king, that is to say a presidential regime similar to the one in America with
Un monarque (Monos) à peu près comme Washington, élu
pour cinq ans et salarié modestement …. Le veto, entre ses
mains, sera un contrôle national dont le peuple ne s’alarmera
jamais ; le veto, cette belle prérogative des tribuns romains,
cette sauvegarde de la liberté contre les atteintes aristocrati-
ques ; le veto, qui ranimait les espérances du citoyen de Rome,
est devenu chez nous un mot odieux, un cri de désespoir en
passant par la bouche d’un roi des Français.236
Cloots opposed his republicanism to the monarchists, whom he called ‘les
royaumanes’.
The deputy Cloots finally voted for the execution of Louis XVI. InChro-
nique de Paris 10 May 1790, he had argued against the death penalty, consid-
ering the sentence of being enchained far worse than death in a country of
free men.237 But so had Robespierre, who changed his views on the death
penalty. Cloots argued for the death of the king, invoking the precedent
of modern England and ancient Rome in his Harangue.238 According to
Cloots, five hundred thousand copies of his Harangue were printed at the
National Assembly, and he wrote that this was not even enough as people
had to copy these printed versions.239 This figure seems highly unlikely ac-
cording to bibliographic surveys made on this period. It has been estimated
that ‘the average print run for a single eighteenth century edition’ was ‘no
more than 1,000 copies’.240 Economic reasons limited the number of cop-
ies printed to be above 500, and below 2,000.241 However, Hunt notes that,
for instance, the Convention sent directly one million copies of the Père
Duchesne over nine months, and thirty thousand newspapers per day to
the army.242
It was not only the king, but also partisans of the king, counter-revolu-
tionaries, who were denounced by Cloots. He called for a ‘purification of
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the Republic’, and to ‘execrate’ all monarchists. Cloots made here direct ref-
erence to Mirabeau, without mentioning his name. Mirabeau’s ashes were
transferred to the Pantheon, but the case of the ‘iron chest’, ‘l’armoire de
fer’, revealed secret documents and correspondance to the interior minister
Roland, notably between Mirabeau and the king. Honoré Gabriel Riqueti,
comte de Mirabeau (1749–1791) was a figure of the French Revolution who
used his oratory talents to favour the cause of the people, and a constitu-
tional monarchy. He was a national hero when he died, and his ashes were
transferred to the Pantheon. The correspondance revealed his duplicity be-
cause of his ties with the king and created a scandal among the revolutionary
establishment.
One of the Convention’s tasks was to draft and adopt a new constitu-
tion. The members proposed many drafts in 1793. However, Cloots’s pro-
ject Bases constitutionnelles was not one of them. Cloots presented his uni-
versal republic based on the recognition of the sovereignty of the human
race, which was subsequently published as Bases constitutionnelles de la
république du genre humain on this occasion, but his intervention was for
taking a decree proclaiming the sovereignty of the human race in view of
automatically incorporating any future country who would recognise the
same principle. However, Cloots does acknowledge that this decree is for-
mulated in the view of finding a stable constitution, for which the Conven-
tion was elected.243 This is also why Cloots suggested despensing with the
name Français in front of republic, and take instead the name ‘Germain’ as
in ‘kindred’, so that there would be no misunderstanding for future coun-
tries about joining a cosmopolitan universal republic and not an imperialist
French republic.244 He read the text of his proposition to the Convention,
which was received with laughter.245
main political writings and execution
Cloots’s pamphlets that elaborated on his political ‘system’ are L’orateur
du genre-humain, ou, Dépêche du Prussien Cloots, au Prussien Hertzberg
(1791),246 La république universelle ou adresse aux tyrannicides (1792),247 and
Bases constitutionnelles de la république du genre humain (1793).248 These
three pamphlets constitute for the greater part the subject of this study on
the political thought of Anacharsis Cloots because nowhere else did he de-
velop as much his main political ‘system’.
243. Cloots, ‘Bases constitutionnelles’, 475.
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The first pamphlet was written as an answer to Prussia’s Kabinettsmin-
ister (chief minister), Ewald Friedrich Graf von Hertzberg (1725–1795). As
every year since becoming the curator of the Berlin Academy in 1786, Hertz-
berg read a mémoire presenting his political views. Hertzberg was initially
in favour of the revolution as he praised its principles to be already imple-
mented in Prussia, but he subsequently rejected it when he saw that it at-
tacked the Prussian regime.249 It remains unclear as to which mémoire Clo-
ots was responding. In his 1789 mémoire, Hertzberg praised the French Re-
volution for putting an end to the preceding ‘monarchical despotism’, and
heading towards the Enlightened model already implemented in Prussia.250
It is only in 1791 that Hertzberg condemned the French Revolution for the
violence exerted in its name.251 Nonetheless, in 1790, Hertzberg’s mémoire
was more severe on the French Revolution than in 1789 as he condemned its
policy towards abolishing hereditary nobility.252 Presumably, this is the mé-
moireCloots answered to a few months later. However, in his answer Cloots
cited Hertzberg’s attack on him and his embassy in his response. But this is
nowhere to be found in Hertzberg’s mémoire. Cloots even quotes a passage
from thismémoire where he is supposedly attacked.253 But this excerpt does
not exist in the mémoire or in any of Hertzberg’s published works. What
matters the most in his answer for the study of cosmopolitanism is that
Cloots expressed for the first time the idea of a single society of the human
race, extending the popular concept of ‘regeneration’ of the people to the
whole human race organised in a ‘confederation of united individuals’.254
Cloots elaborated further on this idea a year later in La république uni-
verselle, written in February–March 1792. The occasion for publishing the
pamphlet was the constitution of a group of tyrannicides with the aim of
sending assassins throughout Europe to kill monarchs renamed ‘tyrans’.255
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In December 1790, Sylvain Maréchal (1750–1803) proposed to form a ‘légion
sacrée des tyrannicides’, which aimed at enrolling young patriots to defend
the Revolution against ‘tyrants’. The proposition was subsequently criti-
cised, but the flight of the King, stopped at Varennes during the night of 20–
21 June 1791,256 reignited the rhetoric of ‘tyrannicide’, although another pro-
ject presented at the Convention on 26 August 1792 by Jean Debry (1760–
1834) equally failed.257 Debry suggested forming an organisation of 1200 vol-
untaries to individually attack ‘tyrants’, which was then dubbed ‘Vengeur
de l’humanité’ by the deputies Chabot and Merlin, and was followed by a
debate regarding the morality of such action and the possibility of attracting
retributions against French generals between Vergniaud and Mailhe, who
answered that it was a war between liberty and despotism and therefore
beyond ancient questions of ethics and customs in war.258 In La république
universelle, Cloots presents his idea of ‘confederation of united individu-
als’ in a ‘universal republic’. Following the belief that ideas overturn whole
populations while the sword only kills one ‘tyrant’, Cloots imagined that
the French Revolution would spread to the whole world, which would join
the renamed French republic as ‘départements’ with representatives.
Cloots had been elected at the end of 1792, and hisBases constitutionnelles
de la république du genre humain reiterated in length his idea of ‘universal
republic’ finishing very succinctly by presenting three articles for a decree in
order to integrate other countries during the revolutionary wars, notably:
‘Article I. Il n’y a pas d’autre souverain que le genre humain’.259 Cloots’s idea
was that any nation (peoples) recognising this principle would automatic-
ally be included in the French republic.
Cloots’s last work, which remained unfinished, was a summary of the
history of the French Revolution.260 This series of articles opened the first
issue of a new publication named Le Batave created together with Dutch
revolutionaries in Paris. Not surprisingly, the history of the revolution is
written with a clear anti-monarchist tone, and is presented as the dawn of
the universal revolution of freedom against despotism. It is also set inside
a theoretical framework of scientific inevitability; revolutions are a healthy
physiological reaction to the diseases of the political body.
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From 11–29 November 1793 Cloots was chosen to be the president of the
Jacobins. However, Cloots’s presidency was immediately followed by his ex-
clusion from the Jacobins at Robespierre’s demand. Cloots often changed
his affiliations and sympathies. He denounced his Girondin friends in Ni
Marat, ni Roland, alienating the whole group against him. He criticised
Robespierre and the theists in his own Jacobin group, as aristocrat he de-
nounced the aristocrats and declared himself sans-culotte. As Prussian he
refused his titles and criticised Prussian politics. As French he suggested
that the country adopted the name of ‘Republic of Germans’. Cloots’s con-
trarian views towards his own friends and club attracted critiques easily.
After writing the Universal Republic, and in particular his view that the Fre-
nch Republic should be called ‘Germaine’, understood in its original sense
of kinship, he was accused of being German and of plotting the demise of
France by taking her very name.261 It was not difficult for Robespierre to
accuse Cloots of opportunism and of being a Prussian spy.262
Cloots opposed Robespierre and his men on two fronts. Firstly, on the
question of war in 1792, and secondly on the question of secularisation in
1793. Robespierre was initially sympathetic to Cloots and his ideas, and, ac-
cording to Cloots, told him that he was the only one to raise adequately
the question of sovereignty.263 Reading Robespierre’s writings and project
of constitution in 1793, one cannot but draw a parallel with Cloots’s own
ideas. For instance, Robespierre also spoke of speaking from a ‘universal
tribune’ to the ‘human race’ in the name of ‘truth and justice’.264
As Robespierre’s influence grew, he succeeded in getting bankers, nobles,
and foreigners expelled from the Jacobins; priests were also targeted, but
Robespierre finally agreed to spare them. Cloots was one of those Jacobin
foreigners. Robespierre managed to get important powers with the institu-
tion of the Comité de Salut Public in December 1793. He participated in
the instigation of a movement of suspicion and verification among mem-
bers of the various clubs. Foreigners were in particular under scrutiny and
Cloots was called to explain himself on 12 December in front of the Jacobins,
after several attacks in the newspapers, notably on his views of religion.265
Cloots, however, did not defend himself, and left without explanation. In-
stead, he responded only on 20 December 1793 in a brochure entitled ‘Ap-
pel au genre humain’, in which he explains his political orientations and
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choices.266 There is no doubt concerning his sincerity and the evolution of
his philosophy, but it was too late; his fate was sealed. Cloots was the vic-
tim of a wider machination against the ‘Hébertistes’— a group he was not
a part of— and a paranoid fear of foreigners. The Hebertists were a group
formed around Jacques Hébert (1757–1794). Labbé quotes a contemporary,
the fellow German Konrad Engelbert Oelsner, who met Cloots during this
period and described his solitude and isolation: ‘On l’évitait pour ne pas
être soupçonné d’espionnage. Il cherchait sans espoir un visage compatis-
sant vers lequel se retourner’.267
On 25 December 1793, Robespierre attacked violently the foreigners of
Paris in a speech at the Convention. Cloots was subsequently arrested dur-
ing the night of 27–28 December at his Parisian residence on rue Ménars,
and sent to an improvised prison in the Luxembourg Palace.268 Cloots still
had time to write a few letters in prison, before being transfered to Saint-
Lazare, and on 20 March 1794, to the Conciergerie. His letters were desper-
ate appeals to reason and common sense in a turbulent period of passion
and terror. Cloots seemed to continue hoping for a change whilst accept-
ing his fate in recognition of his own mistakes: ‘Si je pèche, c’est par trop
de franchise et de naïveté… Effectivement, si mes principes sont universels,
mes talents ne le sont pas…’.269 Cloots still believed that he could reason
with Robespierre, and reminded him that they shared the same idea of the
sovereignty of the human race. Remaining in prison, Cloots then believed
in the people, this political entity that he wrote was never wrong, repres-
enting the general will; he wrote to the ‘Hommes de bonne volonté’, and
signed himself ‘Anacharsis Cloots, homme’.270 His very last recovered let-
ter dated 1 March 1794, addressed to the ‘Amis du genre humain’, ended on
these ominous words: ‘Citoyens-hommes, la liberté ou la mort !’.271
Cloots was guillotined on 24 March 1794. According to witnesses, he re-
mained courageous, even comforting his fellow inmates equally sentenced
to death.272 One can find an account of his last moments in Mémoires d’un
détenu, pour servir à l’histoire de la tyrannie de Robespierre by Honoré Ri-
ouffé (1764–1813), a politician.273 His account, retold almost word for word
by Adolphe Thiers in hisHistoire de la révolution française, depicts a prison
scene where passions flared quickly between Hébert and other prisoners the
night before going to the guillotine, each blaming the other for their con-
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dition.274 Cloots began to murmur a poem, apparently famous at the time,
written by an ‘ancient poet’— Patris— that can be found in its entirety in
an Encyclopédie poétique:
Le Rève du Riche :
Je rêvais cette nuit que, de mal consumé,
Côte à côte d’un pauvre on m’avait inhumé,
Et que, n’en pouvant pas souffrir le voisinage,
En mort de qualité je lui tins ce langage :
Eloigne-toi, coquin, retire-toi d’ici ;
II ne t’appartient pas de m’approcher ainsi.
— Coquin ! ce me dit-il d’une arrogance extrême :
Va porter tes coquins ailleurs ; coquin toi-même.
Ici tous sont égaux ; nous ne nous devons rien ;
Je suis sur mon fumier comme toi sur le tien.275
274. Adolphe Thiers, Histoire de la révolution française, 7th ed., vol. 3 (Bruxelles: Société
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2 C L O O T S ’ S S Y S T E M
C’est en consultant la nature
que je découvre un système
politique dont la simplicité sera
parfaitement saisie par
quiconque…
Cloots, 17931
What Cloots called himself his ‘system’ refers to his political thoughtoutlined mainly in three pamphlets he wrote during the revolution-
ary years: L’orateur du genre-humain, ou, Dépêche du Prussien Cloots, au
Prussien Hertzberg (1791),2 La république universelle ou adresse aux tyranni-
cides (1792),3 and Bases constitutionnelles de la république du genre humain
(1793).4 This ‘system’ defined in these three pamphlets is what forms the
core of the analysis in this study, since Cloots did not develop it further
in any other writings. Cloots does not present his system in a unified and
structured way, as it would be in an academic treatise. Instead, Cloots wrote
using revolutionary pamphleteering rhetoric. But that does not mean that
he did not see himself as a philosopher developing a philosophical ‘system’.
This chapter is the first attempt at presenting a systematic and structured
view of Cloots’s political thought as a system. Previous studies have not
successfully done so, mainly because Cloots’s thought involves many differ-
ent and intertwined ideas; it is an eclectic system. Cloots’s main idea is that
the whole of the human race forms a single nation (in the political sense
of the term), and that it is the only nation that should exist as a political
entity. This principle is based on the observation of nature and of human-
kind— both universal— and using reason— also universal— therefore res-
ulting in a universal principle. It is also based on observing its successful
application in France by the most rational people in the world: the French.
Therefore, the creation of the French republic, based on the Declaration
of the Rights of Man is indeed the mere beginning of the coming republic
of the human race. Every individual being born free and equal, all sover-
eignty stems from them and they form the only sovereign entity on earth
all together. Moreover, since there are no differences among men besides su-
1. Cloots, Bases constitutionnelles, 3.
2. Cloots, L’orateur du genre humain.
3. Cloots, La république universelle.
4. Cloots, Bases constitutionnelles.
93
94 cloots’s system
perficial ones— such as the colour of their skin and cultural mores— there
ought to be only one sovereign polity, a universal republic.5 This unifica-
tion is not only guided by the study of nature and human nature, but also
desirable as a means to end all wars in the world.
How to understand this system? I think it is best understood within
the framework of German metaphysics, and particularly the philosophy of
Christian Wolff (1679–1754). This understanding may seem far-fetched be-
cause Cloots never mentions Wolff in his revolutionary writings, and hardly
any German philosopher besides Leibniz, whose Théodicée is quoted twice
in Certitude for his argumentation on revealed religion and on Jewish re-
ligion,6 and in his revolutionary writings Cloots mentions also Leibniz as
an example of noteworthy philosophers coming from abroad (outside Fra-
nce).7 Cloots studied in Berlin under Sulzer, whose course in ‘metaphysics’
certainly included Wolff, but there are only two mentions of Wolff in Clo-
ots’s pre-revolutionary works (in Certitude as we will se later).
Wolff was the prominent name in German philosophy during this time
between Leibniz and Kant; the latter’s writings, unlike Leibniz’s, Cloots was
certainly not familiar with. There can be several hypotheses for explaining
these few mentions of Wolff in Cloots’s writings. One is that Cloots inten-
ded his publication to reach a French audience primarily, which was not
necessarily well acquainted with Wolff or, when it was, thought that he was
simply recycling Leibniz.8 Therefore, it could be that Cloots did not men-
tion Wolff because he was not considered that important to French readers
or less so than Leibniz. Another one is that Voltaire was one of Cloots’s role
models, and Voltaire, who read Wolff’s works on metaphysics, did not care
much for his metaphysics and again considered it to be Leibniz’s, whom he
refuted.9 This may therefore be why Cloots chose not to mention Wolff
after his Certitude, but Leibniz at least, who was recognised by Voltaire
and the French members of the République des lettres. Finally, it is also pos-
sible that Cloots’s knowledge of Wolff’s philosophy was through Sulzer, his
5. Cloots, ‘La République universelle’, 271.
6. Cloots, Certitude des preuves, 330, 523.
7. Cloots, Ecrits révolutionnaires, 163, 293.
8. See the author’s ‘Avertissement’ in the first volume, which presents a literature re-
view of works in French presenting Wolff’s philosophy: Jean Des Champs, Cours abrégé de
philosophie Wolﬃenne, en forme de lettres, 3 vols. (Amsterdam: Arkstée et Merkus, 1743–
1747).
9. See the correspondance between Voltaire, the marquise du Châtelet, and Frederic on
Wolff in Hans Droysen, ‘Die Marquise du Châtelet, Voltaire und der Philosoph Christian
Wolff’, Zeitschrift für französische Sprache und Literatur 35 (1909): 226–248; and in Ira O.
Wade,The Intellectual Development of Voltaire, Princeton Legacy Library (Princeton, N.J.:
Princeton University Press, 1969), 298–302.
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teacher in Berlin, and his text book Kurzer Begriff aller Wißenschaften.10
There are no works from Wolff at the Gnadenthal library; only Sulzer’s.
It is nonetheless in a general Wolffian framework which I understand
Cloots’s own ‘system’. However, it is only a framework and not a deep en-
gagement with Wolff’s own system at an academic level. This general frame-
work can be characterised as an understanding of the universe as a single
system in which all sciences are included in a comprehensive unity, which
philosophy, based on reason, can discover and explain. Specific branches of
knowledge complement each other in a unified system that I will describe
below. Cloots also used an eclectic range of philosophers and ideas within
this framework, and sometimes attempts to reconcile opposite ideas and
philosophers as if trying to reconcile all points of view into his ‘system’.
In order to demonstrate this Wolffian framework in Cloots’s ‘system’,
despite the relative absence of mentions to Wolff, I will present several ar-
guments here. First, I will argue that Cloots’s works published as pamph-
lets should be taken as serious works of (political) philosophy even though
he was not an academic philosopher in the same sense that Wolff was; the
choice of pamphlets was deliberate and is also contextually explained as
common practice. Second, I will argue that Cloots’s system is one of many
in the century (and the previous one) to attempt to solve the old European
problem of peace and stability; doing so, Cloots is in line with Wolff’s sep-
aration between theoretical philosophy (metaphysics) and practical philo-
sophy, which seeks the improvement of humankind. Third, I will argue
that Cloots’s system that solves this old problem is very likely to have been
inspired by his education in Berlin and his study of German metaphysics.
Finally, this should shed light to understanding his system, which is remin-
iscent of Wolff’s conception of a system, of his organisation of philosophy
and its various disciplines, and of his civitas maxima.
pamphlets r ather than treatises
First of all, I wish to argue that Cloots should not be understood as a pamph-
leteer among others, but as a philosopher with a whole philosophical sys-
tem. So, why did Cloots write pamphlets rather than treatises of political
philosophy? After all, he did write his first philosophical work as a treatise
on religion quoting and citing extensively other works of other authors. In
these three pamphlets other authors are barely mentioned as inspirational
sources, and various concepts are appropriated making it difficult to find
10. Johann Georg Sulzer, ‘Kurzer Begriff aller Wißenschaften und andern Theile der
Gelehrsamkeit, worin jeder nach seinem Inhalt, Nuzen und Vollkommenheit kürzlich be-
schrieben wird’, in Johann Georg Sulzer, Gesammelte Schriften: Kommentierte Ausgabe,
ed. Hans Adler and Elisabeth Décultot, vol. 1: Kurzer Begriff Aller Wissenschaften, Erste
(1745) und Zweite (1759) Auflage (Basel: Schwabe, 2014 [1759]), 49–186.
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exact references. The pamphlets are short and touch upon different genres
in a whole rhetorical device, from political comments to publicised letters,
proposals, and speeches delivered at the assembly. There are several reasons
for choosing this concise medium. First, Cloots became a strong believer in
the political enlightenment of the people, and pamphlets were more widely
distributed and read than academic treatises.
Ce n’est pas avec de gros livres qu’on opère des révolutions ;
les grands ouvrages de Paine et de Sieyès n’ont que cent pages
d’impressions ; ces deux brochures ont remué les deux mondes.
Le vrai moyen d’éviter le poids du papier, c’est de viser au
poids des idées.11
Second, there is such an intense exchange of ideas, so many debates, that no
one has time to read books that are too voluminous. ‘Nous n’écrivons plus
de gros volumes, parce que nous n’avons pas le temps, ni des les faire ni de
les lire’.12 Third, as Delon notes, laconism and concision were held as the
only means to deliver universal truths.13 As Cloots wrote himself,
Je me contente de poser des principes, d’indiquer des dévelop-
pements, et d’effleurer les résultats : car, en ne disant pas tout,
on est sûr d’être tout lu : donnons à penser, et non pas à bâiller.
Les têtes creuses mesurent la profondeur d’un écrivain sur la
grosseur de ses ouvrages ; mais les bons esprits ressemblent
aux gourmets qui préfèrent un consommé restaurateur à une
soupe allongée. C’est un grand mal qu’un gros livre, cela ne
sert qu’à cacher l’insuffisance des auteurs superficiels…14
Finally, Cloots despised academics, principally because he considered with
other revolutionaries that universities sided with the other two estates (clergy
and nobility against commoners). Therefore, there was no point exposing
them to his new political ideas about a universal republic since they were
biased towards maintaining the status quo ante. As Cloots wrote:
Mais les pédants de collège, qui circonscrivent l’univers dans
les limites d’une université, et dont l’esprit de corps franchit
à peine le cercle de quarante éplucheurs de mots, ces gens-là,
nonobstant la destruction récente des corps monastiques, des
corps héraldiques, des corps de métiers, des corps parlemen-
taires, des corps provinciaux, ne croiront jamais à la destruc-
tion de la plus nuisible des corporations, les corps nationaux.15
11. Cloots, ‘La République universelle’, 244.
12. Cloots, ‘Anacharsis à Paris’, 76.
13. Michel Delon, ‘Anacharsis Cloots : identité et légitimité révolutionnaire’, Revue de
littérature comparée 63, no. 4 (October 1989): 456.
14. Cloots, ‘L’Orateur du genre humain’, 130.
15. Cloots, ‘La République universelle’, 317–18.
pamphlets r ather than treatises 97
Cloots does not hide that using metaphors and images are part of the
necessary rhetorical arsenal of the post-revolutionary philosopher: ‘… je me
servis efficacement de mon style figuré pour gagner le peuple par des images
qui semblaient se détacher du Coran et de la Bible’.16 It is again the same
reason for using a more colourful style of writing than dry academic prose:
Malheur aux écrivains monotones et prolixes, dénués d’images
et de précision. Ne recommençons pas Smith, quand nous
voulons parler de la richesse des nations ; et en publiant des ca-
ractères et des maximes, ne répétons pas Théophraste et Epic-
tète.17
Cloots was a man of his time, in line with the ‘rhetoric of Enlightenment’
and the ‘rhetoric of revolution’, to borrow the titles of chapters by Peter Fra-
nce and Lynn Hunt.18 In light with the ‘rhetoric of Enlightenment’, Cloots
followed a Cartesian view of philosophical communication in that philo-
sophy should not be restricted to a few professional, but should be ‘access-
ible to all men of common sense’.19 Incidentally, it is the exact argument
used by Cloots in Certitude against all monotheist religions, and the Chris-
tian ones in particular; God’s word is meant to be accessible to all men of
common sense, and needs not be deciphered or translated by professionals.
As for the ‘rhetoric of revolution’, Cloots operated a change of name
and function associated with the ancien régime, by calling himself ‘ora-
tor’, in reference to ancient Rome, and Anacharsis, in reference to Ancient
Greece.20 Cloots also wrote to a variety of the newspapers that emerged
after the storming of the Bastille, addressing each one with the intent of
convincing its specific readership. The early years of the revolution were
marked by an explosion of newspapers, which were read widely, also read
out loud in local clubs, Jacobins or other, which subscribed to several of
them. Woloch notes that this reading of newspapers in clubs was not im-
mediate, but once it took hold, clubs participated to the development of
the press. Some clubs scheduled their meetings to coincide with the arrival
of the mail, and held a public reading of their favourite newspaper.21 This
did not mean, however, that the provincial Jacobin clubs followed automat-
ically the views of the Parisan Jacobins.22 It must therefore be understood
that Cloots’s writings published in these newspapers were meant to inform
16. Cloots, ‘Anacharsis à Paris’, 81.
17. Cloots, ‘L’Orateur du genre humain’, 131.
18. Peter France,Rhetoric and Truth in France: Descartes toDiderot (Oxford: Clarendon
Press, 1972), 68–112; Hunt, Politics, Culture, and Class in the French Revolution, 19–51.
19. France, Rhetoric and Truth in France, 68.
20. This will be the object of the chapter on rhetoric and self-fashioning.
21. Isser Woloch, The New Regime: Transformations of the French Civic Order, 1789–
1820s (New York, NY: W. W. Norton, 1994), 79.
22. Ibid., 80.
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and convince their readerships all over France of his views regarding the
universality of the revolution and the idea of a universal republic. Often,
Cloots did address directly certain localities in the title of his opinions.
In the ‘rhetoric of revolution’, festivals also played a role in transferring
sacrality and sovereignty,23 and Cloots suggested his own interpretation at
the first fête de la fédération with the transfer from the king to the ‘Nation’
that he understood as ‘nation of the human race’. The lack of a definite
centre of authority, as Hunt notes, resulted in that ‘… revolutionary polit-
ical discourse was rhetorical; it was a means of persuasion, a way of reconsti-
tuting the social and political world’.24 This meant for Cloots that nature
and her creature, the human race, were the new centres of authority, and
Cloots wanted to reconstitute a new social and political world in which the
whole human race lives under a single republic in peace and harmony. This
resulted in a contradiction regarding the source of law — the human race
or nature— as we will see in the chapters on natural law and on humanity.
Equally within the ‘rhetoric of revolution’, Cloots’s rhetoric is marked by
secularisation and opposition to Christianity, based on his pre-revolution-
ary work with Certitude.
Cloots should, for these reasons, be understood as a philosopher who
used pamphlets, newspapers, and any other rhetorical occasion such as pub-
lic celebrations or speeches, to hammer home his philosophical views. That
Cloots should not be understood as a pamphleteer among others in the
revolution can be demonstrated further by looking at the content of his
writings. Cloots designed his ‘system’ as a solution to one of the problems
that occupied philosophers in the seventeenth and eighteenth centuries:
perpetual peace. Moreover, Cloots’s ‘system’ is, I argue, a philosophical sys-
tem, very likely inspired by Christian Wolff during his education in Berlin
under Sulzer. It is, however, an eclectic system, like Wolff’s, taking several
sources of philosophical inspiration.
solving an old european problem
By Cloots’s own admission his system stems from trying to solve an old
European problem: how to achieve peace in Europe (and, by extension, in
the whole world)? To Cloots, and many contemporaries, the ‘old’ solution
was a ‘political balance’ between states, governed by ‘l’horreur de la mon-
archie universelle’, which was only capable of ending wars temporarily.25
This is what Cloots describes as ‘la vaine science de nos vieux politiques’.26
23. Mona Ozouf, La fête révolutionnaire 1789–1799, Bibliothèque des histoires (Paris:
NRF Gallimard, 1976).
24. Hunt, Politics, Culture, and Class in the French Revolution, 24.
25. Cloots, ‘L’Orateur du genre humain’, 155.
26. Ibid., 111.
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To which he proposes his own new ‘science’ based on Enlightenment philo-
sophy from Newton to Diderot and Rousseau, Hobbes to d’Holbach, and
even Machiavelli to the Declaration of the Rights of Man.
Cloots is in line with other philosophers who attempted to map out a
political system that would bring peace to Europe and unite it, from the
Duke of Sully’s Memoires describing the ‘magnifiques desseins’ of Henry
IV, to Saint-Pierre’s Project for Perpetual Peace.27 Cloots acknowledges this
line himself, but he considers his system to be unique and original.28 Ac-
cording to Cloots, people have compared his system to Saint-Pierre’s, which
he rejected as a preposterous comparison since Saint-Pierre’s project was a
council of monarchs, whilst his project is based on the individual.29
The problem is posed in these terms: ‘Il en est des nations entre elles
comme des individus dans l’état de nature ; les forts règnent’.30 If the solu-
tion to inequalities between individuals in the state of nature was to unite
and form a political community, it should be the same solution for states,
which are in a state of nature where the strong ones survive. Cloots finds
the solution to this problem in the French constitution with national unity:
‘C’est dans la constitution française que je trouve la solution d’un problème
insoluble jusqu’à présent’.31 The same way the new French constitution
ended inequalities, which became unbearable under Louis XVI, between
individuals according to their corporations or ‘classes’, the same unifica-
tion shall end all inequalities in the world through national unity. However,
there is only one single nation—the whole of humankind—and one single
patrie— the globe. In other words, the French revolution is just a prelude
to the universal revolution and the French assembly will one day become
the world assembly:
Hommes de tous les climats, une vérité-mère doit vous être
continuellement présente à l’esprit, c’est que la révolution de
France est le commencement de la révolution du monde.32
In order to do so, Cloots has to argue against climate theorists suggesting
that various populations have various political regime because of the cli-
mate they live in, which influences their physical constitution. This will be
the object of the chapter on humanity.
Here, it is useful to see how Cloots takes a theoretical reasoning— single
nation of the human race and sovereignty of the human race, based on nat-
27. Maximilien de Béthune de Sully, Mémoires ou œconomies royales d’estat domestiques,
politiques et militaires de Henry le Grand, vol. 4 (Paris: Chez Augustin Courbé, 1662), 77–
260; Charles-Irénée Castel de Saint-Pierre, Projet pour rendre la paix perpétuelle en Europe
(Utrecht: Antoine Schouten, 1713).
28. Cloots, ‘La République universelle’, 259.
29. ibid., 248. I will discuss further Rousseau and Saint-Pierre in the chapter on nature.
30. Cloots, ‘L’Orateur du genre humain’, 155.
31. Ibid.
32. Cloots, ‘La République universelle’, 266.
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ure and science — in order to conclude a practical solution — therefore a
universal republic for peace and economic prosperity. Wolff’s understand-
ing of philosophy is similarly devided into theoretical philosophy, on the
one hand, and practical philosophy, on the other. The theoretical part of
philosophy comprises ontology, cosmology, psychology, and natural theo-
logy.33 Practical philosophy comprises universal practical philosophy, nat-
ural law, politics, and moral philosophy, with the goal of attaining perfec-
tion for humanity. These are all branches of knowledge that Cloots con-
siders in devising his ‘system’. In the next section I will present this system
after arguing how Wolff’s philosophical system influenced Cloots, probably
through Sulzer’s teaching.
a ‘system’
Cloots refers to his political thought as a ‘system’: ‘mon système’;34 ‘mon
système de la nation unique’;35 ‘mon système philanthropique’.36 I argue
here that Cloots’s ‘system’ is very likely a product of German metaphysics,
particularly Wolffian metaphysics.
Sulzer’s Teaching of Wolff
From the previous biographical chapter on Cloots’s education, I have shown
how Sulzer seemed to have marked the mind of the young Cloots. I have
equally shown that this was certainly due to Sulzer’s pedagogy, which had
influenced Frederic in establishing the académie. This school was not only
for forming officers, professional soldiers for the military, but also gentle-
men, and the faculty had also a lot of ambition regarding their academic
formation. Sulzer taught ‘metaphysics’, and it is not possible to find doc-
uments of his teaching besides the general guidelines written by Frederic.
However, from Sulzer’s Kurzer Begriff aller Wissenschaften one can infer
some general direction of the sort of teaching he gave his pupils at the Aca-
démie. Interestingly, this work by Sulzer appears in the catalogue of the
Gnadenthal castle library, together with Sulzer’s Unterredungen über die
Schönheit der Natur (1750) and Allgemeine Theorie der schönen Künste
(1771–1774). There are two editions of Kurzer Begriff, the first from 1745,
and the second from 1759. In his introduction to the two editions, Hans
33. For a general introduction on Wolff’s understanding of philosophy, see Matt
Hettche, ‘Christian Wolff’, in The Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy, Winter 2016, ed.
Edward N. Zalta (2016), accessed 9 June 2017, https : / / plato . stanford . edu / archives /
win2016/entries/wolff-christian/.
34. Cloots, La république universelle, 195.
35. Ibid., 7.
36. Ibid., 12.
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Adler notes that the 1759 edition constitutes not only a quantitative im-
provement, but also a structural and qualitative one thereby constituting
a ‘reconstruction’ with a reorganisation of the material.37 It is not possible
to know which edition was in the library of Gnadenthal. Perhaps, these
works by Sulzer are in the library because Cloots had to buy them all to-
gether as Sulzer was his professor. Grunert also makes the hypothesis that
the Kurzer Begriff was written at the demand of his pupils or their par-
ents.38 This would explain why theAllgemeine Theorie der schönen Künste
and Unterredungen über die Schönheit der Natur are present in the lib-
rary: there was a re-edition in 1770 of theUnterredungen über die Schönheit
der Natur, and the other one began to be published in 1771. In this case, it
would make more sense to acquire the 1759 edition of Kurzer Begriff aller
Wissenschaften, which perhaps Sulzer recommended to his pupils as text
book, as well as the re-editions previously mentioned. I will assume that
the latest edition was the one in the library, and I will assume that Cloots
read it or that Sulzer taught from it or used it. These are a lot of assump-
tion, but the best that can be made in the absence of more evidence, and
very plausible ones since the Kurzer Begriff was meant to be a textbook
for pupils; read out loud, every paragraph sounds like a lecture from Sulzer
himself.
Just as the Encyclopédie by Diderot and d’Alembert was an organised
representation of human knowledge according to a certain philosophy (Ba-
conian), Sulzer’s Kurzer Begriff is also organised following a certain under-
standing of knowledge, albeit not alphabetically.39 In the Discours prélim-
inaire des Éditeurs, d’Alembert laid out the programme of the Encyclopédie
regarding the presentation of all the sciences, crafts, and arts.40 At the end of
theDiscours, a figure maps the state of human knowledge following Bacon’s
understanding: memory, reason, imagination. While memory is dedicated
to history, reason is dedicated to philosophy, which includes the science of
nature, the science of man, as well as the science of God.
Sulzer follows a different presentation, which is Wolffian. The first branch
of knowledge Sulzer deals with is philology, as it methodologically leads to
the knowledge of other sciences; it is then followed by history, art, mathem-
37. Hans Adler, ‘Einleitung: J. G. Sulzers Kurzer Begriff aller Wissenschaften von 1745
und 1759’, in Johann Georg Sulzer, Gesammelte Schriften: Kommentierte Ausgabe, ed.
Hans Adler and Elisabeth Décultot, vol. 1: Kurzer Begriff Aller Wissenschaften, Erste (1745)
und Zweite (1759) Auflage (Basel: Schwabe, 2014), LXVI–LXVII.
38. Frank Grunert, ‘Kurzer Begriff statt langer Geschichte. Sulzers Kurzer Begriff aller
Wissenschaft im Kontext der Historia literaria des 18. Jahrhunderts’, in Johann Georg Sulzer
(1720–1779). Aufklärung zwischen Christian Wolff und David Hume, ed. Frank Grunert
and Gideon Stiening (Berlin: Akademie Verlag, 2011), 233.
39. Adler, ‘Einleitung’, LXVII.
40. Jean le Rond d’Alembert, ‘Discours préliminaire des éditeurs’, in Encyclopédie, ou
Dictionnaire raisonné des sciences, des arts et des métiers, ed. Denis Diderot and Jean le
Rond d’Alembert, vol. 1 (Paris: Briasson, 1751), i–lii.
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atics, philosophy, law, and theology. Philosophy is divided between theor-
etical philosophy, or metaphysics, and practical philosophy. According to
Sulzer, what is called metaphysics is the part of philosophy (Weltweisheit)
he describes as theoretical or speculative, as opposed to the practical part
of philosophy. What is called ‘German metaphysics’ is this theoretical or
speculative philosophy without the study of logics. The theoretical part
of philosophy is defined as ‘die Erforschungen über die allgemeine innerli-
che Beschaffenheit der Dinge’, whilst the practical part is ‘die Entdeckung
des ersten auf die Verbesserung des Menschen und der menschlichen Ge-
sellschaften an’.41 However, the two complement each other, for Sulzer, as
the one is necessary for the other. Sulzer describes the content of this Ger-
man metaphysics as the following fields of study described from §193 to §213,
which cover ontology, cosmology, pneumatology, psychology, and natural
theology.42 Sulzer notes that Bacon gave the name ‘metaphysics’ to the part
of physics examining the final causes of forces and workings of nature.43 It
is therefore very possible that Sulzer taught these disciplines, even if super-
ficially, in his course on metaphysics at the Académie des nobles.
Following Wolff, Sulzer also presents natural theology as the last-but-not-
least part of philosophy: the science of existence (Dasein) and the proper-
ties of the eternal Being who created and rules the world.44 Sulzer notes
that humankind throughout history—from Ancient Egypt to Greek philo-
sophers— had recognised the existence of an all powerful sovereign Being
through the use of right reason (gesund Vernunft), but that this natural theo-
logy was repressed by the authority of a false religion established by men.45
Throughout his presentation of philosophy, Sulzer sums up the history
of various parts of philosophical knowledge, stating the origins in ancient
Egypt, Greece, and the Orient.46 The history of philosophy seems to follow
a linear progress with an insistance particularly on Socrates, Plato, Aristotle,
then a period of philosophical halt during the middle ages except for schol-
astics and Thomas Aquinas, then Descartes, Leibniz, and finally Wolff.47
Sulzer describes Wolff as being a sort of end point for philosophy, having
made philosophy a real science and having advanced many of its subdiscip-
lines. As such, Wolff plays in Sulzer’s Kurzer Begriff the same role Locke
plays in Frederic’s Instruction: he is the evolutionary end point in the his-
tory of philosophy. If Wolff is not mentioned in Frederic’s Instruction, it is
however unlikely that Sulzer would not have taught Wolff’s philosophy at
the Académie des nobles.
41. Sulzer, ‘Kurzer Begriff, 1759’, 135.
42. Ibid., 135–145.
43. Ibid., 145.
44. Ibid., 144.
45. Ibid., 145.
46. Ibid., 132.
47. Ibid., 133.
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Sulzer’s philosophy and pedagogy were influenced by Christian Wolff.
Did Sulzer’s teaching influence Cloots’s later thought? Is Wolffian philo-
sophy present in Cloots’s writings? I consider here several aspects: German
metaphysics, natural theology, systematic ordering, and Cloots’s cosmopol-
itan republicanism in relation with Wolff’s civitas maxima.
German Metaphysics
It is significative of the general interpretation of Cloots’s thought that the
author of a history of the Académie des nobles, notes the following on him
in his biographical research on all the former pupils and pensionnaires:
In seinem elften Jahre nach Paris mitgenommen, erwirbt er
hier seine niedere und höhere Bildung, man thut also Un-
recht, ihn als ein Produkt der deutschen Metaphysik zu be-
zeichnen.48
But in his writings, Cloots never mentioned his Parisian professors or the
content of his education atPléssis-Sorbonne. Cloots only mentioned an epis-
ode when he defiantly ate a bacon omelette on a lean day and argued bout
religious practices with an adult.49 Was he then not influenced by ‘German
metaphysics’? Did his education at the Berlin Académie des nobles have an
impact on his political thought and future ‘cosmopolitan republicanism’?
It is difficult to cite any direct source. In Cloots’s writings, except for his
first work, there are no precise references of works, and names are gener-
ally dropped as general examples. Wolff is never cited, and Sulzer is never
cited either apart from the quotation mentioned in the previous chapter.
Leibniz is sometimes cited, but then again, so is the Encyclopédie Diderot
and d’Alembert, which follows a Baconian classification of sciences.50 Clo-
ots also mentions Bacon several times in his writings. Is this classification
really different from Sulzer’s, as the latter claims it to be? Both have the same
separation between history, philosophy, and poetry (or in Sulzer’s case it is
art in general). For Bacon, there may be overlap between natural history and
science of nature. For Sulzer, natural scientists and physicians are excluded
from philosophy all together. For Sulzer philosophy is then the research of
truths regarding the organisation and government of the world and moral
affairs of men; it searches the inner and quasi spiritual or moral qualities of
the world.51 However, both understood philosophy as the most important
part of knowledge. In the Encyclopédie, philosophy is the main branch of
the ‘reason’ part of knowledge, and it is described as ‘general metaphysics’.
48. Friedländer, Die Königliche Allgemeine Kriegs-Schule, 351.
49. Cloots, Certitude des preuves, 574–575.
50. d’Alembert, ‘Discours préliminaire’.
51. Sulzer, ‘Kurzer Begriff, 1759’, 131.
104 cloots’s system
It includes the ‘science of God’, the ‘science of man’ or ‘pneumatology’, and
the ‘science of nature’ or ‘metaphysics of bodies’.
In his revolutionary writings, Cloots takes into consideration all these
parts of German metaphysics into a whole system of a universal republic
prescribed by the laws of nature. It could be argued that this could have
just been influenced by the Encyclopédie and Bacon’s ordering of sciences.
However, there is something particular to Cloots, as opposed to other Fre-
nch thinkers, in that he tries to develop a systematic and unifying theory
of political science that takes arguments from cosmology, natural theology,
ontology, and pneumatology (psychology). For instance, Cloots opposes
‘théos’ to ‘cosmos’ in his presentation of cosmology, arguing that the cosmos
is sufficiently complex to human comprehension without adding the even
more complex questions of the existence of God and revealed religion.52 Re-
vealed theology not only does not explain nature, but it makes it more com-
plex, to Cloots. With revealed religion discarded, Cloots considers natural
religion as sufficient for a theological explanation of human life and our ex-
istence, Nature is like a mother, and we are constantly reborn into various
combinations.53 This natural religion reconciles all revealed religions, who
are left to be practised freely in private.54 As for ontology, Cloots considers
that nothing is created, but everything exists eternally; humankind is as old
as mother nature.55 Getting rid of this ‘theocracy’, Cloots seems to present
instead what could be called a cosmocracy— in opposition to ‘theocracy’—
in which the human race as a product of nature replaces God the creator in
natural law theory, and therefore the laws of nature must be respected in hu-
man affairs, starting with the ‘sovereignty of the human race’.56 Cloots also
considers elements of human psychology to explain why these natural prin-
ciples have not been respected. For instance, the natural instinct of good
and order that is characteristic of human nature, is denatured by despot-
ism and aristocracy, which generate vices whereas republicanism generates
virtue and is therefore the natural political solution for the human race.57
All in all, it is possible to say that Cloots follows the tradition of German
metaphysics, as defined by Sulzer and Wolff, although it is difficult to pin-
point exactly which parts influenced him.
52. Cloots, ‘La République universelle’, 251.
53. Cloots, ‘Bases constitutionnelles’, 497.
54. Cloots, ‘La République universelle’, 255.
55. Cloots, ‘Bases constitutionnelles’, 495–496.
56. Ibid., 494.
57. Cloots, ‘La République universelle’, 255.
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Natural Theology
Is it a coincidence that Cloots’s first opus is dedicated to the topic considered
as central by Wolff and Sulzer: natural theology? After his time at theAcadé-
mie des nobles and Sulzer’s teaching in metaphysics, Cloots chose to dedicate
five years to study and write about natural theology. This first monograph,
published in 1780, and his later revolutionary writings, in which he develops
his ‘system’ of a universal republic, are connected in that Cloots’s concep-
tion of natural religion is the overarching framework for his political system.
In his first work, Certitude, Cloots develops an argument against revealed
religion in favour of natural religion. Cloots makes only two references to
Wolff (or ‘Wolf’) in Certitude. Once about a letter published in French by
a Muslim trying to convince him to convert to Islam.58 Cloots writes that
this letter has often been published in French, but I have not found copy of
it. A second time, Cloots quotes a French translation of his 1712 Vernünftige
Gedanken von den Kräften des menschlichen Verstandes und ihrem richti-
gen Gebrauch in der Erkenntnis der Wahrheit, translated as Logique.59 The
excerpt quoted by Cloots is the advice Wolff gives regarding authority, not
unlike Sulzer’s own as seen previously: even geniuses have hesitated in their
thinking, and therefore the awe we experience for them should not make us
forget to examine what they say with our reason rather than accept it as an
yet another argument from authority.60 Cloots gives pre-eminence to nat-
ural religion, which is quite similar to the foundational place Wolff gives to
natural theology in metaphysics.
Cataldi Madonna notes that Wolff had an essential impact on the devel-
opment of critical theology in the German Enlightenment.61 In Discursus
præliminaris, Wolff attacked orthodox theology and the sphere of the sac-
red with an epistemological reconciliation between reason and faith.62 Rev-
elation can be supra rationem, but never contra rationem; it is possible to ar-
gue that the divine is beyond cognitive understanding, but never against it.
Wolff also denies miracles and adopts the theory of double authors—divine
and human—in the Holy scriptures.
In Certitude, Cloots notes how miracles are witnessed by men, and writ-
ten in books by men, and that they are then analysed by learned men who
58. Cloots, Certitude des preuves, 174.
59. Ibid., 504.
60. Christian Wolff, Logique, ou réﬂexions sur les forces de l’entendement humain, et sur
leur légitime usage, dans la connoissance de la vérité (Berlin: Chés A. Haude, 1736), 234.
61. Luigi Cataldi Madonna, ‘Die Vernunft als Grundlage des Glaubens. Zu Christian
Wolffs Kritischer Theologie’, in Thema: Die natürliche Theologie bei Christian Wolff, ed.
Michael Albrecht, vol. 23, Aufklärung: Interdisziplinäres Jahrbuch zur Erforschung des 18.
Jahrhunderts und seiner Wirkungsgeschichte (Hamburg: Meiner, 2011), 41–55.
62. Christian Wolff,Philosophia rationalis sive Logica, methodo scientiﬁca pertractata, et
ad usum scientiarum. atque vitae aptata. Praemittitur discursus praeliminaris de philoso-
phia in genere (Frankfurt: Premlin, 1728).
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attest to their veracity to the rest of humankind lacking in erudition. It goes
against reason that one should believe these men and believe that God chose
to speak only to them rather than to the whole universe and to nature.63
During the revolution, a cult of reason and natural religion developed,
with an enthusiasm for ancient Egypt, Greece, and Rome. The nature god-
dess Isis was often represented in celebrations because Egypt was thought
to be the first natural religion.64 Cloots also reiterated, perhaps from his les-
sons with Sulzer, that the Romans were taught by the Greeks, who were
taught by the Egyptians, who were taught by the Indians, in order to em-
phasise the universality of natural religion, of reason, and how humankind
is equal and united in knowledge.65
However, these were widespread ideas, opinions, and beliefs, which are
difficult to pinpoint to one precise influence in Cloots, or for French revolu-
tionaries in general.
There is an interesting supplément in Cloots’sCertitude in which he writes
to a ‘canon’, probably his uncle Cornelius de Pauw. Cloots writes that if one
had to chose between ‘papism’ and ‘protestantism’, it is best to chose the lat-
ter because papism is based on the premise that one should believe without
examination, and it is opposed to reason, truth, philosophy in a word.66 It
seems, therefore, that Cloots held protestantism learned in Berlin in higher
esteem than catholicism learned in Bruxelles and Paris. Or, that Cloots saw
protestantism as closer and truer to natural religion than catholicism.67
Systematic Order
In his revolutionary writings, Cloots’s ‘system’—as he calls it himself—of a
‘universal republic of the human race’ is comprehensive as it includes ques-
tions of cosmology and the creation of the universe, God, natural theology,
and some elements of ontology and human psychology, as well as natural
law. This ‘system’ is opposed to other ‘monstrous’ systems such as the ‘ar-
istocratic system’ including monarchism, the ‘system of federation’, or the
‘theocratic system’.68 Cloots declares that his system stems from his obser-
vation of nature itself: ‘c’est en consultant la nature que je découvre un sys-
tème politique …’.69 Cloots’s ‘system’, or political philosophy, is meant to
be a comprehensive theory of human organisation around nature and its
laws. Whether Cloots succeeds or not is another question, but it is clear
that he means to develop a whole political system that is universally valid
63. Cloots, Certitude des preuves, 477–479.
64. Edelstein, The Terror of Natural Right, 184.
65. Cloots, ‘L’Orateur du genre humain’, 143.
66. Cloots, Certitude des preuves, 615.
67. More on this in the chapter on reason.
68. Cloots, Ecrits révolutionnaires, 133, 187, 248.
69. Cloots, ‘Bases constitutionnelles’, 476.
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for all time and the whole humankind. That is the reason why, for Cloots,
the whole humankind would agree to it, without the need to impose the
system on anyone.
Wolff advanced the idea of a intellectus systematicus, meaning that man
seeks a system in understanding everything:
Intellectus systematicus percipit voluptatem ex systematis, veri
nempe nominis, consequenter systemata amat, nec in cogni-
tione rerum acquiescit, nisi eam ad systema reduxerit.70
Did Cloots get the idea of building a systematic political philosophy from
Wolff? It is again hard to prove a direct connection in the absence of ref-
erence. The description of a philosophical system appears also in the En-
cyclopédie, which could also have influenced Cloots. However, I think that
Cloots’s overall inclusion of all the disciplines of ‘metaphysics’ into a uni-
fied theory called a ‘system’ presents a strong argument for a Wolffian un-
derstanding of his thought.
Wolff’s understanding of system is placed in a context of ‘paradigmat-
isation’ of geometry inherited from Leibniz and Malebranche, who both
developed the idea of complete system or true system imagined by rational
thinkers against the system advanced by religious scholars.71 By the same
token, for Wolff the ‘intellectus systematicus’ creates a desire for true sys-
tems because it has a higher rate for proving the veracity of knowledge, ex-
tending its memorisation, and its reproduction rather than the contradic-
tions and prejudices mediated by authorities.72 Wolff’s definition of system
is as follow: ‘Systema enim dicitur veritatum inter se et cum principiis suis
connexarum congeries’, which can be translated as ‘A system is the com-
bination of the truths, which are interwoven with one another and with
their principles’.73 Wolff does not make a difference for building this sys-
tem between the mathematical method and the philosophical method, and
considers philosophy in a Euclidean paradigm.74 In such a mathematical
paradigm therefore, there can only be true and false systems, which can be
proven true or false universally.
70. Christian Wolff, ‘De differentia intellectus systematici & non systematici / Über den
Unterschied zwischen dem systematischen und dem nicht-systematischen Verstand’, in
Thema: Die natürliche Theologie bei Christian Wolff, ed. Michael Albrecht, vol. 23, Auf-
klärung: Interdisziplinäres Jahrbuch zur Erforschung des 18. Jahrhunderts und seiner Wir-
kungsgeschichte (Hamburg: Meiner, 2011), §4.
71. Christian Strub, ‘II. System und Systemkritik in der Neuzeit’, inHistorischesWörter-
buch der Philosophie, ed. Karlfried Ritter Joachim; Gründer, vol. 10: St–T (Basel: Schwabe
& Co. AG, 1998), 829–830.
72. Wolff, ‘De differentia intellectus systematici & non systematici / Über den Unter-
schied zwischen dem systematischen und dem nicht-systematischen Verstand’, §5, §8, §14,
§16.
73. Wolff, Discursus praeliminaris, §889.
74. Strub, ‘II. System und Systemkritik in der Neuzeit’, 830–831.
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Cloots consistently referred to geometry and mathematics regarding his
system. For instance, to argue why Paris is the capital city of France, Cloots
writes:
Paris est à la France ce qu’un point mathématique est pour
les géomètres : quatre-vingt et tant de rayons [allusions au
nombre de départements] aboutissent à la commune natio-
nale.75
In another text, Cloots again makes a reference to the hierarchy of powers,
mathematically ordered:
La hiérarchie ingénieuse des cantons, des districts, des départe-
ments, l’Assemblée nationale et le roi, cette gradation mathé-
matique jette la France dans un seul moule, d’où sort, par une
fusion parfaite, un ouvrage que vous adorerez quand vous le
connaîtrez, la constitution française. L’attraction inhérente à
notre nouveau système politique tend évidemment à réunir
des parties détachées sous l’Ancien Régime, telles qu’Avignon,
la Savoie, Liège et le Brabant. Les forces centrifuges de ce beau
système n’auront d’action que pour repousser les ennemis du
dehors.76
For Cloots, therefore, the new French constitution is a ‘system’, and it is the
‘true system’ because of its mathematical quality: every part is mathematic-
ally calculated in proportion, and is represented gradually in a pyramid of
powers, with such force that it attracts other parts that were hitherto not in-
cluded in this whole. This political system works, contradicting what anti-
revolutionaries said against the division into départements, and it works be-
cause it conforms to how the laws of political organisation should be, for
Cloots. By the same token, it exercises its own laws in applying a ‘centrifugal
force’ on ‘ennemies’ who cannot join this system.
This reference to geometry and mathematics was, of course, not only
Cloots’s, who only made reference to the geometrically equal division bet-
ween French départements as a way of dividing a cheese in equal parts.77 As
Cloots remarks himself, this ‘géométrie sublime’ belongs to Sieyès.78 Clo-
ots also cites Giuseppe Antonio Giachimo Cerutti (1738–1792) — another
foreigner in the French revolution— for using a similar metaphor between
physics and politics using geometry:
Voici la métaphore de l’ingénieux Cerutti, au nom des élec-
teurs de Paris : « Le plus hardi des géomètres disait : donnez-
75. Cloots, ‘Bases constitutionnelles’, 480.
76. Cloots, ‘Adresse d’un Prussien à un Anglais’, 47.
77. Cloots, Ecrits révolutionnaires, 209.
78. Cloots, ‘La République universelle’, 283.
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moi de la matière et du mouvement, et je crée un monde. Il di-
rait aujourd’hui : donnez-moi des hommes et la constitution
française, et je crée une nation. »79
On another related note, Cloots compares himself to Newton regarding
his own system: ‘Newton a réuni tous les philosophes par sa découverte phy-
sique ; je réunirai tous les hommes par ma découverte politique’.80 What
Cloots means by this is literally that politics is governed by laws that the
philosopher must discover the same way the philosopher discovers the laws
of nature that govern physics. In that sense, for Cloots, and other revolu-
tionaries, the mathematical division of France into départements is one of
these laws because it leads to political union or good government. Under an
‘aristocratic system’, in order to maintain union, one needs priests, a royal
court, and corrupt ministries, whilst under the new French system, none of
these are needed to maintain union; only a desire for order, and an industri-
ous spirit. Therefore, Cloots defines ‘trust’ as the ‘centre of gravity’ (centre
de gravitation), because this equal distribution between departments en-
ables a harmonious repartition of populations in a way that is neither too
large nor too arbitrary, so that people can trust each other and therefore
maintain political union.81 Cloots then concludes that: ‘Le vrai système so-
cial est simple comme le vrai système planétaire : le génie le trouve ; le bon
sens l’adopte’.82 Cloots’s ‘genius’ is to have discovered the law of ‘single na-
tion’ based on the principle of ‘sovereignty of the human race’; a law dis-
covered by observing nature and by observing the effects of its application
by uniting the provinces of France and improving its government. Sieyès
and other thinkers had the genius to find the system of departmental di-
vision, and the French people had the common sense to adopt it because,
Cloots believes, it is an enlightened people using reason. By the same token,
Cloots claims to have discovered the true system for the whole world which
will be accepted by all the peoples as long as they can use their reason.
This leads to another similarity with Wolff: since the ‘intellectus system-
aticus’ creates a desire for a true system, Cloots also makes the difference bet-
ween true and false systems, and the ‘true system’ is universally valid. The
false systems are, obviously, the ones from the ancien régime, and particu-
larly the so-called ‘harmony’ between the ‘religious system’ and the ‘polit-
ical system’.83 The religious system in question is Catholicism, but also any
other ‘revealed system’, which, as Cloots claims, he has demonstrated lo-
gically the falsehood in his Certitude.84 The political system in question is
79. Cloots, ‘L’Orateur du genre humain’, 123.
80. Cloots, ‘Bases constitutionnelles’, 477.
81. Cloots, ‘L’Orateur du genre humain’, 123.
82. Cloots, Ecrits révolutionnaires, 394.
83. Ibid., 9.
84. Cloots, ‘L’Orateur du genre humain’, 170.
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monarchism, understood as the government of one by sanction of the reli-
gious system that posits the centre of sovereignty in God, anointing kings
to be the earthly representative of this power. However, this political sys-
tem is not worse than the religious or ‘theocratic system’, with its ‘convo-
luted’ metaphysics.85 Indeed, as we will see in the chapter on republican-
ism, Cloots was not anti-monarchist or anti-royalist until the trial of the
king, like many other revolutionaries. Moreover, the accumulation of this
system into multiple sovereign monarchies forms the (utterly wrong) ‘sys-
tème atroce de la balance politique’ in Europe, which cannot provide per-
petual peace (the philosophical project Cloots set himself to accomplish).86
Perhaps this lack of opposition to the king explains why Cloots writes of
his ‘true social system’ rather than ‘political system’; it is the order of soci-
ety that revolutionaries wished to reform, and that Cloots wants to reform:
equality through the abolition of privileges, and liberty through the repres-
entation of the sovereign at the Assembly. The king may well remain in the
system, as long as the people is the real sovereign.
The ‘false’ systems can be proven false using logic, the same way a math-
ematical formula can be proven right or wrong. For instance, as already seen,
the system of ‘revealed religions’ is wrong because it assumes that God’s
word could only be accessible to a select few scholars rather than everyone.
But even the ‘système des théistes’ is wrong because, according to Cloots, it
states that the universe is an ‘ouvrage’ and therefore there must be an ‘ouv-
rier’, demonstrating the existence of God. However, common sense and rea-
son takes this syllogism into pieces, and shows that the premise according to
which the universe is a piece of work, is simply wrong, or it would mean that
God is also a piece of work and therefore was created by another worker.87
Civitas Maxima
A further argument for the Wolffian influence on Cloots is the similarity,
another one, between his ‘universal republic’ and Wolff’s ‘civitas maxima’.
They both involve a certain form of republicanism, and its extension to the
whole world.
Wolff wrote about his civitas maxima in Latin, but it seems that civitas is
best translated as republic rather than state, or civitas as preoccupation for
the common good.88 Leibniz had a theory of an ascending series of societ-
ies from the family until a greater society, which Wolff seems to have taken
with the civitas maxima as an association of moral persons, of civites, which
85. Cloots, ‘La République universelle’, 281.
86. Cloots, Ecrits révolutionnaires, 187.
87. Cloots, ‘La République universelle’, 252–253.
88. Nicholas Greenwood Onuf, ‘Civitas Maxima: Wolff, Vattel and the Fate of Repub-
licanism’, The American Journal of International Law 88, no. 2 (April 1994): 280–303.
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retain their identity.89 Cloots’s universal republic is also an association, but
it is based on the individual: it is an ‘empire des individus unis’ necessarily
obeying the law, rather than an empire of corporations necessarily resisting
the law.90 In contrast, Wolff’s civitas maxima is formed between nations
by means of a quasi-agreement.91 However, it seems that both Cloots and
Wolff argue on the same level that this ‘universal republic’ or civitas max-
ima is a product of the necessary law of nations rather than the voluntary
law of nations, as Grotius argued. Necessary law describes a pre-existing law
derived from nature, whilst voluntary law is the product of human agree-
ment. However, the voluntary law of nations derives from the necessary
law, and, in that sense, for Wolff, the law of nations is nothing but the law
of nature applied to nations.92 For Cloots, there is no law of nations per se,
because only the law of nature exists, and men are born in a natural state
of society; nations (states) are only temporary human aberrations until the
natural nation of the human race is formed.93 So, it is the same necessary law
of nature that applies, and the same principle that there is a civitas maxima
is this necessary law of nature.
By the same token, once this similarity is noticed between Cloots and
Wolff, there is the same recognition of sovereignty belonging to the civitas
maxima to rule over individual nations. For Wolff, this sovereignty is par-
tial.94 For Cloots, this sovereignty is the only one, and therefore total.95
But both agree that sovereignty lies within the people, although again, this
people is considered as a whole for Wolff, while it is the individual sover-
eignty that justify popular sovereignty for Cloots.96 There also seems to be
a similarity between them regarding the right of one nation to act on the
behalf of others. Wolff claims the will of all nations can be expressed by
one if it follows the leadership of nature and uses right reason.97 Cloots also
sees France as the leader and by establishing a republic is in fact establish-
ing a universal republic, whilst the National Assembly is legislating for the
whole human race.98 However, the comparison falls short here; for Wolff,
this leadership and legislation becomes then a voluntary act—out of the ne-
cessary natural law—and this must be subjected to scientific discussion.99
89. Ibid., 296.
90. Cloots, Ecrits révolutionnaires, 410.
91. Christian Wolff, Jus gentium. Methodo scientiﬁca pertractatum, in quo jus gentium
naturale ab eo, quod voluntarii, pactitii et consuetudinarii est, accurate distinguitur (Halae
Magdeburgicae: Renger, 1749), §9.
92. Ibid., §3.
93. Cloots, ‘La République universelle’, 245, 271.
94. Wolff, Jus gentium, §15.
95. Cloots, ‘Bases constitutionnelles’, 476–477.
96. Wolff, Jus gentium, §19; Cloots, ‘Bases constitutionnelles’, 479.
97. Wolff, Jus gentium, §20, §21.
98. Cloots, ‘La République universelle’, 251; Cloots, ‘Bases constitutionnelles’, 476.
99. Wolff, Jus gentium, §22.
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Cloots, on the other hand, seems to see it as a continuation of necessary nat-
ural law, but in his view the ‘universal republic’ is a very minimalistic state
where only a few things are decided, whilst the former countries and new
départements continue to decide locally of their social, economic, cultural,
and political organisations.100
The government of this universal republic is minimalistic. Cloots pre-
dicts a lesser need for decrees in his universal republic.101 All ministries will
disappear and a ‘fraternal government’ will replace it:
La trésorerie nationale ne donnera plus d’inquiétude au pu-
blic ; personne n’y puisera impunément ; car les impôts se-
ront à peu près nuls, et chaque département entretiendra ses
chemins, ses hôpitaux, ses tribunaux, ses ateliers, de manière
que la dépense commune se réduira au salaire du corps légis-
latif, et du gouvernement suprême, et de l’administration gé-
nérale. Ce gouvernement fraternel ne sera qu’un vaste bureau
central de correspondance pour avertir officiellement les cos-
mopolites, de tous les événements qu’il importe de savoir.102
Cloots uses the word ‘cosmopolite’ as literally as citizen of the universal re-
public. Cloots estimates that with the consecration of liberty everywhere in
the world there will be no need for an executive power. This is, of course,
utopian, but it is related to two general views at the time regarding the exec-
utive power. First, the purpose of the executive power would be to apply the
law decided by the legislative power and to maintain liberty, as Rousseau
argued.103 Second, Cloots with other physiocrates and partisans of ‘natural
republicanism’ (as we will see later) believed that the need for government,
for an executive branch, would disappear since there would be no need to
‘maintain’ liberty in a world were liberty was restored, and since there will
be less need to pass laws once everything runs smoothly in accordance with
nature. It is only the lack of respect of the laws of nature in human affairs
that leads to the need to pass laws to govern humankind. Moreover, the di-
vision into three powers will no longer be called ‘power’ but ‘duty’, because
there is only one power, the power of the sovereign.104 Ministers in this ‘ex-
ecutive council’ would be handpicked from the Assembly, but would have
no part in the making of laws except for expressing their opinion. The coun-
cil would not have the right of veto, which can only be used by a sufficiently
representative part of the public. As for the assembly, Cloots is in favour of
unicameralism rather than bicameralism for the same reason as the one for
100. Cloots, ‘La République universelle’, 265.
101. Cloots, ‘Bases constitutionnelles’, 489.
102. Cloots, ‘La République universelle’, 265.
103. Jean-Jacques Rousseau, ‘Du contrat social ou principes de droit politique’, in Rous-
seau : Œuvres complètes, vol. 3 (Gallimard, 1964 [1762]), Ch. 3.1.
104. Cloots, ‘Bases constitutionnelles’, 485.
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the unity of the nation. If there is one nation of the human race, there is
also one representative chamber:
Montrez-moi deux chambres dans la nation et je vous accorde-
rai deux chambres dans la constitution. Un peuple homogène
doit avoir une représentation homogène.105
conclusion
Cloots’s political system thus summed up and explained, one can notice that
there are many contextual elements that require further analysis. What was
Cloots doing by calling himself ‘orator of the human race’? How did nat-
ural law theory claim a scientific status with laws of politics and morality?
How was the human race the only sovereign possible, and how can it be a
‘nation’? What is this republic and how can it encompass the whole globe?
It is this system that the following chapters will address, each focusing
on one of the elements needed to explain Cloots’s system. But before that,
the next chapter will examine Cloots’s change of name to Anacharsis and
the self-given title of ‘Orator of the human race’. It will argue that it was a
way of self-fashioning and had roots in the study of classical rhetoric. Clo-
ots fashioned himself as Anacharsis, a Northern wiseman who travelled to
Ancient Greece and Athens. This is in line with his self-proclaimed title of
‘orator’. For Roman rhetoricians the orator was as much a wise philosopher
as a talented speaker who could convince the audience of the truth he de-
vised through reason. This leads to the next chapter on reason and truth,
examining how Cloots considered French principles to be scientific. This
chapter will then lead to the next one examining the context of thoughts
on nature and natural law theories, which were dominant at the time, and
how Cloots adapted these traditions to his atheist and scientific views. The
following chapter will consider Cloots’s understanding of humanity as a
unity, and of the individual as its most important part. The final chapter
will examine the context of republicanism and how Cloots tried to extend
its limits to the whole world.
105. Ibid., 481–82.

3 S E L F - FA S H I O N I N G A
R E P U B L I C A N O R AT O R
Qu’est-ce qu’un Orateur du
genre humain ?
Cloots, 17921
This study opened with the scene of Cloots’s ‘embassy’ to the NationalAssembly to ask that foreigners be included to the fête de la fédéra-
tion, the first celebration of Bastille Day.2 Cloots led the delegation as self-
proclaimed ‘ambassador of the human race’. Later, Cloots rejected his first
name and adopted the one of Anacharsis. In his writings, he changed also
his ‘function’ as ‘orator of the human race’, a designation applied after his
name. Why did Cloots change his name, and what was his intention? This
chapter argues that the reason was as much an act of self-fashioning during
a time of complete social and political novelty, as it was a rhetorical act re-
lated to Greek and Roman antiquity: presenting the orator in a good light
for the argument.
As Gay notes, an orator was facing several audiences at the National As-
sembly: his fellow revolutionaries, the public in the gallery, and Parisian
and provincial clubs looking for polished performances not straying too far
from the familiar patterns and past great figures of French rhetoric.3 The
delegation led by Cloots was like a theatrical representation, but it was not
an isolated one. There is no power without a theatrical representation of
this power: the king’s coronation, the lit de justice, the parade preceding
the reunion of the three estates, these are just examples of the theatricality
of politics in the ancien régime. That Cloots decided to organise such a del-
egation should not be considered unusual. Nor should it be unusual that
the delegation wore costumes— even if national folk costumes. During the
first celebration of the storming of the Bastille in the town of Beaufort-en-
vallée, in the Loire valley, eighty-three women ceremonially dressed in cos-
tumes representing the new departments.4 The deputies of the three estates
1. Cloots, ‘La République universelle’, 243.
2. For an account of the preparation and the course of the celebration, see Ozouf, La
fête révolutionnaire 1789–1799, 44–74.
3. Peter Gay, ‘Rhetoric and Politics in the French Revolution’, The American Histor-
ical Review 66, no. 3 (April 1961): 672–673.
4. Ozouf, La fête révolutionnaire 1789–1799, 64; Peter McPhee, Liberty or Death: The
French Revolution (New Haven, CT: Yale University Press, 2016), 101.
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also wore costumes symbolising their estate at the opening and during the
sessions of the Estates-General.5 As Hunt notes, revolutionaries were con-
cerned with dress because it was an expression of ‘symbolic forms of polit-
ical practice’.6 Hunt notes that there was a project to create revolutionary
official costumes, and that the way citizens dressed was the object of carica-
tures for how good or bad a republican they were. Above all, there was a
concern for equality and abolishing social distinctions through dress codes.
So, why did it provoke such a strong reaction among commentators when
Cloots led a delegation in national costumes? Why was Cloots accused to
have hired actors in costumes? This cannot be known, but what can be ex-
plained is Cloots’s action.
Choosing the function of ‘Orator of the human race’ was deliberate for
Cloots in his philosophical combat. French society at the time of the re-
volution was more literate than it had ever been, but the spoken word was
still dominant. In 1686–1690, 29% of men and 14% of women were able
to sign their name; the numbers rose to 48% of men and 17% of women
in 1786–90.7 The ability to sign one’s name is not necessarily synonymous
with the ability to read, but it is a rough indication. In this context, the well-
spoken word, eloquence, was necessary in order to convince the illiterate.
After the revolution broke out, Cloots and other pamphleteers continued
to read their publications out loud as orators. At the National Assembly
or the Convention, Cloots’s declaimed his République universelle and Bases
constitutionnelles as speeches. The speeches made by the representatives of
the people were carefully prepared in advance, and always written. At the
occasion of the celebration of the bicentenary of the French Revolution,
Furet started a collection of these speeches by the ‘orators of the French Re-
volution’.8 It is easy to compare the oratory skills of many revolutionaries
who received the same education in the collèges in classical rhetoric. They
were trained not only theoretically, but very practically with various exer-
cises, and even with theatrical representations of plays that were supposed
to express moral values in the city.
But Cloots’s choice was not simply influenced by classical rhetoricians
from his youth. There is a real self-fashioning in choosing a new name, Ana-
charsis. This name is not unrelated to the study of the classics and rhetoric.
Anacharsis was known for his wisdom as a philosopher. The orator was a
hero for Cicero in that he was a philosopher who had to seek truth through
5. See Costume de cérémonie de Messieurs les deputés des 3 ordres aux États généraux :
Clergé, Noblesse, Tiers-Etat (Paris: Print, 1789), cited in Hunt, Politics, Culture, and Class
in the French Revolution, 75.
6. Ibid., 74–86.
7. James van Horn Melton, The Rise of the Public in Enlightenment Europe (Cam-
bridge: Cambridge University Press, 2001), 82.
8. François Furet and Ran Halévi, eds., Orateurs de la Révolution française, vol. 1: Les
Constituants, Bibliothèque de la Pléiade (Paris: Gallimard, 1989).
self-fashioning 117
reason, and then persuade his fellow citizens of this truth through the mas-
tery of eloquence. Anacharsis was a foreigner from the North who came to
the capital of philosophy Athens; Cloots came from the relatively Northern
city of Cleves to Paris, centre of the Republic of letters. Anacharsis wanted
to spread the Greek mores and philosophies back home and anywhere he
went; the ‘orator’ Cloots would act through speeches for the whole hu-
man race. The philosopher Cloots self-fashions himself in the new régime
as ‘Anacharsis’ after an obscure Northern philosopher in Ancient Greece,
and devises a universally ‘true system’ with his reason, which he then tries
to convince everyone to adopt as self-appointed ‘orator’.
self-fashioning
Self-fashioning is understood here in Greenblatt’s sense: a process of con-
structing one’s identity and public persona according to imposed social
standards.9 Taylor wrote a rich study of the historical beginnings of the
modern self. What is novel in the modern notions of natural rights, Taylor
argues, is the place of the subject. ‘The Anglo-French Enlightenment cul-
ture’ is ‘individualist’ in three characteristics: ‘it prizes autonomy’; ‘it gives
an important place to self-exploration’; ‘and its visions of the good life gen-
erally involve personal commitment’.10 Wahrman identifies a clear histor-
ical change between an ‘ancien régime of identity’ and the ‘cultural revolu-
tion’ of the self at the end of the eighteenth century.11 The ‘ancien régime
of identity’ has several characteristics: ‘malleability’ or ‘the sense that one’s
“personal identity” … could be imagined as unfixed and potentially change-
able’, and a ‘pre-self’ or the ‘time that lacked a sense of a stable inner core of
selfhood like that which will emerge at the turn of the eighteenth century’.12
This is certainly the case with Cloots, as with many revolutionaries, and
this ‘malleability’ that changed to a rigid self would explain why nineteenth-
century commentators ridiculed Cloots for changing names, pretending
to be French when he was German, and calling himself ‘orator of the hu-
man race’. There were of course political differences that motivated these
attacks, but they crystallised on Cloots in particular, and not only on his
ideas, but on his person in what could be called a historical ‘character as-
sassination’. It was a general part of the cultural revolution after 1789 to
rename everything according to new standards. It is very significant, that
looking back on this period, historians and intellectuals of the nineteenth
9. Stephen Jay Greenblatt, Renaissance Self-Fashioning: From More to Shakespeare
(Chicago, IL: University of Chicago Press, 1980).
10. Charles Taylor, Sources of the Self: TheMaking of the Modern Identity (Cambridge:
Cambridge University Press, 1989), 305.
11. Dror Wahrman, Making of the Modern Self: Identity and Culture in Eighteenth-
Century England (New Haven, CT: Yale University Press, 2004), xiii.
12. Ibid., 168.
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century started to mock this fluid position regarding identity, especially na-
tional identity.13 They also mocked the references to antiquity, Roman of
course, but above all Greek. Cloots epitomised both sins as he embraced
his French citizenship, and considered himself like the Anacharsis of yore,
as a philosopher who came from the North to find the enlightenment of
philosophy in the intellectual capital of the time. The satirical play Athènes
à Paris attacked Cloots with his lofty dream of Greek philosophy.14 The
‘German’ origins were accentuated by intellectuals during the nineteenth
century, underlining the whole silliness of the project for a ‘German’ to try
and pretend being ‘French’.15 These examples mark the period of fixed iden-
tities based on ‘nationality’ during the first stage of modernity. It cannot be
reduced to mere political differences either, as a left-wing historian ridiculed
Cloots for the same reason, as argued in the introduction.16
However, Cloots was simply a foreigner trying to find his place in this
new setting, perhaps with too much enthusiasm to the taste of anti-repub-
lican commentators. To find his place, Cloots re-invented himself with a
French identity as a free ‘citizen’, rejecting gradually his previous identity of
Prussian noble ‘slave’. He also self-fashioned this new French citizen Cloots
being atheist and aspiring philosophe by adopting the non-Christian name
of Anacharsis. Cloots finally self-fashioned his function of ‘orator’, a Ro-
man republican function, as a new position in the new regime. Moreover,
throughout Cloots’s writings, as will be argued in the following chapters,
the individual has a central place because of the natural rights inherent to
her/him. Just as the revolution refashioned politics and the French insti-
tutions, Cloots refashioned himself. In the old regime, Cloots wanted to
become a member of the Republic of letters, a philosophe. His name and
his title were no issue or obstacle to this, on the contrary. His nobility and
his wealth made it easier to be introduced to the salons, without the need
to find a sponsor. If Cloots wrote his first book under a pseudonym, it was
not only to escape censorship, but to assume a certain sarcastic narrative
strategy; the real author was not hidden. The revolution, as any revolution,
triggered a re-fashioning of the public space. Displays of power from the an-
cien régimewere destroyed or replaced—statues of kings or saints, churches
and cathedrals, Latin inscriptions on hôtels particuliers, and so on. If the
public space was re-fashioned according to new ideas and ideals, intellectu-
als and actors of the revolution felt also the need to fashion themselves —
Marat ‘l’ami du peuple’, Robespierre ‘l’incorruptible’. If some had their epi-
13. See the nineteenth-century historians in the introduction.
14. Sauvage, Balisson de Rougemont and Lurieu, Athènes à Paris.
15. Barbey d’Aurevilly, Portraits politiques et littéraires; Laurent, Histoire du droit des
gens et des relations internationales, vol. 15.
16. Mathiez, La Révolution et les étrangers.
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thet given to them by popular consensus, Cloots and others fashioned it for
themselves.
It was not an isolated case to use names of the antiquity, and this could
be considered as social standard for constructing a public persona. For in-
stance, Lucien Bonaparte (1775–1840), Napoleon’s brother, renamed him-
self Brutus, the Roman politician most famous for his participation in the
assassination of Julius Cæsar who had a king-like behaviour.17 Many revolu-
tionaries looked back to Antiquity to find role models, the same role models
that fuelled their imagination during their formative years in collèges.18 Mon-
nier considers that this these references to Roman heroes were more than
mere rhetoric, but also part of a republican system of values, in which Bru-
tus is the major reference of republican duty and struggle against tyrants.19
François-Noël Babeuf (1760–1797) changed his first name to Camille, and
then, whilst in prison in 1793, chose Gracchus, from the Gracchus brothers,
tribunes in Rome (2 BCE) who tried to pass a land reform redistributing
aristocratic landholdings among the poor.20 Before the age of modern na-
tionalism, Cloots did not see any problem with identifying with the French
Revolution, and he was not the only foreigner to do so, as Thomas Paine
shows. Neither did the ‘French’ revolutionaries as they granted French cit-
izenship to Cloots and Paine, but also Benjamin Franklin, Friedrich Schiller,
and others. During the euphoria of the first years of the Revolution, the
revolutionaries reinvented themselves in new roles that had been hitherto
impossible in the system of the ancien régime.
A good illustration of this refashioning in daily lives is the use of citoyen
as a title prefixing a person’s name. Geffroy argues that the use of the ex-
pression ‘citoyen’ started between 1790–1792, and became popular between
1792 and 1795–1800 as a replacement of monsieur, mademoiselle, and ma-
dame, or any other previous title in a spirit of egalitarianism.21 Geffroy dates
the first use of the title citoyen, in this fashion, at the end of 1790 in a letter
by Augustin Robespierre.22 Cloots called himself citoyen already in an art-
icle published on 15 March 1790 in Chronique de Paris, ‘On se rappellera
que Mesmer est devenu millionnaire (…)’, signing ‘Cloots du Val-de-Grâce,
17. Lucien Bonaparte, Mémoires de Lucien Bonaparte, Prince de Canino, écrits par lui-
même, vol. 1 (Paris: Librairie de Charles Gosselin et Cie, 1836), 35.
18. See: Harold Talbot Parker,The Cult of Antiquity and the French Revolutionaries: A
Study in the Development of the Revolutionary Spirit (Chicago, IL: University of Chicago
Press, 1937).
19. Raymonde Monnier, Républicanisme, patriotisme et Révolution française (Paris:
L’Harmattan, 2005), 200–201, 277–283.
20. McPhee, Liberty or Death, 276.
21. Annie Geffroy, ‘Citoyen/Citoyenne (1753–1829)’, in Dictionnaire des usages socio-
politiques (1770–1815), vol. 4: Désignants socio-politiques, 2, Collection « Saint-Cloud »
(Paris: Klincksieck, 1989), 63–86.
22. Ibid., 72.
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baron en Allemagne, citoyen en France’.23 It is doubtful that Cloots used
the term citoyen in a republican sense, as a citizen of a republic, since this
use was uncommon as of yet. Geffroy notes that citoyen had three differ-
ent values before the revolution: as the inhabitant of a country, legally as
a person with ‘droit de cité’, and finally as a good and truthful person.24 It
is possible that Cloots used it in all these three senses, mainly as inhabitant
in France as the opposition with his birth country seems to imply. How-
ever, it is also a form of title as ‘truthful’ person, and even patriot or ‘good
citizen’ (as opposed to the ‘cosmopolite’ as ‘bad citizen’ described in the in-
troduction) of the new regime in France. Cloots opposed ‘citizen’ in France
to ‘baron’ in Germany and his text is against French aristocrats who fled
France to try their luck in America. Cloots compares himself to them as an
aristocrat who came to France because of the revolution, rather than fled it
for this reason:
Je renonce à mon berceau tudesque et à mes titres gothiques,
pour me revêtir de l’honorable qualité de bourgeois de Paris.
Si les mauvais Français s’expatrient, une foule d’étrangers ar-
rive sur les ailes de la liberté, du plaisir et de la raison.25
One should note the double entendre behind ‘titres gothiques’: playing on
the geographical and temporal understandings of the term, meaning at the
same time that the title of baron is Prussian and archaic. One should equally
note that Cloots uses the expression ‘bourgeois’: it meant both citizen of a
city, and commoner as opposed to gentil homme, noble, and soldier.26 In
the same spirit of egalitarianism, Cloots later identified as a sans-culotte. This
expression metaphorically designated poor, anti-aristocratic, anti-monarch-
ists, ‘honest’ people after 20 June 1791 (when the flight of the King was
discovered and he was brought back under a complete silence among the
Parisian crowd, as showing support and cheering had been forbidden), even
though it previously was an insult and a salacious expression.27
What’s in a Name?
Throughout his writing Cloots took numerous noms de plume. Cloots
changed his name and added different designations to it. The first change he
made was to frenchify his title of baron from Gnadenthal to Val-de-Grâce.
Perhaps that was an attempt to enter the world of French philosophers with
23. Cloots, Ecrits révolutionnaires, 8.
24. Geffroy, ‘Citoyen/Citoyenne (1753–1829)’, 64–65.
25. Cloots, Ecrits révolutionnaires, 8.
26. See Dictionnaire de l’Académie Française, 4th edition, vol. 1.
27. See Annie Geffroy, ‘Sans-culotte(s) (novembre 1790–juin 1792)’, in Dictionnaire des
usages socio-politiques (1770–1815), vol. 1 Désignants socio-politiques, Collection « Saint-
Cloud » (Paris: Klincksieck, 1985), 159–186.
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a name easier to pronounce and remember. After the revolution he rejected
his Christian name to adopt the one of a figure of ancient Greek philosophy,
Anacharsis. He equally rejected his aristocratic title in Prussia, and openly
turned against the Prussian state in favour of the universalist French Re-
volution.
It has to be noted first, that the change of name was an idea that Clo-
ots formulated early on in ‘Jean-Baptiste Cloots à Nicolas Bonneville, salut’,
published in Le Courrier de Paris dans les 83 départements on 28 October
1790:
Il est aisé de prévoir que le baptême en France se perdra bien-
tôt dans la marche rapide de la raison universelle. Je propose-
rais pour lors de faire précéder les noms de famille d’un nom
tiré des règnes de la nature, des événements de l’histoire, des
arts, des sciences, des vertus du genre humain. Si j’étais père
d’une nombreuse progéniture, mon fils aîné s’appellerait 17
juin Cloots, mon puîné s’appellerait 14 juillet Cloots ; mes au-
tres enfants porteraient le souvenir du 4 août, du 6 octobre,
du 2 novembre, du 4 février, du 13 avril, du 19 juin, etc.28
Cloots did not have any legitimate children to name after revolutionary
events (although perhaps this one daughter mentioned in the biographical
chapter). Instead, he changed his own first name, but rather than choosing
a key moment of the revolution he chose a figure from classical history —
Anacharsis. There is more to changing one’s name than simply adopting En-
lightenment philosophy in its critique against Christian traditions. There is
also a clear self-fashioning of one’s own identity, and especially so with the
addition of a designation—‘orator’. The designation in particular plays the
function of an identity in a period where all points of reference have been
erased and everything is to be made anew. However, it has to be noted also
that Cloots never meant to cover or falsify his origins; as he wrote in Lettre
sur les juifs regarding his grammatical mistakes due to his German origins:
‘D’ailleurs il vaut mieux être soi qu’un autre ; & je me montre tel que je
suis’.29
But why did Cloots choose Anacharsis as a model, whose name he de-
cided to take? And why Anacharsis, an obscure figure of Greek antiquity
nowadays? What was he doing by changing his name? To answer these ques-
tions, it is important to research who the historical Anacharsis was in order
to understand why Cloots chose him, and what he meant to do by that.
However, looking at the historical Anacharsis also means to look at what
historical information was available at the time on the historical Anachar-
28. Cloots, Ecrits révolutionnaires, 88.
29. Cloots, Lettre sur les juifs, 41.
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sis. It is this information that Cloots used and that will help us understand
his choice.
Anacharsis
It is first important to note that nothing is known historically about Ana-
charsis. According to contemporary historians, Anacharsis was largely a
legendary figure, as historical sources are very scarce.30 Only Herodotus
and Ephorus wrote stories about him. The Universal History written by
Ephorus of Cyme was the first of this kind and it influenced historians
after him, although his work did not survive him.31 Herodotus presented
Anacharsis as an admirer and also a representative of ‘barbarian criticism’
of Greek ways (The Histories, book 4, chapters 76–77). Born a Scythian
prince, Anacharsis travelled the then-known world and acquired a reputa-
tion for wisdom. He subsequently came to visit Greece. Diogenes Laertius,
in Lives of Eminent Philosophers (1, 101–105) related how Anacharsis be-
friended Solon during his stay in Athens. Anacharsis knocked at Solon’s
door and instructed one of Solon’s servants to ask him to welcome him to
his home. When the servant asked Solon, the latter instructed his servant
to tell Anacharsis that this was reserved for fellow countrymen. Anacharsis
entered the house and went to Solon announcing that he was now in So-
lon’s country (therefore a fellow countryman). His freedom of speech gave
way to an expression in ancient Greek: having a ‘Scythian conversation’.
Diogenes’s Anacharsis preached temperance to men in their course of life.
An unknown author used the name of Anacharsis to convey his own philo-
sophic critique of Greek Cynicism in The Letters of Anacharsis. Although
one of them was translated into Latin by Cicero (Tusc., 5. 90) it is dubious
that the real Anacharsis wrote them. However, they inspired Montesquieu
who took the same idea inLettres persanes.32 Both Herodotus and Diogenes
recognised the extraneity of Anacharsis and how he both adopted and criti-
cised Greek ways. It is said that it is when Anacharsis came back to Scythia,
that he was killed, perhaps by his own brother, while paying tribute to a
Greek rite. However, some historians have questioned the authenticity of
this event as it bears ressemblance to the narrative of a tragedy, and to the
fate of other figures. Kindstrand, who studied the historical Anacharsis in
30. John Hazel, Who’s Who in the Greek World, 2nd ed. (London: Routledge, 2002),
15; Simon Hornblower, Antony Spawforth and Esther Eidinow, eds., The Oxford Clas-
sical Dictionary, 4th ed. (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2012), 77; M. C. Howatson,
ed., The Oxford Companion to Classical Literature, 3rd ed. (Oxford: Oxford University
Press, 2011), 39; Jan Fredrik Kindstrand, Anacharsis: The Legend and the Apophthegmata,
Studia Graeca Upsaliensia, 16 (Uppsala: Uppsala Universitet, 1981).
31. Charles William Fornara,TheNature of History inAncient Greece and Rome (Berke-
ley and Los Angeles, CA: University of California Press, 1983), 44–46.
32. Hazel, Who’s Who in the Greek World, 15.
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length, concludes that what Herodotus and other Greeks knew of Anachar-
sis was largely legendary, even though there may be a ‘historical starting-
point, insofar that a man came to Greece from the North’.33
Cloots’s understanding of Anacharsis was therefore historically inaccur-
ate and based on these unverified accounts mentioned. Cloots’s idea to
make reference to Anacharsis was probably inspired by Barthélémy’s 1788
‘best-selling’ (for the time) historical fiction, in which the supposedly his-
torical Anacharsis narrates his voyages to Greece and Athens.34 Barthélémy
chose to write a sort of historical travel novel with Anacharsis as the cent-
ral character. Although inspired by historical events, it is a work of fiction
rather than non-fiction — the work of a novelist rather than of an histor-
ian. When Cloots writes that Anacharsis ‘was the witness of a great revolu-
tion’,35 it is probably a reference to Barthélémy: ‘Anacharsis fut témoin
de la révolution qui changea la face de la Grèce, et qui quelques temps
après, détruisit l’empire des Perses’.36 However, the ‘historical’ Anacharsis
is without a doubt the prime source of reference for Cloots, who surely
read Herodotus in collège, and Diogenes’ Lives of Eminent Philosophers is
mentioned as source for Cloots by Cubières-Palmézeau. According to Cu-
bières-Palmézeau, the Anacharsis in Barthélémy’s book is fictional (under-
stood as loosely based on the writings by Herodotus, Diogenes Laertius,
etc.), whereas Cloots’s choice of the name is directly linked to the ‘real’ Ana-
charsis as described in Diogenes Laertius.37 It may not only be the idea of a
philosopher coming from the North to Athens, the capital of philosophy,
that inspired Cloots, but also the ‘Scythian conversation’ or frankness and
witty shake-up of customs and traditions. It is here useful to retrace the
steps in Cloots’s writings towards the adoption of the name Anacharsis.
The given name ‘Anacharsis’ appears for the first time in Cloots’s writ-
ings in a letter to Camille Desmoulins on 28 August 1790, published on 20
September 1790 in Révolutions de France et de Brabant: ‘… J.-B. Cloots qui
habite la France, comme Anacharsis habitait la Grèce’.38 It then appeared
again in Cloots’s Anacharsis à Paris, ou lettre de Jean-Baptiste Cloots à un
prince d’Allemagne, written on 6 October 1790.39 This published letter to a
prince in Germany is written with the idea of being a modern Anacharsis.
Instead of being Scythian, this Anacharsis is Prussian (Cloots), and instead
of going to Athens to study Greek philosophy, he goes to Paris (to study
33. Kindstrand, Anacharsis: The Legend and the Apophthegmata, 16.
34. Barthélemy, Voyage du jeune Anacharsis en Grèce.
35. Cloots, ‘L’Orateur du genre humain’, 154.
36. Barthélemy, Voyage du jeune Anacharsis en Grèce, vi.
37. Michel (de) Cubières-Palmézeaux, Les États-Généraux du Parnasse, de l’Europe, de
l’Église et de Cythère ; ou les Quatre Poèmes politiques, lus au Lycée du Palais-Royal et suivis
de plusieurs autres poèmes (Paris: De l’Imprimerie, 1791), 16.
38. Cloots, Ecrits révolutionnaires, 69.
39. Cloots, ‘Anacharsis à Paris’.
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French philosophy). In this short pamphlet, Cloots multiplies the parallels
with Greek and Roman antiquity in order to present the French Revolu-
tion as a peaceful movement inspired by Enlightenment philosophy. For
instance, ‘la société des Jacobins est le palladium de la constitution’.40 As
such, the German prince is invited to come and witness by himself the situ-
ation. Cloots invites him in particular to visit the Lycée, intellectual centre
no less famous than the one in Athens.41 Anacharsis is thus the link bet-
ween Paris and Berlin, France and Prussia. Taking the name Anacharsis in
the title is a way of setting the tone and the purpose of the ‘letter’. The
letter is published and is therefore intended for a wide audience, but it is ad-
dressed to a German prince nonetheless, and as such Cloots sees himself as
a Prussian witness and translator of the French Revolution to the German
elites, which spoke French.
However, he still signed his following articles ‘Jean-Baptiste Cloots’. This
shows that Cloots originally took the name ‘Anacharsis’ not immediately
for himself as a way to fashion his atheist and non-aristocratic identity, but
as a rhetorical strategy: a stylistic way of writing and presenting the political
situation in Paris to his native land. Proof of this claim is that the turning
point for adopting definitively the name Anacharsis is Cloots’s pamphlet
against Hertzberg, L’orateur du genre humain. Cloots claims that, on 5 Feb-
ruary 1791, he gave a certificate of participation to the celebration of the Fed-
eration on 14 July 1790 to a Joseph Cajadaer Chammas signing ‘Anacharsis
Cloots, Orateur du genre humain à l’Assemblée nationale de France’.42 Clo-
ots writes:
J’inviterai donc tous les hommes sensés, qui connaissent l’in-
fluence pernicieuse de la religion chrétienne, de ne perdre au-
cune occasion de convertir leurs frères égarés ; et puisque l’ex-
emple agit efficacement sur les humains, je ne balance pas à
me débaptiser, comme je n’ai pas balancé à me déféodaliser. Et
pour qu’il ne soit plus question ni de baptême ni de baronnie,
je renvoie mon patron, Jean-Baptiste, en Palestine, après avoir
renvoyé mes armoiries en Prusse. Je prends le contre-pied des
Anabaptistes et, parvenu à l’âge de raison, j’abjure les fourbe-
ries de Pierre et de Paul. Et pour remplacer les saints du calen-
drier, je trouve parmi les philosophes de la Grèce un étranger
qui a bien mérité d’un peuple libre, et qui fut témoin d’une
grande révolution : j’adopte son nom, et je m’appellerai doré-
navant Anacharsis-Cloots.43
40. Cloots, ‘Anacharsis à Paris’, 74.
41. Ibid., 75.
42. Cloots, ‘L’Orateur du genre humain’, 160.
43. Ibid., 154.
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The use of the first name ‘Anacharsis’ has two clear objectives: ‘débap-
tiser’ and ‘déféodaliser’. It is a rejection of the two other estates: the clergy,
and the nobility. As shown below, the cult of antiquity by the French Re-
volutionaries was inspired by their classical education in collèges. As Parker
showed, antiquity provided also a model to follow for the republican move-
ment, in particular after the King’s flight. The end of the ancien régime cre-
ated a vacuum in political and moral philosophy that had to be filled. The
Greek and Roman models of republic provided much of the material to
fill this vacuum. However, as Montesquieu had shown in particular, a re-
public could only survive through ‘virtue’ and educated citizens. This task
was equated to the ‘regeneration’ of the people. But if the previous institu-
tions, such as the church, could not provide the required model for mor-
ality, another model had to be found. Antiquity provided such a model,
with ‘heroes’ who showed their ‘virtue’ through their deeds. This use of a
famous name from classical Greece and Rome also inspired Cloots’s friend,
the poet Michel de Cubières-Palmézeau, to rename some of his personal ac-
quaintances and leading politicians of his time, such as ‘Plato’ Sieyès, ‘Bru-
tus’ Robespierre, or ‘Scipio’ Lafayette.44 As Cubières-Palmézeau writes:
Et pour en revenir au Prussien Clootz qui, le premier, nous
a donné l’exemple de nous débaptiser en prenant le nom d’A-
nacharsis, ne vaut-il pas mieux choisir ses patrons & patrones
dans Rome profane que dans Rome la sainte, & imiter des
payens remplis de vertus & de génie, quoique damnés, que des
moines & moinesses canonisés par le pape & solemnellement
placés dans le ciel, quoiqu’ils n’eussent d’autres mérites que de
faire assidûment l’oraison & se donner la discipline ?45
As Parker notes, the identification with figures of the antiquity was a way
of motivating themselves in the face of adversity. Durosy compared a naval
commander with the Greek statesman Aristides, while Robespierre in May
1791 identified himself with the same Aristides in a speech.46 Later, during
the Convention, it became very popular for victims of the revolution to
compare themselves with the persecuted figures of the antiquity.47 But only
Cloots among the revolutionaries changed his first name into one, rather
than just liken his life and fate with one. There is therefore more to it than
just following a rhetorical trend among revolutionaries in order to identify
with the antiquity; there is a self-fashioning with a particular intent.
44. Cubières-Palmézeaux, Les États-Généraux, 13, 16, cited in Michael Sonenscher, Sans-
Culottes: An Eighteenth-Century Emblem in the French Revolution (Princeton, NJ: Prince-
ton University Press, 2008), 306–07.
45. Cubières-Palmézeaux, Les États-Généraux, 16–17.
46. Parker, The Cult of Antiquity and the French Revolutionaries, 171–172.
47. Ibid., 173.
126 self-fashioning a republican or ator
In line with this function of foreign philosopher observing a revolution,
Cloots subsequently added the designation ‘Orator of the human race’. If
this designation still belongs to the self-fashioning it has to be explained by
the explicit reference to Roman and Greek antiquity. Rhetoric played an
important part in the education of the revolutionaries who read classical
Roman and Greek rhetoricians. The Roman orator had a specific role and
was often described as a hero. But it is first necessary to explain the role of
rhetoric and how it was taught in mid eighteenth-century collèges in order to
understand the extent of the influence of classical literature, and the Greek
and Roman classical republican cultures, on Cloots and the revolutionaries.
rhetoric
In Reason and Rhetoric in the Philosophy of Hobbes, Skinner argues that
Hobbes’s central aspiration to create a scientia civilis, a civil science, derived
from classical theorists of eloquence and Cicero in particular.48 According
to Cicero, there were two components of a scientia civilis: reason (the faculty
to uncover truth), and rhetoric (the art of presenting truth with eloquence).
Hobbes’s position shifted throughout his writings regarding the place of
reason and rhetoric, from an initial agreement to a repudiation in favour
of science, and a final acceptance of the power of eloquence in persuading
the multitude. The reason for this change is mainly due to Hobbes’s con-
sideration on the English revolution, which he considered as a triumph of
the irrational and the power of rhetoric over science and rationality.49 As
a result, Hobbes held the role of rhetoric high in persuading an audience
of the truth acquired through reason, and he inaugurated a particular tone
and style of writing philosophy by using ridicule and laughter as weapons
of choice against his intellectual enemies.
The same can be argued with Cloots: truth is acquired through the use of
reason, but the power of eloquence is then used to convince the audience
of this truth. Truth, here, is the scientia civilis of the time, or the ‘science
of man’ as developed throughout the Enlightenment. And for Cloots, it
is also the idea of single nation of the human race and sovereignty of the
human race. The revolutionaries developed a specific rhetoric during the
heyday of the revolution. They received their education on reason from the
philosophes of the Enlightenment, and their education on rhetoric from the
‘classics’ of Antiquity, notably Cicero. As a result, they were trained to think
of the new civil science of the Enlightenment as truth, and to persuade the
audience of it through classical rhetoric. As Brockliss states, education had
a tremendous influence on the mindset of schoolboys: ‘… at no time before
48. Quentin Skinner, Reason and Rhetoric in the Philosophy of Hobbes (Cambridge:
Cambridge University Press, 1996).
49. Ibid., 435.
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the French Revolution was it possible for any but a few members of the
intelligentsia to reject the cultural inheritance of their schooldays’.50
After the king’s flight to Varennes, republicanism became prominent as
the only viable option for a new political order. Both the science and rhet-
oric of the revolutionaries were infused with Greek and Roman republic-
anism. Cloots’s conception of the true civil science and his rhetoric did not
differ from this model. What is interesting is the particular view he had of
this civil science, and the way he used his rhetorical education to persuade
his audience. Cloots interpreted the French Revolution as the beginning of
a universal movement towards the liberation of ‘oppressed peoples’. The
‘regeneration’ of the French people would spread throughout the world,
and the French republic was only the beginning of the universal republic as
all the countries would free themselves from monarchical tyranny. In doing
so, Cloots perceived himself as a broker between France and other countries,
for the whole of the human race. First, as ‘ambassador’, and then as ‘orator’.
Cloots ‘orator of the human race’ used laughter as a rhetorical device to win
the audience in the universal language that French was at the time.
The rhetoric employed by the revolutionaries played an important role
in shaping the new politics. According to Hunt, the collège education not
only structured all the revolutionaries’ speeches along Quintilian’s five-step
structure, but also provided a powerful tool of persuasion infusing emo-
tions and symbols into the new concepts of politics and the political.51 Clo-
ots intended the same with his own ideas: emotions with the use of jokes,
indignation, accusations, etc.; symbols with the use of common republican
symbols such as the reference to the constitution, liberty with the Phrygian
hat against slavery with chains, or the mention of Enlightenment philo-
sophers (Rousseau, Locke, Voltaire, etc.). This was a time of enthusiastic
creation in terms of politics and political concepts; especially so after the
fall of the king. Constructing a republic became a possibility, and all the
previous referents of power and sovereignty had to be replaced. Cloots fol-
lowed this rhetorical explosion with the concept of ‘nation of the human
race’ and ‘sovereignty of the human race’. At times Cloots followed the
rhetorical norms of his time, but often he tried to influence concepts to
shift their meanings according to his own views. The concept of nation is a
good example of this as it was created as an abstract concept designating a
community of free individuals, which Cloots then saw as applicable to the
whole world.
Gay nuanced Parker’s assertion that the ‘revolutionaries’ vowed a ‘cult
of antiquity’ as they neither quantitatively cited nor qualitatively admired
50. L. W. B. Brockliss, French Higher Education in the Seventeenth and Eighteenth Cen-
turies: A Cultural History (Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1987), 4.
51. Hunt, Politics, Culture, and Class in the French Revolution, 2–3, 33.
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the ancients as often as to qualify as a ‘cult’.52 But if only a few revolutionar-
ies qualify as admirers of antiquity, Gay does not provide an exhaustive list
of them, although he mentions Desmoulin, Madame Roland, Saint-Just,
Vergnaud, Brissot, and Robespierre. Gay’s point is that the historian should
not simply disregard the category of a ‘secular religion’ that the revolution-
aries used to replace catholicism. To avoid a simplistic approach to the rhet-
oric of the orators, Gay instead suggests to look at four streams instead: the
tradition of eloquence, the ideology, the mental state of the orator, and the
events surrounding the speech.53
Gumbrecht has analysed the rhetoric of the revolutionaries under the
angle of a Rezeptionsästhetik.54 While highly theoretical, the work analyses
three texts in particular at three different moments of the revolution: 1789,
1792, 1793. In particular, the analysis of Mireabeau’s Projet d’adresse au Roi
on 16 July 1789 shows how the rhetoric of the revolutionaries was structured
by their classical education. Mirabeau’s speech is an example of the third
type of Aristotelian orations, the genus deliberativum or ‘deliberative ora-
tion’, (Rhetoric, book 1 chapter 3).55 The 1793 example of mourning after
Marat’s death constitutes a case of epideictic oratory, or ‘demonstrative ora-
tion’.56
In analysing Cloots’s rhetoric, and following Gay’s study of rhetoric, it is
beyond the scope of this thesis to attempt at analysing the mental state or
any linguistic structure. Instead, I will focus on the historical context in gen-
eral, and more specifically on how the tradition of eloquence played a role,
and what sort of ideology Cloots had. The mental state implies elements
of psychology, which is difficult to assess. I would here brush aside Gay’s
suggestion to use Freud’s concepts of conscient and subconscient as these
views are only studied in psychology as an introduction to the history of
the discipline rather than actual tools of analysis. On another note, it is cer-
tain that physical and psychological exhaustion played an important role in
revolutionary rhetoric, as Palmer notes, but these elements are beyond the
scope of the present study.57 Tackett has written a study on the psycholo-
gical and physical state of revolutionaries during the terror.58 I will focus
here on the education that Cloots received, the same as many other revolu-
52. Gay, ‘Rhetoric and Politics in the French Revolution’, 669–670.
53. Ibid., 672–676.
54. Hans Ulrich Gumbrecht, Funktionen parlamentarischer Rhetorik in der Französis-
chen Revolution. Vorstudien zur Entwicklung einer historischen Textpragmatik (München:
Wilhelm Fink, 1978).
55. See Skinner, Reason and Rhetoric in the Philosophy of Hobbes, 41.
56. Gumbrecht, Funktionen parlamentarischer Rhetorik, 93–97.
57. Robert Roswell Palmer, Twelve Who Ruled: The Year of the Terror in the French
Revolution, Princeton Classic, with a foreword by Isser Woloch (Princeton, NJ: Princeton
University Press, 2005 [1941]).
58. Timothy Tackett, The Coming of the Terror in the French Revolution (Cambridge,
MA: Belknap Press of Harvard University Press, 2015).
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tionaries, which was emphasising rhetoric. It becomes then very clear that
the title ‘orator of the human race’ was related to this classical education
and Roman republicanism. The orator was as much a philosopher as an
eloquent speaker, with a specific role in society.
Education
Mercier in his first volume of Tableau de Paris writes this striking account
of his education in Paris:
Le nom de Rome est le premier nom qui ait frappé mon oreille.
Dès que j’ai pu tenir un rudiment, on m’a entretenu de Romu-
lus & du Tibre. Les noms de Brutus, de Caton & de Scipion
me poursuivoient dans mon sommeil. On entassoit dans ma
mémoire les Epîtres familieres de Cicéron ….
Les Décades de Tite-Live ont tellement occupé mon cerveau
pendant mes études, qu’il m’a fallu dans la suite beaucoup de
temps pour redevenir citoyen de mon propre pays, tant j’avois
épousé les fortunes de ces anciens Romains.
J’étois républicain avec tous les défenseurs de la République ;
je faisois la guerre avec le Sénat, contre le redoutable Annibal ;
je rasois Carthage la superbe ; je suivois la marche des Géné-
raux Romains, & le vol triomphant de leurs aigles dans les
Gaules ; je les voyois sans terreur conquérir le pays où je suis
né ; je voulois faire des Tragédies de toutes les stations de Cé-
sar ; & ce n’est que depuis quelques années que je ne sais quelle
lueur de bon sens m’a rendu François & habitant de Paris.59
Historians of the revolution have argued that the revolutionaries-to-be
received an education that focused heavily on the ‘classics’ of Antiquity.60
These texts formed not only the background for the subsequent oratorical
style and domination of public opinion, but also a romantic enthusiasm for
republican values.61 There are several works of reference regarding the cur-
59. Louis-Sébastien Mercier,Tableau de Paris, Nouvelle édition, vol. 1 (Amsterdam: s.n.,
1783), 149.
60. See: José Antonio Dabdab Trabulsi, ‘8. Liberté, Égalité, Antiquité : la Révolution
française et le monde classique’, Collection « ISTA » (Besançon) 1135, no. 1 (2009): 207–
248; Michel Dubuisson, ‘La Révolution française et l’Antiquité’, Cahiers de Clio, no. 100
(hiver 1989): 29–42; François Hartog, ‘La Révolution française et l’Antiquité : Avenir d’une
illusion ou cheminement d’un quiproquo?’,La pensée politique, no. 1 (1993): 30–61; Claude
Mossé, L’antiquité dans la Révolution française, L’aventure humaine (Paris: Albin Michel,
1989).
61. Robert Roswell Palmer, The School of the French Revolution: A Documentary His-
tory of the College of Louis-le-Grand and its Director, Jean-Francois Champagne, 1762-1814
(Boston, MA: De Gruyter, 2015), 28; Schama, Citizens, 162–174.
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riculum that the revolutionaries studied as pupils of the collèges. It is here
useful to retrace the history of these collèges in which both nobles and the
well-to-do sent their children.62 This will enable us to appreciate the degree
of impregnation of classical authors and the culture of classical republic-
anism in the formative years of the revolutionaries and Cloots. This short
historical sketch shows that the curriculum developed around rhetoric and
eloquence in order to educate future figures of established power, be it the
church, the nobility, or the state. These real collèges have to be distinguished
from others, also called collèges, but in reality functionning as annexes for
religious orders. Colleges, such as the collège de Cluny, accepted poor pupils
on a scholarship for ordination.63 This explains why several figures of the
revolution and the Enlightenment were called ‘abbé’ although they never
preached or very little, and wrote instead works of philosophy.64
The French collèges were founded on the Dutch model initiated by the
Bretheren of the Common Life. The curriculum was the same due to a
constant exchange between the university of Paris and The Netherlands. It
was based on the medieval trivium: rhetoric, logic, and philosophy and sci-
ence.65 There was little rhetoric taught before the reform of the collèges dur-
ing the sixteenth century, but it was gradually introduced mostly in Latin,
and a little in Greek.66 This gradual interest by the political and religious
powers for the teaching of rhetoric may be explained by the fact that soci-
ety was prone to written rather than oral transmission of knowledge and
information. The art of persuasion was therefore of outmost interest for
the powers-that-be, which gave the collèges their function: forming young
minds to become people of the spoken word in order to assume these func-
tions for the church and other institutions of power.67 The dominance of
rhetoric and the educational emphasis on Greek and Roman rhetoricians
was influenced by authorities in order to perpetuate their power, and, iron-
ically, was the reason for their demise.
In the collèges, rhetoric formed an important part of the education of the
pupils. A seminal work is Parker’sThe Cult of Antiquity and the French Re-
volutionaries. Looking at the curriculum of several collèges, Parker takes ten
62. See for instance: Charles R Bailey, ‘An Eighteenth-Century French Board of Educa-
tion’, History of Education Quarterly 10, no. 2 (Summer 1970): 189–202, and Charles R
Bailey, ‘French Secondary Education, 1763–1790: The Secularization of Ex-Jesuit Collèges’,
Transactions of the American Philosophical Society 68, no. 6 (1978): 1–124.
63. Michel Reulos, ‘L’Université et les Collèges’, Bulletin de l’Association Guillaume
Budé 1, no. 2 (June 1953): 37.
64. For instance, Cloots’s friend the abbé Brizard, mentioned in the biographical
chapter.
65. Roger Chartier, Dominique Julia and Marie-Madeleine Compère, L’éducation en
France du XVIe au XVIIIe siècle (Paris: Société d’édition d’enseignement supérieur, 1976),
148–151.
66. Ibid., 151.
67. Ibid., 197.
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examples, of which the University of Paris is one. Parker does not include
Cloots’s collège du Pléssis-Sorbonne, but considers three chosen collèges (Har-
court, Navarre, and Louis-le-Grand) as forming one example since ‘they
were under a common regulation’: the University of Paris.68 By extension,
Pléssis-Sorbonne, where Cloots went, must have had the same curriculum
since it was also part of the University of Paris. Parker shows that the pupils
in the collèges received an education heavily focused on the classics of Rome,
and most importantly Cicero, who was studied during four of their six years
at the collège, followed by Horace and Virgil each studied for three years.69
As seen in the previous chapters, the same authors were on the curriculum
of the Berlin Académie des nobles, and Sulzer had the same emphasis on
clarity for argumentation and concepts.
The study of rhetoric has a long history. Fumaroli retraced the develop-
ment of rhetoric in France between 1550 and 1650, culminating towards a
middle way with Balzac, who wished that the ‘Orator’ in the monarchy
would unite the polished language of nobility with the heart of a ‘repub-
lican’.70 College professors had three different kinds of sources for their
teaching material: theory with Aristotle, practice with Cicero, and pedagogy
with Quintilian.71 Classical rhetoric, as taught in the collèges of the ancien
régime, was built on Quintilian’s Institutio Oratorio.72 After a brief pream-
bule dedicated to matters coming before rhetoric such as speech and defin-
itions, the treatise divides five steps: inventio (discovering the topic), dis-
positio (ordering), elocutio (ornementation), actio (delivery), and memoria
(memory).73 The inventio deals with the status of the speech (deciding what
is at issue), the material for persuading (the impression the orator makes, the
emotions to appeal to, and the proofs), and the loci or topics (a checklist of
possible material on a given subject). Regarding the impression made by the
orator, it was considered normal that the orator established his own good
character at the beginning of the speech. Regarding the appeal to human
emotions, a knowledge of human psychology was necessary, and here Aris-
totle’sRhetoric was a good guide through human passions. The proofs were
not concerned with logic, but with a sufficient degree of probability. The
dispositio deals with the order in which the loci should be composed and
follows a rigid development. First, comes the exordium or general introduc-
tion in which the orator puts himself in a favourable light. Second, comes
the statement of the case. Third, comes a narration of events in favour of
68. Parker, The Cult of Antiquity and the French Revolutionaries, 13.
69. Ibid., 14–21.
70. Marc Fumaroli,L’âge de l’éloquence. Rhétorique et « res literaria » de la Renaissance
au seuil de l’époque classique, Hautes études médiévales et modernes 43 (Geneva: Librairie
Droz, 1980), 705.
71. Chartier, Julia and Compère, L’éducation en France du XVIe au XVIIIe siècle, 197.
72. France, Rhetoric and Truth in France, 8.
73. Ibid., 8–13.
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the speaker’s position and the refutation of points made by opponents. Fi-
nally, the peroration that sums up what has been said and attempts to sway
the public’s opinion in the speaker’s favour through the use of emotion.
The elocutio concerns the stylistic effectiveness of the speech. The speaker
can use figures of speech to impress or stir the audience such as tropes, or
artistic alteration of words or phrases to another meaning (metaphor, syn-
echdoche, metonymy), or figures that artificially alters a phrase rather than
its meaning in order to communicate emotion. It can be a ﬁgurae senten-
tiae, a departure from a normal statement to express or provoke emotion
(rhetorical question, feigned hesitation, appeal to the audience, irony, apo-
strophe, impersonation, exclamation, interruption, etc.). It can also be a
ﬁgurae verborum, a different arrangement of words (repetition, parallelism,
asyndeton, enumeration, polysyndeton, gradation, etc.). One last element
of elocutio is the rhythm of the prose and the construction of the orator-
ical period. The parts regarding delivery and memory are dealt with more
rapidly by Quintilian.
There were numerous exercises to give the pupils the habit of composing
speeches; those asked them to develop a sentence or a title with trites, peri-
ods, transpositions, figures, amplifications, and culminations.74 The most
famous textbooks were written by professors of rhetoric such as L’art de
parler by the Reverend Father Bernard Lamy (1640–1715) at the collège of
Juilly,75 or L’élève de rhétorique by Joseph de Jouvancy (1643–1719),76 who
taught at the collège Louis-le-Grand.77 Theatre was also an important part
of the education at the collèges as it provided an exercise for memory and
the oratory art through the mastery of gesture and vocal expression.78 Plays
were used as instruments of collective moral lessons, and all the theatrical
science—the backstage machinery, the stage set, the costumes—was geared
towards captivating the audience’s imagination and heart.79
Throughout Cloots’s writings, the above mentioned names of the clas-
sics in rhetoric appear several times. Cicero is mentioned over twelve times,80
74. Georges Snyders, La pédagogie en France au XVIIe et XVIIIe siècles (Paris: Presses
Universitaires de France, 1964), 111–128; Jean-Claude Chevalier, ‘La pédagogie des collèges
jésuites’, Littérature 7, no. 3 (October 1972): 120–128.
75. Bernard Lamy, La rhétorique, ou L’art de parler, 3rd ed. (Paris: Chez André Pralard,
1688).
76. Joseph de Jouvancy, L’élève de rhétorique (Candidatus rhetoricae) au collège Louis-
le-Grand de la Société de Jésus au XVIIIe siècle (Paris: Hachette, 1892).
77. Gustave Émond, Histoire du collège de Louis-le-Grand, ancien collège des jésuites à
Paris, depuis sa fondation jusqu’en 1830 (Paris: Durand, Loisel, 1845), 124.
78. Chartier, Julia and Compère, L’éducation en France du XVIe au XVIIIe siècle, 203.
79. Ibid., 204.
80. Cloots, Ecrits révolutionnaires, 70, 141, 164, 176, 292, 299 (three times), 448, 450, 451.
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Horace is mentioned four times,81 Ovid once,82 Homer three times,83 Livy
once,84 and Aristotle once.85 Of the French rhetoricians, Malebranche is
mentioned once,86 whilst Fénelon is mentioned four times.87 Quintilian
and Virgil are absent, but it is doubtful that Cloots did not read them dur-
ing his time in collège du Pléssis-Sorbonne. The complete works of Virgil,
Horace, and Aristotle’s Rhetoric are present at the Gnadenthal library. An
example of French oratory style is also represented in the library with Bos-
suet’s Oraisons funèbres.
The point here is not to analyse how Cloots referred to them but what he
wished to say doing so. This would also turn out quite difficult to do since
Cloots only mentions these authors in passing, and mostly as examples of
great intellect, behaviour, or intellectual dedication. For instance, as we will
see below, Cloots mentions these classical authors and others when writing
to his uncle and comparing his work and dedication to theirs. It is certain
that Cloots received an education with a heavy emphasis on classical rhet-
oric, and that he had read the most famous authors. When Cloots calls him-
self ‘orator of the human race’, therefore, it is a speech act that is influenced
by this classical education. The choice of ‘orator’ is a deliberate reference to
Roman republicanism, in which the orator was an important person with
specific qualities and duties.
Orator of the Human Race
Before calling himself ‘Orator of the human race’, Cloots explained in the
above-mentioned letter to Camille Desmoulins, published in Révolutions
de France et de Brabant 20 September 1790, how he wished to serve the
new regime in France:
Je ne veux pas d’autre magistrature que celle dont la nature et
l’éducation m’ont revêtu : la voix et la plume. Magistrature su-
prême qui juge les rois et les souverains ; magistrature qui ne
dépend pas des ballottements d’un scrutin capricieux ; magis-
trature sans laquelle il n’y a plus de liberté nationale ….88
In the same letter Cloots emphasises the importance of freedom of speech
and of the press. He sets himself the task to exercise this freedom since he
is among the ‘citoyens non-électifs’, and wishes humbly that France could
81. Ibid., 135, 253, 291, 493.
82. Ibid., 128.
83. Ibid., 287, 336, 395.
84. Ibid., 105.
85. Ibid., 287.
86. Ibid., 496.
87. Ibid., 75, 164, 254, 544.
88. Ibid., 69.
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have one thousand like him so that ‘l’État fleurisse à jamais sous tous les
rapports de l’esprit républicain, l’abondance du numéraire et la prospérité
générale’.89 Cloots then praises Desmoulins and draws a comparison bet-
ween him and two ancient orators: Demosthenes and Cicero.90 Cloots an-
nounces then, in this letter, that he wishes to become orator in France as in
Ancient Greece and Rome, in order to monitor the powers-that-be: ‘Je ne
veux pas d’autre place que celle de surveiller les gens en place’.91 He does so
with a repetition and play on the two meanings of the word ‘place’ (called
an antanaclasis in rhetoric).
The designation ‘Orateur du genre humain’ appeared first in Cloots’s
fake article signed by ‘Le roi des Français à tous les rois de la Terre, salut’,
published inChronique de Parison 2 March 1791. Cloots pretended to write
as the king, and ended the article with ‘Signé : Louis. Et plus bas : Cloots,
Orateur du genre humain’.92 Cloots wrote before the flight of the king, and
the statement is not yet fully republican. However, all the references to Ro-
man antiquity are there. The king is still considered the head of the execut-
ive, but only as chosen by the legitimate sovereign, the people.
The use of the designation ‘Orator of the human race’ as a rhetorical
device of the inventio is clearly established in L’Orateur du genre humain,
ou dépêche du prussien Cloots au prussien Hertzberg in March 1791.93 One
should note that among all the used pen names (Jean-Baptiste Cloots, baron
du Val-de-Grâce, ‘Anacharsis’, ‘baron en Allemagne, citoyen en France’,
‘Prussien’, ‘ambassadeur du genre humain’, etc.) Cloots chose to sign as
‘prussien Cloots’ and to entitle the pamphlet ‘L’Orateur du genre humain’.
It was as ‘Prussian’ that Cloots addressed Hertzberg, but he intended to talk
politically, hence the idea to take the name ‘orator’. The orator in classical
Rome or Athens— as discussed by Aristotle, Quintilian, or Cicero— was
at the centre of public life, taking three types of orations for three different
functions: celebratory (religious), judicial, and political. It is the political
orator that Cloots chooses to be, because it enabled him to exercise an inde-
pendant power outside institutions, which he could not join as a foreigner.
Cloots defends his ‘embassy’ on behalf of the human race in front of
Hertzberg and others’ pamphlets (Burke and Calonne). Cloots takes again
the role of the one speaking on behalf of the human race— using the Ro-
man symbolic republican rhetoric that his aristocratic title is nothing but a
‘titre d’esclave prussien’ — and writes in a binary opposition to Hertzberg,
‘l’ennemi de l’humanité’, speaking on behalf of the despots and the old re-
gime.94 As ‘Orator of the human race’, Cloots sees himself as a philosopher
89. Cloots, Ecrits révolutionnaires, 69.
90. Ibid., 70.
91. Ibid., 69.
92. Ibid., 97–98.
93. Cloots, ‘L’Orateur du genre humain’.
94. Ibid., 102.
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with a mission to oppose monarchists, aristocrats, counter-revolutionists,
etc.: ‘Sachez, Hertzberg, que je suis le représentant de toutes les Nations
qui ont le malheur de ne pas jouir de nos dix-sept articles fameux’.95 The
articles in question are of course the ones in the Déclaration des droits de
l’homme. Hertzberg and his pamphlet represent the opposite. Hertzberg
wrote his ‘mémoires académiques’ declaimed in front of an elitist audience
of academicians, as opposed to Cloots’s pamphlet declaimed in front of the
people; he is a ‘démophage’ as opposed to a democrat; his is a ‘vizir’, in or-
der to further ridicule his position in a ridiculous political system. Cloots
makes several references to Hertzberg in relation to the Ottoman empire
and to Persia. For instance, Cloots calls Hertzberg ‘Thamas Hertzberg’ (in
italics in the original publication and not in the Écrits révolutionnaires),96
certainly a reference to Thamas Kouli-Khan (1698–1747), emperor of Per-
sia (1737–1746), who was popularised by several authors.97 Thamas Kouli-
Khan was the name given by prince Thamas to his minister and general
Nader Shah, which meant ‘the Khan Slave of Thamas’, but the latter turned
against the former and declared himself king in 1736 after winning against
the Turcs, with whom he would finally sign a peace treaty in 1746.98 This se-
mantic relation with Persia and Thamas Kouli-Khan is related to the person
of Hertzberg, who devised a diplomatic line against his king Frederick Wil-
liam II regarding Austria and Russia after their war with Turkey, and also to
the ‘despotic’ nature of Prussia compared to France. Hertzberg had diplo-
matic plans of territorial extensions by offering mediation between Austria
and Russia, whereas the king had war plans, and these differences appeared
at the conferences at Reichenbach in summer 1790.99 Hertzberg had earlier
forced a military intervention against his king’s wish in Holland in support
of the stadtholder against the democratic French party, which is the origin
of Cloots’s ire with Hertzberg, and his mocking title of Thamas. Ultimately,
Hertzberg’s criticism of the king’s foreign policy led to his dismissal on 5 July
1791.
95. Ibid., 103.
96. Cloots, L’orateur du genre humain, 4; Cloots, ‘L’Orateur du genre humain’, 102.
97. Jean-Antoine du Cerceau, Histoire de Thamas Koulikan, Sophi de Perse (Amster-
dam: Chez Arkstee, 1740); James Fraser, The History of Nadir Shah, formerly called
Thamas Kuli Khan, the Present Emperor of Persia (London: W. Strahan, 1742); Johan
Otter, Voyage en Turquie et en Perse. Avec une Relation des expéditions de Tahmas Kouli-
Khan, 2 vols. (Paris: Chez les Freres Guerin, 1748).
98. Chevalier Louis de Jaucourt, ‘Perses, empire des’, in Encyclopédie, ou Dictionnaire
raisonné des sciences, des arts et des métiers, ed. Denis Diderot and Jean le Rond d’Alembert,
vol. 12 (Paris: Briasson, 1765), 419–420.
99. See Ewald Friedrich Graf von Hertzberg, Recueil des déductions, mémoires, déclara-
tions, lettres, traités, et autres actes et écrits publics, qui ont été rédigés et publiés pour la cour
de Prusse par le ministre d’État Comte de Hertzberg, dans les années 1789 et 1790, vol. 3
(Berlin: Chez J. F. Unger, 1795), 97–234.
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Cloots writes for a wide readership knowing that Hertzberg will prob-
ably not read his pamphlet. He recognises it himself in the opening of the
pamphlet:
Je suis dans la même position avec mon vizir chrétien que
Jean-Jacques lorsqu’il apostrophe son muphti baptisé, en ces
termes énergiques : « Pourquoi faut-il, monseigneur, que j’aie
quelque chose à vous dire ! quelle langue commune pouvons-
nous parler ? comment pouvons-nous nous entendre, et qu’y
a-t-il entre vous et moi ? ».100
The identity of the audience is even more explicit at the end of the pamphlet
when Cloots writes to Hertzberg to let the ‘free people’ decide who is right:
Ne soyez pas juge et partie : c’est aux hommes libres à pro-
noncer entre l’orateur des nations et les oppresseurs des na-
tions, entre le défenseur des souverains et les rebelles aux sou-
verains.101
The people will have a choice to listen to Cloots as republican ‘orator’ who
claims to speak in ‘defence’ of this ‘sovereign’ people, or to listen to Hertz-
berg, as monarchical ‘oppressor’ who represents the king and is therefore
nothing but a ‘rebel’ to the true ‘sovereign’ that is the people.
But what does it mean for Cloots to be an ‘orator’? It is highly likely
that the choice of calling himself ‘orator’ is linked to Cloots’s readings as a
young boy in collège and the definition that Roman rhetoricians gave to it.
The orator was associated with a positive image of citizenship. According
to Cicero in De oﬃciis, the hero is the
vir civilis, the man who knows how to plead in the law courts
for justice and to deliberate in the councils and public assem-
blies of the respublica in such a way as to promote policies at
once advantageous and honourable.102
For Quintilian too, ‘the true vir civilis is none other than the figure of the
orator’.103 This vir civilis should not only be wise but eloquent; he must be a
man of sapientia, a man of knowledge.104 Cicero even compares the orator
to a philosopher.105 The vir civilis, this orator, must possess ratio in order
to acquire sapientia.106 He must equally possess a certain number of moral
virtues such as justice, fortitude, temperance, ﬁdes (trust), amicitia (friend-
ship), humanitas (philanthropic feelings), clementia ormisericordia.107 The
100. Cloots, ‘L’Orateur du genre humain’, 102.
101. Ibid., 162.
102. Skinner, Reason and Rhetoric in the Philosophy of Hobbes, 69.
103. Ibid., 93.
104. Ibid., 74.
105. Ibid., 75.
106. Ibid., 76.
107. Ibid., 76–78.
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argument that Cicero and Quintilian put forward is that the orator must
be able to not only teach and instruct his fellow citizens of what is the right
and wise thing to do, but must delight and persuade them.108 Reason alone
is not sufficient, as citizens would reject the plan laid out by a wise and vis-
ionary man; according to Cicero: ‘Eloquence is indispensable if men are to
persuade others to accept the truths that reason finds out’.109 For Roman
rhetoricians, it was thus the true goal of the ars rhetorica to achieve a sci-
entia civilis; reason, or the faculty to uncover the truth, had to be exposed
through rhetoric, the art of presenting with eloquence. As such, the orator
was the hero of many of the treatises written on politics.110 A good orator is
defined as someone who forces us to do what reason commands.111
Cloots’s function as ‘Orator of the human race’ should be understood as
the emulation of classical republicanism, coupled with the function of an
Enlightenment philosopher. On the one hand, Cloots compares himself to
Voltaire, when he proclaimed to represent the philosophers in the republic
of letters:
« Je persiste à croire, disait Voltaire, que les philosophes m’ont
daigné prendre pour leur représentant, comme une compa-
gnie fait souvent signer pour elle le moindre de ses associés. »
Anacharsis Cloots persiste, avec la même modestie, à croire
que les peuples opprimés ont daigné le prendre pour leur re-
présentant.112
The idea expressed by Cloots is simply that no one asked Voltaire in the so-
called Republic of Letters to be the spoke-person, the representative, of its
members, but he did so, and for the better. By the same token, no people
in the world asked Cloots to be its representative, but he does so, and, to
his own account, for the better. On the other one, this self-appointed title
can be revoked by the said people. The intention is to give a voice to those
who are not part of the revolution taking place in France, of the first polit-
ical and legal construction of legitimate sovereignty located in the people.
Moreover, Voltaire could be described as a philosopher engaged in public
affairs after the Calas affaire, when he represented the philosophy of the En-
lightenment and defended Calas. The title of ‘representative’ is also a refer-
ence to the representatives of the people seating at the National Assembly,
the Constituante. Cloots, as a foreigner but well-versed in French politics
and philosophy, wants to act as a representative to all the other peoples in
the world. First of all, they are not represented at the only legitimate sover-
eign assembly, where only Frenchmen are. Second of all, they are misrepres-
108. Ibid., 84.
109. Ibid., 94.
110. Ibid., 88.
111. Ibid., 91.
112. Cloots, ‘La République universelle’, 244.
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ented by ‘usurpers’ (monarchs or other despots), who act on their behalf.
Hertzberg is one of these usurpators; as such, he is referred to as one of the
‘oppressors of the nations’, whereas Cloots speaks from the vantage point
of philosophy and defends the principles of true sovereignty in a free soci-
ety: ‘orator of the nations’. Cloots received an elite education and just as
he wished to be part of the republic of letters as a philosophe, he fashioned
himself as an ‘orator’ in the French Republic. However, he finds a role by
defining himself as an outsider, a foreigner, who is lucky enough to be in the
place where this revolution broke out. Cloots thus takes it upon himself to
‘represent’ all those who are not present, but should be.
J’ai acquis le droit de choisir librement mes épithètes, mes apos-
trophes contre les grands de la terre ; car l’Orateur du genre hu-
main, le défenseur officieux des souverains opprimés[,] eût été
une des premières victimes de la rage de nos perfides oppres-
seurs.113
The title is not official since the oﬃcial authorities claiming to be sovereign
are not bestowing this function on him. However, Cloots gives himself this
title in the name of the real sovereign that is the peoples under the rule of
undemocratic representatives, which are self-appointed monarchs.
In a letter to Cornelius de Pauw on January 1790, published in La répub-
lique universelle, Cloots praises his uncle for his success with his Recherches
sur les Grecs, and takes the opportunity to trace the Attic origins of philo-
sophy and rhetoric, then continued by Rome and classical French authors
such as Boileau, Bossuet, and Racine.114 For Cloots, his uncle, like Cicero,
Isocrates, and Demosthenes, toils on his writings, burning the midnight
oil, years spent studying, re-writing the same work until this dedication pro-
duces excellence, a chef d’œuvre that defies time, ‘immortality’. Cloots notes
that ‘oratory talent’ was no improvisation, but careful study and prepara-
tion, with long quotes of texts in order to claim the authority of histori-
ans, poets, or the law. A clerk was even in charge of verifying the quotes
as the orator performed publicly. The art of oratory, Cloots adds, was par-
ticularly present in exordiums and perorations, which were the objects of
careful treatises for mastering this art. As a result, Cloots has nothing but
contempt towards his contemporaries who claim to be orators by simply
improvising some speech:
Les ignorants parleurs, qui fatiguent de leur babil, de leur logo-
diarrhée, les habitués d’un café borgne, se croient de sublimes
improvisateurs, ils poussent la sottise jusqu’à répéter sérieuse-
ment qu’il suffit de prendre une plume et du papier pour être
113. Cloots, ‘La République universelle’, 290.
114. Ibid., 291–292.
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un écrivain. On aurait beau leur dire qu’il y a fagot et fagot,
et qu’il suffit d’avoir une langue de commère pour improviser
des sottises, ils élèveront insolemment le verbe, en demandant
si vous les prenez pour des ânes ? Et voilà comme ces petits
importants font eux-mêmes la demande et la réponse. C’est
arracher à une truie ses cochons de lait, que de faire entendre
la raison et la vérité à un vieux sot qui veut en imposer à des
jeunes gens qu’il croit aussi mal instruits, et mal appris, et mal
organisés que lui. Qu’est-ce que l’éloquence ? C’est la logique
bien vêtue ….115
One can see here Cloots’s education coming to the fore: ‘orator’ is a partic-
ular position, which requires years of apprenticeship and preparation, and
it is not solely the act of captivating an audience whilst speaking publicly; it
also involves a philosophical preparation regarding the content of the deliv-
ery, pondering a question for a long time until reaching a logical and true an-
swer. It is also important to use reason, in order for eloquence to be effective:
‘… les prestiges de l’éloquence, … la popularité des orateurs tombent sans
l’appui de l’invincible raison…’.116 As Cloots argues afterwards, the study
of Roman and Greek rhetoric has shown how the tricks of rhetoric was
abused by the ‘sophists’ to temporarily ‘inebriate’ their audience by their
words, but that reason, in the end, shows how these are misused.
As such, only oratory talent counts, it is an intellectual meritocracy. Clo-
ots takes up the function of orator because he thinks he possesses the skills,
dedication, learning, and qualities that make a good orator. However, he
is not the right judge for this, as his puts it himself at the end of the same
speech: ‘… on se dira … je suis convaincu, par la logique bien ou mal vêtue
d’Anarcharsis Cloots …’.117 It is not up to Cloots to judge of the quality of
his own eloquence, but the audience. If any other person would present
even better skills and qualities, the function would have to go to this better
orator:
Si la majorité des citoyens me déclare indigne de la tribune uni-
verselle, j’en descendrai avec ma conscience, en félicitant celui
qui m’aura surpassé par ses talents, et qui m’aura égalé par son
zèle.118
Or again, Cloots does not claim to be absolutely right, even if he thinks he is;
he might be wrong, but then one should demonstrate it: ‘Si je me trompe,
qu’on me réfute : on n’a pas d’autre droit sur un homme privé, sur un écri-
vain isolé’.119 There is a mixture of enthusiasm for Roman republican times
115. Ibid., 292.
116. Cloots, ‘Adresse d’un Prussien à un Anglais’, 50.
117. Cloots, ‘La République universelle’, 306.
118. Cloots, ‘L’Orateur du genre humain’, 162.
119. Ibid., 124.
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and for contemporary French philosophy, both of which were emulated
during Cloots’s education.
In a letter to a friend written on 21 August 1792, after the destitution of
the king on 10 August, Cloots shares his joy, which would be complete if his
friend would then be elected to the Convention. Cloots regrets not being
eligible, but notes that his ‘… indépendance ne saurait s’accommoder avec le
régime d’une fonction quelconque. … J’exerce une magistrature inamovible,
volontaire…’.120 The reference to magistrature is most certainly connected
to Roman republicanism, where there were several types of magistrates, one
of which being the tribunus plebis or tribune of the people. They represen-
ted the plebs and, although they were not officially magistrates, they acted
as such and could propose legislations to the assembly. Cloots was certainly
doing so, and saw his ‘function’ as such, as we can see from his numerous
interventions at the Assemblée nationale. He also used the term plébéien
often in his speeches, designating the people he addressed.
There is strong evidence to suggest the influence of Cicero on Cloots
for deciding on his title of ‘Orator’ besides the multiple mentions of him
throughout his writings. In his speech to the national Convention justify-
ing his decision concerning the execution of the king, Cloots notes in a foot-
note that Cicero, speaking about Rome in one of his Philippiques, said that
he would stay there as long as he is let, because it is the place from where he
could observe everything. Cloots then writes about Cicero: ‘L’Orateur ro-
main … se trouvait dans une position moins avantageuse que l’Orateur du
genre humain…’.121 It is clear in this passage that Cloots compares himself to
Cicero, one ‘orator’ to another, or more rightly their respective situations
as orators.
Cicero wrote about the perfect orator in De oratore where Crassus enu-
merates the qualities that an orator must possess:
Non enim causidicum nescio quem, neque proclamatorem,
aut rabulam, hoc sermone nostro conquirimus, sed eum vi-
rum, qui primum sit eius artis antistes, cuius cum ipsa natura
magnam homini facultatem daret, tamen dedisse deus puta-
batur; ut et ipsum, quod erat hominis proprium, non partum
per nos, sed divinitus ad nos delatum videretur; deinde, qui
possit, non tam caduceo, quam nomine oratoris ornatus, in-
columis, vel inter hostium tela, versari; tum, qui scelus frau-
demque nocentis possit dicendo subicere odio civium, suppli-
cioque constringere; idemque ingenii praesidio innocentiam
iudiciorum poena liberare; idemque languentem labentem-
que populum aut ad decus excitare, aut ab errore deducere,
aut inflammare in improbos, aut incitatum in bonos, mitigare;
120. Cloots, Ecrits révolutionnaires, 385.
121. Ibid., 451.
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qui denique, quemcumque in animis hominum motum res et
causa postulet, eum dicendo vel excitare possit, vel sedare.122
At the beginning of La république universelle, Cloots explains in length
what he means by ‘Orator of the human race’ in a way that is strikingly sim-
ilar to Cicero; too similar not to be voluntary, especially with the same use
of the same figure of repetition,mesarchia, amplifying the role and the qual-
ities of the orator, and the use of similar other tropi such as the metaphor
of fire (‘inﬂammare’ for Cicero, and ‘brûle’ and ‘s’enﬂamme’ for Cloots):
Qu’est-ce qu’un Orateur du genre humain ? C’est un homme
pénétré de la dignité de l’homme ; c’est un tribun qui brûle
d’amour pour la liberté, et qui s’enflamme d’horreur contre
les tyrans ; c’est un homme qui, après avoir reçu la sanction
de son apostolat universel dans le sein du corps constituant
de l’univers, se dévoue uniquement à la défense gratuite de
tous les millions d’esclaves qui gémissent d’un pôle à l’autre
sous la verge des aristocrates ; … c’est un homme qui s’exile vo-
lontairement des foyers qui l’ont vu naître, des contrées qu’il
a parcourues, des climats divers où un doux souvenir le ca-
resse, pour rester inébranlablement assis dans le chef-lieu de
l’indépendance, en renonçant à toutes les places honorables
et lucratives où son zèle et ses talents l’appelleraient indubita-
blement. La mission de l’Orateur du genre humain ne finira
qu’après la déroute des oppresseurs du genre humain.123
We must remember that the first impression the orator makes, according
to Quintilian, is important, and that it is normal for the orator to establish
his own good character as part of the inventio. Similarly, in the dispositio the
orator puts himself in a favourable light as part of the exordium or general
introduction. La république universelle was another milestone in Cloots’s
122. ‘For in this talk of ours we are not seeking some pettifogger, declaimer or ranter, but
that man who, to begin with, is high-priest of that art which, though unaided nature be-
stowed on mankind a great capacity for it, was yet deemed to have been the gift of a divinity,
so that a property peculiar to humanity might seem no offspring of ourselves, but to be
sent down upon us from heaven; who secondly can abide unharmed even on the field of
battle, through the respect felt for his title of orator rather than any heraldic staff; who fur-
thermore can by his eloquence expose to the indignation of fellow-citizens, and restrain by
punishment, the crimes and iniquities of the guilty; who also, by the shield of his talent, can
deliver innocence from legal penalties; who again can either inspire a lukewarm and erring
nation to a sense of the fitting, or lead them away from their blundering, or kindle their
wrath against the wicked, or soothe them when they are excited against good men; who
lastly can by his eloquence either arouse or calm, within the souls of men, whatever pas-
sion the circumstances and occasion may demand’. Marcus Tullius Cicero, On the Orator:
Books 1–2, trans. E.W. Sutton and H. Rackham, Loeb Classical Library 348 (Cambridge,
MA: Harvard University Press, 1942), I.LXVI.202, vol.1, pp. 140–143.
123. Cloots, ‘La République universelle’, 243–44.
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career after the ‘embassy of the human race’. It was intended as a speech to
be made at the barre of the National Assembly; the barre being reserved for
non-members of the assembly to present speeches. The published text must
be read as a speech given in front of the audience of the National Assembly.
Cloots, here, uses the same rhetorical technique mesarchia as Cicero’s de-
scription of the good orator, but in a sort of inverted progression. While
Cicero builds up on ‘that man who’ with various capacities eloquence can
accomplish, Cloots builds from personal qualities of himself and personal
experiences from his own life. One of the similarities between Cicero’s ora-
tor and Cloots’s is the emphasis on refusing any other title than the one of
‘orator’; that is after the one of ‘human being’, ‘homme’. Similarly, Cloots
let go of his title of baron after the French Revolution abolished nobility.
In the same Roman and republican fashion, Cloots as ‘orator of the hu-
man race’ refuses any title or position besides exercising his oratory skills in
favour of those without a voice, those not represented in the National As-
sembly: foreigners, the peoples not living under a republican regime. This
representative function of the ‘orator of the human race’ did not stop after
he was elected to the Convention to represent the Oise département. He
neglected the humdrum of his constituents in favour of his constitutional
plan of a universal republic for the départements of the whole world.
Cloots makes another reference to Roman republicanism with ‘tribune’,
who is an elected representative of the people put in charge of defending its
interests against those in power. A tribune did not have the same power as
an official magistrate of Rome, but progressively the Senate and the Patri-
cian had to recognise the power and the function of the tribune. As such,
the tribunes constituted a legal defence for the common people, the plebei-
ans, against authority and possible tyranny.
By the same token, Cloots states that the ‘orator of the human race’ re-
ceived this function from the ‘corps constituant de l’univers’. Cloots sees
the French assemblée constituante as this first representation of sovereignty
by the people, in charge of drafting a constitution that would be valid for
the whole world since it is based on the Universal Declaration of the Rights
of Man. However, the title is entirely self-proclaimed since Cloots did not
yet have any official function or recognition. It is only a few months later,
in August 1792, that Cloots officially received his French citizenship, and in
September he was elected as representative to the Convention. Nonetheless,
prior to his election Cloots stated his role in representing the weak and the
voiceless by putting his sapientia and elocutio at their service: an orator in the
Roman sense. In the same vein, Cloots defines these peoples as ‘slaves’, that
is peoples who are not represented by the sovereign. This time the reference
is as much to Rousseau— whose opening line of On the Social Contract is
‘L’homme est né libre et partout il est dans les fers’— as it is to Roman re-
publicanism.
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The ‘orator of the human race’ is also a ‘universal apostolate’. The ref-
erence is Christian, but the signification of ‘apostolate’ changed during the
revolution, even if this change was not recognised in the French dictionaries
until after the second half of the nineteenth century. From the ‘ministry of
the apostle’ it became used for designating the ‘propagation of new ideas’
during the Revolution.124 In this sense, Cloots sees the National Assembly
as the place for legitimate representation of sovereignty, and as ‘orator’ Clo-
ots is ‘sanctioned’ by the Assembly to spread the ideas of the French Re-
volution to the whole world. The reference to the Assembly as ‘constitut-
ing body of the universe’ is a reference to the function that it gave itself to
draft a constitution for France. Cloots sees the whole process as universally
valid since it is based on the Universal Declaration of the Rights of Man.
This is also what Cloots elaborates on in the rest of the pamphlet: the Fre-
nch Revolution is indeed the beginning of a universal revolution, and the
constitution of the French republic the constitution of a universal repub-
lic. In another contemporary dictionary, one finds the following definition
for ‘apôtre’, besides the literal Christian sense: ‘Figurément, homme qui
prêche avec zèle, c’est un Apôtre. On done aussi ce nom à des Missionnaires
illustres’.125 In the Dictionaire de l’Académie it is added: ‘On dit, Prêcher en
Apôtre, comme un Apôtre, pour dire, Prêcher avec onction & d’abondance
de coeur’.126 The reference to the ‘apostolat’ and ‘apôtre’ is therefore related
to the zeal and passion with which Cloots spread the ideas of the revolution.
Immediate contemporary uses of the expression ‘dignity of man’ referred
explicitly to the rights of man from the state of nature, in particular free-
dom that gives man his nobility and soul. For instance, in a short pamph-
let written in response to a traveller’s account of America, and in particu-
lar to his attack on black people, Jacques Pierre Brissot (1754–1793), who
would later become a leading figure of the Girondins, called for the ‘dignité
de l’homme’, after mentioning Rousseau, Locke, and Sidney.127 In the next
paragraph, Brissot takes upon himself to remind the recipient of his attack
of the definition of the dignity of man as he reads it in the first chapter of
the constitution of Pennsylvania (the declaration of rights):
La dignité de l’homme consiste dans sa liberté, dans son égalité
de droit, dans son indépendance, dans sa faculté de n’être assu-
124. See the entry in the 4th edition of the Dictionnaire de l’Académie and the digital
version of the Trésor de la langue française: http://www.cnrtl.fr/definition/apostolat. Ac-
cessed 2nd February 2017.
125. Jean-François Féraud, Dictionnaire critique de la langue française, vol. 1, A-D (Mar-
seille: Chez Jean Mossy, 1787), 125.
126. Dictionnaire de l’Académie Française, 4th edition, 83.
127. Jacques Pierre Brissot (de Warville), Examen critique des voyages dans l’Amérique
septentrionale, de M. le Marquis de Chatellux ; ou Lettre à M. le Marquis de Chatellux,
Dans laquelle on réfute principalement ses opinions sur les Quakers, sur les Negres, sur le
Peuple, & sur l’Homme (London: s.n., 1786), 109.
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jetti qu’aux Loix qu’il a consenties, dans le contrôle qu’il exerce
sur ceux auxquels il confie son autorité. La dignité de l’homme
consiste encore dans le parfait développement de ses facultés
morales & intellectuelles, dans les efforts qu’il fait pour décou-
vrir la vérité, pour la faire régner. Elle consiste en un mot dans
de grandes idées, dans une volonté forte & constante.128
D’Holbach, who influenced Cloots greatly as he mentions him several
times, links the ‘dignity of man’ to the ‘greatness of the soul’ and ‘virtue’,
and cites Plutarch and Seneca as examples of resisting insults and keeping a
noble attitude in adversity.129 Furthermore, the moral science should incite
politics to reward all acts that reinforce the links between individual hu-
man beings and the interest of the human race, and sanction the acts that
are detrimental to the human race by stripping its authors of their ‘dignity’
and ‘rights’.130 In his Histoire philosophique de la religion, the abbé Yvon
(1714–1789), who never practised as an abbé and contributed to the Encyc-
lopédie, starts with the first period of mankind under natural law; Yvon ini-
tiates his argument with nature and the ‘dignity of man’ as being what sets
man apart from animals, not because of a lack of feelings or judgement, but
because man possesses language, writing, arts, morality, and knowledge of
God. These attributes elevate man above animals, and constitute this ‘dig-
nity’.131
The writer and dramaturgist Baculard d’Arnaud (1718–1805) tells a story
about a 17 year old man named Joseph Chrétien, who saved three children
from drowning, stating that this act showed in him ‘toute la dignité de
l’homme, la noblesse de l’ame’ despite his young age.132 The expression seems
to be linked to a certain higher status of the soul due to the humane quality
of the person, such as the act of saving other human beings from a certain
death. In another work by an obscure author, the expression ‘dignité de
l’homme’ refers to an important element of the new science morale.133 Mor-
ale can only apply to man as opposed to slaves, the ‘dignity of man’ is linked
to ‘l’horreur de l’humiliation et de la servitude’.134
128. Brissot (de Warville), Examen critique des voyages, 110.
129. Paul Henri Thiry baron d’Holbach,Lamorale universelle, ou Les devoirs de l’homme
fondés sur sa nature, vol. 1: Théorie de la morale (Amsterdam: Chez Marc-Michel Rey,
1776), 196–198.
130. Ibid., 152–153.
131. Claude Yvon, Histoire philosophique de la religion, vol. 1 (Liege: Chez Plomteux,
1779), 4–15.
132. François Thomas Marie de Baculard d’Arnaud, Délassemens de l’homme sensible, ou
Anecdotes diverses, vol. 2 (Paris: Chez Buisson, 1786), 186.
133. Butot, Cours de morale, fondée sur la nature de l’homme. Par M. P**, pasteur de **,
vol. 1 (London: s.n., 1789).
134. Ibid., viii.
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… [L]a dignité de l’homme … exige l’indépendance la plus ab-
solue ; qui consiste à n’obéir qu’aux loix qu’on s’est imposées
soi-même, et à être exempt de tout reproche.135
The author also links the ‘dignity of man’ to the soul, a person of high vir-
tue, a good citizen, husband, father, neighbour, respecting his duties; this
‘dignity’ is only possible when in possession of liberty, and not when an-
swering to a ‘tyrant’ in a regime that corrupts the soul and the mores. There
is thus a connection with Roman republicanism, as opposed to an implicit
corrupted monarchy. The whole book is a general plan for establishing a
‘confederation’ in which each man is a ‘citizen’ in a ‘civil and political soci-
ety’, that is a society where each man has recognised the benefits of consti-
tuting it while retaining his freedom and independence from nature.
Cloots, ‘orator of the human race’ possesses the true knowledge, the new
science of politics, which he intends to instruct the people with, and per-
haps persuade the ‘oppressors of the human race’. In this sense, Cloots
refers to the political science believed and practised by Hertzberg and other
statesmen in Europe as ‘la vaine science de nos vieux politiques’.136 This
‘vain science’ is monarchism and the balance of power in Europe. The new
political and moral science is based on the Déclaration, the sovereignty is in
the people and not the monarch. But the ‘orator of the human race’ goes
even further than his revolutionary contemporaries by extending the prin-
ciples of the revolution to the full extent: the whole human race is the only
sovereign, and hence the French republic can only be a universal republic.
The sapientia of the orator, the scientia civilis that he induces through ra-
tio, in short the truth through reason, is the object of the next chapter on
reason and truth.
135. Ibid., 191.
136. Cloots, ‘L’Orateur du genre humain’, 111.

4 R E A S O N A N D S C I E N C E
… la raison appartient à tous en
général ; mais la science est le
prix d’une étude particulière.
Cloots, 17911
As we saw in the previous chapter, Cloots fashioned himself as Anachar-sis, a Northern wiseman who came to the capital of philosophy, and
as ‘orator of the human race’, in classical Roman fashion. The ‘orator’ was
a figure with special qualities. Possessing at the same time reason and know-
ledge, which gave him the capacity to access the truth, he was a philosopher.
But he also possessed eloquence and through the mastery of rhetoric was
able to communicate this truth and persuade the people of it through the
appeal of emotions.
Whereas the previous chapter focused on the eloquentia as the important
part of the formation of scientia civilis, this chapter focuses on the other
part: ratio, ‘reason’, and sapientia, ‘knowledge’. Focusing in this chapter on
the substantial part of Cloots’s rhetoric, other paradoxes come to the fore,
such as the claim of a descriptive yet normative science, and the claim of
determinism yet freedom through this science. The reason and the truth
used by the orator of the human race are those of the Enlightenment. And
even more particularly, of the atheist French philosophy as developed by
Diderot or d’Holbach.
The sapientia during the eighteenth century was linked to the ‘science
of man’. This human science attempted to discover a new definition of hu-
man nature in a ‘scientific’ manner, that is using the same observation and
experimental tools as natural sciences.2 There were a plurality of different
views of this science, but a work such as the Encyclopédie shows an agree-
ment on two basic claims: the separation between secular and theological
‘scientific’ knowledge, and the universal nature of secular science.
This chapter examines how Cloots understood reason and science, and
how it compares to other eighteenth-century traditions. Thomson has stud-
ied how religious and scientific debates on the soul developed in England
in the early Enlightenment, and how these debates ‘echoed’ in France dur-
1. Cloots, ‘L’Orateur du genre humain’, 141.
2. Pagden, The Enlightenment: And Why it Still Matters, 11–12.
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ing the eighteenth-century, culminating with the materialists.3 Cloots was
clearly influenced by these debates, even if he did not touch the question
of the soul, as the influence of Collins, Locke, and Hume shows through
his writings, as well as the French ‘echoes’ with Voltaire and d’Holbach, in
particular.
For Cloots, sciences, communication, and arts, are gifts from nature to
humankind to form one single ‘reasonable’ family— the human race.4 Rea-
son is universal and singular; it leads to the unity of humankind in sci-
ence and truth by forming a universal law. This universal reason, Cloots
describes it as ‘common strength’. It is a social power in the end that moves
nations, such as France, towards the truth, towards universal law. Particular
interests must therefore be in harmony with this ‘common strength’, and
this ‘universal law’, or they will sooner or later be overcome by it, as the
revolution showed.5
Reason and science are thus linked as the former leads to the discovery of
the latter, and the latter allows the former to form a single community, for
Cloots. The science that Cloots is considering is the ‘science of man’, that is
the science of government and political organisation.
Cloots uses the concept of reason under two main aspects, which ulti-
mately merge to form what he calls ‘cosmopolitan reason’. The first use of
the concept of reason is in relation to debates on religion and revelation.
The second use of the concept of reason is for understanding the world
and for founding a ‘science of man’. I argue that these two uses of reason
merge into one concept that Cloots calls ‘cosmopolitan reason’.6 By oppos-
ing a ‘théos’ to a ‘cosmos’, Cloots opposes two uses of reason— respectively
a ‘bad’ use and a ‘good’ use— when considering matters of the metaphys-
ical realm (théos) or matters of the physical realm (cosmos). Cloots suggests
that we focus our reason solely on the cosmos, on the physical realm, for our
political system. Doing so, leads to adopting the French constitution, and
ultimately the universal republic. The world as a community will ultimately
adopt the principles of the universal republic because it will use its reason,
its ‘cosmopolitan reason’. Cloots used his reason to discover this scientific
law of the single sovereign, the human race, forming the universal republic.
Everyone possesses reason, but science is the product of long application of
this reason.7 Ultimately, however, everyone with reason will recognise the
principles of this science.
3. Ann Thomson, Bodies of Thought: Science, Religion, and the Soul in the Early En-
lightenment (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2008); Ann Thomson, L’âme des lumières.
Le débat sur l’être humain entre religion et science, Angleterre-France (1690–1760), Collec-
tion Époques (Paris: Champ Vallon, 2013).
4. Cloots, ‘La République universelle’, 299.
5. Ibid.
6. Cloots, ‘Bases constitutionnelles’, 492–493.
7. Cloots, ‘L’Orateur du genre humain’, 141.
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Cloots uses reason primarily as opposed to religion, but also as opposed to
‘despotism’, that is to say a monarchy where one person has an arbitrary
power over others. In this sense, Cloots uses a republican understanding
of reason, a sort of republican reason that has three further characteristics:
first, reason is a source of morality; as such, and second, reason is used either
correctly or incorrectly; third, reason is opposed to passions. Furthermore,
Cloots considers reason as universal, eternal, and singular, which allows him
to argue for a unique political system, the unity of the whole world in one
polity. This leaves us with the expression of ‘cosmopolitan reason’, which
Cloots uses that must be fleshed out.
Against Revelation and the Church
As a continuation of his reflection engaged in Certitude des preuves, Cloots
mainly uses reason as opposed to revealed religions throughout his revolu-
tionary writings. It is therefore important, in order to understand Cloots’s
concept of reason, to have a look at Certitude des preuves. As mentioned
in the biography chapter, the book is an answer to Bergier’s own book Cer-
titude des preuves du Christianisme. Bergier was an important theologian
and apologist of Roman catholicism in the eighteenth century.8 His first
work, Le Déisme réfuté par lui-même (1765), was a critical and personal an-
swer to Rousseau’s Émile and marked the beginning of his career.9 In 1769,
Bergier came to Paris, and he published another answer to one of the philo-
sophes, this time d’Holbach and his Christianisme dévoilé, with an apology
of Christianity.10 Bergier actually frequented the same salon as d’Holbach,
as well as Diderot, in Paris and this led him to publish a refutation of their
materialism in a direct critique of d’Holbach’s Système de la nature.11 This
provoked a definitive break-up between Bergier and the philosophes. Bergier
continued his attacks, with a Suite de l’apologie oriented towards Voltaire’s
Dictionnaire philosophique at the end of his second edition of the Apolo-
8. For more on Bergier, see Sylviane Albertan-Coppola, L’Abbé Nicolas-Sylvestre Ber-
gier (1718–1790). Des Monts-Jura à Versailles, le parcours d’un apologiste du XVIIIe siècle,
« Les dix-huitièmes siècles » 128 (Paris: Honoré Champion, 2010); and Alain Cabantous,
‘Bergier, Nicolas-Sylvestre’, in Encyclopedia of the Enlightenment, ed. Alan Charles Kors,
vol. 1: Abbadie–Enlightenment Studies (Oxford ; New York, NY: Oxford University Press,
2003), 139–140.
9. Nicolas-Sylvestre Bergier, Le déisme réfuté par lui-même, ou Examen des principes
d’incrédulité répandus dans les divers ouvrages de M. Rousseau, en forme de lettres (Paris:
Chez Humblot, 1765).
10. Nicolas-Sylvestre Bergier,Apologie de la religion chrétienne contre l’auteur du Chris-
tianime dévoilé, & contre quelques autres critiques, 2 vols. (Paris: Chez Humblot, 1769).
11. Nicolas-Sylvestre Bergier, Examen du matérialisme, ou Réfutation du système de la
nature, 2 vols. (Paris: Chez Humblot, 1771).
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gie.12 Towards the end of his life, Bergier published two important works
of reference with aTraité historique et dogmatique de la vraie religion,13 and
aDictionnaire de théologie reedited several times.14 Bergier with this body of
works constituted therefore one of the major proponents what has been la-
belled ‘anti-philosophy’ or ‘anti-Enlightenment’, despite the fact that they
contributed with their critiques to the Enlightenment itself.15
Bergier was a renowned figure of the opposition to the philosophes, and
it is probably his opposition to Rousseau, Voltaire, Diderot, and d’Hol-
bach— Cloots’s role models— that inspired Cloots to criticise him and the
arguments he presented in one of his books. This book constituted for Clo-
ots his letter of accreditation to the Republic of Letters to be admitted as
philosophe. Cloots in the footnotes includes himself as one of the philosophes
by using the pronoun ‘nous’ and often calling the attention of the reader as
rational accomplice. At the end of the book, Cloots writes that
Tout lecteur pénétrant se sera d’abord apperçu que cet Ou-
vrage, qui manquoit absolument à la République des Lettres,
est très-propre à opérer une révolution générale dans les es-
prits….16
The sarcastic tone Cloots chose for his comments is not far from Vol-
taire’s wit, thereby also attempting to garner the sympathy of fellow deists.
It must be noted, however, that many apologists also adopted the rhetoric
and the language of the philosophes in order to give a contemporary pop-
ularity to their arguments; they used irony and ridicule the same way Vol-
taire did, and used reason as well to argue for the rationality of Christian-
ity.17 Bergier was one of them, and his works were prepared by studying
an ‘entire library’ to provide a rational historical argumentation through
‘facts’.18 In this sense, Cloots is right when he notes ironically that Bergier
12. Nicolas-Sylvestre Bergier, ‘Suite de l’apologie de la religion chrétienne, ou Réfuta-
tion des principaux Articles du Dictionnaire Philosophique’, in Apologie de la religion
chrétienne, 2nd ed., vol. 2 (Paris: Chez Humblot, 1770), 298–576.
13. Nicolas-Sylvestre Bergier, Traité historique et dogmatique de la vraie religion, avec
la réfutation des erreurs qui lui ont été opposées dans les différens siècles, 12 vols. (Paris: Chez
Moutard, 1780).
14. Nicolas-Sylvestre Bergier, Dictionnaire de théologie, 8 vols. (Liège: La Société Typo-
graphique, 1789).
15. See on the anti-philosophy Didier Masseau, Les ennemis des philosophes. L’anti-
philosophie au temps des Lumières (Paris: Albin Michel, 2001). On the contribution of the
‘anti-Enlightenment’ to the Enlightenment, see Jean Deprun, ‘Les Anti-Lumières’, in His-
toire de la philosophie, ed. Yvon Belaval, vol. II: La Renaissance, l’Âge classique, Le Siècle
des Lumières, La Révolution kantienne, Encyclopédie de la Pléiade 36 (Paris: Gallimard,
1973), 717–727.
16. Cloots, Certitude des preuves, 636.
17. Sylviane Albertan-Coppola, ‘L’apologétique catholique française à l’âge des Lu-
mières’, Revue de l’histoire des religions 205, no. 2 (1988): 151–180.
18. Ibid., 159.
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contributes to the work of the philosophes (Voltaire and d’Holbach’s attack
on the church).19 However, not everyone among catholics shared Bergier’s
way of refuting the deists by adopting their style and rationalism. Jansenist
André Blonde (1734–1794) provided a public display of these disagreements
in the camp of Christian apologists with several refutations of Bergier and
a much harsher condemnation of and general intolerance to Rousseau and
other deists.20 Although, what he really means is that Bergier’s arguments
are too poor to be taken seriously by a rational person and discredits there-
fore his side, rather than what contemporary historians mean by the ‘anti-
philosophy’ contributing to the Enlightenment by taking their arguments
seriously and trying to argue for revealed religion.
Cloots makes many citations, sometimes quoting excerpts at length. The
goal with this is to publish in one single book a compilation of all the argu-
ments against revealed religions by various philosophers for those who do
not have the time to read much.21 It is therefore an ambitious first book that
Cloots intended to write as he had to demonstrate not only a strong know-
ledge of the main monotheistic religions and other religions and sects, theo-
logical and historical, but also of the arguments presented by Bergier and
others in favour of one of them as the true revealed religion, of the argu-
ments against these presented by various philosophes and thinkers of the ‘Re-
public of Letters’, developing his own argument, and presenting the whole
with a literary flair combining humour and seriousness. At the end of Cer-
titude, Cloots added another short work entitled Lettres d’un jeune philo-
sophe à un jeune théologien.22 The title shows clearly what Cloots thought
of himself and what he intended to do: become a philosopher in the Repub-
lic of Letters and participate in the Voltairean campaign, ‘écrasez l’infâme’,
with the use of reason.
Since Cloots intended Certitude to give the busy educated reader a com-
pilation of the most important works and ideas by the philosophes on rea-
son, deism, and natural religion, it is an excellent indication of his own in-
tellectual influences. Obviously, it is also an indication of the most influen-
tial figures of the time for deist arguments, but Cloots does not mention
all of them. The most cited author and work is Bayle’s Dictionnaire cri-
tique.23 Often, Cloots uses Bayle for his article onMahomet to give an intro-
duction to Islam to the reader, or about Spanish and Portuguese atrocities
19. Cloots, Certitude des preuves, 123.
20. See Monique Cottret, Jansénismes et Lumières. Pour un autre XVIIIe siècle, Biblio-
thèque Albin Michel histoire (Paris: Albin Michel, 1998), 104–111.
21. Cloots, Certitude des preuves, 116.
22. Ibid., 529–593.
23. Pierre Bayle,Dictionnaire historique et critique, 1st ed., 2 vols. (Rotterdam: Chez Rei-
nier Leers, 1697). However, the Gnadenthal library catalogue mentions only an abridged
version, which is the one Cloots may have used: Pierre Bayle, Extrait du dictionnaire histo-
rique et critique, 2 vols. (Berlin: Chez Chrétien Frédéric Voss, 1765).
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committed in the name of Christianity. We may remember from the bio-
graphical chapter that Bayle was on the curriculum at the Berlin Académie
des nobles. Voltaire is then the other most cited author, especially his Dic-
tionnaire philosophique.24 Cloots quotes Voltaire, sometimes from his pub-
lished correspondance, for some bon mots or well formulated reflections,
mostly against the church and superstitions. The third most cited author
is Collins with the French translations of Discours sur la liberté de penser,
and less often Examen des prophéties qui servent de fondement à la reli-
gion chrétienne.25 Cloots quotes passages on individual freedom of thought,
and the necessity to individually assess with reason all collective movements
of thought. Cloots quotes Hume several times, mainly for his translated
Histoire naturelle de la religion,26 but also his Essais with the tenth and
eleventh essays, respectively on superstition and enthusiasm, and on hu-
man nature.27 Cloots also uses Locke for his Essai sur l’entendement hu-
main, quoting passages on reason rejecting arguments based on faith. This
work is fundamental in the history of reason and marked the beginning of
eighteenth-century discussions on the limits of reason.28 Another frequent
quote is the French translation of German Lutheran Church historian Jo-
hann Lorenz von Mosheim’s (1693–1755) Latin Institutionum Historiae Ec-
clesiasticae Antiquae Et Recentioris.29 Other notable authors cited several
times are d’Argens’s Lettres juives,30 d’Holbach’s Système de la nature,31 De
la cruauté religieuse,32 and, under Fréret’s name, Œuvres philosophiques.33
24. This work had several editions, and the last one was published under the appropriate
name: Voltaire, La raison par l’alphabet, 6th ed., 2 vols. (s.l.: Chez Cramer, 1769).
25. Anthony Collins, Discours sur la liberté de penser écrit à l’occasion d’une nouvelle
secte d’esprits forts, ou de gens qui pensent librement. Traduit de l’anglais et augmenté d’une
lettre d’unmédecin arabe (London: s.n., 1714); Anthony Collins,Examen des prophéties qui
servent de fondement à la religion chrétienne. Avec un Essai de critique sur les prophêtes et
les prophéties en général, trans. Paul Henri Dietrich baron d’Holbach (London: s.n., 1768).
26. David Hume, Histoire naturelle de la religion (Amsterdam: Chez J. H. Schneider,
1759).
27. David Hume, Œuvres de M. Hume, vol. 1 (Amsterdam: Chez J. H. Schneider, 1764).
28. Manfred Kuehn, ‘Reason and Understanding’, chap. 6 inThe Routledge Companion
to Eighteenth Century Philosophy, ed. Aaron Garrett (London, New York, NY: Routledge,
2014), 167–187.
29. Joahnn Lorenz von Mosheim, Histoire ecclésiastique ancienne et moderne, depuis la
naissance de Jésus-Christ jusqu’au commencement du XVIIIe siècle, trans. Archibald Ma-
claine, 6 vols. (Maestricht: Chez Jean-Edme Dufour & Philippe Roux, 1776).
30. Jean-Baptiste de Boyer marquis d’Argens, Lettres juives, ou Correspondance philoso-
phique, historique et critique, entre un juif voyageur à Paris & ses correspondans en divers
endroits (La Haye: Chez Paul Gautier, 1736).
31. Paul Henri Thiry baron d’Holbach, Système de la nature ; ou, Les loix du monde
physique, & du monde moral, 2 vols. (London: s.n., 1770).
32. Paul Henri Thiry baron d’Holbach, De la cruauté religieuse (London: s.n., 1769).
33. Nicolas Fréret and Paul Henri Thiry baron (auteur présumé) d’Holbach,Œuvres phi-
losophiques (London: s.n., 1776).
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Leibniz’s Théodicée is also mentioned several times.34 Absent from the list
of quoted authors are, among others, Condillac, Spinoza, Toland, Herbert
of Cherbury, Matthew Tindal, Lessing, Samuel Clarke, William Paley, and
Kant. These authors were otherwise important and influential at the time.35
This confirms, therefore, the hypothesis that Cloots meant to develop his
own argument by selecting authors with similar views to his, notwithstand-
ing their own philosophy.
Indeed, these mentioned authors held different views, and were some-
times opposed; for instance Bayle and Leibniz, even though they both were
writing letters to each other and held each other in high intellectual es-
teem.36 Moreover, even apologists, whom Cloots mentions as well, had
various views and used reason as part of their arguments to actually dem-
onstrate the existence of God and the true revealed religion. It is therefore
not a monolithic and homogenous block of philosophes against another ho-
mogenous block of apologistes, as Cloots presents, but an intricate and vast
field of discussions around God, religion, and reason. It is beyond the scope
of this chapter and this section to present this discussion. What is import-
ant here is to focus on Cloots’s views on reason, either directly or through
quoted authors.
Cloots does not deny the existence of God, nor does he discuss it in Cer-
titude. It is a deist argument that he presents, and the goal is to argue in
favour of a natural religion. Reason is given to mankind by God, and it is
universal; therefore, reason provides the same guide to everyone and Clo-
ots can quote Confucius with the same argument to show that all popula-
tions on earth share the same view.37 The main point that Cloots hammers
home is that if reason is given by God, then religions should not ask to set
reason aside in order to serve God; hence all the religions that ask to do
so are false. Cloots quotes in length English Deist Charles Blount (1654–
1693) in a French translation of his edited and commented version of La
Vie d’Apollonios de Tyane by Philostratus (c. 170–c. 245 AD); reason is the
surest guide to avoid falshood from any religion: ‘Nous savons que tout ce
que nous dicte la raison ordinaire, est vrai ; & nous ne pouvons pas croire ce
que la foi enseigne : croire n’est pas savoir’.38 Cloots also takes the same argu-
mentation from members of the Church in order to show that theologians
34. Gottfried Wilhelm Leibniz, Essais De Théodicée Sur La Bonté De Dieu, La Liberté
De L’Homme, Et L’Origine Du Mal (Amsterdam: Chez Isaac Troyel, 1710).
35. See for example Maria Rosa Antognazza, ‘Reason, Revelation, and Arguments for
the Deity’, chap. 5 in The Routledge Companion to Eighteenth Century Philosophy, ed.
Aaron Garrett (London, New York, NY: Routledge, 2014), 145–166.
36. Pierre Rétat, Le dictionnaire de Bayle et la lutte philosophique au XVIIIe siècle, Bi-
bliothèque de la faculté de lettres de Lyon, XXVIII (Paris: Société d’édition “les belles
lettres”, 1971), 102–111.
37. Cloots, Certitude des preuves, 230, 469, 495.
38. Ibid., 26.
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agree on that point. For instance, Cloots quotes abbot Daniel Le Masson
des Granges inLe philosophe moderne, ou l’incrédule condamné au tribunal
de sa raison, who cites French priest Louis Bourdaloue (1632–1704), who in
his Pensées notes that God gave the human race reason in order to serve as
guide and never intended to exclude it even from religious matters; faith is
a ‘reasonable submission’ to God, otherwise it would no longer constitute
a virtue and would be vague and without principle.39 Cloots takes another
example from Welsh deist (although he always denied being a deist) David
Williams (1738–1816), who held a public service in a rented chapel in Mar-
garet Street in London in 1776,40 and whose sermon, stating that reason was
a gift from God for truth and tolerance, was translated in Gazette litéraire
de l’Europe.41
By the same token, in his argument against the Muslim Gier-Ber, Cloots
notes sarcastically that even the ‘good Christian’ Bergier regards reason as
a universal gift from God (thus pointing at contradictions in Bergier’s ar-
gumentation).42 Cloots, then, uses reason ironically to form an argument
against Bergier in favour of another revealed religion—Islam. Bergier’s argu-
ment was that ‘savages’ and even ‘civilised peoples’ would be able to distin-
guish among all the sects and religions between ‘true and false revelation-
ism’. Since Bergier is transformed into the Imam Ali Gier-Ber in Cloots’s
narrative, Cloots remarks ironically in a footnote that, he is right indeed:
Islam is better equipped to convince anyone of being the true revelation be-
cause unlike Christianity and its ‘ridiculous’ ‘triumvirat’ of God, Islam only
has one God; moreover, unlike Christianity and its incarnation of an unlim-
ited God in a mortal Jewish man, the Muslim God is eternal, and His body is
also not offered for ‘lunch’, and finally, unlike Christianity and its plurality
of codes and versions of the Bible, Islam has only one Quran; not to men-
tion the progress of incredulity among Christians with so many philosoph-
ers and scientists refusing revelationism.43 However, this was just meant as
a counter argument to Bergier’s claim of the rationality of Christianity com-
pared to other religions. The real rational religion is natural religion:
… puisqu’il s’agit de la raison (& de quoi s’agiroit-il sans elle?)
le Théiste a cause gagnée, il peut convaincre l’homme le plus
stupide de la vérité de sa religion : son Alcoran ne sera point
un Livre inutile à ceux qui ne savent pas lire, & un Dédale ob-
scur pour quiconque le lit, quoiqu’incomparablement moins
inintelligible que l’ancien et leNouveau Testament ; sonCoran,
39. Cloots, Certitude des preuves, 117–118.
40. On this sermon and David Williams, see James Dybikowski, ‘David Williams and
the Margaret Street Chapel’, Man and Nature 8, no. hors série (1989): 99–106.
41. Cloots, Certitude des preuves, 166–168.
42. Ibid., 268.
43. Ibid., 256–258.
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dis-je, sera le Ciel & la Terre ; la nature entière confirmera ses
paroles.44
Cloots imagines then a fictitious dialogue between a ‘savage’ and ‘Revela-
tionist missionaries’. At the end of this dialogue, the ‘savage’ concludes:
La raison, l’évidence, poursuit le Sauvage, me disent de n’en
croire aucun, puisqu’il est impossible à tout homme inéru-
dit de savoir lequel de ces argumentans, seroit Orthodoxe ;
& cette impossibilité prouve qu’ils battent tous la campagne :
c’est une leçon pour ne jamais s’écarter du chemin tracé par
le sens-commun. Le Déiste a raison, car il me parle raison ;
ses preuves sont à ma portée : le révélationiste a tort ; car il
me tient un langage & absurde, & contradictoire, & inintelli-
gible.45
Cloots quotes thereafter Collins’s Discours sur la liberté de penser in Fre-
nch, who quotes the archbishop John Tillotson (1630–1694) depicting the
second Council of Nicaea — which discussed the use of icons — as ridicu-
lous as an assembly of the most famous Greek mathematicians to decrete
that two plus two equals five. To which Cloots concludes:
Voilà ce que c’est quand la saine raison est bannie de l’esprit-
humain ; sans ce palladium,46 les plus graves personnages se
conduisent en enfans & font rougir les Sauvages.47
For Cloots, reason is an individual assessment of how much religions make
sense with their stories, customs, and traditions. The only religion that
makes sense, in the end, is natural religion — a religion stripped of any
scriptures, or human interpretations, an individual communion with God
through nature and its observation.
In this sense, Cloots writes to his uncle de Pauw about religion in these
terms:
Ces réflexions justifient assez la prédilection des Philosophes
en faveur du Protestant. Quoiqu’il erre d’ailleurs, ses principes
radicaux sont avoués, sont d’accord avec la saine Philosophie.
Il y a toujours espérance de ramener des gens qui font cas, qui
encensent la raison.48
44. Ibid., 258.
45. Ibid., 261.
46. Palladium means what protects an individual or a thing. It is a figure of speech in
relation to the Greek statue of Pallas, the icon protecting Troy. Cloots therefore, wittily
extends the metaphor on the theme of the second Council of Nicaea regarding icons.
47. Cloots, Certitude des preuves, 261–262.
48. Ibid., 618.
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What Cloots means is that protestantism is more in line with d’Holbach,
Voltaire, and his own views because it has been critical of Church tradi-
tions that led to abuses in Roman Catholic Christianity. Protestantism also
suggested a critical reading of the Bible, and to consider it a higher author-
ity than church traditions. Moreover, protestantism has equally emphas-
ised the individual relation with God and religion—universal priesthood—
rather than a dependance on a mediator between God and the people. All
these elements, for Cloots, are part of the ‘écrasez l’infâme’ movement: de-
nouncing the abuses and absurdities in the practices and traditions of the
Roman Catholic Church, rejecting through rational critical reading of reli-
gious writings anything contrary to reason, and finding an individual, nat-
ural, and rational relation with God. However, protestants still roam in
other matters, and Cloots may mean here, among other things, that they
still believe in the Bible as an authentic document.
Cloots notes, in this ‘écrasez l’infâme’ battle, that God is not on trial, it
is the institution of the church and its ministers who spread lies, false doc-
trines, and impose on other men to deny the use of God’s given gift that
sets mankind apart from ‘brutes’. In any case, ‘la raison n’enseigne point
l’Athéisme’.49 What reason leads to is a critical view of revealed religions and
their customs and traditions in particular. This is an important argument
because it is against Bergier, who argues that ancient traditions and customs
observed by populations are proofs of revelation, beyond the need to know
about written accounts such as the Scriptures.50 Cloots uses Bayle’sDiction-
naire, Collins’s Examen des prophéties, Voltaire’s La Bible enﬁn expliquée,
and Locke’s Entendement humain to show historical and factual examples
of how easily false traditions and customs entered various sects.51 In the end,
reason is about common-sense applied to past events, and past testimonies:
should one trust what some claim to have witnessed in the past? Are they
trustworthy and impartial? Are their testimony in accordance with the nor-
mal observation of the rules of nature? All these questions must be asked
as Locke pointed out in his Essay on Human Understanding.52
Against Bergier’s argument that reason is part of faith, Cloots adopts
Locke’s opposition of faith and reason, but Cloots seems to stay on the prac-
tical level of things in that he only quotes Locke on what is directly of use
against Bergier. Cloots does not quote Locke, for instance, on his concep-
tion of reason as discussed in book IV chapter XVII, and instead quotes
chapter XVI. If it seems that Cloots takes Locke’s conception of reason as
based on sensible ideas (there are no innate ideas, and the bounds of ours
49. Cloots, Certitude des preuves, 254.
50. See chapter 5 in François Laplanche, La Bible en France entre mythe et critique
(XVIe–XIXe siècle), Collection « L’évolution de l’humanité » (Paris: Albin Michel, 1994),
87–106.
51. Cloots, Certitude des preuves, 6–7, 46–47.
52. Ibid., 131–132.
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senses cannot be overcome by reason), it is not clear if Cloots accepts Locke’s
distinction of what is contrary to reason and what is beyond reason (a dis-
tinction rejected by Toland, self-proclaimed disciple of Locke, but whom
Cloots does not mention). When Locke considered the resurrection from
the dead as beyond reason, Cloots focuses instead on refuting the fact of be-
lieving in testimonies of resurrection by taking examples of many sects and
religions that paid tribute to resurrected individuals and worshipped them
with monuments and statues. Why, then, asks Cloots, would Christianity
and Bergier only recognise one of them and not the other? For this, Clo-
ots takes examples in other religions from Bayle’s Dictionnaire and Pluche’s
Histoire du ciel.53
Cloots does not directly write that resurrection is contrary to reason, or
that it is beyond reason, but that many religions have made the same claim,
and that it has been proven to be false by Christian authors who demon-
strated how these errors entered religious traditions, and how the custom
of worshiping monuments cannot be considered proof of its veracity. So,
why believe Christianity, asks Cloots? Reason teaches scepticism towards
man’s words.54 Cloots distinguishes between miracles that are simply based
on ignorance quoting Mosheim regarding so-called miracles that can be ex-
plained by natural causes.55 In other words, some miracles are called so due
to a lack of reason applied to natural causes. Other miracles reported by
some witnesses, are due to their whole social and intellectual conditioning
in believing that miracles do exist, so that they can persuade themselves of
the veracity of a miracle; here, Cloots quotes La Bruyère’s Caractères (1688),
famously depicting all the gamut of human psychology in various literary
portraits.56
All in all, Cloots seems to reject miracles — even when understood as
within the bounds of reason, but extraordinary events — and only recog-
nise one true miracle that he is witnessing himself with Bergier:
c’est que dans le siècle où nous vivons, il se trouve, hors des pe-
tites-maisons,57 un Personnage grave, qui débite sans pudeur,
& avec privilège, des idées aussi creuses.58
Although Cloots does not mention this affiliation and although he quotes
Wolff only twice for hisLogique rather than natural theology, he seems to be
closer to Wolff than Locke in that he also considers natural theology within
the strict boundaries of reason. It seems that Cloots agrees with Wolff’s theo-
logical rationalism in that theology is about certainty since God cannot have
53. Ibid., 46–48.
54. Ibid., 57.
55. Ibid., 201.
56. Ibid., 329.
57. Bedlam; institution for the care of mentally ill people.
58. Cloots, Certitude des preuves, 18–19.
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revealed anything that would not be found outside the realm of human rea-
son. However, Cloots avoids all these metaphysical discussions, and quotes
Voltaire much more than Wolff.
Reason also leads to profound doubts. Scepticism was a theme explored
by several philosophers, starting from Bayle, pondering the limits of rea-
son.59 Cloots quotes Hume on reason and doubt, noting that philosophy
presents itself as a shelter, whilst various superstitions fight one against
another amidst widespread doubt, uncertainty, and irresolution.60 If any
religion should be followed, it is natural religion. Cloots quotes this, for
instance, Locke in a French translation of Essai philosophique concernant
l’entendement humain with this argument:
L’Être suprême … a accordé au Genre-Humain une assez gran-
de mesure de raison pour que ceux qui n’ont jamais entendu
parler de sa Parole écrite, ne puissent point douter de l’existen-
ce d’un Dieu, ni de l’obéissance qui lui est due, s’ils appliquent
leur Esprit à cette recherche. Puis donc que les Préceptes de la
Religion Naturelle sont clairs & tout-à-fait proportionnés à
l’intelligence du Genre Humain….61
Unlike revealed religion, natural religion does not depend on any human
doing— be they writings or customs.62
During the revolutionary period, Cloots revised this view in favour of
atheism: ‘les athées ont raison contre les théistes’.63 This time, Cloots attacks
the existence of God, and particularly the theist argument of design. There
is no contention regarding the eternal existence of the universe, but the ex-
istence of a divine mould is contrary to reason, for Cloots: if something
that exists is necessarily a creation (of God), then God is necessarily also
a creation; hence, the syllogism makes no sense. As the chapter on nature
will show, Cloots, in his revolutionary writings, moves closer to d’Holbach’s
view about God in Système de la nature as a mere anthropomorphic way of
talking about nature, which is eternal.64
However, reason is still not opposed to religious practice, for Cloots, but
to the domination of one religion in the state to the detriment of other re-
ligions. In Chronique de Paris, 27 May 1790, Cloots writes that he has just
59. See Sébastien Charles and J. Smith Plı́nio, eds., Scepticism in the Eighteenth Century:
Enlightenment, Lumières, Aufklärung, International Archives of the History of Ideas, 210
(Dordrecht; New York, NY: Springer, 2013); Anton M. Matytsin,The Specter of Skepticism
in the Age of Enlightenment (Baltimore, MD: Johns Hopkins University Press, 2016).
60. Cloots, Certitude des preuves, 190.
61. Ibid., 482–483.
62. Ibid., 10.
63. Cloots, ‘La République universelle’, 252.
64. See the next chapter on natural law.
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finished reading Le despotisme de la maison d’Orange, by Mirabeau,65 men-
tioning the episode where the republican Barneveld was sent to the scaffold
because of his republican sympathy against state religion. This serves Clo-
ots in his argument to send Voltaire’s remains to the Panthéon. Cloots also
notes that Voltaire fought against the domination of a state religion, and his
works therefore ‘respirent le zèle de la raison et l’amour de l’humanité’.66
This qualification is reminiscent of Rémi’s understanding of cosmopolisme.
Cloots explicitly rejects Rousseau and Mably in favour of Voltaire regarding
religious tolerance, even equating Rousseau in his intolerance of religious
zealots with the same zealots: ‘fanatiques de Rome et de Genève’.67 To Rou-
sseau suggesting the expulsion of catholics from the state in his Contrat so-
cial (‘quiconque ose dire : hors de l’Église point de salut, doit être chassé de
l’État’),68 Cloots answers that ‘… chasser les intolérants est la plus absurde
des intolérances’.69 Cloots’s target is not only Rousseau and Mably, but the
revolutionaries who use Rousseau and Mably ‘blindly’ and without think-
ing.
Cloots’s position must be understood in the context of the debates on re-
ligion before and during the revolution. As Tackett sums up, in the period
after mid-century, the catholic clergy faced four sources of attacks; two from
outside, and two from inside.70 From the outside, the most visible source
was the philosophes, as already seen, and Cloots’s position among them has
already been considered. Another external source of attack was ‘parliament-
ary Gallicanism’, which claimed power for the courts (parlements) over
church matters. From the inside, the lower clergy identified with the gen-
eral population, and expressed discontent towards the upper clergy and
their outrageous privileges; principally, regarding rank in the church based
on birth rather than merit, but also luxury and wealth. This movement has
been called ‘curé syndicalism’ or ‘Richerism’.71 The other internal source of
attack came from the Jansenists against the Jesuits, the former successfully
suppressing the latter in the mid-1760s. All these groups had an influence
on the deputies during the revolution.
65. Honoré Gabriel Riqueti Mirabeau (comte de),LeDespotisme de lamaison d’Orange,
prouvé par l’histoire (Hollande: s.n., 1788).
66. Cloots, Ecrits révolutionnaires, 25.
67. Cloots, ‘L’Orateur du genre humain’, 148.
68. Rousseau, ‘Du contrat social’, 469.
69. Cloots, ‘L’Orateur du genre humain’, 148.
70. Timothy Tackett, ‘The French Revolution and religion to 1794’, chap. 27 in Cam-
bridge History of Christianity, vol. 7: Enlightenment, Reawakening and Revolution 1660-
1815 (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2006), 539–541; Timothy Tackett, Religion,
Revolution, and Regional Culture in Eighteenth-Century France: The Ecclesiastical Oath
of 1791 (Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press, 1986), 6–11.
71. Timothy Tackett, Priest and Parish in Eighteenth-Century France: A Social and
Political Study of the Curés in a Diocese of Dauphiné, 1750–1791, Princeton Legacy Library
(Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press, 1977), 225–268.
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Cloots writes that he had ‘une part très active’ in the decree of 13 April
1790.72 It is not clear what part he had, but he may be referring to his pre-
revolutionary writings against ecclesiastical institutions. It seems therefore
to be a post hoc ergo propter hoc argument about his writings and his pos-
ition inﬂuencing the Assembly, or participating to the intellectual climate,
in issuing the decree:
Il a été décrété le 13 avril dernier, et je l’avais imprimé aupa-
ravant, et la raison l’avait décrété le premier jour du monde,
qu’un corps national ne saurait avoir de religion ; cette relation
ne pouvant exister qu’entre Dieu et un individu, « entre Dieu
et ma conscience, et non pas entre Dieu et des consciences
prises collectivement ».73
In this decree, the national assembly refused to recognise a state religion.
This was an answer to the third motion tabled by the right wing of the As-
sembly to adopt Catholicism as state religion; this time by the Carthusian
monk Don Gerle on 12 April 1790, which led to ‘perhaps the single most
impassioned and divisive debate since the beginning of the Revolution’.74
Not everyone agreed with the decree,75 and part of the assembly published
a declaration expressing their disagreement and their refusal to vote on this
decree because they considered catholicism to be the state religion as ‘une
vérité de fait’.76 The refusal to adopt Catholicism as state religion was also
motivated by the proclamation of toleration and civil rights for Protestants
and Jews. Protestants had been granted religious liberty on 24 December
1789, and Sephardim Jews had been granted equal rights on 28 January 1790.
However, the populations of some strongholds of Catholicism in the East
and South of France did not accept them, and episodes of violence against
these minorities erupted. We have already seen that Cloots expressed toler-
ation and a defence for these religions. Catholic populations saw ‘the Re-
volution as a “Protestant attack” against their faith’.77 Considering Cloots’s
own views— his preference for protestantism among revealed religions and
his view of an individual relation to God— it was not far-fetched.
To this climate of violence and tension between religions, one should
emphasise the tension also created by the civil constitution and the Oath
of 1791. Gallican lawyers and Jansenists sympathisers passed a reform at the
assembly regarding the ‘Civil Constitution of the Clergy’ on 12 July 1790.
72. Cloots, ‘L’Orateur du genre humain’, 148.
73. Ibid., 139.
74. Tackett, ‘The French Revolution and religion to 1794’, 543.
75. Gazette nationale ou le Moniteur universel, n° 104, mercredi 14 avril 1790.
76. Jean-Lambert Tallien, Déclaration d’une partie de l’Assemblée nationale, sur le dé-
cret rendu le 13 avril 1790, concernant la religion (Paris: De l’Imprimerie de Vezard & Le
Normant, 1790).
77. Tackett, ‘The French Revolution and religion to 1794’, 544.
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According to Tackett, ‘[t]he great debates in the Assembly itself, which cli-
maxed in the passage of the Civil Constitution on July 12, 1790, contributed
in further exacerbating divisions between a clerical Right and an anticler-
ical Left…’.78 The Civil Constitution was a consequence of the abolition of
privileges on 4 August 1789, as the remuneration of the clergy had to be
re-organised accordingly. If several measures were asked in the cahiers de
doléances by sympathisers of ‘curé syndicalism’, and therefore agreed upon,
such as the suppression of some fees and a fairer remuneration of clergymen,
other measures requiring a rationalisation of the clergy and the abolition of
socially ‘useless’ positions gathered some resentment.79 However, it is the
requirement of a formal oath in favour of the constitution that provoked a
crisis in 1791, not so much because of the requirement of taking an oath—
a common form of revolutionary allegiance — but because it seemed, for
some clergymen, to impinge on spiritual matters and might be contrary to
their oath to the church. Already on 27 November 1790, Voidel, the presid-
ent of the comité des recherches proposed a decree on the oath, following a
vehement speech pronounced the day before, denouncing part of the clergy
as refusing to obey the will of the sovereign and obeying a foreign one in-
stead (the papacy).80 The decree imposed clergymen to take the oath within
eight days or to face prosecutions.81 The king reluctantly signed the oath on
3 January 1791, and the debates on 3 and 4 January at the Assembly demon-
strated the stark polarisation between the left and right as a Manichaean po-
sition for or against the revolution.82 The Assembly later adopted a more
conciliatory tone, and the oath was not required to be taken within eight
days, and refractory priests would be retired with a small pension and not
prosecuted, and so only after a replacement could be found.
Cloots is in the left camp against the right; he is in favour of the re-organ-
isation of the clergy, even a radical re-organisation towards natural religion,
particularly to save money: ‘La religion ramenée à sa simplicité primitive,
épargnerait au peuple libre et éclairé de l’heureuse France, plus de cent mil-
lions annuellement’.83 But he also addresses these left radicals for their in-
tolerance towards the intolerants. Cloots writes that, in the end:
C’est vraiment un prodige que le parti national du corps consti-
tuant n’ait pas succombé sous les efforts de tout le côté droit,
et des ministériels de la gauche, et des fourbes de la gauche, et
78. Tackett, The Ecclesiastical Oath of 1791, 12.
79. Ibid., 11–16.
80. M. J. Mavidal and M. E. Laurent, eds., Archives Parlementaires de 1787 à 1860. Re-
cueil complet des débats législatifs et politiques des chambres françaises, 2nd ed., Première
série (1787 à 1799) (Paris: Librairie administrative de Paul Dupont, 1879), 21:7; cited in Tack-
ett, The Ecclesiastical Oath of 1791, 23.
81. Mavidal and Laurent, Archives Parlementaires, 21:81–82.
82. ibid., 22:8; cited in Tackett, The Ecclesiastical Oath of 1791, 25.
83. Cloots, Ecrits révolutionnaires, 45.
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des oisons de la gauche, et de la secte de Rome, et de la secte
de Jansénius, et de la secte de Rousseau, dont la gauche offrait
le funeste mélange.84
In another example of perceived exaggeration from the left against catholics
and refractory priests, Cloots addresses Charles de Villette (1736–1793), in
whose home Voltaire died, and who therefore took the initiative to change
the name of his home street from Quai des Théatins (name of the neigh-
bouring church and congregation) to Quai Voltaire on 13 April 1791 and
requested a decree to legalise the change.85 Villette wrote in Chronique de
Paris, on 5 June 1791, about a mass held by a refractory priest in precisely
this Theatine church, next to his home.86 The event created a bit of an up-
roar among the local Parisians, accusing the priest of instigating hate against
revolutionaries. Villette tried to defend the priest in the name of religious
tolerance, but was won over the argument of potential danger caused by
refractory priests. Therefore, Villette asked to evict refractory priests, and
in this case, to use the church as storage for wheat. But Cloots answered
to Villette that it was precisely the same irrational fear that led to the Saint
Bartholomew’s Day massacre; the spirit of Voltaire is to let ‘eternal reason’
guide the policies of a ‘free people’ and tolerate masses held by refractory
priests: ‘La persécution répercute le virus religieux, et la liberté le fait évapo-
rer par tous les pores’.87
In the end, Cloots is an atheist who believes that reason ultimately pre-
vails, and overcomes faith. Science and truth will reign instead of religion
because freedom of ideas promotes truth— ‘Je ne crains rien avec les armes
de la raison dans un pays libre. Dans la patrie du genre humain. Une pro-
position vraie peut y paraître choquante aujourd’hui ; mais elle sera re-
vue, pensée, adoptée la semaine suivante’— and because they are mutually
exclusive — ‘La raison et l’illumination ne sauraient s’asseoir sur le même
trône’.88 However, Cloots also believes in freedom of conscience and ab-
solute tolerance of people’s opinions. Reason and science shall not prevail
out of impositions and sanctions, but as a natural imposition in peoples’
minds as the best thing for society after a free exchange of ideas: ‘Laissons
les églises aux prêtres, laissons la messe aux dévots, jusqu’au moment où
la raison donnera congé à la messe, aux dévots et aux prêtres’.89 Reason al-
ways triumphs, and violence must not and need not be used for that: ‘Dis-
cutons, disputons ; mais ne nous battons pas. La raison aura le dessus tôt
84. Cloots, ‘L’Orateur du genre humain’, 148–149.
85. Charles Villette, Lettres choisies de Charles Villette, Sur les principaux Évènemens de
la Révolution (Paris: chez les Marchands de Nouveautés, 1792), 109–111.
86. Chronique de Paris, vol. 3 (1790–1791) (Paris: s.n., 1790–1793), 622.
87. Cloots, Ecrits révolutionnaires, 192.
88. Cloots, ‘L’Orateur du genre humain’, 127, 170.
89. Ibid., 167.
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ou tard ; en la brusquant, nous gâterions nos affaires’.90 The context of this
sentence is the discussion following the flight of the king and the debates
concerning the future of the country; Cloots calls for rational debates with-
out violence. Cloots’s position regarding religion is equally that of a laissez
faire of opinions, with the certainty that reason and truth prevail in the
end: ‘c’est que la raison vient de renverser plus de murailles en peu d’heures,
que l’oppression n’en éleva durant dix siècles’.91 To Claude Fauchet, Cloots
writes: ‘Invoquez votre Saint-Esprit, j’invoque ma sainte raison’.92 To each
his/her own rationale.
However, if freedom and tolerance entail the same equal right to expres-
sion, for Cloots, it does not mean that all opinions are equal in terms of
right and wrong. Cloots in his revolutionary rhetoric systematically opposes
a ‘wrong’ reason to a ‘right’ reason, mostly in relation to religious views, but
also progressively in relation to counter-revolutionary and then non-repub-
lican views. For instance, Cloots writes on the power of reason against non-
sense: ‘Le torrent de la raison entraînera les immondices de nos temples : et
les orateurs du bon sens feront disparaître les prédicateurs du non-sens’.93
What makes the difference between a ‘good’ and ‘bad’ use of reason, be-
sides the popular judgement, is the capacity to recognise one’s own errors
and change opinion accordingly:
J’ai pourtant par-devers moi quelque chose qui me dit que je
raisonne juste ; car la différence entre une bonne et mauvaise
judiciaire,94 ne consiste pas à ne jamais errer, mais à ne jamais
revenir de son erreur.95
Cloots makes a distinction between ‘wrong’ reasoning and ‘bad’ reason-
ing, where bad reasoning is linked to ‘aristocrats’ or those in favour of mon-
archy, and wrong reasoning are revolutionaries, who, according to Cloots,
are making a mistake in their policies, which leads to the same result: an-
archy. In this case, it is about prohibiting betting, rather than taxing the
revenues from it, which would help consolidating the state’s finances:
Un des principaux phénomènes de notre révolution, c’est que
nous soyons parvenus à établir la meilleure constitution de
l’univers, malgré la foule des mauvais raisonneurs patriotes
qui grossissent le nombre de méchants raisonneurs aristocra-
tes. En effet, par je ne sais quelle débilité mentale, nous voyons
90. Cloots, ‘La République universelle’, 275.
91. Cloots, ‘L’Orateur du genre humain’, 162.
92. Cloots, Ecrits révolutionnaires, 179.
93. Cloots, ‘L’Orateur du genre humain’, 166.
94. ‘JUDICIAIRE s.f. La faculté de juger’. Dictionnaire de l’Académie Française, 4th
edition.
95. Cloots, ‘L’Orateur du genre humain’, 172.
164 reason and science
deux classes diamétralement opposées, nous offrir le même ré-
sultat politique : l’anarchie, la contre-révolution !96
Reasoning ‘wrong’ or ‘bad’ is also called ‘perverse’ or ‘stupid’, when it
comes to a natural law such as the Rights of man:
Mépris aux raisonneurs pervers ou stupides qui oseraient en-
core nier la possibilité de l’établissement universel des Droits
de l’homme : droits sacrés qui remplaceront l’universelle ty-
rannie, et qui répareront les maux de toutes les institutions
barbaresques.97
The revolutionary rhetoric easily shifts from ‘bad’ reason, to ‘perverse’ rea-
son, to ‘enemy of reason’.98 The category is close to that of ‘enemy of the
human race’, which we will analyse in the chapter on humankind. Indeed,
Cloots writes in an earlier article about the ‘genre humain raisonnable’.99 It
is therefore a thin rhetorical line that Cloots, together with other Jacobins,
threads on. On the one side, freedom of speech entails the free expression of
ideas and beliefs, even those contrary to one’s own. On the other, the rhet-
orical attacks ad hominem that ensues—‘bad’ use of reason or ‘stupidity’—
is closely related to declaring someone an ‘enemy’, therefore justifying sanc-
tions against him or her. It is however true, that Cloots never did cross the
line, except when voting the death penalty for the king, but the rationale
was his ‘treason’ against the nation, not a ‘bad’ use of reason.
This then leads to a qualification of ‘good citizen’ against a ‘bad citizen’
depending on how reason is used: a good citizen is a revolutionary anti-cler-
ical republican.
Les préjugés, les opinions erronées prêtent des armes aux mé-
chants, aux mauvais citoyens, contre les bons citoyens qui con-
sultent la raison avant tout.100
The argument behind this good and bad use of reason is that there is
only one ‘single’ reason, ‘eternal’, ‘invariable’, ‘imperishable’ and ‘univer-
sal’. These expressions appear often in Cloots’s revolutionary writings.101
As previously mentioned, it is difficult to pinpoint intellectual origins for
Cloots’s views since he wrote short pamphlets rather than academic treat-
ises. However, we have seen how his education at the académie des nobles
focused on Locke and very likely Wolff, through Sulzer’s teaching. It can
96. Cloots, Ecrits révolutionnaires, 220.
97. Cloots, ‘La République universelle’, 250.
98. Cloots, Ecrits révolutionnaires, 237, 474, 534.
99. Ibid., 236.
100. Cloots, ‘L’Orateur du genre humain’, 124.
101. Cloots,Ecrits révolutionnaires, 36, 251, 268, 344, 450, 458, 474, 477, 481, 500, 501, 597,
601, 618, 622, 630, 649.
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be useful here to compare Cloots’s views on reason with theirs, noting that
nowhere Cloots mentions Kant, whoseKritik der reinen Vernunft was pub-
lished in 1781 and could have been known to Cloots.102
There is an interesting justification of why Cloots was right in predict-
ing an economic outcome without the need of experience, when comment-
ing on the law regarding hats. Cloots writes that in 1789 he argued against
those who predicted the ruin of French hat makers in favour of Spanish
hat makers, supposedly because hares and rabbits were being destroyed in
France:
… des raisonneurs dont la logique est d’autant plus caduque,
qu’ils prétendaient raisonner comme tout le monde. Moi, qui
me défie beaucoup des raisonnements de tout le monde, je
soutins, en 1789, que nous aurions dorénavant plus de gibier
que jamais, et que nos chapeaux seraient aussi communs qu’au-
paravant. Cette thèse sonna mal aux oreilles un peu sourdes.
Il fallut donc recourir à l’expérience, language dont l’homme
clairvoyant n’a pas toujours besoin, mais dont le vulgaire des
hommes ne saurait jamais se passer.103
What is interesting is less whether Cloots was right or wrong, and why, but
what he writes in the last sentence regarding the need or not of experience.
‘L’homme clairvoyant’, which means the philosopher using reason, need
not wait for the ‘experience’ of a thesis induced or deduced through reason,
to be proven right. It seems, in this way of reasoning, that Cloots follows
more closely a Wolffian rationalism rather than a Lockean empiricism in
that experience and reason seem to be two different ways of acquiring know-
ledge for Cloots. Wolff explained this clearly in his GermanMetaphysics:104
§371. Weil man nun von demjenigen / was man durch blosse
Erfahrung erkennet / daß es ist / nicht einsiehet / wie es mit
andern Wahrheiten zusammen hanget (§. 325); so ist bey dieser
Erkäntnis gar keine Vernunfft (§. 370) / und wird dannenhero
die Erfahrung der Vernunfft entgegen gesetzet.
§372. Wir haben demnach zweyerley Wege / dadurch wir zur
Erkäntnis der Wahrheit gelangen / die Erfahrung und die Ver-
nunfft.105
Wolff then gives the example of the sunrise, which most people experience,
but cannot explain, as opposed to those who know through reason that the
102. Immanuel Kant, Kritik der reinen Vernunft (Riga: verlegts Johann Friedrich Hart-
knoch, 1781).
103. Cloots, ‘La République universelle’, 269.
104. See Hettche, ‘Christian Wolff’.
105. Christian Wolff, Vernünfftige Gedancken von Gott, der Welt und der Seele des Men-
schen, auch allen Dingen überhaupt (Halle: Renger, 1720), 202.
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cause for this is the movement of planets around the sun, and can predict it
without the need of experience.
In Cloots’s view, another proof of the ‘progress’ of reason, and the proof
by experience that the French Revolution provides, is the republican turn of
institutions in the new regime. Republicanism will be delt with in the final
chapter; here, I will focus on Cloots’s argumentation of reason favouring
classical republicanism.
Against Despotism and Tyranny
After the revolution, Cloots used reason not only against revealed religion
and the Church, but also to argue for republican institutions by opposing
reason to despotism and tyranny. They are both related in a republican
meaning: against an institutionalised dominant religion (Christianity) im-
posing its views and demanding to set aside the use of reason, based on
faith, tradition, superstition; against an institutionalised dominant political
régime (monarchy) also demanding to set aside the use of reason because it
requires an individual to obey another individual’s arbitrary will.
Cloots assigns a sort of Renaissance narrative to reason in political his-
tory, comparing monarchism and the nobility with the Middle Ages and
its feudal structures. The 1789 revolution, with the progress and triumph of
Enlightenment reason, is a rebirth of classical antiquity. In an article pub-
lished in Le courrier de Paris dans les 83 départements on 21 August 1790,
while commenting on the duel between Jacques Antoine Marie de Cazalès
(1758–1805) and Antoine Barnave (1761–1793), Cloots condemns this ‘me-
dieval’ practice that is the equivalent of letting God decide human affairs
instead of human reason through laws and institutions:
La raison nous a délivrés du joug féodal ; elle nous délivrera,
sans doute, des tristes effets de ce joug atroce ; l’indiscipline et
le mépris des lois faisaient partie de l’héritage des nobles…
Prenons l’Antiquité pour modèle, servons d’exemple à nos
contemporains, si nous voulons mériter les suffrages de la pos-
térité. Votre génie donnera l’impulsion à la raison éternelle.106
A little later, in a letter to Madame Beauharnais published in August
1790, Cloots comments the day after the first celebration of the fête de la
fédération:
Cette fête nationale vous transporte à deux mille ans en arrière,
par je ne sais quelle teinte d’antiquité ; elle vous transporte à
deux mille ans en avant, par les progrès rapides de la raison
dont cette fédération est le fruit précoce et délectable.107
106. Cloots, Ecrits révolutionnaires, 35, 36.
107. Cloots, ‘Adresse d’un Prussien à un Anglais’, 54.
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Classical antiquity seems to be a model, to which Cloots combined En-
lightenment reason, to create a sort of modern antiquity. The Revolution
is the result ofmodern antiquity, but also its future. Such a futuristic vision
based on classical antiquity was not uncommon in the second half of the
eighteenth-century. It was perhaps best materialised in some monuments
and buildings (actually carried through or left as projects) labelled as ‘neo-
classicism’. The architects Claude-Nicolas Ledoux (1736–1806) and Étienne-
Louis Boullée (1728–1799) played a major role in this movement. Cloots’s re-
newal of antiquity through enlightened reason towards a futuristic utopia
is akin to Boullée’s 1784 cenotaph for Newton and 1785 project for a royal
library, or Ledoux’s 1804 project for the ideal city of Chaux.
Reason led revolutionaries to form a ‘cult of reason’, reminiscent of an-
tiquity, replacing the void left with abolishing religion. This ‘cult of rea-
son’ was preached by Jacques René Hébert (1757–1794), Pierre Gaspard
Chaumette (1763–1794), Joseph Fouché (1759–1820), and Antoine-François
Momoro (1756–1794). Hébert was the most famous of them for founding
the ‘worship of reason’ and organising the ‘festival of Reason’ on 10 Novem-
ber 1793 for which many churches were re-assigned to the new cult of rea-
son.108 Women were dressed in Roman togas in order to represent the new
goddess of reason, Liberty.109 They were called the ‘Hébertistes’, and since
they opposed Robespierre and his ‘cult of the Supreme Being’, they were
sent to the guillotine, together with Cloots even though he was not one of
them. However, Cloots’s thought bears many similarities with the Héber-
tistes regarding his cultic view of reason:
Croyez à mes prophéties ; car ce n’est pas le ciel qui m’inspire ;
ma vaticination ne descend point du Vatican ténébreux, mais
elle jaillit abondamment de la nature des choses.110
There is paradoxically a risk of isolation in seeing ‘truth’ and thus claim-
ing to be its missionary; ‘Comme s’il ne suffisait pas de la faculté de voir
la vérité et d’exprimer la vérité, pour en être le missionnaire’.111 On the one
hand, Cloots accepts criticism, but on the other he is blindly convinced of
seeing everything. His faith in the cult of reason is a reflection of the gen-
eral spirit of his time.112 It is also a reflection of the danger of producing an
intellectual terror. It is perhaps best represented with Robespierre’s own cel-
ebration of the Supreme Being on 8 June 1794 in Paris, where he descended
from a mountain like God or the messiah.113 However, to Cloots and his
108. Emmet Kennedy, A Cultural History of the French Revolution (New Haven, CT:
Yale University Press, 1989), 343.
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contemporaries there is only one truth. This truth for Cloots comes from
the French Enlightenment and the French Revolution, and the whole of
humankind will understand it and benefit from it, like oracles in classical
antiquity:
Le genre humain comprendra les oracles de la raison invariable.
J’occupe la tribune de l’Univers, et la catholicité de nos prin-
cipes doit frapper l’oreille de tous les hommes. Les dénomina-
tions de français et d’universel vont devenir synonymes, à plus
juste titre que les noms de chrétien et de catholique.114
Republicanism was an antiquated idea, as the chapter on republicanism
will show. One did not think that it was applicable to a large modern nation,
such as France. But, for Cloots, reason reinterpreted anew this old concept,
which proves to be the future for France and the world. The feudal regime
that was monarchy was based on the rationale that one should accept to
belong to one man, but that is obviously irrational; instead, one ought to
belong to reason:
Appartenir à un homme au lieu d’appartenir à la raison, su-
bordonner le choix de mon domicile et ma manière d’être à la
volonté arbitraire d’un individu !115
With these words, Cloots explains to Hertzberg why he chooses to inhabit
revolutionary France rather than Prussia, and thereby also characterises mon-
archism as opposed to republicanism. Monarchism is the realm of supersti-
tion, tradition, authority, faith, whilst republicanism is the rule of reason,
truth, and science: ‘on est vigoureux avec la raison, on est invincible avec
la vérité. Une fierté républicaine m’inspire le mépris des tyrans’.116 The op-
position between this irrational monarchism and rational republicanism is
exacerbated by the fact that Cloots defends the revolution representing the
new regime as opposed to Hertzberg, representing Prussia and the ancien
régime. The revolutionary rhetoric of classical republicanism serves to ac-
centuate the opposition of a country of liberty, of free citizens, to a country
of slavery, of enslaved subjects: ‘la raison est la seule politique des peuples
libres’.117 This is a theme that Cloots continues throughout the revolution,
and opposing despotism imposed by monarchs with despotism imposed by
reason, is similar to the ‘legal despotism’ that will be analysed in the chapter
on republicanism as a main component of ‘natural republicanism’. Cloots
writes in these terms about the ‘despotism of reason’:
114. Cloots, ‘Bases constitutionnelles’, 481.
115. Cloots, ‘L’Orateur du genre humain’, 111.
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Le despotisme de la raison est aussi exclusif que celui des mo-
narques. Une note ineffaçable couvrira d’infamie quiconque
prêchera désormais la pernicieuse doctrine royale.118
In a speech to the Assembly on 9 September 1792, Cloots addresses an
audience well-versed in classical antiquity, men who followed the same cur-
riculum in the collèges as described in the chapter on rhetoric. In order to
make his case for the rational principle of sovereignty of the human race,
Cloots presents the irrationality of the plurality of national sovereignties,
with a parallel from Greek antiquity and republican Florence:
Le polythéisme historique est aussi déraisonnable que le poly-
théisme mythologique. Les hostilités divines sont des guerres
civiles imaginaires ; mais les hostilités humaines sont des guer-
res civiles trop réelles. Vraisemblablement, la ridicule diploma-
tie de notre petite planète a fourni les matériaux de l’histoire
fabuleuse du ciel d’Homère et de l’enfer de Dante.119
Cloots makes here a reference to the internal wars in Ancient Greece and
14th-century Florence— the Trojan wars in Greece and the battle between
the Guelphs and Ghibellines in Florence — that inspired Homer for his
poem explaining war between gods in the sky, and inspired Dante for his
poem explaining the circles of hell in the afterlife.
Cloots modernises classical republicanism with Enlightenment reason,
thus, re-actualising republican themes of despotism, tyranny, and author-
ity: ‘toute autorité doit reposer sur l’inébranlable raison’.120 For Cloots, rea-
son is not only the basis of natural religion opposed to faith-based revealed
religion, but also the basis of good government with republicanism built
on liberty as opposed to authority being the cause of bad government in
monarchical regime that is equaled with slavery. The power of theology, or
‘theocracy’, is against reason, and the power of one person, monarchy, is
contrary to liberty: ‘La théocratie universelle persécute la raison ; la monar-
chie universelle persécute la liberté ; la République universelle rend à cha-
cun ce qui lui est dû.121’ Liberty is universal, reason is universal, therefore
the regime combining both is bound to be universal as well.
In his historical account of the French Revolution, Cloots notes:
Mais l’époque du règne de la raison, de la liberté et de l’égalité,
l’époque du règne du peuple, en un mot, était irrévocable-
ment arrivée ; il n’était plus au pouvoir des oppresseurs d’ar-
rêter les progrès de la vérité ; il n’était plus en leur pouvoir de
118. Cloots, Ecrits révolutionnaires, 388.
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concentrer le génie humain dans le cercle de l’ignorance, des
préjugés et de l’esclavage : toutes les idoles étaient renversées.122
The narrative in which Cloots interprets the revolution is one of modern
antiquity with the re-instatement of Ancient Greek and Roman principles
within Enlightenment reason. Republican reason is nothing but the renais-
sance of the Republican Athens and Rome of the revolutionaries’ school-
books, fired up with the power of imagination that reason cast for the fu-
ture.
Cosmopolitan Reason
In Cloots’s project for a decree he uses the expression ‘cosmopolitan reason’:
Le salut du peuple repose sur le nivellement complet des au-
torités constituées, sur l’indépendance respective des citoyens,
sur le despotisme de la loi qui enchaîne tous les despotismes
individuels. Ce serait une erreur bien funeste de ne songer
qu’à nous ; l’humanité nous fait un devoir de ne pas oublier
les autres hommes. Si la constitution française ne peut conve-
nir au reste du monde, elle sera mauvaise ; elle s’écroulera aux
applaudissements du genre humain, de la raison cosmopolite
dont la sanction est indispensable. Le genre humain, régénéré
dans toutes les branches législatives, ne connaît ni plage étran-
gère,123 ni souveraineté partielle, ni deux volontés suprêmes,
ni deux majorités et deux minorités contradictoires, incompa-
tibles.124
The context for this project of a decree is the perceived menace of fed-
eralism in France, and the issue that new territories at the French borders
represent. The solution, for Cloots, is the establishment of the universal
republic, of which the French constitution is the foundation, with the re-
cognition of the principle of ‘sovereignty of the human race’. Any new pop-
ulation that would recognise this principle would automatically be part of
the universal republic. Therefore, the Constitution as it now stands and is
being discussed is French, but it is has to be universally valid in order to
be applicable to the whole world in the long term. This is only possible
when political science is a universal truth, and the human race is universally
equal. When the human race is ‘regenerated’, like the French nation was ‘re-
generated’ after the revolution, it will participate in the making of laws in
the same universal republic. There are therefore no ‘foreign countries’, and
122. Cloots, ‘Résumé historique’, 537.
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therefore the same philosophical reasoning behind the making of laws in a
nation applies to the nation of the human race. These are the ‘supreme will’
and the ‘majority’, of which there can only be one and not several.
Cloots is therefore engaging with the same concepts used by others about
national sovereignty, but instead of a nation confined within the limits of a
country, it is the whole human race. The same questions discussed between
the concepts of general will and the issue of majority over the minority ap-
ply, but for Cloots on the global scale. For instance, let us see what Con-
dorcet writes about the issue of majority and minority, and the question of
the general will and reason. In De la nature des pouvoirs politiques dans une
nation libre, published in 1792, Condorcet writes:
La raison, d’accord avec la nature, ne met qu’une seule borne
à l’indépendance individuelle, n’ajoute qu’une seule obliga-
tion sociale à celles de morale particulière : c’est la nécessité
et l’obligation d’obéir dans les actions qui doivent suivre une
règle commune non à sa propre raison, mais à la raison collec-
tive du plus grand nombre ; je dis à sa raison et non à sa volonté,
car le pouvoir de la majorité sur la minorité ne doit pas être
arbitraire ; il ne s’étend pas jusqu’à violer le droit d’un seul in-
dividu ; il ne va point jusqu’à obliger à la soumission lorsqu’il
contredit évidemment la raison. Cette distinction n’est pas fu-
tile : une collection d’hommes peut et doit, aussi bien qu’un
individu, distinguer ce qu’elle veut, ce qu’elle trouve raison-
nable et juste.125
When Cloots writes of ‘cosmopolitan reason’, it is a way to emphasise
that reason is not limited to the borders of the French polity, but it is the
reason of the whole future polity of the human race. That is because rea-
son is universal and is the same to all humankind. In this way, Cloots ar-
gues that the French Constitution must conform to ‘cosmopolitan reason’,
and this is not only about the French constitution adopting universal prin-
ciples, but also about not imposing itself on other as ‘French’, which is to
say a minority on the majority of the rest of the world. Cloots continues
with this thought in the following paragraph in presenting a procatalep-
sis by raising an argument made against him: that he wants to submit the
whole world to French domination, the majority to a minority. Cloots an-
swers that he knows nothing of any ‘French domination’ or ‘French consti-
tution’, he only knows of the rights of man that gather all individuals under
the domination of the human race.126 In other words, the natural rights of
125. Jean-Antoine-Nicolas de Caritat marquis de Condorcet, ‘De la nature des pouvoirs
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man and the citizens are not ‘French’, they are universal, conform to and
discovered by ‘reason’, and therefore, the constitution based on them is not
‘French’, it is universal, conform to ‘cosmopolitan reason’, and the republic
it establishes is not ‘French’ but ‘universal’.
Source of morals
If faith and revealed religion are contrary to reason, and therefore rejected,
what is to be the source of morals? For Cloots, it is nature and its obser-
vation through reason. Already in Certitude, Cloots stated that, in natural
religion, reason replaces authority and faith as source of morality:
La vérité de sa Religion ne se fonde point sur des preuves
équivoques, obscures, banales, il ne fait pas dépendre sa foi
d’un fatras de vieux Livres ; mais le Ciel & la Terre, voilà sa
Bibliothèque. Le Révélationisme est multiple, parce que les
livres sont des productions humaines : la Religion Naturelle
est unique; parce que l’Univers est l’ouvrage de Dieu : comme
si la Morale n’étoit pas naturelle à l’homme : comme si le Créa-
teur en lui donnant la raison, l’eût privé de ce qui constitue la
raison. Pour faire naître, ou plutôt, pour développer la Mo-
rale dans notre entendement, il ne faut que la Société de deux
individus, comme pour la formation du fétus, il suffit que
l’homme connoisse la femme, le reste s’acheve de soi-même.
„Les grands préceptes de la Morale, observe le Pape Clément
XIV, sont les mêmes chez toutes les Nations, parce qu’ils sont
empreints dans nos coeurs. La même main qui traça, l’image
de sa Toute Puissance dans les Cieux en caractères de feu, grava
dans nos ames nos principaux devoirs. Notre coeur est une
table, un Décalogue que rien n’a pu briser ; mais que nos pas-
sions effaceroient si le cri de notre conscience ne nous repro-
choit nos écarts.”127
Cloots develops the same idea even a little further in his revolutionary
writings, and to simply get rid of any ecclesiastical institution, as well as any
book containing principles of morals; they are not universal but temporally,
spatially, and culturally located:
… les places publiques, les plaines, les bosquets rassembleront
la commune, le septième jour de la semaine, autour du plus
vertueux paroissien, qui développera les maximes salutaires de
la raison universelle. Comme la morale est de tous les temps et
de tous les lieux, je conseillerais de ne faire aucun usage ni du
127. Cloots, Certitude des preuves, 469–470.
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Coran, ni de l’Evangile, ni du Zend-Avesta, sous prétexte de
quelques bons préceptes clairsemés dans ces livres fameux.128
However, Cloots does not elaborate here on what universal principles of
morals could be, nor why and how ‘the most virtuous parishioner’ could
find them. Cloots’s goal is first and foremost to undermine the Church in-
stitutionally, but not by force, these are merely suggestions for a post-ec-
clesiastical society. By the same token, Cloots praises clergymen who turn
to natural religion such as Antoine de Cournand (1742–1814), abbot of
the Parisian church Saint-Étienne-du-Mont, member of the Jacobins, who
defrocked himself in 1790, and married secretly in 1791 after lobbying for
clerical marriage. Cloots calls him ‘Prêtre de la raison, prédicateur de la na-
ture’.129
Cloots elaborates a little more on morals with the debates surrounding
the first criminal code adopted between 25 September and 6 October 1791 by
the National Assembly, shortly after adopting the constitution on 3 Septem-
ber 1791. Cloots states that against the saying ‘point de mœurs, point de
lois’, it is, on the contrary, the law that makes the mores: ‘mauvaises lois,
mauvaises mœurs ; bonnes lois, bonnes mœurs’.130 Therefore, Cloots urges
the Assembly: ‘Consultez la raison en dictant votre code, et vous effacerez
nombre de péchés mortels et véniels de votre catéchisme barbare’.131 Cloots’s
target are so-called ‘sins’ prescribed by religion’s law that translated into hu-
man law with crimes and sentences. It concerned, in this case, the domain
of sexuality such as ‘sodomy’, which included many non-procreative sexual
acts.132 It has to be noted that the identification of sodomy with male homo-
sexuality dated from the end of the eighteenth century, but that the crime of
‘sodomy’ in this sense had not been applied since 1750.133 It had become less
a matter of criminal law, and more a matter of social policy in Paris to make
homosexuality less visible.134 It also concerned ‘imaginary crimes’, such as
blasphemy or sacrilege. Cloots’s views are part of the general discussions of
the time comparing these practices with nature. For instance, Jean-Baptiste
Boyer d’Argens (1704–1771) in Thérèse philosophe argues that God created
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everything that exists, including desires and inclinations that are found in
nature, which are therefore not ‘antiphysiques’, not against nature.135 Clo-
ots’s analysis with the observation of nature goes perhaps even further in
using a metaphor with the laws from physics in order to talk about physical
acts, particularly among the youth:
On s’étonne de la corruption des gymnases, comme si des
corps électriques revêtus de houpes nerveuses, pouvaient se
mouvoir ensemble, sans éprouver de fréquentes détonations.
J’aimerais autant appeler les chatouillements et les démangeai-
sons, des crimes contre nature.136
What matters is more the issue of physical exhaustion and loss of energy
than the identification of crimes, and Cloots quotes here the work by Doc-
tor Tissot on onanism, suggesting abstinence to avoid physical degenera-
tion.137 Regarding anything else, Cloots suggests considering the relativity
of what is considered vice and virtue, and therefore crime or not, which
has been different among societies and through time. Cloots concedes that
nothing is outside the domain of legislation, but instead of religious views,
Cloots suggests using reason (universal) and argues that, by defining vice
and virtue, one can find a universal standard. The definition is set in terms
of usefulness or harmfulness to society: ‘Tout ce qui est utile à la société est
vertue, tout ce qui lui est nuisible est vice’.138 In that sense, Cloots suggests
softening the law, and to agree that only a minimal list of crimes that are
truly hurtful to society: rape, kidnapping, seduction, and adultery.139
Cloots never mentions Jeremy Bentham (1748–1832) in his writings, but
this definition is close to Bentham’s principle of utility based on the accept-
ance that nature gave man two leading forces of behaviour with pleasure
and pain— as described in Introduction to the Principles of Morals and Le-
gislation, printed in 1780 and first published in 1789.140 It is not clear if Clo-
ots knew about Bentham, but Etienne Dumont translated Bentham’s 1790
Draught for a New Plan for the Organization of the Judicial Establishment
in France as Sur le nouvel ordre judiciaire en France in 1790 and the text was
presented to the National Assembly.141
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Perhaps, more directly, Cloots’s reference may be Helvétius. Claude-Ad-
rien Helvétius (1715–1771) believed that humans were born with equal apt-
itudes and only slight differences.142 As such, and since they are motivated
by pleasure and pain, laws and education could mould individuals.143 How-
ever, Helvétius was not interested in the human race as an entity, as the
diversity of laws and models of education meant a great diversity of societ-
ies.144 As Thomson argues, Helvétius posited a utilitarian form of natural
law in stating that the ‘sole inviolable law’ was the ‘general interest’, the
‘happiness of the majority’.145 Cloots mentions Helvétius several times, and
quotes Helvétius on God and religion:
Helvétius disait que si Dieu avait daigné se révéler aux hu-
mains, il aurait fait descendre du ciel un bon plan de législa-
tion sur la terre. En effet, une religion quelconque est inutile
ou nuisible, sans une bonne constitution : celle-ci tient lieu de
toutes les religions possibles.146
Against Raynal, Cloots quotes Helvétius who allegedly advised precaution
towards ‘l’espion Raynal’.147 Helvétius is cited elsewhere among other great
French thinkers, or cited as part of an argument for his work on friend-
ship— probably fromDe l’esprit 148 on ‘need’ as the engine of friendship.149
In République universelle, Cloots reiterates the idea of reason against re-
ligion being the source of morals:
En effet, toutes les religions battent en brèche la raison ; car
la Divinité disparaît en y réfléchissant une heure tout au plus.
Or, plus les hommes seront raisonnables, et plus ils seront ver-
tueux, c’est-à-dire utiles à la société : donc la religion est une
maladie sociale qu’on ne saurait guérir trop tôt.150
What follows is a diatribe against religious men, who pretend to be virtuous,
but are corrupt because they let ‘prejudice’ and ‘sophism’ be the masters of
their entendement. When clergymen, they lead to ‘ruin, anarchy, slavery’,
unless rational men (bons raisonneurs) police them.151
What reason leads to, according to Cloots, is the respect of nature (‘… la
nature est plus sage que les hommes’),152 which the law should encourage,
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since reason also leads to republicanism. Cloots writes: ‘La Loi bienfaisante
remplacera un Dieu insignifiant’.153 But leaving nature unhinged is not the
solution, for Cloots, who takes the argument of determinism from revealed
religion to natural religion. The law is there to balance nature, which is glob-
ally good, but leaves moral freedom to men; therefore, virtue and vice do
exist.154 Laws, for Cloots must take these into consideration, and as a result:
‘La société présentera des appâts à la vertu et des obstacles au crime’.155
In this sense, reason is also opposed to passion, which is again correl-
ated with revealed religion and monarchism. For instance, regarding the
‘aristocrats’, encompassing both the nobility and the clergy, Cloots writes:
‘L’orgueil et l’avarice sont les démons familiers de nos aristocrates’.156 What
follows is the need to re-establish reason in the the highest law of the repub-
lic, the constitution:
Les hommes de la constitution sonderont l’abîme des passions :
les lumières de la raison corrigeront les erreurs de l’instinct. J’ai
calculé tous les inconvénients de la royauté ; mais je calcule
aussi toutes les bizarreries d’un peuple novice.157
The bizarreries in question is the tendency of the people, as Cloots notes,
to express sympathy towards the king and the ancien régime, which Cloots
excuses as one of the consequences of attaining a higher degree of civilisa-
tion. Cloots refers to the need, according to him, to suppress the liste civile
(civil list), which defines the expenses supporting the monarch. One of the
decrees taken on 10 August 1792, following the storming of the Tuileries
and the suspension of the king, abolished the civil list.
Education, or elsewhere called ‘regeneration’, is the solution that Cloots
and the revolutionaries saw for the future of the nation: ‘Moins la raison
est développée, plus les passions sont déchaînées. En améliorant l’éducation,
nous améliorerons la nation’.158 Education had been the monopoly of the
clergy, and became an important project for the revolutionaries in their plan
for the ‘regeneration’ of the nation, which will be explore more in details
in the chapter on humankind. The basis of this education of reason is of
course based on ‘science’ as understood in the second half of the eighteenth
century. The role of nature in Cloots’s thought will be analysed further in
the next chapter. It is now time to say a word about the result of reason with
science in the next section. The last subsection on the ‘science of man’, will
then continue this discussion on reason as the source of moral.
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science
We saw in the first part of the first section how Cloots aligned with Vol-
taire’s position regarding reason against faith, and thereby authority and
tradition. Cloots opposed reason to the church based on superstition, and
which maintained ignorance to usurp moral and social authority. The solu-
tion to this, for Cloots, is its opposite — the product of reason — science,
and the education of people to science:
L’ignorance étant l’attelier de l’imposture, il devoit s’ensuivre,
par la raison des contraires, que la science remédieroit aux ra-
vages de son ennemie : la force des préjugés, le respect-humain,
la cupidité, l’empire de la coutume, s’opposent, il est vrai, à la
destruction totale de l’erreur ; mais du moins la principale par-
tie des hommes, celle qui donne le ton aux autres, brise ses fers,
& cela suffit.159
Universality and Unity
Science is universally valid and understandable, and because of that, Cloots
means that it is the reason why the whole humankind should unite rather
than be divided. Science means the development of transports, exchanges,
communication technologies, all possibles means for Cloots to make one
human understand one another and share things together despite great dis-
tances, as opposed to animals:
Ce morcellement est d’autant plus honteux et funeste, que la
nature nous a doués de la parole et de l’invention des arts et
des sciences, de l’imprimerie, et de la poste et de la navigation,
pour ne former qu’une seule famille raisonnable sur notre pe-
tit globe. Je pardonne aux singes de Sumatra de n’avoir aucune
parenté avec les singes du Paraguay ; mais l’homme des Indes
occidentales, qui ne fraternise pas avec l’homme des grandes
Indes, est doublement inepte, doublement coupable et dou-
blement puni. Ses relations incohérentes deviennent crimi-
nelles : il en résultera des guerres, des fratricides, tant que tous
les intérêts particuliers ne seront pas en harmonie avec une
force commune, avec une loi universelle.160
Another example of the universality of science, for Cloots, is that it is im-
ported from abroad, and every country’s scientific improvement is built on
159. Cloots, Certitude des preuves, 324.
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another country’s discoveries. Cloots seems to paraphrase the Latin meta-
phor of dwarfs standing on the shoulder of giants (‘nanos gigantum hume-
ris insidentes’), also expressed by Newton, when he writes this defence of
foreigners: ‘Rappelons-nous que chaque nation doit ses arts, ses sciences,
ses lumières, sa philosophie aux étrangers’.161
This science, for Cloots, is of course the one gathered in theEncyclopédie,
it is the science of all the philosophes who identify with the intellectual prin-
ciples of ‘les lumières’, the ‘Enlightenment’:
Malgré le penchant de l’homme vers la superstition, l’Encyclo-
pédie parviendra néanmoins, tôt ou tard, à son but, en tirant
l’esprit de l’assoupissement qui le rend crédule.162
Cloots sees the Revolution, and the ‘new regime’ as the result of the pro-
gress of reason and of ‘les lumières’, hence the defeat of ignorance, supersti-
tion, corruption, and all the ills associated with the ancien régime, which
was not based on reason and science; it was an ‘encyclopaedic explosion’:
Le délabrement des finances, voilà la cause; la philosophie, voi-
là les moyens. Les frondeurs ridicules, sous les Mazarin, sont
devenus révolutionnaires sous le Breteuil,163 grâce à l’explosion
encyclopédique.164
The science of the Enlightenment created the revolution, and the ‘new re-
gime’ enacts the scientific principles of the Enlightenment in the fields of
morals and politics, opposing therefore an ‘old’ and a ‘new’ science, in Clo-
ots’s revolutionary writings: ‘La vaine science de nos vieux politiques est en
défaut depuis le jour de l’insurrection parisienne’.165 Of course, the context
of this pamphlet is the perceived attack on the French Revolution and Clo-
ots by Prussian minister Hertzberg, and therefore Cloots attacks him and
his profession as ‘charlatanerie’. Later on in the revolution, Cloots also at-
tacks Fauchet and other writers on the same premise: ‘Le malheur du jour,
c’est cette nuée d’écrivailleurs nés d’hier à la science profonde des publi-
cistes…’.166 This old science is based on the founding principle of univer-
sal monarchy, that guides certain policies such as the European ‘balance’ of
power.167 Cloots denounces this policy based not on moral or reason, but
on reason of state calculated to maintain an equal amount of power among
European states so no one is closer to achieving a ‘universal monarchy’. That
161. Cloots, ‘L’Orateur du genre humain’, 143.
162. Cloots, Certitude des preuves, 330.
163. Louis Charles Auguste le Tonnelier, baron de Breteuil (1730–1807), was the last
prime minister of Louis XVI, appointed a few days before the storming of the Bastille.
164. Cloots, ‘L’Orateur du genre humain’, 145.
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166. Cloots, ‘La République universelle’, 313.
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does not mean that Cloots considers this true political science solely based
on morals. As Cloots writes in Chronique de Paris on 27 July 1791, justify-
ing his postponing of putting an end to the slave trade: ‘La morale est es-
sentielle dans l’intérieur d’un ménage, mais un État ne saurait faire vie qui
dure, sans la science du profond Machiavel’.168 This ‘old science’ in politics
is also based on tradition and authority, particularly the deference to older
men in society, as is the case in the Orient and was the case in ancient re-
publics, which is why republics failed and despotism suceeded, according
to Cloots.169 However, despotism is bound to fall, even if Cloots admits
that sciences and arts may some times flourish because a despot decides to
sponsor them. Ultimately the corruption of a despot and his court will ruin
the talent of the best artists (and scientists).170
The ‘new’ science, the science of the philosophes, is universal and unified,
because it is based on nature and the observation of its principles. As one of
the philosophes, the ‘Orator of the human race’, claims to have found a basic
principle of this ‘new science’ of human organisation by observing nature:
the single sovereignty of the human race leading to the universal republic
(as opposed to the single sovereignty of God appointing monarchs, leading
to the universal monarchy). This new science is based on the Encyclopédie.
The Encyclopédie aimed at containing and describing all the sciences and
gives the following definition of science:
science, en terme de philosophie, signifie la connoissance claire
& certaine de quelque chose, fondée ou sur des principes évi-
dens par eux-mêmes, ou sur des démonstrations.171
The article continues by stating that, in this sense, science is opposed to
doubt, and opinion is in between the two.172 Science is clearly connected
to philosophy, and refers to the clear and certain knowledge of something.
There is no mention of a scientific method beyond the reference to what
is ‘self-obvious’ or ‘demonstrations’. The relation to philosophy is even
clearer in Jaucourt’s following article classifying the various types of ‘Sci-
ences (connaissances humaines)’, in which he makes reference to classical
rhetoric and the understanding of science as needing eloquence to be com-
municated; he mentions, for instance, Aristotle and Cicero, and, later in the
article, Quintilian.173 Science to Jaucourt and the Enlightenment is related
168. Cloots, Ecrits révolutionnaires, 199.
169. Ibid., 147.
170. Cloots, ‘La République universelle’, 303.
171. Unknown, ‘Science (Logique et Métaphysique)’, in Encyclopédie, ou Dictionnaire
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to philosophy and also to rhetoric and the vir civilis, who must acquire this
sapientia, this science. Jaucourt even equates the reign of sciences with An-
cient Rome, the fall of which was the fall of sciences and the beginning of
centuries of superstition and prejudice that only the scientific ‘revolution’
put an end to by rediscovering antiquity. At the end of the article, Jaucourt
emphasises that nobles of Ancient Greece and Rome devoted their time
and fortune to the advancement of sciences, and he encourages the present
king to do the same.174 Sciences are the way forward to enlighten and reform
society for the better.
What was understood as ‘science’ during the Enlightenment was differ-
ent from our contemporary understanding of it, even if it is during this
period that the categories of science that we know today began to form.
‘Science’ was also known under the general label of ‘natural philosophy’ or
simply ‘philosophy’, as Jean le Rond d’Alembert (1717–1783) states that the
two are synonymous.175 In the Discours préliminaire des Éditeurs, d’Alem-
bert laid out the programme of theEncyclopédie regarding the presentation
of all the sciences, crafts, and arts.176 At the end of theDiscours, a figure maps
the state of human knowledge following Bacon’s understanding: memory,
reason, imagination. While memory is related to history, reason is related
to philosophy, which includes the science of nature, the science of man, as
well as the science of God. Science is everything that is the product of reason,
branches of knowledge gathered under the general term of philosophy.
Science of Man
The eighteenth-century ‘science of man’ continued to advance the project
that started in the preceding century with the ‘knowledge of ourselves’.177
In France, the search for a science of man before the revolution was linked to
the pressing necessity for reforms as the organisation of society and the state
was increasingly inefficient and ineffective— most notably the collection of
taxes, from which the wealthiest were exempted, whilst the participation in
the American revolutionary wars emptied the state’s coffers. In this context,
already before the revolution, Turgot (1727–1781), when he was a minister
of Louis XVI, explained to the king the necessity to develop a ‘new objective
science of society founded on the constants of human nature and the mu-
tual needs of all men and women’.178 Condorcet was a friend of Turgot’s,
and together they were the first to use the term ‘social science’ based on
174. Jaucourt, ‘Sciences (connaissances humaines)’, 789.
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reason and experience as opposed to traditions.179 Turgot and Condorcet’s
views were that science would allow to bureaucratic reform because it could
replace its opacity, inefficiency, and secrecy with universality, openness, and
mathematical precision.180 According to them, ‘politics itself was to be sub-
jected to scientific rule’ and ‘natural reason, rather than political will, was
to be the source of order and authority in political affairs’.181
The science of man is included in the Encyclopédie as a particular branch
of scientific knowledge regrouping morals, logic, and ‘science of the soul’.182
The science of the soul is about the knowledge of the human soul through
theology. The remaining division between logic and moral is explained by
the fact that the science of man is presented following the faculties of man,
which are Entendement and Volonté: The Entendement must conform to
‘truth’, which is the goal of logic; Volonté must be subjected to ‘virtue’,
which is the goal of morals.183 It is in this paradigm that Cloots wrote:
… tous les humains seraient vertueux, s’ils pouvaient en avoir
la volonté. Rien au monde n’est plus volontaire que la volonté
qui nous conduit irrésistiblement. On ne saurait donc trop
rectifier notre jugement par des notions saines et lucides. Les
lois doivent être assises sur ces données fondamentales.184
Cloots seems here to apply Diderot (otherwise often cited by Cloots) dir-
ectly in submitting human volonté to legal entendement, albeit with gentle
incentives towards virtuous behaviours and obstacles to vicious ones.
The moral science is then divided between a general and a particular
one, the particular one concerning ‘laws or jurisprudence’: natural laws, eco-
nomic laws, and political laws. ‘Moral’ comes from Latin mores, meaning
custom, manners; the moral sciences study human behaviour, the everyday
life of human beings. It is within this science of man that Cloots wants to
make a breakthrough, particularly with the discovery of natural laws and
political laws. These laws, can be discovered through reason by observing
nature, just as the laws of physics by a natural philosopher such as Newton.
Here, Cloots claims to have made a discovery in the science of man with the
principle of ‘sovereignty of the human race’.
As Hankins notes, ‘The ideology of Enlightenment tended to make nat-
ural philosophers into heroes, and in France the greatest hero of all was
Newton’.185 Newton’s accounts were circulated widely, and discussed by
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educated elites, for example Voltaire and Mme du Châtelet.186 What re-
mains important in how Newton was perceived after the publication of
Principia Mathematica in 1687 is that the physical world, the universe, na-
ture, was an orderly place governed by laws, and that human reason was cap-
able of discovering and understanding them.187 Newton was certainly ahero
to Cloots, who mentions him several time as an important figure of philo-
sophy, together with other scientists or philosopher such as e.g. Galileo, Co-
pernicus, Leibniz, Locke, or Voltaire.188 Cloots also adopts Newton’s view
of the world as an orderly place governed by laws— a ‘system’ as analysed
in chapter two — and Cloots sets himself the goal to discover them in the
realm of politics with the principle of sovereignty of the human race: ‘New-
ton a réuni tous les philosophes par sa découverte physique ; je réunirai tous
les hommes par ma découverte politique’.189 This sort of comparison was
not unusual in eighteenth-century France; although, it was made by philo-
sophes to other philosophes: Bernardin de Saint Pierre called the work of the
botanist Tournefort similar to what Newton did to astronomy; Quesnay
was referred to as the Newton of economics.190
Nature and God
There is a clear indication that, for Cloots, philosophical principles induced
through reason are as universal and perennial as the laws governing the
physical realm. His principle against all religions is universally and etern-
ally valid. Early in Cloots’s thought there was a recognition that philosophy,
the act of thinking, the use of reason, was connected to truth and science.
In Vœux d’un gallophile, Cloots writes: ‘Le Musée fera pour la philosophie
ce que l’académie des sciences fait pour l’astronomie…’.191 To Cloots all this
scientific development is a replacement of Christianity with the equivalent
of human science in philosophy. As such, ‘nature’ and the observation of
its manifestations constitute the bulk of philosophical reasoning. Misus-
ing reason leads to falsehood and sophisms, and a strong candidate for that
is religious thinking, but also any idea based on ‘prejudices’. In a letter to
Charles Stanhope published in Adresse d’un Prussien à un Anglais, Clo-
ots writes: ‘C’est à la philosophie de réparer les fautes des hommes et des
186. For the introduction of Newton in France see J. B. Shank, The Newton Wars and
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dieux’.192 It is clear to Cloots that knowledge and reasoning should serve
the truth and be disseminated in order to ‘fix’ the errors of men (monarch-
ism) and gods (the church).
For this purpose, Cloots opposes a théos and a cosmos as the two explana-
tions of the universe. The théos is the immaterial universe or God, the cosmos
is the material universe or nature. Cloots writes:
Quant aux causes finales, il n’est pas plus étonnant de les trou-
ver dans la nature éternelle que dans la divinité éternelle. C’est
un grand phénomène que la nature, je l’avoue ; mais votre dieu
invisible, indéfinissable, serait un phénomène bien moins com-
préhensible. Vous voulez expliquez une merveille par une autre
merveille. Il est clair qu’en ajoutant un incompréhensible théos
à un incompréhensible cosmos, vous doublez la difficulté, sans
la résoudre. Je m’en tiens à ce que nous entendons, à ce que
nous palpons, sans chercher midi à quatorze heures. Je vais
remonter à la source de toutes les questions insolubles. Pour-
quoi existe-t-il quelque chose ? Pourquoi votre soi-disant Dieu
existe-t-il ? Pourquoi le très réel univers existe-t-il ? Nous n’en
savons rien ; mais on ne conçoit pas non plus le néant absolu.
Il me semble que l’espace existe nécessairement. Or si quelque
chose existe nécessairement, il n’en coûte pas plus d’admettre
le contenu que le contenant. Laissons donc les soleils et les
planètes innombrables rouler éternellement dans le vide.193
Cloots is here answering to and arguing against two theses in the side of the
théos: the a priori cosmological argument, and the a posteriori teleological
argument. The ‘cosmological argument’— or a priori argument— is a type
of argument that seeks to explain the existence of the cosmos with the exist-
ence of a prior being, God.194 The other argument regarding the existence
of God is an a posteriori argument, also called teleological argument. This
argument starts from the awe that strikes the observer of nature and the
universe, whose structure, interconnectedness, balance, and order can only
be explained by deliberate mind behind it all; there must be a design.195
Cloots’s argument against theology is that it does not explain nature, but
adds complexity to explaining nature. Theological explanations are really
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only adding complexity and even more questions, when physical questions
are already complex enough. Therefore, for Cloots, it is better to stay within
the realm of the physical and try to solve its mysteries with questions from
physics rather than from metaphysics. In this way Cloots dismisses the ‘cos-
mological argument’ — ‘why is there something rather than nothing?’ —
and the necessity argument for the existence of God as a watchmaker, prime
mover, or designer. Cloots simply rejects the utility of metaphysical consid-
erations regarding who created what we observe and why; what matters is
to focus on explaining what is visible and material. In his next pamphlet,
Bases constitutionelles, Cloots reiterates this argument against searching for
metaphysical explanations. This time, Cloots opposes what he calls ‘divine
nature’ to ‘palpable and visible nature’, which is sufficient to explain nat-
ural phenomena:
Quelque chose existe éternellement : c’est une vérité simple ;
mais n’allons pas nous perdre dans les spéculations d’une na-
ture divine et créatrice, pendant que tout s’explique avec la na-
ture palpable et visible. Je nie l’existence d’une nature créée, et
vous ne m’endormirez pas avec votre prétendue nature créa-
trice et motrice. Je ne veux point de fabrique, et par consé-
quent point de fabricateur. Le bon sens rejette le premier mo-
teur d’un mouvement éternel.196
The observation of nature is, for Cloots, the beginning of starting to re-
ject theology; or, nature is the only revelation acceptable, revealed religions
should be rejected:
Ma doctrine est la révélation de la nature ; les autres révélations
se dissipent devant elle comme les spectres du sommeil devant
les veillés de la philosophie.197
Cloots rejects the watchmaker argument. The world may not have ap-
peared by itself, but the question of its origins is asked in a wrong way be-
cause asking for the origins of something and answering that a pre-existing
being must have existed to create it leads to an endless chain of pre-existing
beings: if the world did not create itself and therefore there must be a God
to create it, then must there not be a God who created this God who created
the world? In laying this argument Cloots makes an important distinction
for his own argument later between théos and cosmos, which we will see in
the conclusion more in details:
Les croyants disent que le monde ne s’est pas fait lui-même,
et certainement ils ont raison, mais Dieu non plus ne s’est pas
196. Cloots, ‘Bases constitutionnelles’, 496.
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fait lui-même, et vous n’en conclurez pas qu’il existe un être
plus ancien que Dieu. Cette progression nous mènerait à la
tortue des Indiens. La question sur l’existence de Dieu (Théos)
est mal posée ; car il faut savoir préalablement si le monde (Cos-
mos) est un ouvrage. Demandez donc la question préalable, et
vous passerez à l’ordre du jour dans le silence de vos adversaires
stupéfaits.198
The Indians’ tortoise in question is a reference to Hindu mythology in
which a world turtle, named Akupāra, holds the world on its back; or in
some versions holds elephants on its back, who hold the world on theirs. It
is very likely that Cloots takes this comparison from the French translation
of Locke, who in Essays Concerning Human Understanding(book II, ch.
13, and ch. 23), writes about how wrongly some argue with substance to sup-
port an accident, comparing with an Indian arguing for a turtle supporting
elephants supporting the world.199 In other words, Cloots uses Locke’s ar-
gument about the limits of human understanding: explaining the world by
being created by a God, leads to the question of who created God, similar
to how the Indians’ turtle leads to the question of who or what supports
the turtle, which supports the elephants, which support the world.
Following this passage, Cloots refutes the watchmaker argument because
comparing the universe with a watch is comparing apples and oranges: the
watch is man-made, whilst nature is not. Doing so, Cloots is paraphrasing
Hume’s argumentation in part II of his Dialogues Concerning Natural Re-
ligion when he explains that when we see a house we know by experience
that it is man-made and has an ‘architect’, but that we cannot make the
same analogy for the universe because we do not have the same experience
of someone creating the universe to infer this cause/effect reasoning.200 Clo-
ots writes: ‘… mais cette différence ne me fera pas adopter une similitude
entre l’architecte de ma maison et le prétendu architecte de la nature’.201 As
we have seen previously, Hume’s Dialogues was one of the sources for Clo-
ots’sCertitude, and it is likely that he remembered this part of theDialogues
in this argument, although he does not mention Hume.
Cloots also puts forward an argument similar to Bayle’s regarding cre-
ation and time, equally one of his sources for writing Certitude.202 For Clo-
ots, the universe and nature exist and must be accepted as facts, which are
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eternal, without wondering about their creation and therefore the concept
of time outside the creation. Bayle intervened in a discussion about the
eternity of creation and God. For Christian orthodoxy, the world was not
eternal and had been created at some point in time by God. For some schol-
astics, like Aquinas, the world was created ab æternam, but adversaries ar-
gued that it was not possible that God, eternal, also created the world eternal.
Bayle recycled the argument already put forward by Anselm of Canterbury,
Augustinus, Boethius, Aquinas, Suarez, and others, by making a distinc-
tion between eternity, that can be counted, and sempiternity, that cannot
be counted.203 God is sempiternal, but has created the universe eternal:
C’est dans les idées de Dieu que se trouve la vraie mesure de
la quantité absolue des choses, tant à l’égard de l’étenduë qu’à
l’égard du tems. L’homme n’y connoît rien ; il ne connoît que
des grandeurs ou des petitesses relatives.204
Cloots takes this argument of eternity, but again, drops the theological ar-
gumentation. Nature is eternal, and its creatures (animals and the human
race) are equally eternal; this is a given fact that must be accepted and stud-
ied in order to explain it, but it should not be studied and explained by
adding another ‘fact’ of an eternal or sempiternal God outside this world:
… la nature ne produit rien. Tout ce qui la compose existe
éternellement : ce que nous appelons vulgairement l’enfant de
la nature est aussi vieux que sa mère. N’allons pas expliquer
l’existence de la nature incommensurable par l’existence d’une
autre nature incommensurable. Vous cherchez l’Éternel hors
du monde, et je le trouve dans le monde. Je me contente du
cosmos incompréhensible, et vous voulez doubler la difficulté
par un théos incompréhensible !205
Cloots, then, seems to feel a need to fill the void that these theological an-
swers then leave, once discarded; void, which is ultimately an existential one.
A new type of secular natural religion based on science replaces revealed reli-
gion for this purpose, once theology has been discarded. Observing nature
leads one to discredit theology, and to replace existential questions hitherto
addressed by theology: why are we here? What is death? Cloots compares
nature to a ‘good mother’, and death to a good night’s sleep until a rebirth
under a different form, alluding, perhaps to decomposition and recompos-
ition:
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La nature est une bonne mère qui se plaît à voir naître et re-
naître ses enfants sous des combinaisons différentes. Un pro-
fond sommeil ne laisse pas que d’avoir son mérite.206
In general, Cloots wants to propose a, philosophically-speaking, ecumen-
ical system, one that is valid for all regardless of one’s view on religion and
one’s belief. Only the observation of nature can lead to universal laws of
morality, valid for any system of beliefs, any religion:
Ma philosophie est trop vraie pour être chagrinante ; et les es-
prits faibles qui ne sauraient soutenir cette clarté, devraient
consulter la nature, qui couvre tous les systèmes spéculatifs
d’un voile consolant. En effet, soyez athée ou déiste, matéria-
liste ou spiritualiste, vous irez toujours votre train ordinaire
dans le cours de la vie.207
For Cloots, revealed religions led to a clouding of reason and the applic-
ation of false laws, which were wrong because they were man-made against
nature. Men’s laws are particular and temporary, whereas the laws of nature
are general, universal, and eternal. Cloots there adds that the ‘science’ of the
Enlightenment, physical sciences, in order to lay the principles of a scientia
civilis. However, this scientia civils, being also based on a ‘religion of nature’,
also has some repercussions on how to replace the metaphysical questions
that are thus rejected. Thus, instead of a theological teleology with a be-
ginning and an end, Cloots suggests a parallel to what Lavoisier expressed
about the transformation of elements in nature by stating that plants and
animals do live and die, but they are elements that decompose to form new
ones in an eternal law of nature— a rebirth in other words:
La vaine curiosité des métaphysiciens et le furieux despotisme
des théologiens ont rendu obscures les plus lucides notions
de notre entendement. On a substitué, aux lois générales et
immuables de la nature, les lois particulières et vacillantes de
l’homme. Les modifications végétales ou animales, que nous
appelons la naissance et la mort, nous ont fait supposer un
commencement et une fin au grand tout, quoique nous avou-
ions que rien ne s’anéantit dans l’univers. Les formes changent,
les éléments se combinent et se décomposent ; mais les lois
sont éternelles.208
‘Rien ne se perd, rien ne se crée, tout se transforme’ is a quotation attributed
to Lavoisier, but in reality a paraphrase of Anaxagoras, even if Lavoisier in
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his Traité élémentaire de chimie writes about matter in the same, but less
catchy, terms:
… car rien ne se crée, ni dans les opérations de l’art, ni dans
celles de la nature, & l’on peut poser en principe que, dans
toute opération, il y a une égale quantité de matière avant &
après l’opération ; que la qualité & la quantité des principes
est la même, & qu’il n’y a que des changemens, des modifica-
tions.209
Cloots declared the same from nature to political organisation: ‘La nature
ne gagne rien et ne perd rien’.210 Observing humankind like a scientist means
observing human nature, and Cloots draws a parallel between humankind
and other social animals like bees. Unlike animals, humans lack instinct and
must use reason to palliate this handicap.211 Cloots uses an argument com-
pletely at odds with his ‘cult of reason’. Reason is actually the faculty that
led man to deviate from the natural principles on which social organisation
should be based. One must thus look at the ‘primitive laws’, study human
nature like a scientist in order to find the laws that govern it for designing
the best government. However, it might be a ‘wrong’ use of reason, as op-
posed to a ‘right’ use of reason.
Cloots’s argumentation is solidly based on the claim to scientific truth,
and he reflects this by making countless parallels and metaphors with scient-
ists and scientific elements. His favourite one is to draw a parallel between
political and moral sciences and physics. ‘La fameuse expérience d’Otto
Guericke212 étonna les physiciens de l’Europe, et l’expérience de nos Fran-
çais déconcerte vos publicistes modernes’.213 Physics and politics are equally
hard sciences based on ‘experimentations’, in line with the Baconian divi-
sion of sciences, and the programme set out by theEncyclopédie. To be sure,
Cloots is nothing but the Newton of political science: ‘Newton a réuni tous
les philosophes par sa découverte physique ; je réunirai tous les hommes par
ma découverte politique’.214 ‘Discovery’ had a particular meaning, as the
Encyclopédie emphasised:
On peut donner ce nom en général à tout ce qui se trouve
de nouveau dans les Arts & dans les Sciences ; cependant on
209. Antoine-Laurent de Lavoisier, Traité élémentaire de chimie : présenté dans un ordre
nouveau et d’après les découvertes modernes, vol. 1 (Paris: Chez Cuchet, 1789), 140–141.
210. Cloots, ‘La République universelle’, 306.
211. Cloots, ‘Bases constitutionnelles’, 494.
212. German scientist Otto von Guericke (1602–1686) reached scientific fame for his
work on the physics of vacuums. He invented a vacuum pump in 1654, and conducted an
experiment in 1657, which disproved Aristoteles’ theory that that nature abhors a vacuum:
substances are not pulled by a vacuum, but are pushed by the pressure of the surrounding
fluids.
213. Cloots, ‘L’Orateur du genre humain’, 133.
214. Cloots, ‘Bases constitutionnelles’, 477.
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ne l’applique guere, & on ne doit même l’appliquer, qu’à ce
qui est non-seulement nouveau, mais en même tems curieux,
utile, & difficile à trouver, & qui par conséquent a un cer-
tain degré d’importance. Les découvertes moins considérables
s’appellent seulement inventions.215
D’Alembert then states that discoveries are mainly made by genius, and
sometimes by chance or both. Cloots’s ‘genius’ is thus to have come to real-
ise that another principle from nature, which ensues from natural rights,
is the sovereignty of the whole human race, and not individual peoples or
‘nations’. Mathematics or geometry are also often used comparisons.216 Or
writing about his system of the single nation of the human race:
Cette dernière découverte, dont l’universalité est aussi indubi-
table que l’ascension universelle de la montgolfière, renversera
plus d’erreurs en douze ans que les pères de famille n’en accu-
mulent sur la tête de leurs enfants depuis mille lustres.217
All these parallels with physics or mathematics point to the same intel-
lectual project of developing a system based on nature, a natural system of
politics and morals:
C’est en consultant la nature que je découvre un système poli-
tique dont la simplicité sera parfaitement saisie par quiconque
désire toute l’indépendance, tout le bonheur dont l’homme
est susceptible.218
Or again a little later in the same work: ‘Ma doctrine est la révélation de la
nature’.219 However, these arguments are just using nature, science, and rea-
son as cautions for the ‘truth’ in Cloots’s argument. This is not to say that
Cloots, the politician, cynically tries to manipulate his audience in order
to convince it of his views. Cloots does believe sincerely in his views, he sees
himself as a philosopher who discovered that nature was preaching unity to
humankind, and hence the science of man should preach unity of human-
kind in its political organisation: ‘L’unité, l’unité ! la nature entière nous
prêche l’unité’.220 There are various reasons to be found in nature for claim-
ing unity as a universal principle. There are no frontiers in nature, rivers and
seas are naturally connected, and so mankind should imitate this natural
215. Jean le Rond d’Alembert, ‘Découverte (Philosophie)’, in Encyclopédie, ou Diction-
naire raisonné des sciences, des arts et des métiers, ed. Denis Diderot and Jean le Rond
d’Alembert, vol. 4 (Paris: Briasson, 1751–1772), 705.
216. Cloots, ‘Bases constitutionnelles’, 480.
217. Cloots, ‘La République universelle’, 307.
218. Cloots, ‘Bases constitutionnelles’, 476.
219. Ibid., 496.
220. Cloots, ‘La République universelle’, 250.
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principle. By the same token, mankind is one single species, and therefore
should not be separated politically and economically, as it is against nature.
These questions will be dealt with in the two following chapters on natural
law and humankind.
These questions of God and metaphysical arguments in theology are
important political ones too because they relate to the concept of legit-
imate sovereignty and legitimate moral authority. Cloots the philosopher
fits the mould of revolutionary rhetoric in simplifying the world into ‘us’
against ‘them’, ‘modern’ against ‘ancient’, ‘republic’ against ‘monarchy’,
‘nature’s laws’ against ‘scholastic natural law’, ‘the people’ against ‘God’,
‘théos’ against ‘cosmos’. In these simplifications, the question of sovereignty
is central, as Cloots seems to consider all natural law tenets as one and identi-
fying God as the source of sovereignty deferred on earth to kings, priests,
and any variant of them as there are cultures and civilisations.221 Natural
law was the paradigm within which all these discussions took place. It was
not a unified view, and many different schools and thinkers had opposite
views.
What this chapter showed, was the will for Cloots to expel any ecclesiast-
ical influence from these debates, and ultimately, to expel any metaphysical
consideration regarding the existence of God. Only the observation of nat-
ure through reason (as opposed to faith) should guide the establishment of
the science of man, as orderly and obeying laws as physics. For those who
considered God, the Supreme Being, as the creator of nature, sovereignty
and morality were located in His will. For Cloots, the absence of God from
the discussion leads to locating sovereignty and morality somewhere else:
in nature, and in the human race. These are the objects of the next two
chapters.
221. Cloots, ‘Bases constitutionnelles’, 494.
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Vox populi, vox Dei : la voix du
peuple est la voix de la nature.
Cloots, 17921
One of the central claims in the numerous cahiers de doléances (note-books of grievances) drafted in preparation for the reunion of the es-
tates general was the reference to rights that were not respected even though
they were considered natural.2 This is why one of the very first acts by the
national assembly was to draft the Declaration of the Rights of Man and
the Citizen on 26 August 1789. The Declaration is a central document in
the Revolution, and it is equally central in Cloots’s political system.3
The Déclaration in itself was the product of many projects and discus-
sions, and only what was meant to be a draft of seventeen articles came
out of the meeting held on 4 August.4 However, the National Assembly
never came back to the 1789 Déclaration after completing the constitution
in 1791.5 The preambule of the Declaration states that:
Les représentants du peuple français, constitués en Assemblée
nationale, considérant que l’ignorance, l’oubli ou le mépris
des droits de l’homme sont les seules causes des malheurs pu-
blics et de la corruption des gouvernements, ont résolu d’expo-
ser, dans une déclaration solennelle, les droits naturels, inalié-
nables et sacrés de l’homme, afin que cette déclaration, con-
stamment présente à tous les membres du corps social, leur
rappelle sans cesse leurs droits et leurs devoirs ….
The rights of man are natural and as such are inalienable. The end of the pre-
ambule mentions that these rights are declared ‘sous les auspices de l’Être
1. Anacharsis Cloots, ‘Monarchie sans roi’, Annales patriotiques et littéraires, 27 July
1792. In Cloots, Ecrits révolutionnaires, 372.
2. That is in all of the cahiers written by the third estate, in most of those written by
the nobility, and in a few of those written by the clergy. See Stéphane Rials, La déclaration
des droits de l’homme et du citoyen, Pluriel (Paris: Hachette, 1988), 115–118.
3. Cloots, ‘L’Orateur du genre humain’, 160.
4. See Keith Michael Baker, ‘The Idea of a Declaration of Rights’, chap. 4 inThe French
Idea of Freedom: The Old Regime and The Declaration of Rights of 1789, ed. Dale Van
Kley, The Making of Modern Freedom (Stanford, CA: Stanford University Press, 1994),
154–196.
5. Peter McPhee, ed.,A companion to the French Revolution (Chichester; Malden, MA:
John Wiley & Sons, 2013), 85.
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suprême’: this is a reference to the deist arguments against all religions as
source of ‘prejudice and superstition’, but admitting the existence of a ‘su-
preme Being’ to avoid the mention of God. Therefore, these natural rights
are also ‘sacred’.
When, in 1793, the Convention met to discuss a new constitution after
the rejection of constitutional monarchy following the flight of the king,
the députés presented almost three hundred projects.6 The question left by
the principle of liberty and equality was the organisation of the making
of the law and the participation of the people, which was a central point
of discussion among the projects in 1793, showing a great political creativ-
ity.7 The amount of drafts for a constitution reflects the variety of inter-
pretations of the Declaration, on which a radically new society was to be
built.8 Cloots’s project for a decree is not one of them, but he used the oc-
casion to express his views on the basic principle the constitution should
be based on: the sovereignty of the human race as the only sovereign on
earth.9 Cloots’s idea of ‘sovereignty of the human race’ is based on his ana-
lysis of theDeclaration, in particular the principles of individual liberty and
equality. Based on these principles, Cloots expresses the view that individu-
als have sovereignty over themselves, but that upon encountering another
individual they merge their sovereignty, and so on until the whole mass of
individuals on earth have merged their individual sovereignty into the only
political body that is in accordance to natural law: the ‘nation’, but of the
whole human race.
In order to understand Cloots’s political system, and to situate it in the
context of his time, it is necessary to look at natural law and the debates on
natural law in the French Enlightenment that led to the 1789 Declaration of
the Rights ofMan and the Citizen. Many aspects are important, but most of
all for this discussion the presence of a ‘supreme Being’, the ‘political associ-
ation’ (article 2), and the principle according to which ‘sovereignty resides
essentially in the nation’ (article 3), the definition of liberty as ‘doing any-
thing which does not harm others’ and limited only by law (article 4), and
finally the understanding of law as the expression of ‘general will’. From
this understanding of the context of natural law theories it is then possible
to move on to the context of republicanism in their interpretation of nat-
ural law.10 Historians have long discussed these various interpretations, not
6. Jacques Godechot and Hervé Faupin, Les Constitutions de la France depuis 1789
(Paris: Flammarion, 2006), 71.
7. Pierre Rosanvallon, La démocratie inachevée : Histoire de la souveraineté du peuple
en France (Paris: Gallimard, 2000), 56–64.
8. Peter McPhee, The French Revolution, E-Book (Melbourne: Melbourne University
Press, 2015), Ch. 1.
9. Cloots, Bases constitutionnelles.
10. This will be the object of the last chapter.
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only in relation to the French Revolution and the French declaration, but
also to the American revolution and Declaration of Independence.11
Natural law had had a long history before the French Revolution in all
Europe. There are various positions and various traditions, which are neces-
sary to present before moving on to the natural law debates in France, and
whose views influenced Cloots’s. Synthesising here all the debates and the
richness of the natural law tradition is attempting the impossible. I will here
only sketch the main lines of the debates and present the main characters
that are useful to situating and understanding the French debates on nat-
ural law and Cloots’s views. This is thus only a sketch of the basis on which
eighteenth-century jusnaturalists commented upon.
In this chapter, I argue that Cloots replaced God and His moral author-
ity with the human race, and that he did so within the voluntarist school of
natural law. Natural law traditions were built upon the idea that it was the
law from God’s will. However, the Enlightenment was a period of attacks
upon revealed religion. This is why there is mention of ‘Supreme Being’,
rather than ‘God’, in the 1789 Declaration. God is the moral authority de-
creeing and sanctioning natural law and natural rights. Men can only find
them through reason; hence, the natural rights are ‘declared’. Cloots was
part of this Enlightened movement with Certitude, but in the Revolution
became atheist, as the previous chapter showed. However, Cloots also based
his political system on theDeclaration. Therefore, the source of natural law
cannot be God, or the Supreme Being, for Cloots, and the previous chapter
already showed that Nature was the source of morality. Nature, seems to
be the source of natural law and natural rights for Cloots. However, Cloots
also writes about the people being the equivalent of God as a source of law
with general will leading to ‘legal despotism’, but also with moral authority
based on reason leading to ‘rational despotism’.
natur al law tr aditions
The central question in natural law is the location of absolute sovereignty.
As Cloots points out:
On ôta la souveraineté au genre humain pour en revêtir un
prétendu souverain dans le ciel, dont les représentants sur terre
étaient des rois, des empereurs, des papes, des lamas, des bon-
zes, des brahmanes, et tant d’autres grands officiers ecclésias-
tiques et civils.12
Cloots makes here a reference to natural law traditions, in which God was
the moral sovereign authority with natural law, and His representatives on
11. I will present this literature in the chapter on republicanism.
12. Cloots, ‘Bases constitutionnelles’, 494.
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earth were monarchs and religious figures with political sovereignty, and
who struggled to monopolise it by claiming to be the representant of God’s
moral authority. It is here useful to sum up the natural law traditions that
form the context of Cloots’s political thought regarding sovereignty and
moral authority.
There is a vast literature on the history of natural law, particularly rich
in German countries and therefore called German natural law (also called
modern, Protestant, post-scholastic, or secular natural law).13 It can be de-
scribed as a non-unified ‘tradition’ or a ‘genre in moral and political philo-
sophy’ with a variety of views.14 By the eighteenth century, it was a well
established discipline in almost all universities and colleges in Protestant
Europe.15 Hartung points to the Roman origins of natural law in the Ger-
man debates with a Begriffsgeschichte of obligatio naturalis (natural duty)
and the duties implied by the lex naturae (natural law).16 Until the eight-
eenth century, the paradigm of scholastic natural law was the proper divi-
sion between law and morals, and natural law appeared as much of a law
as statutory and customary law on the basis of obligatio naturalis.17 It is on
this religious basis that other natural law theorists subsequently discussed
natural law.18
In the eighteenth century, most of the debates on natural law focused
on the issue raised by Hugo Grotius (1583–1645) regarding the paradox in
scholasticism19 that, on the one hand, man used reason to understand nat-
ural law, and, on the other, was supposed to create positive laws conform-
13. See for instance the literature review in Michael Seidler, ‘Pufendorf’s Moral and Polit-
ical Philosophy’, in The Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy, Winter 2015, ed. Edward N.
Zalta (2015), accessed 26 April 2016, http://plato.stanford.edu/archives/win2015/entries/
pufendorf-moral/. See also the review article Ian Hunter, ‘The Recovery of Natural Law:
Hochstrasser’s History of Morality’, Economy and Society 30, no. 3 (2001): 354–367. For
a general introduction: Knud Haakonssen, ‘German Natural Law’, chap. 9 in The Cam-
bridge History of Eighteenth-Century Political Thought, ed. Mark Goldie and Robert Wok-
ler, The Cambridge History of Political Thought (Cambridge University Press, 2006), 251–
290.
14. Knud Haakonssen, ‘Protestant Natural Law Theory: A General Interpretation’,
chap. 4 inNewEssays on theHistory of Autonomy: ACollectionHonoring J.B. Schneewind,
ed. Natalie Brender and Larry Krasnoff (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2004),
92.
15. Ibid., 93.
16. Gerald Hartung, Die Naturrechtsdebatte. Geschichte der Obligation vom 17. bis 20.
Jahrhundert, Studienausgabe, Alber Praktische Philosophie 56 (Freiburg im Breisgau: Ver-
lag Karl Alber, 1999).
17. Ibid., 22, 36, 50.
18. Ibid., 167.
19. For a presentation on schoasticism on the division between natural law and natural
rights, see Knud Haakonssen and Michael Seidler, ‘Natural Law: Law, Rights and Duties’,
chap. 27 in A Companion to Intellectual History, 1st ed., ed. Richard Whatmore and Brian
Young, Wiley Blackwell Companions to World History (Chichester: John Wiley & Sons,
2016), 381–383.
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ing to natural law: how can one man’s reason be objectively said to be better
or more right than another one’s?20 It is this conundrum regarding the re-
lativity of individual reason that occupied most of natural law debates and
led to two schools of thought: realism (also called rationalism or intellec-
tualism) and voluntarism. Representatives of the realist school are chiefly
Gottfried Wilhelm (von) Leibniz (1646–1716) and Christian Wolff (1679–
1754), whilst representatives of the voluntarist school are chiefly Samuel
Pufendorf (1632–1694) and Christian Thomasius (1655–1728), as well as
Thomas Hobbes. The realist tradition is called like that because these think-
ers assumed that there was an existing structure of moral and action, meta-
physical (from God’s natural world) but inherent in reality (in humanity’s
cultural world), which could be analysed and understood by the human
mind. Since this structure was accessible to human reason, they are also
called ‘rationalists’.21 The voluntarist tradition, on the other hand, emphas-
ised, mainly, that the human mind had no access to the divine mind through
reason. In order to palliate this lack of knowledge of values and morals
through rational probing of God’s will, they suggested understanding hu-
man nature without considering any divine intention. It is therefore only
possible to understand the values in humanity’s cultural world by focusing
on the human will.22
Wolff’s natural law was a teleological vision of human life in which hu-
manity’s destiny is perfectibility.23 Wolff then distinguishes between the ‘ori-
ginal state of natural liberty’ in which an individual exercises freely one’s in-
dividual right to perfection, and the ‘adventitious state’ of ‘relations of gov-
ernance’ in which the individual exercises one’s liberty to give up the future
exercise of this liberty to a governing body more apt to maximise perfection
and happiness than the individual on one’s own.24 In other words, this is the
Wolffian version of the social contract. Pushed to its limits, this natural law
theory posits a universal society encompassing humanity as a whole in a civ-
itas maxima.25 There are several ways to translate ‘civitas’, from city to polis,
to state and commonwealth, but Onuf argues convincingly that republic
would be the best understanding of what Wolff meant by ‘civitas’.26 The
Wolffian metaphysical framework for moral philosophy ultimately became
dominant in German universities, and hence this was the doctrine taught
to the governing elite.27
20. Tim J. Hochstrasser,Natural Law Theories in the Early Enlightenment (Cambridge:
Cambridge University Press, 2000), 4.
21. Haakonssen, ‘Protestant Natural Law Theory: A General Interpretation’, 94.
22. Ibid., 96.
23. Haakonssen and Seidler, ‘Natural Law: Law, Rights and Duties’, 391.
24. Ibid., 392.
25. Ibid.
26. Onuf, ‘Civitas Maxima: Wolff, Vattel and the Fate of Republicanism’, 292.
27. Haakonssen, ‘Protestant Natural Law Theory: A General Interpretation’, 95.
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Pufendorf was arguably one of the central figures in modern natural
law,28 although some questioned whether he could be considered a found-
ing figure.29 Together with his follower, Thomasius, Pufendorf took the
debate on natural law towards what they considered a ‘true science of nat-
ural law’.30 Continuing the separation between theology and natural law,
Pufendorf argued that, God’s mind being inaccessible to the human mind,
it could not serve as a basis for the organisation of social life; therefore ‘hu-
manity had to rely on empirical observation of the world’.31 This kind of
method that Pufendorf introduced, and his followers continued, was based
on a Baconian understanding of science, and following in the footsteps of
Grotius. Natural law was to be described using the same method as physics,
a ‘quasi-mathematical approach’, to produce a ‘theoretical coherence’ and
‘empirical plausibility’.32 However, in his later works, Pufendorf also used
the historical works of various authors, including classical ones, forming
a more ‘eclectic’ method.33 Equality among individuals is presumed to be
natural since all moral categories are human made, and therefore inequal-
ity is a result of human interference in nature; as a consequence, there is
no natural right to equality since all rights are created in social settings.34
God and nature are framing human life in that they provide ‘laws of nat-
ure’, including the ‘law of sociability’, which regulates social interactions,
but rights are human inventions that depend on the duties imposed by the
law of sociability.35 In any case, it is important to note that natural rights
were not a central notion in early modern natural law, and it is only with
Scottish, Swiss, and American thinking that it became so.36
Pufendorf was translated into French and annotated by the Huguenot
Jean Barbeyrac (1674–1744), whose work then dominated discussions in
French.37 This led to the creation of a Swiss ‘school’ of natural law, whose
28. Pufendorf’s thought was heavily commented upon in the Republic of Letters by
philosophers such as Locke, Leibniz, Vico, Carmichael, Wolff, Hutcheson, Hume, Rous-
seau, and Smith. See the introduction by James Tully on Pufendorf in Samuel Pufendorf,
On the Duty of Man and Citizen According to Natural Law, ed. James Tully, Cambridge
Texts in the History of Political Thought (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1991),
xvi.
29. See Detlef Döring, Pufendorf-Studien: Beiträge zur Biographie Samuel von Pufen-
dorfs und zu seiner Entwicklung als Historiker und theologischer Schriftsteller, Histor-
ische Forschungen 49 (Berlin: Duncker & Humblot, 1992). Cited in Simone Zurbuchen,
‘Samuel Pufendorf and the Foundation of Modern Natural Law: An Account of the State
of Research and Editions’, Central European History 31, no. 4 (1998): 416.
30. Hochstrasser, Natural Law Theories in the Early Enlightenment, 3.
31. Haakonssen and Seidler, ‘Natural Law: Law, Rights and Duties’, 388.
32. Seidler, ‘Pufendorf’s Moral and Political Philosophy’.
33. Hochstrasser, Natural Law Theories in the Early Enlightenment.
34. Haakonssen and Seidler, ‘Natural Law: Law, Rights and Duties’, 389.
35. Ibid.
36. Haakonssen, ‘Protestant Natural Law Theory: A General Interpretation’, 104.
37. Hochstrasser, Natural Law Theories in the Early Enlightenment, 15.
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writings in French influenced in turn French philosophers and physiocrats
in particular.38 Barbeyrac’s main concern was with freedom of conscience:
it was a gift from God and as such was not only a right but a duty and
could not be alienated in the contractual agreement between the people and
the government.39 Following Locke, Barbeyrac argued that this was in fact
the very reason government was created: to protect this right. He thus con-
tributed to make ‘Lockean ideas part of natural law in the Enlightenment’,
which would influence Rousseau and later the French and American Re-
volutions.40 For Barbeyrac, if ‘man’ is the philosophical starting point, then
natural law should come from the will of God.41 Barbeyrac thought of the
concept of a moral community of humankind with the ‘communauté de
Droite Raison’.42
Other figures of the ‘Swiss school of natural law’ were Jean-Jacques Bur-
lamaqui (1694–1748) and Emmer de Vattel (1714–1767), who formed the in-
tellectual context in which Rousseau conceived his views on natural law.43
However, Cloots does not mention them, and it does not seem that his
political thought was marked by their ideas. It is however useful to give
a brief account Burlamaqui’s thought because he was a reference for the
Encyclopédie, and Diderot wrote against his ideas, as we will see below. Bur-
lamaqui introduced his own original ideas, notably with the refutation that
society was based on self-preservation, as Hobbes and Pufendorf argued,
but instead was based on the pursuit of happiness, since God created man
to be happy.44 Man’s natural qualities were a gift from God and comprised
‘understanding, will, and liberty’; as a consequence, social institutions had
to preserve and not corrupt them.45 Another innovation from Burlamaqui
was his distinction between a primitive and a natural state of man, in which
what Hobbes and Pufendorf understood as ‘natural state’ is redefined as
‘primitive state’ by Burlamaqui in order to reject their negative standard
that justified constituting the sovereignty of a superior, in favour of a nat-
38. Catherine Larrère, L’invention de l’économie au XVIIIe siècle (Paris: Presses Uni-
versitaires de France, 1992).
39. Haakonssen and Seidler, ‘Natural Law: Law, Rights and Duties’, 393.
40. Ibid.
41. Tim J. Hochstrasser, ‘Conscience and Reason: the Natural Law Theory of Jean Bar-
beyrac’, The Historical Journal 36, no. 02 (June 1993): 289–308.
42. Ibid., 298.
43. For an overview of the Genevan context see Helena Rosenblatt, Rousseau and
Geneva: From the First Discourse to The Social Contract, 1749–1762 (Cambridge: Cam-
bridge University Press, 2007), ch. 3, 88–158; also for a nuanced view of the importance
of the Genevan context see Richard Whatmore, Against War and Empire. Geneva, Bri-
tain and France in the Eighteenth Century (New Haven, CT; London: Yale University
Press, 2012), ch. 3, 54–97.
44. Robin Douglass, ‘Rousseau’s Debt to Burlamaqui: The Ideal of Nature and the Nat-
ure of Things’, Journal of the History of Ideas 72, no. 2 (April 2011): 211–212.
45. Ibid., 213–214.
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ural state in which nature is a normative ideal to be preserved by the sov-
ereign.46 The issue that Burlamaqui identified is inequality, since the sov-
ereign governs the rest.47 However, this is contrary to the state of nature
in which men are equals. Burlamaqui argues for the necessity of a distinc-
tion between a sovereign and a population governed by the sovereign, but
rejecting Hobbes and Pufendorf he argues that ‘… le droit de Souveraineté
dérive d’une Puissance Supérieure, accompagnée de Sagesse & de Bonté’.48
God is wise, kind, and superior and thus universal sovereign who imposed
a natural law on humankind that Burlamaqui defines as such:
Loi Naturelle, une Loi que Dieu impose à tous les hommes, &
qu’ils peuvent découvrir & connoître par les seules lumières
de leur Raison, en considérant avec attention leur nature &
leur état.49
Order in the world derives from God’s principle of ‘Sociability’ given
to humankind, from which all human laws and duties should come: ‘Com-
mon Good’; the spirit of sociability is universal; we are obligated to consider
ourselves naturally equal and treat each other as such, except when just de-
fence is invoked.50 These two societies— civil society and natural society—
are connected in that civil societies must respect natural law from natural
society, but the only sanction for disregarding it occurs during Judgement
Day.51 God is thus the sovereign moral authority of natural law.
Cloots does mention Barbeyrac’s preface to Pufendorf as ‘excellent’ in a
lettre philosophique to a friend.52 As seen in the previous chapters, Cloots
studied Grotius at the Académie des nobles in Berlin, and it is very likely
that Sulzer also taught Wolff’s views on natural law. But, regarding natural
law, Grotius, Wolff, and Pufendorf through Barbeyrac seem to be distant
references to Cloots, compared with Rousseau and French authors such as
d’Holbach, Diderot, and Helvétius (Helvétius for his principle of pain and
pleasure as seen in the previous chapter). There are also physiocratic ele-
ments present in Cloots’s thought, although he does not mention any of
them. However, it is a revolutionary natural law that Cloots also adapts and
transforms, and this may be why he does not acknowledge the variety of tra-
ditions, but refers to all as imagining a ‘sovereign in the sky’, by definition
illegitimate, with representatives on earth, illegitimate as a consequence. In-
stead, Cloots replaces the sovereign God with the people and nature, but do-
ing so, Cloots seems to mix the voluntarist and rationalist traditions in their
46. Douglass, ‘Rousseau’s Debt to Burlamaqui’, 215.
47. Jean-Jacques Burlamaqui,Principes du droit naturel (Genève et Coppenhague: Chez
Cl. & Ant. Philibert, 1756), 72.
48. Ibid., 81.
49. Ibid., 111.
50. Ibid., 149–150.
51. Ibid., 246–248.
52. Cloots, Certitude des preuves, 540.
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attempt to answer the deterministic conundrum of reason: using reason to
understand natural laws, but also applying natural laws in human laws. Clo-
ots seems to accept the voluntarist view of abandoning God from natural
law, but replacing God with nature, Cloots seems to follow the rationalist
view of understanding and observing nature and its laws. The next sections
will present Cloots’s views on natural law, compared with these authors to
see what he took from them, where he differed from them. It must be noted
here, as Thomson remarks, that, in French, one used two expressions: ‘droit
naturel’ and ‘loi naturelle’. These expressions were not the equivalent to the
distinction in English between ‘natural right’ and ‘natural law’. Depending
on the context, these expressions could be used synonymously, and ‘droit
naturel’ could refer either to ‘natural law’ or ‘natural right’.53
nature and its laws
That Cloots focused on nature to find social and moral laws is not an isol-
ated case. As shown above, other philosophers took the observation of nat-
ure as the starting point for building their legal and moral systems.54 Some,
as Cloots did, also claimed a natural religion as the only true and universal
religion. We have already seen in the previous chapters that a fascination
with classical republican authors led Cloots to call himself ‘orator’, a philo-
sopher in search of truth and charged with the mission of educating and
convincing others of this truth with the ‘scientia civilis’. We have also seen
that the ‘science of man’ in the typology of all sciences including physical
sciences, and was thought to be the precursor of the social sciences. Daston
explains this relation between scientific observation of even tiny parts of
nature such as insects, and a personification and valorisation of nature.55
In a way, Daston argues, the dedication that naturalists put in the practice
of observation and description of what was otherwise considered ‘trivial’
objects of knowledge, such as intestine worms or flower pistils, was a cel-
ebration of God in the marvel of His creation. This ‘natural theology’ in
the practice of observing nature, its tools and rituals, was a way of admir-
ing ‘God the artisan’ in the carefully crafted works such as a beehive or an
anthill. These practices linked the work of the naturalists with the work of
political economists through the analysis of ‘utility’ or ‘fitness’ in nature
and how systems are regulated.56 Daston compares the observation of ‘util-
53. Ann Thomson, Materialism and Society in the Mid-Eighteenth Century: La
Mettrie’s Discours préliminaire (Geneva: Librairie Droz, 1981), 245.
54. On the understandings of nature in France on the first half of the eighteenth century,
see Jean Ehrard,L’idée de Nature en France à l’aube des lumières (Paris: Flammarion, 1970).
55. Lorraine Daston, ‘Attention and the Values of Nature in the Enlightenment’,
chap. 4 in The Moral Authority of Nature, ed. Lorraine Daston and Fernando Vidal
(Chicago, IL: University of Chicago Press, 2003), 100–126.
56. Ibid., 102.
200 natur al law
ity’ by naturalists in their studies, with the utility of the works of artisans as
described for arts and crafts in the Encyclopédie. The works of insects and
the works of locksmiths deserved the same respect according to naturalists
and philosophes.57 They believed that everything in nature was created to a
particular end, it had a ‘utility’.58 In art, nature so depicted as creating util-
ity in all details was represented through personification as ‘Nature’, often
a goddess in a Greco-Roman fashion, ‘mother Nature’. For Daston, this
practice of observing nature and its values led to vesting nature of moral
authority.59
This moral authority vested in nature, and which justifies its study and
the respect for its laws, can be found in Cloots. His ‘system’, based on a
science of nature and a science of human mores, is heavily influenced by
d’Holbach and Diderot, although Cloots disagrees with their views regard-
ing borders and the organisation of society. There is also some physiocratic
elements in Cloots’s views about economic organisation, and, most import-
antly, the ‘despotism of the law’.
Moral Authority
Paul Thiry d’Holbach (1723–1789) rejected metaphysics in natural law as-
sociated with religious dogmas, and instead established a science with phys-
ical laws of nature. This move is very much in line with the question of
how natural law became a parallel of the laws of nature, i.e. morality as a sci-
ence obeying laws in par with the natural world.60 Nature, for d’Holbach,
is the only source of knowledge on humankind.61 Nature is also a superior
power that universally sanctions excesses (for example gluttony) with con-
sequences (a short life-span).62 It is therefore a System of nature with laws
of Natural politics, and one must observe nature scientifically by accepting
the world as it really is rather than trying to shape it according to metaphys-
ical ideas of how it ought to be.63 Therefore, man is in society not because
it is better than a so-called state of nature, which only exists in some philo-
sophes’ mind, but because it is the natural state: ‘L’homme … fut toujours en
Société’.64 However, d’Holbach recognises the plurality of societies, rather
57. Daston, ‘Attention and the Values of Nature in the Enlightenment’, 119–120.
58. Ibid., 123.
59. Ibid., 126.
60. Lorraine Daston and Michael Stolleis, eds., Natural Law and Laws of Nature in
EarlyModern Europe: Jurisprudence, Theology,Moral andNatural Philosophy (Farnham:
Ashgate, 2008).
61. d’Holbach, Système de la nature, 2.
62. Ibid., 448–452.
63. Paul Henri Thiry baron d’Holbach, La politique naturelle ; ou, Discours sur les vrais
principes du gouvernement, par un ancien magistrat, vol. 1 (Londres [i.e. Amsterdam]: s.n.,
1773).
64. Ibid., 5.
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than one society of humankind.65 Moreover, the sovereign power is then
based on the observation of nature and man, and must therefore protect it
and do what leads to ‘happiness’.66
Chapter two already showed how Cloots designed his political thought
as a ‘system’, which seems to be in a Wolffian paradigm because of Cloots’s
understanding of knowledge. Moving away from natural theology, Cloots’s
revolutionary thought seems close to d’Holbach’s understanding of nature:
morals is akin to a science with laws to be respected, nature is a superior
power, and natural laws must be respected as human laws because the state
of society is the state of nature. We have seen in the preceding chapter how
Cloots replaced faith with reason to find the source of morality in nature
and its observation rather than scriptures. Very clearly, Cloots writes that
nature is the guide for morality as it is wiser than men: ‘la nature est plus
sage que les hommes’.67 In another speech to the National Assembly on
9 September 1792, Cloots reiterates the same view in order to argue for the
single human race, and therefore the need to organise his universal republic:
La nature, plus puissante que les hommes dénaturés, nous ra-
mène impérieusement à l’arbitrage de la famille humaine ; et
cette famille est unique comme la nature.68
In his speech ‘Diplomatie révolutionnaire’ on 5 October 1793, Cloots de-
clared again that ‘La nature n’a rien fait en vain, et une république fondée
sur les lois naturelles ne contrariera jamais la nature’.69
By the same token, Cloots often compares the human race to other spe-
cies of animals in order to accentuate how humankind is a ‘child of mother
nature’ just like other living beings on earth. ‘La famille humaine est sou-
mise à des lois primitives, comme la famille des abeilles ou des castors’.70
This primitive law, as we will see below, is natural law, which is in fact a
political and social law since society is the natural state. Just like animals are
observed naturally in flocks, so are human beings. Therefore, Cloots makes
the comparison between bees and men, and a beehive and a city. Just like
other animals, like castors, man is naturally ‘sociable and industrious’. Soci-
ety is nature, sociability is nature, there is no separation between a state of
nature and a state of society, we live in both according to Cloots.
The comparison with other animals, and bees in particular, is not fortu-
itous. The allegory of the bees and the beehive is an old trope in Western
literature and its representation of human society as industrious and chaste
was still present in the eighteenth-century through the enduring influence
65. Ibid., 13.
66. Ibid., 20.
67. Cloots, ‘La République universelle’, 255.
68. Cloots, Ecrits révolutionnaires, 393.
69. Ibid., 614.
70. Cloots, ‘Bases constitutionnelles’, 494.
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of Virgil and Aristotle.71 So much so, that a book inverting the trope to
argue in favour of vice for the collective good —The Fable of the Bee by
the Anglo-Dutch philosopher and political economist Bernard Mandeville
(1670–1733)— was ordered to be burned on a public square in Paris in 1740
when its French translation was published.72 Many books were ordered to
be destroyed, but it is interesting that the book was burned because it inver-
ted the trope. Through this inversion of the trope, Mandeville really wanted
to deflate the anthropocentric view of humankind as superior and rational,
‘naturally good’, and through this Mandeville showed how the use of ‘nat-
ure’ had value attached to it and was not neutral.73 What Mandeville really
denounced was the confusion made between authority and nature by mor-
alists using the bee trope ‘cunningly’ in order to mask authority without
seeming to.74
Physiocratic Elements
Cloots’s thought contains physiocratic elements, particularly when it comes
to economics, even if he never acknowledges any of the physiocrats. His
economic programme is in line with the ‘laissez faire, laissez passer’ of the
physiocrates, as well as respecting the natural order in the socio-economic
organisation of society:
La nature a donné à tel pays du vin, à tel autre du blé ; un pays
occupe le haut d’un fleuve, un autre en occupe les bouches.
Tout se détériore en élevant un mur entre le pays de la vigne et
le pays du froment, entre la montagne des sources et la plaine
des embouchures, entre les pressoirs de l’huile et les mamelles
de la génisse … et comme toutes les rivières, les fleuves et les
mers communiquent ensemble naturellement, c’est à nous de
multiplier ces communications par des chemins et des canaux,
et non pas de les interrompre par des constitutions, des fron-
tières, des forteresses, des escadres. Imitons la nature, si nous
voulons être ses heureux enfants.75
For Cloots, there is a virtuous circle between the economy and peace in
aligning political and economic organisations with nature. The absence of
obstacles to trade produces peace, and peace produces a surplus of goods
that even natural calamities cannot undermine:
71. Danielle Allen, ‘Burning The Fable of the Bees: The Incendiary Authority of Nat-
ure’, chap. 3 in The Moral Authority of Nature, ed. Lorraine Daston and Fernando Vidal
(Chicago, IL: University of Chicago Press, 2003), 74–100.
72. Ibid.
73. Ibid., 79.
74. Ibid., 80–85.
75. Cloots, ‘Bases constitutionnelles’, 490.
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Le mal physique n’étant plus aggravé par le mal moral, on
supportera patiemment l’inclémence des saisons et tous les
maux naturels. … La paix perpétuelle maintiendra un niveau
perpétuel entre la consommation et les consommateurs, entre
l’ouvrage et les ouvriers.76
Physiocracy is a term coined from the Greek words physis (φύσις), nat-
ure, and kratos (Κράτος), power or government (from the god Kratos in
Greek mythology).77 Physiocracy is better known for its economic theory
of minimal state intervention in trade as summed up in the motto ‘laissez
faire les hommes, laissez passer les marchandises’, coined by French econom-
ist Jacques Claude Marie Vincent de Gournay (1712–1759).78 Physiocracy
was the precursor of liberalism, and stood opposed to mercantilism that
defended protectivist state intervention in trade. Its prominent figure was
the physician and economist François Quesnay (1694–1774) and the states-
man and economist Anne-Robert-Jacques Turgot (1727–1781). Other not-
able members were the marquis de Mirabeau (1749–1791), Pierre Samuel
Dupont de Nemours (1739–1817), and Pierre-Paul-François Le Mercier de
76. Ibid., 488–489.
77. On physiocracy, see: Manuela Albertone, ‘Physiocracy’, in Encyclopedia of the En-
lightenment, ed. Alan Charles Kors, 4 vols. (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2002);
Reinhard Bach, ‘Les physiocrates et la science politique de leur temps’, Revue Française
d’Histoire des Idées Politiques, no. 20 (February 2004): 229–259; Yves Citton, ‘L’école
physiocratique au cœur ou dans les marges des Lumières ?’, inLesMarges des Lumières, ed.
Didier Masseau (Geneva: Droz, 2004), 99–112; Bernard Delmas, ‘Les Physiocrates, Turgot
et « le grand secret de la science fiscale »’, Revue d’histoire moderne et contemporaine 56,
no. 2 (April 2009): 79–103; Elizabeth Fox-Genovese, The origins of physiocracy, economic
revolution and social order in eighteenth-century France (Ithaca, NY: Cornell University
Press, 1976); Tim J. Hochstrasser, ‘Physiocracy and the politics of laissez-faire’, chap. 19
in The Cambridge History of Eighteenth-Century Political Thought, ed. Mark Goldie
and Robert Wokler, The Cambridge History of Political Thought (Cambridge University
Press, 2006), 419–442; Larrère, L’invention de l’économie au XVIIIe siècle; Pierre Rosan-
vallon, ‘Physiocrates’, inDictionnaire critique de la Révolution française, ed. François Furet
and Mona Ozouf, vol. 2 (Paris: Flammarion, 1988), 359–371; Michael Sonenscher, ‘Re-
view Article—Physiocracy as a Theodicy’, History of Political Thought 23, no. 2 (February
2002): 326–339; Michael Sonenscher, Before the Deluge: Public Debt, Inequality, and the
Intellectual Origins of the French Revolution (Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press,
2009), 189–199; Philippe Steiner, ed.,Revue Française d’Histoire des Idées Politiques, 20, Les
Physiocrates et la Révolution française (L’Harmattan, February 2004); Liana Vardi, The
Physiocrats and the World of the Enlightenment (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press,
2012); Finally, Weulersse’s work is the most important on physiocracy: Georges Weulersse,
Le mouvement physiocratique en France (de 1756 à 1770), 2 vols. (Paris: Félix Alcan, 1910);
Georges Weulersse, La physiocratie sous les ministères de Turgot et de Necker (1774–1781)
(Paris: Presses Universitaires de France, 1950); Georges Weulersse, La physiocratie à la ﬁn
du règne de Louis XV (1770–1774) (Paris: Presses Universitaires de France, 1959); Georges
Weulersse,La physiocratie à l’aube de la Révolution (1781–1792), ed. Corinne Beutler (Paris:
Editions de l’Ecole des Hautes Etudes en Sciences Sociales, 1985).
78. See Albertone, ‘Physiocracy’.
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La Rivière de Saint-Médard (1719–1801). Quesnay wrote several articles for
Diderot and d’Alembert’s Encyclopédie disseminating physiocratic princip-
les regarding agrarian economy: ‘Fermiers’, ‘Grains’, ‘Homme’. Under his
supervision, Le Mercier de la Rivière wrote L’Ordre naturel et essentiel des
sociétés politiques (1767). Diderot recommended this book to the Russian
tsarina for reforming her empire.79 Since physiocracy considered econom-
ics as a science about organising society according to a natural order, it was
also a political theory, and was focused on maintaining natural law.
In order to maintain natural order, physiocrats argued that a strong polit-
ical power was needed, which they call ‘legal despotism’.80 There was there-
fore a tension between a general freedom and absence of state intervention,
and the need for a strong state power to implement and protect the free or-
der of nature. The physiocrats developed a different theory of representa-
tion, which departed from the representation according to estates or orders,
emphasising the role of representing economic interests such as landown-
ers. This theory of representation in turn influenced the revolutionaries in
shaping the representative system of the republic, particularly through Con-
dorcet and the Girondists.81 Marie Jean Antoine Nicolas de Caritat, mar-
quis de Condorcet (1743–1794) was a close friend and protégé of Turgot
who procured his position as ‘Inspecteur général de la Monnaie’.82 Con-
dorcet in his Esquisse d’un tableau historique des progrès de l’esprit humain
writes about physiocracy as a ‘nouvelle science’, ‘système si simple’, ‘doc-
trine nouvelle’, ‘progrès dans la politique et dans l’économie politique’.83
Regarding the French physiocrats, Cloots did not cite any of them with
two exceptions. First, Dupont de Nemours, but only in his summary of
the French Revolution mentioning his pamphlet defending the ‘pacte de fa-
mille’ (alliance treaty between the French and Spanish crowns) ‘en esclave’,
when Sieyès attacked it ‘en homme libre’.84 Second, inVœux d’un gallophile,
Cloots criticised Mirabeau’s book Ami des hommes:85
J’ai lu Mirabeau & ne puis comprendre comment son Ami
des Hommes a fait une si grande fortune. Ce livre peche par
le principe. Repoussez l’or & attirez les denrées de l’étranger,
nous dit-il. Maxime extravagante ! Je dis, au contraire : attirez
79. Bach, ‘Les physiocrates et la science politique de leur temps’, 233.
80. Albertone, ‘Physiocracy’.
81. Ibid.
82. Emma Rotschild, Economic Sentiments: Adam Smith, Condorcet, and the Enlight-
enment (Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press, 2001), 20.
83. Bach, ‘Les physiocrates et la science politique de leur temps’, 231.
84. Cloots, ‘Résumé historique’, 603.
85. Victor Riqueti Mirabeau (marquis de),L’ami des hommes, ou Traité de la population,
3 vols. (Avignon: s.n., 1756–1760).
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l’or ; repoussez les denrées étrangères ; exportez l’excédent dé vos
propres denrées.86
Cloots underlined the importance of gold in the international economy.
In the Gnadenthal library catalogue, there are no listed books of the phy-
siocrats. However, it is difficult not to see some parallels with physiocracy
in Cloots’s thought, even if he disagreed with Mirabeau’s economic doc-
trine and did not cite any other physiocrats. InVœux d’un gallophile, Cloots
showed interest and emphasised the importance of ‘économie rurale’, the
importance of cultivating and exploiting the land.87
Cloots advocated, as the physiocrats did, a minimal political organisa-
tion based on simple principles derived from nature. Cloots also called his
political thought a ‘simple system’, and ‘inspired by nature’, reminiscent of
Condorcet’s formulations. This simplicity of a system based on nature is
obvious in quotation used as epigraph to chapter two, or again here: ‘Mon
système est si simple, si beau, si analogue à la nature humaine…’.88 In the
last chapter on republicanism, we will see how Cloots’s universal republic
was meant as a minimal form of government, also in line with physiocratic
views that following nature requires the absence of state intervention. But
it is really the concept of ‘legal despotism’ that shows the affinity of Cloots
with physiocratic political thought: ‘… la liberté civile est une force coercive
qui enchaîne tous les despotismes individuels sous le despotisme de la loi’.89
Cloots’s expression of legal despotism is however different from the physio-
crats’ in that Cloots opposes it to monarchical despotism, on the one hand,
and, on the other, attaches it to his conception of general will, as we will see
below. Then again, Cloots also modifies Rousseau’s general will in adapting
it to the whole human race as one single sovereign. The expression of gen-
eral will is the law, that ‘despotically’ applies to all: ‘La paix ne sera faite sur
la terre, que par l’expression unique de toutes les volontés individuelles ; par
le despotisme de la loi universelle’.90 We will analyse Cloots’s conception of
general will further below.
However, unlike the physiocrats, Cloots disapproved of having a polit-
ical representation based on economic orders. Physiocrats rejected the tra-
ditional division of corporate assemblies of constituted orders with a rep-
resentation based on property. On the contrary, Cloots shared Rousseau’s
concept of the general will and the necessity to reject any corporation that
may accumulate a strong individual will against the general will, as we will
see below.
86. Cloots, Vœux d’un gallophile, 42.
87. Ibid., 257.
88. Cloots, ‘La République universelle’, 265.
89. Cloots, ‘L’Orateur du genre humain’, 127.
90. Ibid., 159.
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Natural Borders
Since nature is the basis for the new scientia civilis, and since one observes
no borders in nature, Cloots considers that there can be no political borders
either between human beings. However, his reasoning evolved and contra-
dicted itself. Cloots moved from a position of ‘natural borders’ between
countries to a position of ‘no borders besides the one between the earth
and the firmament’. Prior to the Revolution, in Vœux d’un gallophile, Clo-
ots expressed the idea, based on nature, of ‘Gaul’s natural borders’.91 He
wrote that the ‘natural borders’ of Gaul are the Alps, the Pyrenees moun-
tain, the Rhine, the Mediterranean Sea, and the Atlantic Ocean.92 When
Cloots wrote in 1786 that the Rhine was the natural border of France, he was
the first to take such a clear position so early; the same position on natural
borders and the Rhine was only taken by the revolutionaries after five years
of lengthy debates.93 Cloots’s argument for the natural borders of France
in 1786 was almost out of a sense of aesthetic and philosophical harmony;
the Alps, the Pyrenees, the Atlantic ocean, the Mediterranean Sea, and the
Rhine, all seem to delimit naturally the historical Gaul. Other natural bor-
ders, other rivers, delimit in the same manner the other European powers,
in such a way that no one could ever again claim territory over another, and
Europe will live in perpetual peace.94 However, Cloots changed his position
after the Revolution, after he ‘discovered’ his ‘system’ of the ‘single nation
of the human race’. Early 1792, debates were renewed regarding the ‘natural
borders’ of France.95 Cloots’s argumentation, against any border, natural or
political, is, to him, as much an empirical observation of nature from which
a general law for governing humankind is induced, and an observation of
human history and its progress:
On discute en Europe les intérêts d’un habitant des antipodes,
et l’on doutera si une assemblée représentative des deux hémi-
sphères peut exister pour le bonheur permanent de l’humani-
té ! Je ne connais de barrière naturelle qu’entre la Terre et le
firmament.96
91. See the biography chapter, section ‘Cloots’s first revolutionary writings’ for an ex-
planation of the use of the name ‘Gaul’ rather than ‘France’.
92. Cloots, Vœux d’un gallophile, 53.
93. Joseph Smets, ‘Le Rhin, frontière naturelle de la France’, Annales historiques de la
Révolution française 314, no. 1 (1998): 676.
94. Cloots, Vœux d’un gallophile, 54.
95. Hervé Hasquin, ‘La Révolution française, la Belgique et l’Europe’, in Révolution
et population. Aspects démographiques des grandes révolutions politiques, ed. Éric Vilquin,
Chaire Quetelet 1989 (Louvain-la-Neuve: Academia, 1990), 26.
96. Cloots, ‘Bases constitutionnelles’, 491.
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The only natural border existing is the one that separates a planet from an-
other one, or the earth from the firmament. And Cloots already recognises
the progress in human communication and interdependence:
Les prétendues barrières naturelles qui s’opposent à cette uni-
on désirable sont des barrières aussi fragiles que factices. Les
Alpes et les Pyrénées, le Rhin et l’Océan, dans les siècles té-
nébreux, n’ont pas été des barrières pour les Carthaginois et
les Romains, pour les Grecs et les Scythes, pour les Goths et
les Normands ; et l’on nous répétera un adage que nos posses-
sions dans les deux Indes réfutent aussi victorieusement que
les armées d’Annibal et de César, de Charlemagne et de Charles
Quint. Nous recevons chaque jour sur la Seine qui coule dans
le centre des climats, à égale distance du Pôle et de la Ligne,
nous recevons, dis-je, des courriers et des aviso de Rome et de
Dublin, de Lisbonne et de Pétersbourg, de Boston et de Ba-
tavia ; et l’on nous parle encore des barrières naturelles de la
France !97
Cloots thus contradicts himself and his previous position, actually debat-
ing against his own previous argument: the so-called natural borders were
no borders at all to stop any foreign army. Moreover, communication bet-
ween human beings is not stopped by any natural borders either. Therefore,
according to Cloots, observing nature and observing human activities lead
to the conclusion that borders simply do not exist in nature, and as a con-
sequence neither should they in human societies, which must respect the
principles set by nature.
Par exemple, les pacages de la Hollande et les guérets de la
Beauce, et les graves de Bordeaux, et les côteaux de la Provence
ne sauraient s’isoler sans se faire un tort mutuel ; et comme
toutes les rivières, les fleuves et les mers communiquent en-
semble naturellement, c’est à nous de multiplier ces commu-
nications par des chemins et des canaux, et non pas de les in-
terrompre par des constitutions, des frontières, des forteresses,
des escadres. Imitons la nature, si nous voulons être ses heu-
reux enfants.98
The only natural frontier that Cloots recognises is the one between the
earth and the firmament.99 However, by stating so he directly contradicts
himself from his former position on the extension of the ‘natural borders’
of France as expressed in Vœux d’un gallophile.100
97. Ibid., 490–91.
98. Ibid., 490.
99. Ibid., 491.
100. Cloots, Vœux d’un gallophile, 53–63.
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Furthermore, for Cloots, nature cannot stand the separation of the hu-
man race into different political units because man has been bestowed with
an instinct and proselytism in order to build unity:
La nature abhorre ce morcellement dont nous sommes pu-
nis avec rigueur ; elle semble n’avoir donné à l’homme l’esprit
de prosélytisme que pour rompre les barrières qui nous sé-
parent.101
It is true, however, that nature has given different colours of skin to man-
kind, but that should not be the principle on which to separate mankind
into different sovereign states.102 After all, man has the unique ability to
find through different means a common ground for all:
Cette heureuse tendance des hommes de tout climat, pour
trouver, par des moyens différents, le niveau commun de la
nature nous annonce l’approche du nivellement final : la sou-
veraineté universelle, la nation unique, le peuple humain.103
To sum up this section, it seems that Cloots replaced God in natural law
theory with nature. Doing so, Cloots seems to be influenced by d’Holbach
and physiocratic views of nature as imposing a natural order or system that
humankind ought to respect in order to build a functioning society. It is
therefore within the rationalist tradition of natural law that Cloots seems
to base his system, perhaps remembering his courses on Wolff by Sulzer in
Berlin. If nature has laws that can be observed and deduced by reason in
order to be imposed in society through ‘legal despotism’, here Cloots takes
the other natural law tradition into consideration and builds his system,
which is original, but also contradictory.
nature and society
Natural law traditions had various views about how societies came to be.
Cloots adopts d’Holbach’s position regarding the absence of a transition
from a natural to a social state, and hence the absence of a social contract.
The social state is the natural state, and the general will of the people is the
sovereign law, the people being the whole human race. Regarding the gen-
eral will, Cloots makes a distinction between the ‘despotism of law’ that it
entails, and the ‘despotism of reason’. This seems to be the result of com-
bining Rousseau and Diderot’s views on general will, and a reminiscence of
voluntarism and rationalism in natural law theories.
101. Cloots, ‘La République universelle’, 306.
102. Ibid., 271.
103. Ibid., 316.
nature and society 209
Absence of Social Contract
Cloots rejects the transition from a supposed ‘state of nature’ to a state of
society. Already in L’orateur du genre humain Cloots makes it clear when
he writes an account of the debates held at the Cercle Social— also called
le Cirque due to its location in the Cirque du Palais Royal. Cloots praises
Fauchet, who established the Cercle Social with Brissot, for criticising Rou-
sseau, and showing the ‘mistakes’ of the ‘social contract’. After that, Cloots
states that there is no transition from a natural state to a social state because
the so-called social state is just as natural to man as it is to other gregarious
animals:
On a perdu plusieurs mois au Cirque, à mesurer le passage de
l’état naturel à l’état social ; comme si l’état social n’était pas
l’état naturel de l’homme, de l’abeille, de la fourmi, du gros
bétail, du menu bétail, des volatiles et des poissons.104
This rejection of a transition from a state of nature to society, and hence
the rejection of a social contract, is what Edelstein identifies as the key ele-
ment of ‘natural republicanism’.105 It has to be noted that Scottish philo-
sopher and historian Adam Ferguson (1723–1816), although not a natural re-
publican, had already stated this absence of transition, or equated the state
of nature with the state of society, inEssay on the History of Civil Society.106
However, Cloots never mentions Ferguson, and his works do not appear in
the catalogue of the Gnadenthal castle library. Edelstein sees the two polit-
ical languages of ‘natural rights’ and ‘classical republicanism’ as mutually
compatible and as fusioning in the eighteenth century. The language of
natural rights posited an imaginary state of nature from which individu-
als exited to a state of society by forming a social contract in order to either
protect their natural rights—Lockean version—or to protect them against
a violent state of nature— Hobbesian version. The language of republican-
ism implied a constitution between citizens to create a republic with laws to
protect them. Edelstein identifies Mably as a perfect example of the fusion
of these two languages, because he recognises the need for good laws, but
also the need for political systems to obey the natural order.107
Gabriel Bonnot de Mably (1709–1785), also known as Abbé de Mably,
wrote Des droits et des devoirs du citoyen in 1758, but it was only published
after his death in 1789.108 However, the manuscript was widely circulated
104. Cloots, ‘L’Orateur du genre humain’, 114.
105. Edelstein, The Terror of Natural Right, 73.
106. Adam Ferguson,An Essay on the History of Civil Society (Dublin: Boulter Grierson,
1767).
107. Edelstein, The Terror of Natural Right, 71–75.
108. Gabriel Bonnot de Mably, Des droits et des devoirs du citoyen (Kell: [s.n.], 1789).
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before its publication.109 The book opens with a quotation of Cicero from
DeRepublica, of which the book is a long commentary: ‘Est quidem vera lex
recta ratio naturae congruens, diffusa in omnes, constans, sempiterna…’.110
For Mably the state of nature was a state of perfect equality and freedom,
where the only duty was to secure one’s own happiness.111 However, indi-
viduals recognised its limitation and therefore made a contract to transfer
their rights to magistrates, thus leaving the state of nature to civil society.112
Mably criticises here other natural law writers here, caricaturing their po-
sitions and tarring them with the same brush: Grotius, Pufendorf, Wolff,
and Hobbes.113 According to Mably, these authors are mistaken in conceiv-
ing the natural state as if it had to be ended and cancelled, when it had to
be secured and perfected.114 Mably argues that, in order to understand the
state of nature, we must examine human nature. The most essential and
noble attribute is reason, understood as Cicero’s recta ratio.115 Nature has
bestowed upon us reason, liberty, and a desire to seek happiness; if any of
these three faculties is threatened, one can invoke it against an unjust gov-
ernment.116 The sovereign power belongs to the people, who bestowed it
to the magistrates and can always revoke it.117 Ultimately, Mably is a ‘clas-
sical republican’: he admired Athens and Sparta as republics. As such, he
also admired the plurality of republics, as numerous as there are sovereign
peoples.
Cloots often cites Mably,118 but does not seem to follow him beyond his
classical republicanism and following the natural order in laws. Cloots also
agrees with Mably in that the natural state should be secured, although he
follows d’Holbach in that there is no transition between the two rather than
the need to secure the former in the latter. Cloots is very critical of Mably, as
he was of Rousseau, regarding their views on religious tolerance, which he
found intolerant.119 And he is equally critical of both regarding their views
on a plurality of republics and federalism, as we will analyse further in the
chapter on republicanism.120
109. Michael Sonenscher, Work and Wages: Natural Law, Politics and the Eighteenth-
Century French Trades (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1989), 336.
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Cloots never uses the term ‘sociability’, the key concept to explain the
transition from nature to society, throughout his revolutionary writings.
Cloots only uses the term ‘sociable’ a little later in the same paragraph when
comparing flocks of animals and humans:
… vous trouverez partout des peuples plus ou moins indus-
trieux et sociables que le castor, l’éléphant et l’homme. Fon-
tenelle a rendu gaiement une pensée profonde, en disant que
« Paris est à la campagne ». Une ville, une ruche d’hommes
est l’ouvrage de la nature, pas moins qu’une ruche d’abeilles.
La différence entre nous et les étrangers, et je ne connais pas
d’autres étrangers que les autres espèces d’animaux, c’est que
nous n’atteignons pas directement à la perfection, nous avons
malheureusement le choix des modifications.121
That the state of society is the state of nature is confirmed by observing
how nature works, and how human nature behaves:
Il est dans la nature de l’homme d’aimer la société, et plus la
réunion d’hommes est nombreuse, plus les agréments sont
nombreux et variés. La foule attire la foule, et les déserts re-
poussent les humains.122
So, man, this ‘industrious and sociable’ animal among others, is born in
the natural state of society. And since nature does not know of any limit,
of any border, this society of individual human beings does not recognise
borders either. For Cloots, there is only one society as nature is one as well.
Moreover, history shows how dangerous the plurality of societies, that is to
say of sovereign powers, is: ‘La nature est une, la société est une : les puis-
sances collectives s’entrechoquent comme les individus indépendants’.123
Nature requires unity: ‘L’unité, l’unité, la nature entière réclame l’unité !’124
This unity of human society constitutes the sovereign: universal, single,
and indivisible. Humankind takes therefore the role of God in natural law
theories, in that it is the ultimate source of power. This is both a solution
and an absolute contradiction.
Cloots makes the comparison several times in his works, but there is a
confusion between God and nature. In his article ‘La monarchie sans roi’,
published inAnnales patriotiques et littéraires on 27 July 1792, Cloots wrote:
‘Vox populi, vox Dei : la voix du peuple est la voix de la nature. … Le genre hu-
main est Dieu, les aristocrates sont des athées’.125 In Bases constitutionnelles,
Cloots writes:
121. Cloots, ‘L’Orateur du genre humain’, 114.
122. Cloots, ‘La République universelle’, 260.
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… le genre humain, l’Être Suprême…. Les attributs d’une di-
vinité fantastique appartiennent réellement à la divinité poli-
tique. J’ai dit, et je le répète, que le genre humain est Dieu, les
aristocrates sont des athés.126
The confusion between humankind as God and Nature may not be fortuit-
ous. It may be a sign of the plurality of approaches that Cloots took regard-
ing natural law. As we will see below on the general will, Cloots followed Di-
derot’s version of general will replacing God with humankind, and based on
reason and liberty. But Cloots also understood the general will with Rous-
seau as the sum of individual wills forming an indivisible general will. The
problem is that the reason for taking each individual of the human race as
forming a general will comes from having natural rights at birth. Being free
and equal is what gives each individual the same equal right of sovereignty.
So, who gave these natural rights to humankind if humankind is sovereign?
If nature gave these rights to humankind, then how can humankind be sov-
ereign at all in the way that God was sovereign in natural law theories?
By the same token, the ‘social contract’ is natural, or as Cloots puts it,
‘primitive’, and it is made by the whole human race:
Le genre humain ne doit trouver aucune résistance nulle part ;
il agit comme bon lui semble, il ne souffre point de co-associé.
Ce contrat primitif, cette condition éternelle est le seul cachet
de la souveraineté.127
Since there is no transition from a natural state to a social state, there is no
‘social contract’. The contract, if any, is primitive and natural, as eternal as
the human race and nature. This again emphasises the contradiction bet-
ween nature and the human race as the moral authority that justifies sover-
eignty; the issue that Rousseau saw after writing his manuscrit de Genève
when discarding a state of nature, and the reason why nature reappeared in
the published version of the Contrat social.
General Will
Another reason that Cloots argues for the unity of society is the notion of
general will. We have already seen that Diderot and Rousseau are two of
the names that Cloots often cited. They each developed influential and op-
posed theories of general will. Despite the lack of direct reference to their
works, there is little doubt that Cloots read them, and it seems that he dev-
eloped his conception of the general will as a sort of compromise between
the two. However, Cloots is more inclined to follow Diderot because of
126. Cloots, ‘Bases constitutionnelles’, 476.
127. Ibid., 477.
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their common affinities with physiocratic thought. But Cloots also accepts
Rousseau’s general will as indivisible and essential to the unity of a polit-
ical body. Rousseau’s conception of general will is so crucial to the exist-
ence of society that he rejects any partition of it into any collective bodies.
Moreover, Rousseau’s general will is not just any whimsical will of the ma-
jority, but based in natural law. Cloots uses the same notion of general will
but enlarged to the whole human race, excluding any particular will of any
other collective body.
Diderot did not discuss the questions of natural law traditions in any
comprehensive treatise, but in various discussions or comments on other
authors.128 Diderot’s critique of Christian morality led him to establish a
‘science of mores’ in the science of nature.129 As such, Diderot sees morals
as another form of the physical life, and determined by it in a mechanistic
way. As such, only politics can determine morality, as a scientific condition-
ing of consciences.130 With his views on political authority and general will,
Diderot contributed to the political thought of his time and even preceded
Rousseau despite having been eclipsed in this role by intellectual histori-
ans.131
In his article on ‘droit naturel (morale)’ in the Encyclopédie, Diderot
answered to Boucher d’Argis’s article in the same Encyclopédie ‘droit de la
nature’, which was based on Burlamaqui.132 Diderot starts by stating that
freedom is the precondition for any conception of justice/injustice, moral-
ity/immorality, good/evil, rights, or obligations.133 Secondly, reason is what
sets the human race apart from other animals, and reason is the character-
istic that leads to truth, which must be obeyed unless one is to loose the
quality of being human.134 Once that is settled, one must recognise that an
individual cannot decide alone what is just or unjust by virtue of his reason
because that would be the equivalent of being judge and jury.135 It is there-
fore the ‘human race’ (‘genre humain’), which can decide what is good and
evil, because of its passion for the well-being of all.136 Next, Diderot intro-
duced the notion of ‘volonté générale’ (general will) as the guide for the in-
dividual to know the extent of his/her freedom: ‘Vous avez le droit naturel
128. Thomson, Materialism and Society, 248.
129. Jacques Proust, Diderot et l’encyclopédie (Paris: Armand Colin, 1962), 295.
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le plus sacré à tout ce qui ne vous est point contesté par l’espèce entiere’.137
This ‘general will’ is found everywhere in nature, from the jus gentium to
the behaviour of ‘peuples sauvages et barbares’.138 The description is vague
and includes the law of nations and anthropological observations about hu-
man nature, but the individual who solely responds to her particular will
is an ‘ennemi du genre humain’.139 The general will is deduced through rea-
son without regard for any human passion or emotion, for Diderot. The
general will is always right and legislative power must therefore be the gen-
eral will and not individual wills, which can be wrong. As Proust notes,
Diderot replaced the role that God played for Burlamaqui with the human
‘species’.140
Jean-Jacques Rousseau (1712–1778) contributed to a sentimentalisation
of the language of natural law.141 As Hunt has shown, the rise of the dis-
course of human rights corresponded to a rise in best-selling novels such as
Rousseau’s Julie, ou la nouvelle Héloïse (1761),142 and, with it, the develop-
ment of sentiments and empathy, which led to an emotional acception of
rights in all human beings.143 We have seen in the biography chapter that
Cloots was receptive to Rousseau’s novels and was therefore likely sharing
the same sentimentalisation of natural rights. Scholars agree that Rousseau
had knowledge of natural law thinkers such as Grotius, Pufendorf, Barbey-
rac, and Burlamaqui, but they disagree regarding Rousseau’s intellectual po-
sition towards them.144 Rosenblatt has noted the importance of the intellec-
tual and political context of Geneva to Rousseau’s position towards natural
law,145 and notably the fact that natural law theories— Barbeyrac and Bur-
lamaqui in particular — were used to support the unjust patrician regime
in Geneva.146 However, Rousseau’s view of nature was close to Burlama-
qui’s, which itself was close to Leibniz, in that he considered nature as a pre-
cise, harmonious, and ordered phenomenon, as his objection to Voltaire’s
poem on the disaster of Lisbon shows in their correspondence.147 Rousseau
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presented his view on natural law and nature in his Second Discourse On the
Origins of Inequality.148 In the Second Discourse, Rousseau attacks the dis-
crepancy in the natural law theories of Barbeyrac and Burlamaqui in that,
on the one hand, they have a positive vision of human nature, but, on the
other, they posit that the state of nature is negative nonetheless and pushed
men to restrict their liberty in favour of a sovereign.149 In general, Rous-
seau accused previous philosophers of a sort of philosophical anachronism
by putting in conceptions of nature conceptions that are from society.150
Rousseau identified the source of this issue in a discrepancy between de-
scribing man as God made him, and as he was.151 Natural man is described
by Rousseau as strong, free, and virtuous; it is society that corrupted him.152
This observation on man’s strength stems from accounts published by trav-
ellers of their encounters with ‘primitive societies’: they are physically and
psychologically strong.153 Why then did man enter society since there was
no conflict and all lived in a state of independence?154 Rousseau mocked
the concept of sociability and argued that it was some historical circum-
stances: when the first man found himself needing assistance and the first
man found it useful to use other men as a result.155 Rousseau presents in-
stead an incremental history of the emergence of dependency, first mater-
ial with property, and then psychological with the development of social
groups.156 A sort of self-sustaining vicious cycle was thus created in that
dependency led to greater specialisation of workers, which led to inequal-
ity, which in turned fuelled the state of dependency.157 The social contract
presented by Pufendorf,158 Barbeyrac, and Burlamaqui was presented as a
way to avoid this exploitation, but as a matter of fact, Rousseau argues, it
was a bogus argument, a trick for imposing a contract that only benefited a
few, whilst taking away man’s freedom.159
Rousseau only provides a solution in the Social Contract to this critique
of natural law in the Second Discourse. Doing so, he reintroduced contract
theory in France, which had not been used since the sixteenth century, by
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merging the French conception of absolutist sovereignty and popular con-
stitutionalist republic.160 Rousseau answered in the first version of his So-
cial Contract to Denis Diderot’s (1713–1784) conception of ‘general will’ ex-
pounded in the Encyclopédie. In this manuscrit de Genève Rousseau rejects
the idea of a ‘golden age’ of the state of nature.161 However, as Wokler ar-
gues, since this rejection of natural law led to a lack of overriding moral sanc-
tion for the social contract, he subsequently removed this part and wrote a
new version.162 In his chapter on natural law, later cut in the published ver-
sion, Rousseau argued that, unlike what ‘philosophes’ stated, the reasoning
of entering society after being a man in the natural society of humankind
was wrong and upside down: man is first a man in a natural sense after be-
ing a citizen in a society. Rousseau aimed directly at Diderot, and what he
called the ‘cosmopolites’ (meaning probably the collaborators of the Encyc-
lopédie), as Diderot based his article on natural law and his conception of
the general will on Pufendorf and Barbeyrac.163
Nous concevons la societé générale d’après nos sociétés parti-
culiéres, l’établissement des petites Republiques nous fait son-
ger à la grande, et nous ne commençons proprement à devenir
hommes qu’après avoir été Citoyens. Par où l’on voit ce qu’il
faut penser de ces prétendus Cosmopolites, qui justifiant leur
amour pour la patrie par leur amour pour le genre humain,
se vantent d’aimer tout le monde pour avoir droit de n’aimer
personne.164
Rousseau’s view on how individuals become a people is similar to Hob-
bes’s, although Rousseau had a different answer: without unity, a group
is an aggregation and not an association; hence, the community and the
sovereign are the same, legitimacy depends on the people retaining sover-
eignty, even if not all inhabitants need be citizens.165 The transition oper-
ated through the social contract is an exchange of natural liberty for civil
rights; through this act, personality is transcended in the contract and in-
dividuals gain self-mastery.166 Each particular individual particular will to-
gether combined form a moral person with a general will. The only sover-
eign must be this general will since it is the only force that can govern a state
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for the benefit of the ‘common good’.167 Sovereignty is therefore inalienable
and indivisible or it is not for the common good.
The idea of ‘general will’ is an old one that dates back to theological
discussions on God’s will as general will leading to natural law, and dis-
tinguished from God’s actions which were His particular will expressed
through miracles.168 Rousseau recycled this originally divine general will
already used by Pascal, Malebranche, Fénelon, or Leibniz, and directly as a
political concept by Pierre Bayle in his Pensées diverses sur la comète.169 Sim-
ilar to the distinction between God’s will and God’s actions, the general will
of the people is distinguished from the particular interests of its individual
members, in order to reach the objective of a common good.170 A difficulty
arises in this transition from God’s will to the people’s general will: men’s
will must be made general, and for Rousseau this is done through educa-
tion.171 There is thus a conundrum between free will and morality, as Riley
notes, but Rousseau’s solution is that man must be educated before becom-
ing free; the capacity to decide is made and not innate.172
Since general will is what identifies and sustains the existence of a col-
lective body, Rousseau refused to see it diluted by allowing other collective
bodies have a political role.173 The general will has to be willed by the cit-
izens, but it is not equal to their whims; it is based on what sustains society
as prescribed by natural law.174 Moreover, the general will is a principle of
political right, and the object of political right is liberty and equality (as in-
dependence and procedure).175 A majority is the only means to achieve this
political right for Rousseau, so it may be that the majority is wrong, but
the citizens cannot override the general will.176 Some have called this view
‘illiberal’ as leading to a totalitarian despotism, although Rousseau would
have disapproved of such a reading and would never have agreed that lib-
erating the whole humanity would have ‘justified shedding the blood of a
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single man’.177 Blum has argued that the vision of Rousseau as spreading the
seeds of totalitarianism was related to the discursive construction of Rous-
seau and his conception of virtue by the revolutionaries.178
Rousseau accepted the principle of representation of individual mem-
bers by magistrates in the government; because the sovereign is democratic,
whereas a democratic government would entail direct democracy, which
would be impossible; the execution of laws willed by the democratic sov-
ereign through the general will requires an intermediary, an aristocracy.179
The larger the state the weaker the relation between the government and
the sovereign because the particular wills can be more powerful, which re-
quires a more powerful government and thus less freedom.180 Moreover,
Rousseau’s view of the role of government was intrusive in that some insti-
tutions, a Censor and a civil religion or any religion accepting other ones
and other truths, should be in charge of public morality to ensure the mor-
ality of citizens— atheism being the worst for a republic.181
Rousseau, however, was not against the project of a universal society, as
he defended Saint-Pierre’s project.182 He believed, first, in the existence of a
European society of interdependent states with a common history and cul-
ture.183 But this society should be organised by a ‘coercive force’, which can
only be a union between the most powerful sovereign states in an assembly.
Voltaire rejected with sarcasm this so-called ‘universal’ assembly, to which
the emperor of China was not invited.184 Rousseau also accepted, before his
‘Social Contract’ that separated the world into as many societies as ‘general
wills’, that natural law applied to all of them nonetheless because it was the
‘general will’ of the society of humankind:
… car alors la grande ville du monde devient le corps politique
dont la loi de nature est toûjours la volonté générale, et dont
les états et peuples divers ne sont que des membres indivi-
duels.185
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As Riley notes, the idea of generality developed by Pascal, Malebranche,
Fénelon, Bayle, and Rousseau is between particularity and universality, and
in that it is distinctly French; as opposed to ‘German rationalistic universal-
ism’ in Kant’s thought.186 This Rousseauist generality tends towards uni-
versality by rising above the particular, but is not building on reason and is
thus lesser than Kantian universal will.187
The first reference to general will by Cloots is in L’orateur du genre hu-
main discussing the pamphlet Supplément au contrat social by Gudin. Paul-
Philippe Gudin de La Brenellerie (1738–1820) was an author who wrote
several plays and published this pamphlet as a praise to Rousseau’s original
work, with the addition of his own views.188 Cloots criticises this pamphlet
vehemently on various grounds, but what matters here is Cloots’s view on
the general will. Cloots accuses Gudin of contradicting himself when justi-
fying the royal veto to the acts of parliament. Regarding English bicameral-
ism Gudin argued that the assembly had a great authority but was rightly
subjected to the veto of a house of Lords, which was the product of feudal
history and not of the will of the English nation— therefore contrary to li-
berty.189 Implicitly, Cloots makes the argument that a national assembly—
the chamber of parliament with elected representatives of the sovereign
people — is the only legitimate representative of the general will of the
people. Cloots then also argues against Gudin’s view on ‘gradation’ that
built upon Rousseau’s conception in Considérations sur le gouvernement
de Pologne.190 The book was published after Rousseau’s death, but was
circulated in manuscript form already since 1773. Rousseau was more con-
cerned with saving Poland by adapting existing social and political institu-
tions than applying his own philosophy, and that is why the views expressed
are not fully compatible with the Social Contract, particularly regarding the
‘gradation’ of citizens in a senate. In Considérations, Rousseau expounded
in depth a system of gradation for citizens in order to climb to the top of
their order in the republic, before entering the senate.191 Cloots argues that
Rousseau himself would have rejected this system had he been living during
the time of the Revolution. Cloots saw clearly the contradiction in having
other political institutions capable of putting a veto to the general will of
the people represented by an elected assembly. Unlike Rousseau, Cloots
considered national polities as one of those corporations diluting the gen-
eral will that Rousseau wrote against. As seen previously, and as the next
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190. Jean-Jacques Rousseau, Considérations sur le gouvernement de Pologne et sur sa ré-
formation projettée (Londres: s.n., 1782).
191. Ibid., ch. 13.
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chapter will analyse, Cloots had a specific understanding of the concept of
nation, as an abstract community of free and equal men, and only recog-
nised the single ‘nation of the human race’.
The general will guarantees the unity of national sovereignty, for Rou-
sseau, and that means a small republic. For Cloots, the larger the republic,
the larger the general will and the stronger national sovereignty: ‘Et plus
nos départements seront nombreux, plus ils seront subordonnés à la loi, à
la volonté générale’.192 Contrary to Rousseau, Cloots believes that the larger
the republic the stronger the union.193 Cloots’s reasoning on the necessity
to enlarge a republic as much as possible is based on the historical observa-
tion that independent sovereign polities are more likely to fight with one an-
other. In ‘Adresse aux Français, par Anacharsis Cloots, Orateur du genre hu-
main’ on 22 May 1792, Cloots explains: ‘En effet, sans une loi commune, les
moindres différends dégénèrent en hostilités longues et atroces’.194 Cloots
then cites the example of Italy and Germany where sovereign entities wage
war upon one another, as opposed to the national unity in France where
two cities settle their disputes in court thanks to a common law for all, a
common will. Therefore, Cloots asks rhetorically: ‘Voulez-vous étendre les
hostilités d’Avignon et de Carpentras sur la France entière ? Rendez chaque
district indépendant de la volonté générale’.195 The major use of the concept
of the general will for Cloots is to put an end to wars between nations. The
law expressed by the general will is supreme because it is the expression of
the sovereign, the people. In that sense it is ‘despotic’, just like any other
sovereign laws, but it is a legitimate despotism because it is democratically
imposed and self-imposed. The individual wills are a threat to social and
political cohesion, and therefore the individual wills of nations are a threat
to global cohesion; they are synonymous with wars raged against one an-
other: ‘La paix ne sera faite sur la terre, que par l’expression unique de toutes
les volontés individuelles, par le despotisme de la loi universelle’.196
This poses the same issue as in Rousseau’s conception of the general will:
the charges of seeding despotism pure and simple. If it is possible to argue
that Rousseau would have never accepted that the blood of a single person
be shed to justify liberating the whole world (see above), the same may not
be said of Cloots. He wrote the pamphlet La république universelle to ar-
gue against killing foreign monarchs on the ground that it would only kill
the person but not the idea, while reason and the Déclaration were the real
weapons of choice to kill the idea of monarchy.197 However, already in his
Adresse d’un Prussien à un Anglais Cloots minimised acts of violence by
192. Cloots, ‘La République universelle’, 283.
193. Ibid.
194. Cloots, Ecrits révolutionnaires, 347.
195. Ibid.
196. Cloots, ‘L’Orateur du genre humain’, 159.
197. Cloots, ‘La République universelle’, 243–244.
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the Parisian crowds, their killings and exhibition of severed heads on piques,
as justified by centuries of oppression.198 Cloots also declared himself in fa-
vour of the war against Prussia and Austria in Spring 1792, going as far as
sending money to the troops; although he also sent them a copy of his book
arguing against killing foreign monarchs, La république universelle.199 Per-
haps the best argument that can be put forth in favour of Cloots’s general
will and ‘despotism’ of universal law is that, contrary to Rousseau, he saw
the government as minimal in a universal republic. Unlike Rousseau, here
Cloots is more influenced by the physiocrats in seeing nature as a sufficient
system of governance. Establishing a universal republic would be assuring
that the natural order is respected, and, everyone being free, there would be
no more need for a government beyond the administration of taxes world-
wide, as we will see in the chapter on republicanism. A further argument
against despotism in Cloots’s system is that, as we have seen in the chapter
on ‘reason’, Cloots introduced the concept of ‘cosmopolitan reason’ as a ra-
tional check on a particular reason, a sort of general reason checking partic-
ular reasons. Cloots’s ‘cosmopolitan reason’ seems to be different from the
philosophes’ ‘universal reason’ in that it is respectful of possible dissent by
other populations exercising their reason, but Cloots does not explain more
on this concept. It is in line with the communauté de droite raison from Bar-
beyrac’s preface on Pufendorf. It is also close to Diderot. However, most
importantly, Cloots’s conception of general will was, as Rousseau’s, an ac-
ceptance of the will of the majority, even if he did not think it was right.
This is contrary to Diderot’s conception, for whom general will is always
right and deduced through reason; or, it could be understood as conform
to Diderot if one recognised that a general will that is wrong and contrary to
reason was not the real general will but only the common will of the people,
not conform to the real general will deduced through reason.
In La république universelle, Cloots accepts — because it is the general
will — the compromise that has been made in keeping the monarchy and
the church in the constitution of 1791. This is akin to Rousseau’s pragmatic
Considérations recycling existing institutions despite their obsolescence into
a republican constitution. The king and the church have been maintained
in the constitutional settings because the people still believe in them. Cloots
unites both institutions as the product of the same philosophy, an ‘artificial
philosophy’ as opposed to a ‘natural philosophy’ — ‘artificial philosophy’
that is paradoxically equated with the ‘theocratic system of metaphysics’—
in other words, this is what Cloots identified as traditional natural law the-
ory.200 Kings and priests are the enemies, declares Cloots, but the people
will not remain stupid for long: armed with reason and obeying the law,
198. Cloots, ‘Adresse d’un Prussien à un Anglais’, 47–48.
199. Cloots, Ecrits révolutionnaires, 338–339.
200. Cloots, ‘La République universelle’, 281.
222 natur al law
the people will soon see the absurdity of paying for a ‘étrange roi’ (strange
because it makes no sense) and a ‘culte étranger’ (foreign because it is gov-
erned from the Vatican).201 There will not be any violence between repub-
licans and monarchists because republicans respect the law and the general
will of the majority. Cloots believes that truth and reason will triumph in a
state of free press and expression as everyone will have access to these opin-
ions. Sooner or later, the people will rise to reject kings and priests.202 So, in
this passage, Cloots adheres completely to Rousseau’s general will, includ-
ing the fact that the majority may be wrong. However, it is Diderot’s general
will based on reason that Cloots builds on:
Le principe de la soumission à la loi, au vœu de la majorité,
nous préservera de la guerre civile ; car chacun se reposera
sur la bonté de sa cause, et on attendra tout du bénéfice de
la presse sans entraves. Cette réflexion est de la plus grande im-
portance pour le crédit public et la prospérité nationale et la
tranquillité des citoyens timides, qui craindraient une explo-
sion désastreuse entre les royalistes et les républicains. Nous
avons notre boussole dans une mer pacifique ; et l’amour du
mieux ne nous fera jamais briser la règle qui rallie tous les in-
dividus autour de la volonté générale. Le despotisme de la
loi ne provoque pas l’insurrection, il se plie tôt ou tard sous
le despotisme de la raison. La France libre se lèvera un jour,
pour jeter un cri éclatant et unanime : « Point de roi, point de
prêtres. »203
The ‘despotisme de la loi’ is created by the general will of the people as sover-
eign represented by elected députés, following Rousseau’s view. However, if
it is contrary to reason, it should be respected as the will of the majority even
if it is wrong, as Rousseau theorised, but it will eventually have to conform
to the ‘despotisme de la raison’. The prevalence of reason is more Diderot’s
conception of the general will than Rousseau’s, especially since Cloots sees
it as a guide for moral decision. It is also most likely the ‘cosmopolitan rea-
son’ that Cloots has in mind, that is the reason of the human race as a moral
and political community.
Even if the general will is momentarily in favour of a constitutional mon-
archy — or ‘theocracy’, and ‘artificial philosophy’ — respecting the law is
primordial because this law will sooner or later submit to reason and a
democratic republic — or cosmocracy (although Cloots does not use this
term), and ‘natural philosophy’. Of course, that entails that the law in ques-
tion enforces free speech and liberty of the press. However, later on, Cloots
201. Cloots, ‘La République universelle’, 281.
202. Ibid.
203. Ibid.
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used the same argument of majority dominating the general will regarding
the sans-culottes. This time, Cloots argued in favour of the ‘passive citizens’,
who did not have the right to vote, and were called ‘sans-culottes’. In other
words, they form the real majority, even though they cannot vote and can-
not participate to the general will. In that, Cloots is faithful to Rousseau,
for whom the sovereign had to be democratic, even if the government could
not be. In ‘Vive les Sans-Culottes !’ published in Annales patriotiques et lit-
téraires on 31 July 1792, Cloots thus argues:
La loi est l’expression de la volonté générale, vous en convenez :
obéissez donc au souverain, c’est-à-dire aux Sans-Culottes ;
ils prédominent en nombre et en sagesse dans les villes, les
bourgs, les villages, les hameaux, les camps et les forteresses.204
Cloots adds afterwards that these sans-culottes are ‘les gens honnêtes’, more
numerous, as opposed to ‘les honnêtes gens’, less numerous.205 The distinc-
tion is subtle and was common at the time. Honesty did not only reflect
a moral quality, but also a social respectability; radical republicans, such
as Cloots, used the expression ‘honnêtes gens’ as a derisive term that des-
ignated those of higher social rank in the ancien régime who could afford
to be refined and educated, honnête.206 The real ‘honest’ people were those
of lower social rank, les gens honnêtes, the sans-culottes.
InBases constitutionnelles, Cloots gives a more precise view on the general
will.
Toutes nos actions particulières sont soumises à l’inspection
du souverain. Un homme solitaire sur le globe serait souve-
rain, une famille solitaire serait souveraine, et cette famille, en
croissant et multipliant jusqu’aux extrémités de la terre, ne
perdrait pas ses droits imprescriptibles ; de sorte que le sou-
verain est essentiellement seul, unique, indivisible : sa volonté
est la suprême loi, l’inaltérable vertu, l’éternelle justice. … Si les
droits sont les mêmes, les devoirs sont les mêmes ; or les droits
de l’homme sont inhérents à notre nature. … Je sais qu’un
homme ne sera jamais étranger à l’homme, et que la volonté
particulière sera toujours subordonnée à la volonté générale.
… Le droit de souveraineté ne s’altère point par des exceptions
locales et passagères.207
204. Cloots, Ecrits révolutionnaires, 375–376.
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Sovereignty is part of an individual as a natural right. Every individual is
sovereign, but by associating themselves they merge their particular sover-
eignty into a bigger one, since they all share the same right of sovereignty
as the same natural right. For this position to work, one has to understand
all men as equal and as the same. In this same paragraph Cloots explains his
position on humankind, rejecting any sort of distinction: male and female,
regardless of the colour of the skin, and regardless of any ‘advancement’ as
a civilisation, all are included as a human being having the same equal nat-
ural right of sovereignty. The next chapter will develop more fully Cloots’s
conception of humankind in the context of his time. Since there is no dif-
ferentiation between individual human beings, and since all have the same
natural right of sovereignty, on the one hand, and since, on the other, sov-
ereignty is unique, single, and indivisible, there can only be one sovereign
on earth, and that is the whole human race. The particular will of every in-
dividual on earth shall always submit to the general will of the human race.
Cloots’s conception of the general will seems therefore closer to Diderot’s
in that it is based on freedom and reason, and considers from the start that
individuals have the natural rights of freedom and equality. Moreover, it
is the general will of the human race that is taken into consideration. In
this understanding of the general will and the natural rights, it seems that
Cloots considers them as laws of nature, which would explain the confusion
between humankind as God and nature, which Diderot also does:
Deux hommes, ou deux peuples isolés sur la terre pourront
se croire souverains ; mais au moment du contact, au premier
signal des droits de l’homme, il n’y a plus qu’une volonté ab-
solue dans le monde. Qui dit souverain dit despote ; ne soyons
pas étonnés si les prétendus souverains ont ravagé les domaines
du souverain légitime dont le despotisme est le résultat heu-
reux et unique de toutes les volontés particulières. Une seule
erreur a livré notre globe à une chaîne de calamités ; c’est de
couronner toute autre puissance que le genre humain. Détrô-
nons les fractions sociales ; et le tout, le despote par excellence,
la loi universelle réalisera les fables de l’âge d’or.208
The fusion of sovereignties between two individuals or two peoples is auto-
matic by contact. And what is more natural than social contact? As seen
above, Cloots considered with the physiocrats that the state of society was
the natural state. The rights of man are also natural, liberty and equality
gives them the equal sovereign right over themselves through their indi-
vidual will; therefore men are naturally merging their individual will into
a general will, the legitimate sovereign of the human race. It is an ‘error’ not
to respect nature by allowing any other corporation as sovereign, as having
208. Cloots, ‘Bases constitutionnelles’, 479.
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an independent will from the general will of the human race. Only through
the realisation of this general will of humankind, the sovereignty of the hu-
man race, is it possible to attain what other philosophers have called the
‘golden age’, even if Cloots rejects, as seen above, such a pre-existing period
as ‘natural state’. Another argument worth noting is the despotism of the
sovereign. Cloots here does not mean that the general will, the sovereign is
arbitrary, but that it is unique and absolute by essence. It is therefore prone
to abuses, and has been abused throughout history. The only legitimate
‘despot’, the only legitimate unique and absolute sovereign is the whole hu-
man race expressing the general will.
This use of ‘legal despotism’ is again in line with the views of the physio-
crats, as described above. However, Cloots does not see any tension between
the free will of men and the need for a strong state, or perhaps he thinks that
he solved this tension by introducing Rousseau’s concept of general will to
his physiocratic view of nature and society. Once the sovereignty of the hu-
man race has been established, once the general will of the human race is
in place, there is no need for a government because respecting the natural
order, natural rights, in a universal republic, will bring perpetual peace and
the end to of any conflicts. As we will see in the chapter on republicanism,
Cloots envisioned a minimal republic only in charge of collecting taxes and
redistributing them evenly.
Cloots’s general will is a mix of Rousseau and Diderot’s. With Diderot,
Cloots argues that only the whole human race can decide what is good and
evil; only the human race can express the general will that is the supreme
law, justice, and morality. Moreover, with Diderot, Cloots argues that all
peoples are included, even so-called ‘primitive’ ones. However, the view of
general will as indivisible and the rule of the majority is closer to Rousseau’s:
the sovereign can only be the general will, it is unique and indivisible, and
even if it is wrong, the minority must respect the majority’s will because it
is stronger than particular wills.
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Edelstein argues that natural rights earlier perceived as deriving from God
came to be transferred to nature, resacralised as the new ‘divine legislator’,
even for authors such as Diderot and d’Holbach.209 Cloots was certainly in-
fluenced by Diderot and d’Holbach, as he cites them often and his views are
similar. Cloots removed God from the equation, and, doing so, he equally
came to resacralize nature as the source of superior law to human law and
sovereignty; the laws of nature that humankind should respect in positive
laws. However, Cloots also resacralised the ‘children of mother nature’: hu-
209. Dan Edelstein, ‘Enlightenment Rights Talk’,The Journal of Modern History 86, no.
3 (September 2014): 558.
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mankind. Cloots affirmed that the people was God and that the source of
sovereignty came from the individual human being who delegated it to the
whole of the human race, creating a ‘despotism of the law’ with the general
will of the human race. The general will can however be wrong, contrary to
the ‘despotism of reason’. That does not mean that it should not prevail in
positive law, and Cloots only believe that eventually it reason will triumph.
‘Cosmopolitan reason’ as a moral guide superior in terms of truth to general
will, seems reminiscent of voluntarism and the previous views of natural law
where God was the superior moral authority. It seems close to Barbeyrac’s
reading of Pufendorf and the ‘communauté de droite raison’.
The rejection of a transition from a state of nature to society, and the use
of the term ‘legal despotism’, together with the belief in following nature as
the solution to end all political and social ills draws Cloots towards the Jac-
obin ‘natural republicanism’, as expounded by Edelstein.210 However, Clo-
ots had a larger vision for this natural republicanism, which was not limited
to the French republic. In the concluding chapter, I shall argue that it con-
stitutes a ‘cosmopolitan republicanism’, but it is first necessary to expound
Cloots’s view of humanity and of individuality, and to appraise his repub-
licanism in the context of his time. These will be the objects of the next two
chapters.
210. Edelstein, The Terror of Natural Right.
6 H U M A N I T Y
La liberté, quoi qu’en dise
Montesquieu, est une plante
qui s’acclimate partout.
Cloots, 17921
Montesquieu published hisDe l’esprit des lois in 1748, which markeda milestone in European thought about human diversity and its
cause.2 For Montesquieu, human diversity was related to the environment
in which populations lived: climate, religion, laws, political principles, tra-
ditions, customs, and manners.3 However, to Montesquieu’s eyes, this did
not explain what François Bernier had identified as the problem of immob-
ility of Asian despotism in his writings on les États du Grand Mogol, later
collected in the 1699 Amsterdam edition as Voyages.4 This is why Montes-
quieu pointed to the role of climate, a long tradition of thought stemming
from Hippocrates and Aristotles that contemporary authors (Jean-Baptiste
Dubos, Espiard de la Borde, John Arbuthnot) had written about.5 Montes-
quieu transferred this line of thought regarding the influence of climate on
human character to the general laws governing populations: cold shrinks
the body’s fiber and creates better blood circulation, hence stronger and
more supple people who resist despotism; heat stretches the body’s fibers
and reduces strength and suppleness rending people subjects to despot-
ism.6 Montesquieu divides the world in three clear-cut zones according to a
North-South axis: first, temperate climes with agriculture, herding, civilisa-
tion; second, cold climates with harsh nature and savage populations; third,
hot climates with overly prodigious nature and equally savage, but indolent
and lazy populations.7 The heat found in Asia is thus responsible for the
lack of change in laws, manners, and customs, and the prevalent despotism
1. Cloots, ‘La République universelle’, 249.
2. Silvia Sebastiani, The Scottish Enlighenment: Race, Gender, and the Limits of Pro-
gress, Palgrave Studies in Cultural and Intellectual History (New York, NY: Palgrave Mac-
millan, 2013), 25.
3. Montesquieu, De l’Esprit des loix, I: 10.
4. François Bernier,Histoire de la dernière révolution des Estats du GrandMogol, 2 vols.
(Paris: Chez Claude Barbin, 1670); François Bernier, Suite des Mémoires du Sieur Bernier
sur l’Empire du Grand Mogol, 2 vols. (Paris: Chez Claude Barbin, 1671).
5. Sebastiani, The Scottish Enlightenment, 26.
6. Montesquieu, De l’Esprit des loix, I: 360–366.
7. Ibid., I: 360–382.
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in Asia, according to Montesquieu. ‘The radical conclusion that could be
drawn from such reasoning is that not all climates produce liberty, which
is thus beyond some peoples’.8
Students of Cloots have often quoted this chapter’s epigraph regarding
liberty and Montesquieu, but they have not paid attention in detail to its
reference and context.9 It seems evident that, for Cloots, in order to con-
vince his audience and readership of the feasibility of the universal repub-
lic, humankind must be conceived, not only as a unity, but that its diversity
is not a challenge to republicanism, especially regarding liberty and the ca-
pacity to adopt and understand laws. Cloots’s remark on liberty as a plant
that grows under any climate on earth is a direct challenge to Montesquieu’s
assertion that not all climates produce liberty. Throughout Cloots’s work
there is an understated reflection on humankind, its unity and diversity,
which is in direct connection with eighteenth-century debates on that mat-
ter. The question: ‘What is human nature?’ was a fundamental one during
the eighteenth century. This will be the object of the first section.
Humankind and humanity as opposed to ‘national egoism’ were themes
that Rémi mentioned in his Le cosmopolisme. ‘National egoism’ referred to
a state-centric chauvinism around a kingdom for Rémi. The revolution re-
placed the concept of kingdom with the nation as legitimate sovereign, with
a loose definition of nation as population of free and equal individuals; a
population whose rights are recognised and protected. Since for Cloots hu-
mankind is more united and based on individuals, and since all individuals
can aspire to liberty and equality, there is no contradiction in considering
the ‘nation of the human race’ as the only nation on earth. This will be the
object of the second section.
The Gnadenthal Castle library catalogue mentions the presence of Re-
cherches sur l’origine du despotisme oriental (1761), probably written by
French philosopher Nicolas-Antoine Boulanger (1722–1759), who collabor-
ated to the Encyclopédie.10 Boulanger, like Bernier, tries to understand the
cause for widespread despotism in Asia. Boulanger does not criticise Mon-
tesquieu’s premise that there is despotism in Asia, but unlike Montesqu-
ieu, his answer is that a very ancient cataclysm led the survivors to adopt
a just law inspired by divinity. Later, men usurped this divinity to govern
as despots. Boulanger notes that Europeans were the first to try to escape
despotism by establishing republics, but notes that they never managed to
8. Montesquieu, De l’Esprit des loix, I: 436–437.
9. Cheneval, ‘Der kosmopolitische Republikanismus’, 373; Bevilacqua, ‘Conceiving
the Republic of Mankind’, 551.
10. Nicolas-Antoine Boulanger,Recherches sur l’origine du despotisme oriental : ouvrage
posthume de Mr. B.I.D.P.E.C (s.l.: s.n., 1761); Nicolas-Antoine Boulanger, Recherches sur
l’origine du despotisme oriental, Edition critique annotée, ed. Paul Sadrin, Centre de Re-
cherches Jacques Petit (vol. 52) (Paris: Annales Littéraires de l’Université de Besançon, Les
Belles Lettres, 1988 [1761]).
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protect the liberty and equality that they hoped a republican regime would
achieve.11 But Boulanger was wondering how men could get rid of liberty
when it is connatural to them. For Boulanger, despotism has historical and
religious roots, including in republicanism. Boulanger’s conclusion is that
a European monarchy is the best regime because, as Montesquieu noted,
it is characterised by honour and moderation, unlike republics, which re-
quire an inhuman and thereby immoderate virtue and thus have roots in
despotism.12 Cloots most certainly disagreed with Boulanger’s thesis that a
republican regime was immoderate and therefore had roots in despotism,
but it is perhaps in response to Boulanger that Cloots formulated the prin-
ciple of universal republic, since one of Boulanger’s criticisms of republics
was that they were constantly at war by fear from external threats.
Part of the argument for a cosmopolitan view in Cloots is a certain con-
ception of humanity as a united and single community. Cloots did not use
the word ‘humanité’ and constantly referred to ‘genre humain’ (‘human
race’) instead. When referring to humanity as the whole group of human
beings, contemporary writers preferred the term ‘genre humain’ over ‘hu-
manité’.13 It is however the same meaning, even if the term differs. The word
‘humanité’ also referred to two other meanings: human nature, and the feel-
ing of kindness and compassion for the rest of mankind.14 There have been
several studies on the word humanité and its use during the eighteenth cen-
tury, which will serve in this chapter to illustrate the background of thought
on humanité in which Cloots writes.15
It has to be noted that, for Cloots, what constitutes this genre humain
is the individual homme, understood not as man in terms of gender but as
a human being. There is a dialectical construction between humanity and
11. On Boulanger see Paul Sadrin,Nicolas-Antoine Boulanger (1722–1759) ou avant nous
le déluge, Studies on Voltaire, vol. 240 (Oxford: The Voltaire Foundation, 1986).
12. On Boulanger and Montesquieu, see Denis de Casabianca, ‘Comment les régimes
peuvent-ils être despotiques ? Montesquieu et Boulanger’, Revue Française d’Histoire des
Idées Politiques, no. 35, Débats et polémiques autour de L’Esprit des lois (January 2012):
37–50.
13. Henri Duranton, ‘Humanité’, in Handbuch politisch-sozialer Grundbegriffe in
Frankreich 1680–1820, ed. Rolf Reichardt and Hans-Jürgen Lüsebrink, vol. 19/20
(München: Oldenbourg, 2000), 19–23.
14. Ibid., 11–12.
15. Hans Erich Bödecker, ‘Menschheit, Humanität, Humanismus’, in Geschichtliche
Grundbegriffe. Historisches Lexikon zur politisch-sozialen Sprache in Deutschland, ed. Otto
Brunner, Werner Conze and Reinhard Koselleck, vol. 3 (Stuttgart: Klett–Cotta, 1982),
1079–1083; Duranton, ‘Humanité’; Eduard von Jan, ‘Humanité’, Zeitschrift für französ-
ische Sprache und Literatur 55 (1932): 1–66; Fritz Schalk, ‘Humanitas im Romanischen’,
inExempla romanischerWortgeschichte (Frankfurt am Main: Vittorio Klostermann, 1966),
255–294; Ann Thomson, ‘Issues at Stake in Eighteenth-Century Racial Classification’,Cro-
mohs – Cyber Review of Modern Historiography, no. 8 (2003): 1–20, accessed 25 October
2016, http://www.fupress.net/index.php/cromohs/article/view/15684; Paul Vernière,
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individuality in that what is noble is to be homme; the individual ‘homme’
forms part of humanity, and that humanity is what makes an individual
homme. The quality of being human, humain in the first meaning of hu-
manité as opposed to animals, is what makes an individual homme. In Clo-
ots’s understanding, as in many other contemporaries’, ‘homme’ is the most
honorific title in the aftermath of 1789 when aristocratic titles have been re-
jected: ‘Je veux être homme ou rien’.16
By the same token the concept of sovereignty is also involved in a dialect-
ical construction between homme and genre humain: the individual man
being free has sovereignty over the self, and upon meeting other free men
they transfer their sovereignty to the group, ultimately to the human race.
Being human is what gives natural rights such as liberty and equality (which
will be further explained in the chapter on republicanism). In return these
rights mean that no one can claim a power over someone else without his
consent. Therefore, no polity can pretend to be sovereign at the exclusion
of another without breaching this universal imperative. As a result, only
the whole, the society constituted by every individual homme can hold the
ultimate power that is sovereignty.
This chapter aims to identify Cloots’s understanding of the human race
and the individual within the context of his time. Seventeenth-century hu-
manist thinking influenced the political thought of the eighteenth. The
idea of social contract based on natural law, as seen in the previous chapter,
was a central preoccupation for political thinkers, and that meant that ‘man’
was equally at the centre. Society must tend towards the development of
the individual’s happiness. Obviously, a state of constant wars is not achiev-
ing this goal and many thinkers proposed peace plans for the whole human
race.17 The most famous of them, and first in the century, was Abbé Saint
Pierre’s Perpetual Peace (1713), and the last ones were Piattoli (1795) and
Kant’s (1795).18 Such a project also impassioned unknown individuals such
as former galley condemned criminal (later declared innocent) Pierre-An-
dré Gargas (1728–1801), who addressed his plan to Benjamin Franklin, or
general André Guillaume Resnier de Goué (1729–1811).19
Among Cloots’s possible readings and influence on his view of man and
mankind, one can find Buffon and his Histoire naturelle in the library at
16. Cloots, ‘L’Orateur du genre humain’, 131.
17. Elizabeth V. Souleyman, The Vision of World Peace in Seventeenth and Eighteenth-
Century France (New York, NY: Putnam’s Sons, 1941).
18. Saint-Pierre, Projet pour rendre la paix perpétuelle en Europe; Scipione Piattoli,
Épitre du vieux cosmopolite Syrach à la convention nationale de France (Sarmatie: s.n., 1795);
Kant, Zum ewigen Frieden.
19. Pierre-André Gargas, Conciliateur de toutes les nations d’Europe ou Projet de paix
perpétuelle entre tous les souverains de l’Europe, et leurs voisins (s.l.: s.n., 1782); André
Guillaume Resnier de Goué, République universelle, ou L’humanité ailée réunie sous
l’empire de la Raison (Genève: s.n., 1788).
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Gnadenthal, as well as Pliny’s Natural History. Of course de Pauw’s works
are there as well as Voltaire’s complete works. Equally in the library, one
finds L’Ami des hommes, ou Traité de la population by Mirabeau, although
Cloots is critical of him. This chapter will show how Cloots possibly used
these authors in his conceptions of the human race and the individual, and
how he formulates his own idiosyncratic views.
genre humain
The eighteenth century debated extensively the question of humankind
and the individual. As Thomson argues, there were many different posi-
tions that intersected in a nexus of complicated ideas and arguments.20 Sev-
eral disciplines were involved, from Biblical studies to anthropological ones,
physiognomy, travellers’ accounts, geographical accounts, history, or the
science of government. If one marvels at the immense diversity between
populations on earth, one also ponders the reasons, and answers are found
through as many methods and beliefs as the period allowed. In England,
several volumes already existed on the subject.21 In France, Voltaire’s Essai
sur les mœurs (1756) is another example of a contribution to the historical
study of humankind. Rather than writing the history of monarchs, Voltaire
writes a history of the peoples, their cultures, and their societies. Voltaire
wants to write a universal history of the populations, a history of mankind.
Voltaire criticised nationalist views of history hitherto written: ‘Ceux qui
mentent ainsi au genre humain sont encore animés souvent par la sottise
de la rivalité nationale’.22 Not only is humankind a more worthy subject of
study than monarchs and aristocrats, but it must be studied from an ob-
jective point of view. However, if humankind is considered as an entity,
a unity that can and should be studied historically, it is also characterised
by what seems to be an infinite diversity. Voltaire and Hume distinguish
between human ‘races’ and were polygenists noticing some ‘obvious differ-
ences’. They were nonetheless abolitionists, and their view on races did not
prevent them from writing a universal history of humankind.
The study of man in particular, and in general of mankind, is a project
that was highly debated during the French Enlightenment. However, these
studies did not include the term ‘humanité’ in the understanding of human
race, preferring ‘genre humain’ (human race).23 Monogenesis recognised dif-
20. Thomson, ‘Issues at Stake in Eighteenth-Century Racial Classification’.
21. See Pomeau’s introduction in Voltaire,Essai sur lesmoeurs et l’esprit des nations et sur
les principaux faits de l’histoire depuis Charlemagne jusqu’à Louis XIII, ed. René Pomeau,
2 vols., Classiques Garnier (Paris: Bordas, 1990 [1756]), 1: xix.
22. Voltaire, ‘Discours historique et critique sur la tragédie de Don Pèdre’, in Oeuvres
complètes de Voltaire, vol. 6 (s.l.: Imprimerie de la Société littéraire-typographique, 1785),
109.
23. Duranton, ‘Humanité’.
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ferent variants in the human race, while polygenesis recognised several dif-
ferent human ‘races’, opening the way to what Todorov calls ‘racialism’.24
What is interesting here is the separation between racist doctrines of superi-
ority and inferiority of races and their consequences on colonialism and
slavery, on the one hand, and, on the other, the ‘racialist’ premise according
to which societies are different and that the world is divided into as many
societies as there are ‘races’ of human beings. These visions are essential in
determining if this human race can live together despite its diversity. What
was the context of ideas according to which varieties of men determined
varieties of societies, and how did philosophers think and organise human-
kind into a single one? Cloots’s conception of humankind must be under-
stood, and appreciated for its unique progressiveness, among these debates.
Cloots did not write much on women specifically, but that may be be-
cause he included women in his universal thinking about the human race, as
shown below (‘êtres mâles et femelles’). Before the revolution, Cloots wrote
already enthusiastically about the possibility of receiving an enlightened
education in the lycées in Paris, which also included women, contrary to
what was the case in previous centuries: ‘… les femmes, dans ce siècle-ci, sont
relevées du vœu d’ignorance …’.25 Cloots also considers having an education
as a thing of ‘beauty’; the beauty of an educated women, of course,26 but
also of ‘handsome’ educated men, thanks to Rousseau’s educational prin-
ciples developed inEmile, which leads to the conclusion: ‘Il semble en vérité
que la philosophie embellit, agrandit les corps et les âmes’.27 A very Plato-
nian view of beauty expounded as an abstract idea in Parmenides (130b),
as the value of the beauty of the soul in Phaedrus (250c-d), and of course
the dialectical progression from the love of beautiful bodies to beautiful
souls in the Symposium (210b-c, 211a-b). In any case, in a letter to Le Pat-
riote français published on 12 March 1792, Cloots makes it clear that the
domination of husbands over their wives is contrary to philosophy and to
the Enlightenment. Cloots also calls on women to be the equal of men in
the workplace and to work in factories to replace the lack of men: ‘On parle
d’améliorer le sort du beau sexe ; eh bien, donnons-lui de l’ouvrage dans les
fabriques et les manufactures !’28
Cloots calls upon Frenchmen to compare past enslaved France with pres-
ent freed France, and the evolution of philosophy in history to observe how
‘l’oubli des droits naturels, la tyrannie des maîtres sur les domestiques, des
maris sur les femmes, des pères sur les enfants’ were ingredients for future
social revolts.29 And why should women not be as free as men are? After all,
24. Tzvetan Todorov, Nous et les autres (Paris: Seuil, 1992), 133.
25. Cloots, Vœux d’un gallophile, 179.
26. Cloots, ‘Anacharsis à Paris’, 75, 79.
27. Cloots, ‘La République universelle’, 302.
28. Cloots, Ecrits révolutionnaires, 378.
29. Ibid., 321.
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Cloots notices that women— and children— are also actors in the revolu-
tion, arming themselves with what they could find to fight, or sharing the
same ardor for the revolutionary cause.30 In his short history of the revolu-
tion, Cloots also emphasises the role played by women in the revolution,
not only in terms of ‘sacrifices’ for the patrie, but with the Women’s March
on Versailles on 5 October 1789, when market women decided to ask the
‘baker in Versailles’ for bread following a steep rise to prices in the market-
place.31
Unity and Diversity
There are various arguments along the eighteenth century regarding the
unity, or not, of the human race. These arguments are based on various re-
ligious, historical, social, geographical, environmental, and biological posi-
tions. But even within one position, there can be disagreement; for instance,
one can be a Christian and consider the human race in its entirety as the
creature of God, or, on the contrary, consider that some populations are
inferior and cannot be enlightened by God’s word. Fundamentally, there
are two positions to be taken regarding the unity of the human race: either
monogenesis considering humankind as one and the same, or polygenesis
considering different races. Since positions are so intermingled, one way to
present them is to proceed by authors. The authors chosen here are presen-
ted because they are the most representative and influential in Enlighten-
ment thought, and also because their names are mentioned by Cloots.32
However, only in Certitude does Cloots actually quote and refer to the ori-
ginal works. Otherwise, the historian has to assume that Cloots had read
the works described here, based on the catalogue of the works at the Gna-
denthal Castle library, in which they appear.
Voltaire is a theist, and even if he rejects religion— therefore the Biblical
stance on monogenesis— he nonetheless considers humankind as equal be-
fore God, although he considers polygenesis as explaining diversity on earth.
Voltaire states equality of the human race before God: ‘… Et Dieu nous pesa
tous dans la même balance’.33 And even after any fall from paradise (or the
opening of Pandora’s box in this poem) this original equality remains. In-
equalities that were released into nature from Pandora’s box should not put
an end to establishing equality among men in society; everyone should have
the right to reach happiness:
30. Ibid., 352, 398.
31. Cloots, ‘Résumé historique’, 557–560.
32. For a general overview of the debates on slavery and racial theories, see for instance
Carminella Biondi, Mon frère, tu es mon esclave ! Teorie schiaviste e dibattiti antropologico-
razziali nel Settecento francese, Studi e Testi 41 (Pisa: Editrice Libreria Goliardica, 1973).
33. Voltaire, ‘Discours en vers sur l’homme’, in Mélanges, ed. Jacques van den Heuvel,
Bibliothèque de la Pléiade (Paris: Gallimard, 1961 [1740–1745]), 215.
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On dit qu’avant la boîte de Pandore
Nous étions tous égaux : nous le sommes encore ;
Avoir les mêmes droits à la félicité,
C’est pour nous la parfaite et seule égalité.34
However, despite this equality among men before God and the right to
happiness, Voltaire writes his polygenist statement as such: ‘… les blancs
barbus, les nègres portant laine, les jaunes portant crins, et les hommes sans
barbes, ne viennent pas du même homme’.35 It has to be noted that this was
not intended for publication. However, specialists on Voltaire’s thought
consider that it reveals his genuine thinking. In his Essai sur les mœurs, Vol-
taire made it clear for publication that he considered that there were ‘differ-
ent races of men’:
Il n’est permis qu’à un aveugle de douter que les Blancs, les
Nègres, les Albinos, les Hottentots, les Lapons, les Chinois,
les Américains, soient des races entièrement différentes.36
As such, for Voltaire, there are inequalities in the development of these ra-
cial societies. Difference of race also means difference of culture and the in-
capacity for some races to accomodate to ‘European standards’ of humanity:
‘Les Peuples de l’Europe ont des principes d’humanité, qui ne se trouvent
point dans les autres parties du monde …’.37 For Voltaire, these races follow
‘sociability’ as a ‘natural instinct’ given by the ‘author of nature’ and form
different societies.38 Voltaire is thus opposed to Montesquieu’s monogen-
esis and his theory of climate to explain diversity; he had started a manu-
script before his death, Commentaire sur L’Esprit des lois, in 1777.39 But,
despite his views on inequality among human races, Voltaire was a potent
voice among abolitionists.
Buffon is a monogenecist, like Montesquieu, and was highly influential
in the eighteenth century with his view on humankind. The human race is
opposed to animals by the faculty of possessing reason. This opposition to
animals based on reason is an idea shared by many philosophers, from the
polygenist Voltaire to the monogenecist and materialist d’Holbach. Buffon
writes:
34. Voltaire, ‘Discours en vers sur l’homme’, 212.
35. Voltaire, ‘Traité de Métaphysique’, in Mélanges, ed. Jacques van den Heuvel, Biblio-
thèque de la Pléiade (Paris: Gallimard, 1961 [1734–1738]), 161.
36. Voltaire, Essai sur les mœurs, vol. 1, 6.
37. Voltaire, ‘Discours préliminaire sur le Poème de Fontenoy’, in Mélanges, ed. Jacques
van den Heuvel, Bibliothèque de la Pléiade (Paris: Gallimard, 1961 [1745]), 123.
38. Voltaire, ‘Traité de métaphysique’, 192.
39. Myrtille Méricam-Bourdet, ‘Voltaire contre Montesquieu ? L’apport des œuvres his-
toriques dans la controverse’,Revue Française d’Histoire des Idées Politiques, no. 35, Débats
et polémiques autour de L’Esprit des lois (2012): 25–36.
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Il y a une distance infinie entre les facultés de l’homme et celles
du plus parfait animal, preuve évidente que l’homme est d’une
différente nature, que seul il fait une classe à part….40
That being said, it did not stop Buffon from comparing some populations
as closer to animals than humans, in particular in his horrible description of
Eskimos.41 Buffon was the most influential figure in the eighteenth century
for a non-Biblical explanation of monogenesis. Buffon’s argument in favour
of monogenesis is founded on the observation that ‘whites’ and ‘blacks’ can
procreate together. There are therefore no different species in the human
race, but there was originally only a single one:
Tout concourt donc à prouver que le genre humain n’est pas
composé d’espèces essentiellement différentes entres elles, qu’-
au contraire il n’y a eu originairement qu’une seule espèce
d’hommes, qui s’étant multipliée et répandue sur toute la sur-
face de la terre, a subi différents changements par l’influence
du climat, par la différence de la nourriture, par celle de la
manière de vivre, par les maladies épidémiques, et aussi par
le mélange varié à l’infini des individus plus ou moins ressem-
blants….42
However, despite the monogenecist principle, Buffon identifies various
hierarchies and classifications. If what the constitutive element of human-
kind is the faculty of reason, what constitutes the diversity of humankind
is ‘sociability’: ‘… l’homme … n’est homme que parce qu’il a su se réunir à
l’homme’.43 Sociability pushed individuals to form societies, which explains
the ‘varieties’ of human beings found in the world. Buffon then considers
that what distinguishes a ‘nation’ is the degree of civilisation:
… toute nation où il n’y a ni régle, ni loi, ni maître, ni société ha-
bituelle, est moins une nation qu’un assemblage tumultueux
d’hommes barbares & indépendans, qui n’obéissent qu’à leurs
passions particulières, & qui ne pouvant avoir un intérêt com-
mun, sont incapables de se diriger vers un même but & de se
soûmettre à des usages constans, qui tous supposent une suite
de desseins raisonnez & approuvez par le plus grand nombre.44
40. Georges-Louis Leclerc Comte de Buffon, Histoire naturelle, générale et particulière.
Avec la description du cabinet du roi, 36 vols. (Paris: De l’imprimerie royale, 1749–1788), 2:
443.
41. Thomson, ‘Issues at Stake in Eighteenth-Century Racial Classification’.
42. Buffon, Histoire naturelle, 3: 529–530.
43. Georges-Louis Leclerc Comte de Buffon, ‘Histoire naturelle des animaux’, chap. Dis-
cours sur la nature des animaux inŒuvres, ed. Stéphane Schmitt, Bibliothèque de la Pléiade
(Paris: Gallimard, 2007 [1753]), 487.
44. Buffon, Histoire naturelle, 3: 491.
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Buffon’s ‘science of man’ relates considerations of climate, cultures and
mores, and the ‘variety’ of human being.45 Climate, and other environ-
mental matters explain diversity among the human race, and by the same
token, it implies that changing a people’s environment could improve its
condition — argument used by abolitionists against the one that Africans
were naturally inferior.46
Buffon’s conception of humankind had a great influence on Enlighten-
ment philosophers, and Diderot merely summarised it in his article ‘Hu-
maine, espèce’ in the Encyclopédie.47 However, unlike Buffon, Diderot saw
human nature as constantly changing, and therefore no classification was
possible.48 Part of Diderot’s abolitionist argument, in Histoire des deux
Indes, was to add moral factors to the existing external ones of climate in
order to explain the inferior condition of slaves as a result of the treatment
slave owners had inflicted upon them.49 However, Diderot, as a material-
ist, was not only interested in Buffon’s naturalist explanation of human
diversity, but also in the intellectual capacities of man in the Encyclopédie’s
article ‘Animal’, and utilised existing research on physiognomy.50 The reli-
gious account of intelligence had been linked to the soul, which obviously
was an explanation rejected by materialists like Diderot. The question of
intelligence was thought to be related to skull sizes.
Diderot engaged in a dialogue with Helvétius on intelligence among
groups. Helvétius considered that all humans had the same intellectual ca-
pacities, but that differences appeared due to education and the type of
government.51 Diderot refuted the argument of equal intelligence among
human beings, and invoked physical causes such as climate and social and
political organisation in determining human capacities, with climate being
more determinant for nations, and organisation being more determinant
for individuals.52 The view according to which the type of government im-
pacted on people’s intelligence was also adopted by d’Holbach.53
The study of the human species was fuelled by geographical discoveries,
and reported in the popular genre of travelogues, in which the author— ex-
plorer, globe-trotter, merchant—often moonlighted as an ‘anthropologist’.
An ‘amateurish’ genre that did not please Cloots’s uncle, Cornelius de Pauw,
who had the ambition of writing a more scientific analysis on the human
45. Georges-Louis Leclerc Comte de Buffon, ‘Histoire naturelle de l’homme’, inŒuvres,
ed. Stéphane Schmitt, Bibliothèque de la Pléiade (Paris: Gallimard, 2007 [1749]), 270.
46. Thomson, ‘Issues at Stake in Eighteenth-Century Racial Classification’.
47. Ibid.
48. Ibid.
49. Ibid.
50. Ibid.
51. Ibid.
52. Ibid.
53. Ibid.
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race, starting with the Americas, and doing so without leaving the comfort
of his home— a travelogue of travel books, of sort. This first work, and his
subsequent works, sparked stark controversies in the Republic of Letters,
as de Pauw represented the native populations of the Americas as physic-
ally and mentally inferior to Europeans.54 There is no doubt, nonetheless,
that for de Pauw the populations in the Americas are part of the human
race and he uses expressions such as ‘l’universalité du genre humain’.55 Even
men considered the most remote from humanity (understood as European
civilisation) are still part of the human race. De Pauw writes thus on the
‘sauvage chasseur’:
Jamais en paix avec les hommes ou avec les animaux, son ins-
tinct est féroce & ses mœurs barbares : plus son génie s’occupe-
t-il des moyens de subsister, moins réfléchit-il sur la possibilité
de se policer. Il est dans le genre humain ce que sont les bêtes
carnassières entre les quadrupèdes, insociable.56
De Pauw wrote his study on the Americans as forming part of the ‘human
race’, but notes the ‘variety of the human species in America’.57 De Pauw
classifies the human species into races as a polygenist. Other ‘savages’, from
the North this time, close to the Arctic circle, are characterised as such: ‘Pe-
tits, basanés, foibles, dégénérés du genre humain, ils paraissent constituer
la race la plus chétive & la plus méprisable…’.58 This description is reminis-
cent of Buffon’s concerning the Eskimos. Climate is however to blame for
the ‘superiority’ or ‘inferiority’ that nature gave the various ‘races’ inside the
human race, thereby agreeing with Buffon and Montesquieu’s explanation
of human diversity, but within polygenesis instead of monogenesis.
David Hume in his ‘Essay on National Character’ refuted Montesqu-
ieu’s climate theory by noticing that a nation did not change even when
moving to different climes, as Jews and Armenians, or even Europeans in
their colonies, show.59 Instead, Hume proposes his concept of sympathy,
as developed in Treatise on Human Nature, to explain the diversity of pop-
ulations: ‘the innate sociability of human beings drove them to share senti-
ments, passions, and inclinations, especially within the same political body,
where occasion for contact multiplied’.60 This thesis presupposes uniform-
ity of human nature, passions are at the origins of all human behaviour.61
54. Henry Ward Church, ‘Corneille De Pauw, and the Controversy over His Recherches
Philosophiques Sur Les Américains’, Publications of the Modern Language Association 51,
no. 1 (March 1936): 178–206.
55. Pauw, Recherches philosophiques sur les Américains, 49.
56. Ibid., 101.
57. Ibid., 131.
58. Ibid., 278–279.
59. Sebastiani, The Scottish Enlightenment, 28.
60. Ibid., 29.
61. Ibid., 30.
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But if these principles of morality are fixed, their nature is socially plastic;
space and time modified their evolution.62 However, Hume is a polygenist
and takes his classification from Swedish botanist, physician, and zoologist
Carl Linnaeus’s (1707–1778) Systema Naturae (1735), dividing into variet-
ies, species, genera, orders, classes. Hume identified four main varieties of
humans: American (red skin, black hair, obstinate, choleric, governed by
customs), European (white skin, fair haired, blue eyes, acute, inventive, gov-
erned by law), Asiatic (yellow skin, melancholic, severe, governed by opin-
ion), and African (black skin, curly hair, phlegmatic, indolent, governed by
caprice).63 Hume was against slavery, but considered Africans as inherently
inferior; not inferior due to external conditions such as climate for Mon-
tesquieu, but inferior due to internal moral conditions that explained why
Europeans had been able to exploit them.64
Adam Smith was probably influenced by Hume and his thesis on sym-
pathy on the evolution of societies, but also the ‘relationship between “his-
torical man” and “natural man” as elaborated in Buffon’s Histoire naturelle
and Rousseau’s Discours sur l’origine was central to the Scottish definition
of history’ and to Smith.65 Scottish philosophers were more inclined to fol-
low Buffon’s characterisation of man with a natural social attitude than
Rousseau’s, but added ‘stage theory’ as a distinctive feature.66 Smith formu-
lated a development of societies through ages, evolving progressively from
the first age of hunters, to the second age of shepherds, to the third age of
agriculture, and finally the fourth age of commerce.67 According to Smith
property and means of subsistance were the main factors of progress to-
wards a ‘civil society’, civil being understood as ‘civilised’ and opposed to
‘savage’ and ‘barbaric’.68 Both Hume and Smith were interested in the rela-
tionship between feelings and reason; feelings could be a source of destruc-
tion, but also of social virtue if properly guided.69
Cloots had in his library the complete works of Voltaire, Montesquieu,
Diderot, Hume, Smith, Buffon, and de Pauw, and he mentioned d’Holbach
and Helvétius frequently. How did his view on the human race equate or
differ from theirs? Cloots, in La Certitude, often uses the expression ‘genre
humain’ with the monogenesis argument. The aim of the book, as men-
tioned previously, is to find a universally valid religion for the human race.
One of the main arguments is to argue that only a religion that is universally
intelligible can be valid. What is implied in this reasoning is that the whole
62. Sebastiani, The Scottish Enlightenment, 31.
63. Ibid., 34.
64. Ibid., 42.
65. Ibid., 45.
66. Ibid., 46.
67. Ibid., 47.
68. Ibid., 48–49.
69. Ibid., 51–52.
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humankind has the same capacity for reason. However, Cloots notes that
three quarters of the human race is ignorant of God’s message; not because
of stupidity, but because monotheist religions require years of study in or-
der to be able to understand God’s word.70 Therefore, Cloots refutes all the
monotheist religions from Islam to Judaism and Catholicism, each claim-
ing to be the sole religion for the human race, and each necessitating years
of personal study or the authoritative translations of the word of God by
such knowledgeable persons.71 Moreover, the accounts on the human race
given by these religions, religious histories of the human race, are worthless
at best if not dangerous (to human intelligence): ‘Chaque culte ramène &
enchaîne l’histoire du Genre-Humain à celle de ses rêveries…’.72 This is an
obvious reference to the creation myth, and its history of the human race
based on the Book of Genesis and God’s expulsion of Adam and Eve from
the Garden of Eden. Natural religion is the only accessible one to the whole
of the human race because everyone has the same reasoning capacity and
needs only observe nature to understand God’s message.73
As for a non-religious argument of the origin of the human race, Cloots
rejects the debate between monogenesis or polygenesis altogether. For him,
what matters are the physiological human qualities, which make a human
part of humankind. These are the five senses, reproduction, and the faculty
of speech:
Les êtres mâles et femelles qui ont cinq sens et l’usage de la
parole, avec la faculté de faire souche, ces êtres appartiennent à
la même famille, n’importe la descendance d’une seule tige ou
de plusieurs tiges. Je ne connais rien de primitif dans le règne
animal ou végétal.74
Implicitly, Cloots accepts monogenesis in fact, but he rejects any external
factors that would enable a classification as variety or race, such as climate
or geography. Only a few internal factors matter to qualify as a human be-
ing: five senses, the faculty of speech, and the capacity for reproduction and
therefore to start a family and a line of descendants. The reference to ‘prim-
itif’ is a reference to the first, the original in an animal or vegetal species,
as Bauzée’s article ‘Primitif (grammaire)’ in the Encyclopédie defines it.75
Cloots argues therefore that it does not matter where man comes from; he
does not know who was the first man, or what was the first flower. Cloots
70. Cloots, Certitude des preuves, 5.
71. Ibid., 29–33.
72. Ibid., 32.
73. Ibid., 70.
74. Cloots, ‘Bases constitutionnelles’, 499.
75. Nicolas Beauzée, ‘Primitif’, inEncyclopédie, ou Dictionnaire raisonné des sciences, des
arts et des métiers, ed. Denis Diderot and Jean le Rond d’Alembert, vol. 13 (Paris: Briasson,
1751–1772), 369.
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adds what he does know: ‘Je sais qu’un homme ne sera jamais étranger à
l’homme…’.76 Cloots has probably read at least all the above mentioned au-
thors and their views on humankind, and it seems to him that none of their
argument is satisfactory for the time being because science cannot show
who was the first man anyway. Therefore, there can be no historical account
and no stages of evolution, no elements to judge one society superior or in-
ferior to another one. The solution Cloots proposes is simply to take how
things are with a minimal definition of humankind. But it is indeed min-
imalist, and perhaps too much so; La Mettrie had declared in L’homme ma-
chine that if one could teach an ape to talk, there would be no difference
between a human and an animal.77
Another view on which Cloots slightly differed from his contemporaries
is the traditional distinction between the human race and the animal race.
Reason is what sets the human race apart, and defines its opposition to the
rest of animals according to philosophers. For Cloots, reason is what sets
the human race apart from animals, it is true, but in a wrong way as the hu-
man race does possess reason, but lacks therefore animal instinct. Animals
in a way are superior to men because they possess a natural ‘instinct’, which
allows them to follow the laws of nature and live in harmony with nature
without thinking about it. Man does not have this instinct and must there-
fore use ‘reason’ to find these laws of nature and thus live accordingly and in
the most perfect harmony (See the previous chapter on nature). However,
here again, Cloots is not consistent. At times he writes that the human race
does have a natural instinct— for order, for instance— and that it is mon-
archism and clericalism that ruins this natural instinct:
Le bien l’emporte généralement ; car l’instinct de l’ordre appar-
tient à la presque totalité des hommes ; et cet instinct contra-
rié, dénaturé par le despotisme ou l’aristocratie, appelle tous
les vices, au lieu d’engendrer toutes les vertus. Il résulte de là
une apologie complète du gouvernement républicain….78
I examine in more detail the question of republic and virtue against mon-
archy and corruption in the next chapter on republicanism, but it can be
mentioned here that this is the reason for Cloots to justify the revolutionary
wars, not as imposing French government on others, but liberating them
from their despotic government, in order to give them the choice of join-
ing the universal republic, of which the French one is but the starting point.
Furthermore, this shows that Cloots shares the thesis of organisation or gov-
ernment as influencing individuals, but opposing despotism to republican-
ism, and equating monarchism with despotism, when the above mentioned
76. Cloots, ‘Bases constitutionnelles’, 499.
77. Thomson, ‘Issues at Stake in Eighteenth-Century Racial Classification’.
78. Cloots, ‘La République universelle’, 255.
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philosophers were opposing civilised monarchism to savage anarchy or des-
potism (as it was thought to be in Asia by some). But as Cloots mentions
a few lines after, he tries to reconcile everyone: atheists, deists, materialists,
and spiritualists.79 The same could be said about his attempt at proposing
a minimalist definition of what constitutes a human being on which poly-
genists and monogenecists would agree, also despite their internal disagree-
ments about inherent and external causes for diversity, as above mentioned.
Man is neither good nor evil, it is the political organisation that determines
his nature: ‘La nature toute nue n’est ni belle ni laide ; mais elle devient un
Léviathan sous l’armure de l’ignorance et de l’oppression ; elle devient une
divinité adorable sous l’armure de la constitution française’.80
Cloots attempts to refute the hypothesis on national differences, whilst
maintaining national diversity — ‘national’ understood as it was at that
time.81 In particular with his self-fashioning, Cloots argued at the same time
for universality, but retaining roots and local particularism.82 Cloots does re-
cognise diversity and differences, as his delegation dressed in folk costumes
illustrates. Cloots himself, always referred to himself as ‘Prussian’, or ‘Bel-
gian’ at the end of his life, while always maintaining his universal persona
as ‘homme’ and ‘orateur du genre humain’. However, for Cloots, all these
particularities are minor compared to how the human race is united in nat-
ure, not only in biological terms, but also in terms of natural law; liberty
is universal, notwithstanding Montesquieu’s application of climate theory
to differentiate among legal regimes in the world.83 Cloots expressly rejects
climate theory as developed by Montesquieu in De l’esprit des lois imply-
ing that some populations may not be able to live with liberty. Moreover,
liberty is also understood as a natural feeling, that is materially located in
the hearts of individual human beings. I will develop more on liberty in the
next chapter on republicanism, but it is sufficient to note here that Cloots
seems to mix Rousseau’s sentimentalisation with Diderot and d’Holbach’s
materialism.
Eighteenth-century conceptions of the human race combined the under-
standing of ‘nation’ with the understanding of ‘peoples’, forming a concep-
tion close to today’s ethno-nationalism.84 But for Cloots, this human race
forms a nation, and in this ‘nation du genre humain’ there is no more for-
79. Ibid.
80. Ibid., 257.
81. See next section on nation.
82. See the first chapter on self-fashioning.
83. Cloots, ‘La République universelle’, 249.
84. See, for instance, Anthony D. Smith,The Ethnic Origins of Nations (Oxford: Black-
well, 1998 [1986]); Walker Connor,Ethnonationalism: The Quest for Understanding (Prin-
ceton, N.J.: Princeton University Press, 1994); John Hutchinson and Anthony D. Smith,
eds., Ethnicity, Oxford Readers (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1996); Daniele Con-
versi, ed., Ethnonationalism in the Contemporary World: Walker Connor and the Study
of Nationalism (London: Routledge, 2002).
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eigner as a consequence. Cloots defends the figure of the foreigner, and in
particular those foreigners that were attacked by philosophers above men-
tioned, Africans and Indians:
Rappelons-nous que chaque nation doit ses arts, ses sciences,
ses lumières, sa philosophie aux étrangers. Toutes les nations
peuvent dire : nous ne sommes rien par nous-mêmes, nous
brouterions l’herbe sans les étrangers. Nos impertinents rai-
sonneurs blâmeraient-ils la fameuse ambassade des Romains,
qui demanda au peuple d’Athènes la communication des lois
de Solon ? Ignorent-ils que les Grecs n’éclairèrent Rome qu’a-
près avoir été à l’école des Egyptiens, et que les Indiens furent
les instituteurs de l’Egypte? Que ne devons-nous pas aux sa-
vants Arabes et aux émigrants du bas Empire ? Ce cha pitre se-
rait long, si j’avais envie d’écrire de longs chapitres. Cela nous
mènerait de Babylone à Salamanque, de Constantinople à Pa-
ris, de Pékin à Pétersbourg, en traversant l’Asie, l’Afrique et
l’Europe.85
Civilisations progress, perhaps, but also regress. As Cloots notes, the splend-
our of Ancient Rome and Athens, so admired by European philosophers,
disappeared, and, more importantly, this splendour was also due to the ex-
ternal input of Egypt, and for Egypt, of India.
Not only Europeans should not feel superior of their civilisation, as it
has roots in India and Africa and could just as well collapse like Rome and
Athens, but Paris (the contemporary Athens) is not civilised simply because
it is Paris. Parisians are not great because they are Parisians or French, but
because they are men, for Cloots. Barbarism is not the other uncivilised, it
can very well be the self-proclaimed civilised man expressing prejudice over
perceived barbaric neighbours:
Les Parisiens ont fait des progrès si rapides dans la civilisation,
n’étant ni parisiens, ni français, ils sont hommes. Il n’y a pas,
monsieur, de plus grande marque d’ignorance et de barbarie
que de supposer ses voisins ignorants et barbares, sans les avoir
ni vus ni connus.86
However, Cloots has hope, because man is a ‘political animal’: ‘Il est dans
la nature de l’homme d’aimer la société’.87 This sentiment that is reminis-
cent of Hume and Smith applies also to the single society of the whole the
human race, for Cloots. Cloots takes this argument used to explain diversity
in the human race and returns it to argue for the unity of the human race.
85. Cloots, ‘L’Orateur du genre humain’, 143.
86. Ibid., 163.
87. Cloots, ‘La République universelle’, 260.
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As a result no one is a foreigner. Men are all the same and therefore no man
is a foreigner to another man: ‘Je sais qu’un homme ne sera jamais étranger
à l’homme…’.88
The only foreigner then is the foreigner to the human race— animals:
La différence entre nous et les étrangers, et je ne connais pas
d’autres étrangers que les autres espèces d’animaux, c’est que
nous n’atteignons pas directement à la perfection, nous avons
malheureusement le choix des modifications.89
However, as mentioned previously, the distinction is minimalistic and less
than clear since the ability to speak is the main distinction for the human
race, according to Cloots.
Genre Humain and Humanité
Cloots did not use the expression ‘humanité’ to refer to the entity composed
of human beings. Following the usage of the time Cloots employed instead
the expression ‘genre humain’, ‘human race’. When Cloots uses the term
‘humanité’ it is in reference to the feeling of kindness and compassion that is
due to mankind. Therefore, Cloots participates to the ‘bouleversement des
valeurs spirituelles’ that the Enlightenment constituted in its redefinition of
humanity, departing from Thomism and the diffidence in man’s goodness
since original sin.90 However, Cloots departs from his intellectual mentors,
such as Rousseau, Diderot, and Voltaire, who did participate in the laicisa-
tion of the Christian caritas as the renewal of the idea of ‘humanitas’.91 Be
it Rousseau in Emile, Diderot in his article ‘Législateur’, or Voltaire in his
Dictionnaire philosophique, all suggest in one way or another the need to
educate man to access the noble level of humanity.
For de Pauw, on the other hand, the human race is neither good nor bad.
It is simply sick of its own passions, but a sickness that cannot be cured.
There is no hope of educating the human race for this reason.
Il n’est pas question ici de faire la satyre ou l’éloge du genre
humain, que ni le blâme, ni les louanges n’ont jamais corrigé :
trop trompé par ses maîtres, trop avili par la servitude, trop
corrompu par ses passions dégénérées en faiblesse, c’est un ma-
lade incurable, abandonné à son destin, ou à la providence. Il
faut s’attacher aux faits, les exposer comme ils sont, ou comme
88. Cloots, ‘Bases constitutionnelles’, 499.
89. Cloots, ‘L’Orateur du genre humain’, 114.
90. Vernière, ‘L’idée d’humanité au XVIIIe siècle’, 171.
91. Ibid., 176.
244 humanity
on les croit être, sans haine, sans prévention, sans respect, si-
non pour la vérité.92
For Cloots, on the other hand, there is no need for this. If anyone should
be educated it should be those who are already overeducated due to their
privileged social position. Aristocrats should be educated to the the dignity
of being a man. The human race is one single family, and therefore one
should treat another man as ‘brother’. This is how moral is reintroduced in
politics for Cloots. There is no sense in getting richer when your brother is
getting poorer as a result:
C’est donc pour être plus riche que vous vous réjouissez du
malheur de nos frères communs ; et vous ne souhaiteriez pas
la mort de vos proches parents, pour être plus riche ?93
Cloots’s view is against Smith’s ‘circles of sympathy’ influenced by Stoic
oikeiōsis.94 It is a direct cosmopolitan view of basing our humanity on the
communality of the human race, as argued by recent cosmopolitan the-
orists.95 There is no dilution of humanity with the distance of geography
or culture. The human race encompasses all men, and thus the rights of
man apply to all men: ‘Les droits de l’homme s’étendent sur la totalité des
hommes’.96
However, this position did not prevent Cloots, as other revolutionar-
ies, to paradoxically support inhumane positions. Even though Cloots was
against slavery, and in favour of the universal application of the rights of
man, he yielded to the fallacious argument that abolishing slavery would
lead to a disaster. In ‘Réponse de l’Orateur du genre humain aux citoyens
de couleur et nègres libres’ published on 16 June 1791 inLe Patriote français,
Cloots argues tentatively that although he is in favour of the liberation of
slaves, and considers slavery as a dishonest trade, he considers it politically
damaging to free the colonies immediately for the interests of France, but
Cloots promises that his
… système de la libération générale n’admet ni colonies, ni mé-
tropoles, ni différence de couleurs, ni différence de nations ;
et je ne demande qu’un peu de prudence, un peu de politique
pour arriver à ce but final de mes pensées. Ce plan régénéra-
teur m’occupe dans mon cabinet, dans mes promenades, dans
mes conversations ; il charme mes insomnies, il absorbe mes
92. Pauw, Recherches philosophiques sur les Américains, 208.
93. Cloots, ‘La République universelle’, 257.
94. Fonna Forman-Barzilai,Adam Smith and the Circles of Sympathy: Cosmopolitanism
and Moral Theory, Ideas in Context 96 (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2010).
95. Martha Nussbaum, ‘Patriotism and Cosmopolitanism’, Boston Review 19, no. 5 (Oc-
tober 1994).
96. Cloots, ‘Bases constitutionnelles’, 476.
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veilles. Et je renonce à toutes ces places, à toutes les élections
dont le peuple français voudrait m’honorer ; et je ne m’attache
à aucun souverain provisoire, à aucune fraction de l’humanité,
pour ne m’occuper que de la révolution des deux hémisphères,
de la manifestation du véritable souverain, du souverain éter-
nel et unique, la nation du genre humain.97
Cloots’s good faith is not to doubt. Cloots did believe in his system, and
did want to see his system concretised in a revolution of the whole world.
However, Cloots is more prudent in the steps to take, and shows some polit-
ical calculation that appears cynical and unusual to his, otherwise fervent,
idealism. The real test of humanity is in the classification that Cloots and
other revolutionaries made of the ‘enemies of the human race’.
Ennemi du Genre Humain
In relation to the conception of the human race, the eighteenth century
also used the concept of ‘enemy of the human race’, or in Latin hostis hu-
mani generis, derived from natural law and the law of nations. Grotius in
particular developed in De jure belli ac pacis on the idea that sovereigns
must have the monopoly of executive power and the ability to give punish-
ment. The people deserving punishment were ‘Barbarians’, ‘Beasts’, and
also ‘Tyrants’.98 Vattel in his Le Droit des gens used the expression ‘ennemi
du genre humain’ in characterising these ‘barbarians’ and ‘beasts’ that Gro-
tius thought deserved punishment by death.99 Throughout the revolution,
some revolutionaries made use of the rhetoric of beasts and monstrous
creatures to characterise counter-revolutionaries.100
Cloots and the revolutionaries voted in favour of the death of Louis XVI.
A death that was not politically necessary.101 The king had already been
stripped of all his powers, but it was symbolically required to be killed as
‘the Jacobins substituted for the myth of magical monarchical authority the
myth of a phoenix-like republic rising from the blood of the dead king’.102
97. Cloots, Ecrits révolutionnaires, 194–195.
98. Dan Edelstein, ‘War and Terror: The Law of Nations from Grotius to the French
Revolution’, French Historical Studies 31, no. 2 (Spring 2008): 235.
99. Gabriella Silvestrini, ‘Justice, War and Inequality. The Unjust Aggressor and the En-
emy of the Human Race in Vattel’s Theory of the Law of Nations’,Grotiana 31 (2010): 44–
68.
100. Antoine De Baecque, Le Corps de l’histoire. Métaphores et politique (1770–1800)
(Paris: Calmann-Lévy, 1993).
101. William Doyle, France and the Age of Revolution: Regimes Old and New from Louis
XIV to Napoleon Bonaparte (London, New York, NY: I.B. Tauris, 2013), 101–111.
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In ‘Harangue de Cloots’ on voting the death of Louis XVI, he argues to kill
a man in the name of ‘humanity’:
L’humanité prononce la sentence du client des aristocrates, de
l’arc-boutant des contre-révolutionnaires. Quant à moi, je me
croirais le plus inique des juges, le plus inhumain des hommes,
le plus vil des esclaves, si en qualité de membre de la commis-
sion des six & de la commission des douze, après avoir fait le
dépouillement du porte-feuille du ci-devant Monsieur, & de
l’armoire de fer du ci-devant roi, je ne prononçais pas formelle-
ment la mort du directeur de tous les conjurés que la loi punit
chaque jour.103
The death of the king is an act of purification for the republic. By the
same token, all the ‘crawling men’ who profited from the ancien régime,
allegedly being corrupt, must share the same fate:
Il est temps enfin de purifier la République, en désignant à
l’exécration du genre humain les hommes rampants, les ames
vénales, qui préfèrent les largesses d’un traître couronné aux
bénédictions du Souverain reconnaissant.104
The rhetoric seems harsh, but it is very mild compared to the one of Marat
in his newspaper L’ami du peuple or Hébert in Le père Duchesne. Louis
XVI is a ‘roi’ and for this deserves death for his treason to the sovereign
nation, but he is also a ‘monsieur’ who equally committed treason against
people, and so do all other monarchs, and any monarchist or aristocrat: ‘Je
conclus à la mort de l’ex-roi & de tous les rois qui seront amenés sur le sol de
la terre libre. L’échafaud des monarques sera le tombeau des feuillants’.105
The revolutionaries’ argument is that the human race is the only sovereign,
and that monarchs do not recognise this principle and never will, thereby
going against natural law as tyrants. However, if Cloots uses the expression
‘enemy’ several times, only to one person does he use the expression ‘en-
emy of the human race’: William Pitt.106 The reference to Pitt was related
to his actions against people sympathising with the revolution in England
and his repressive legislations against free speech. Cloots did not call Louis
XVI an ‘enemy of the human race’. However, he did call other French kings
‘monsters’, such as Louis XI who murdered his brother, or Louis XIV for
imprisoning his.107
This denunciation of crimes committed by previous kings had been made
by Louis-Charles de Lavicomterie (1746–1809) and Camille Desmoulins
103. Cloots, Procès de Louis le dernier, 8.
104. Ibid., 9.
105. Ibid., 10.
106. Cloots, Ecrits révolutionnaires, 610, 627.
107. Cloots, ‘L’Orateur du genre humain’, 118.
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(1760–1794).108 It is very likely that Cloots is making a reference to this con-
text. In this sense, Louis XVI was made to pay for the crimes against hu-
manity committed by his forefathers. Cloots was not opposed to the death
penalty, unlike Robespierre, but it is also likely that he voted for death for
the same reason Robespierre and other deputies did because of the multiple
threats to the revolution and the king’s inability to accept constitutional
monarchism. In general, Cloots calls ‘monster’ the ‘tyrants’ or anyone sup-
porting ‘despotism’ such as ‘aristocrats’, or abstract political systems related
to these.
Cloots’s voice was just one of many in the revolutionary choir singing
the ‘regeneration of man’, of the ‘human race’, a purification through the
execution of these ‘enemies of the human race’, in the name of the human
race, an act of real humanity where false humanity would be proof of being
feeble.109 Louis XVI did not commit crimes against humanity, but he was
guilty of treason, and plotting against the revolution, at a time when Brun-
swick’s Manifesto made it clear that all revolutionaries would be exterm-
inated, and his refuge from the Tuileries to the Manège of the Assembly
without telling his Swiss guard to stand down resulted in a blood bath on
10 August 1792.
Régénération, Éducation
As many revolutions, the French revolution had a general project for re-es-
tablishing order and transforming society through a redefinition of man.
The expression ‘régénéré’ is widely used to refer to this process of trans-
formation of man into a better man.110 ‘Regeneration was an active process
of nation construction, driven by political will’.111 As Bell notes, ‘regenera-
tion’ was a term used prior to the revolution in a theological context, but
moved from the realm of God to something that humans could achieve,
which they attempted to do with a messianic vocabulary.112 This messianic
dimension of forming a homo novus with a ‘before’ and an ‘after’ has been
studied by de Baecque, who notes how this regenerated man is supposed
to be the future, perfection and innovation as opposed to the corrupt man
of the ancien régime.113 It is also Furet and Halévi’s analysis that the term
108. See Camille Desmoulins, La France libre (Paris: Ébrard, 1834 [1789]); Louis Lavi-
comterie de Saint-Samson, Les crimes des rois de France, depuis Clovis jusqu’à Louis XVI,
Nouvelle édition (Paris: bureau des révolutions de Paris, 1792 [1791]). Cited in Monnier,
Républicanisme, patriotisme et Révolution française, 211.
109. Duranton, ‘Humanité’, 43–47.
110. Ozouf, L’homme régénéré.
111. David Avrom Bell, The Cult of the Nation in France: Inventing Nationalism, 1680–
1800 (Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press, 2001), 75.
112. Ibid., 76.
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‘régénéré’ was used as a rejection of the past with its ‘feudal oppression’,
‘administrative despotism’, ‘aristocracy’, and ‘monarchy’, and a jump into
the future with the nation.114 This left the question of what to do with the
king, the ‘before’, and what to do with the nation, the ‘after’. Two issues
that were highly contentious and debated.
For Cloots, according to the science of man, as achieved by the Enligthen-
ment, the nature of man is shown to be neither good nor evil, but rather
driven by self-interest, in a Hobbesian way. In a materialist way, Cloots con-
siders that man commits what is considered a crime in society by following
his nature, and therefore punishment is a less enlightened way of treating
this issue than understanding it:
Le progrès des Lumières nous montrera l’homme moins mé-
chant que faible, plus entraîné vers le mal qu’ennemi du bien ;
plus criminel machinalement que volontairement ; plus digne
de compassion que de punition.115
Understanding the nature of man is the object of the science of man, and
this science shows that, as noted above, the root of all problems, accord-
ing to Cloots and many of his revolutionary contemporaries, is the absence
of regard for nature, in general, and denial of natural rights, in particular.
These natural rights as declared in 1789 must be enacted in order to put
an end to the corruption that disregarding this eternal truth has produced,
notably through monarchism. Because, as Cloots notes:
Tout languit, tout se corrompt, tout se détruit dans l’absence
d’une vérité-mère. Si les princes ont pris la place des principes,
c’est en rappelant les principes que nous chasserons les prin-
ces.116
There is a little rhetorical play on words by opposing ‘princes’ and ‘princip-
les’, which is characteristic of Cloots’s rhetoric.
What is needed therefore is a ‘regeneration’ of this man corrupted by
monarchism. The revolution operated this ‘regeneration’ of this ancien ré-
gime man by proclaiming the liberty and equality of man as the funda-
mental principles of a political regime.117 In this sense, France is the cradle
of the regenerated human race: ‘C’est le genre humain régénéré que j’avais
en vue, lorsque j’ai parlé du Peuple-Dieu dont la France est le berceau et le
point de ralliement’.118
114. Furet and Halévi, Orateurs de la Révolution française, LXXXIII.
115. Cloots, ‘La République universelle’, 257.
116. Cloots, ‘Bases constitutionnelles’, 482.
117. See the chapter on republicanism for an analysis of Cloots’s conceptions of liberty
and equality.
118. Cloots, ‘Bases constitutionnelles’, 476.
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In order to operate this ‘regeneration’, it is necessary to establish two
things: first, a republic that respects nature and natural rights; secondly, an
education for this homo novus. This was one of the tasks that the new re-
public set itself, and there were many projects drafted in the 1790s, notably
one by Condorcet in 1792, which was not implemented due to increasing
difficulties in 1792–1793.119 This text later inspired the principles as estab-
lished by France’s minister for Education Jules Ferry (1832–1893) but with a
completely different project. Condorcet wanted to dispense knowledge to
free individuals, whilst Ferry wanted an education at the service of the Re-
public.120 Instead a Jacobin education policy was passed in particular by the
Bouquier law of 19 December 1793, instituting compulsory education for
children aged 6–13, emphasising linguistic uniformity and republican and
patriotic values.121 Talleyrand or the abbé Grégoire, among others, had ex-
pressed that French was the language of liberty and equality, and the result
was to Frenchify the whole country around one language, thus crushing all
regional dialects and identities.122
Cloots was arrested nine days after the Bouquier law was passed. Cer-
tainly, Cloots approved linguistic unity, and had also stated that French was
the language of liberty that the whole world would learn. However, this
does not mean that he considered that people should not learn their native
tongue. Cloots did not survive the terror of the comité de salut public, and
it is difficult to know how much he would have approved or disapproved
of this particular law, but he made public his own plan for education, as we
will see below. However, it is certain that he saw the ‘regeneration’ as extend-
ing to the whole world, and that ‘national corporation’ should be abolished:
‘La France s’est régénérée en abolissant les corporations et les provinces ; le
monde sera régénéré en abolissant l’esprit de corps national’.123 Cloots also
signs his article according to the new revolutionary calendar, but as marking
for him the date of the regeneration of the world.124
Cloots feared for the revolution in 1793, like the rest of the revolutionar-
ies. He saw this regeneration of the human race in danger. In February 1793,
in the ‘preliminary discourse’ of hisRésumé historique de la révolution, Clo-
ots published his philosophical reflexions on the revolution. Cloots writes
classically how the revolution happened naturally, biologically, in a coun-
try that was politically ill due to a corrupt regime. This patient recovers, his
body ‘regenerates’ itself into a healthy one after a healthy revolution. How-
119. Jean-Antoine-Nicolas de Caritat marquis de Condorcet, Rapport et projet de décret
sur l’organisation générale de l’instruction publique : présentés à l’Assemblée nationale, les
20 et 21 avril 1792 (Paris: de l’Imprimerie nationale, 1792).
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122. McPhee, Liberty or Death, 347–348.
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ever Cloots warns the reader. History shows how this regeneration could
return into a state of illness, how the patient could relapse:
Semblables aux maladies du corps humain, les maladies du
corps politique produisent des révolutions intestines, dont les
secousses violentes opèrent de grands changements ; mais l’ex-
périence des siècles nous prouve que, jusqu’à nos jours, les ré-
sultats de ces changements ont constamment différé entre ces
deux corps. Dans un malade à l’extrémité, ramenant l’harmo-
nie parmi tous les ressorts qui composent la machine, souvent
la crise révolutionnaire a rétabli l’équilibre et fait renaître la
santé ; au contraire, si l’on parcourt les annales des révolutions
de tous les peuples, on n’en trouve pas une dont ces peuples
soient sortis plus heureux qu’ils ne l’étaient avant ; loin de là !
presque toujours on voit les révolutions les réduire à un état
de calamités, pire que celui dont elles les avaient tirés.125
Cloots then states three causes for this relapse: the people have not been
able to base its thinking on ‘eternal reason’; the people has blindly trusted
a few men, who are hypocritically profiting from the revolution; and, fi-
nally, the clumsiness and lack of foresight of the people that dooms it to
relapse into slavery.126 It seems therefore, that Cloots would not have ap-
proved of an education in the service of the republic, that is educating— in
the Latin sense of educatio, from ducere, lead, meaning breading, rearing—
was not the republican enlightenment and regeneration he had in mind. It
was probably an idea closer to that of Condorcet’s, rather than educating it
was instructing— from the Latin instruo, build, arrange— giving the indi-
vidual, the citizen, the tools to think independently so that no individual
or group of individuals may take hold of their mind again. Moreover, as
we will see in the next chapter on republicanism, his idea of the universal
republic was minimal and more of a federal type with large independence
for local populations to decide for themselves what they wanted, includ-
ing in matters of education policy. One could also infer Cloots’s education
policy from this remark in L’orateur du genre humain, in which he recom-
mends the work on onanism by Swiss doctor Samuel Auguste Tissot (1728–
1797).127 This work, as Cloots explains, recommends abstaining from mas-
turbation during puberty and adolescence in order to grow stronger and
more robust. It is obviously rather ridiculous today, but Tissot was other-
wise trying to build a scientific method for medicine and was widely pop-
ular, also quoted by Voltaire and Kant. In this sense, it seems to me that
125. Cloots, ‘Résumé historique’, 520.
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Cloots is interested in educating the population with the latest scientific
works, rather than crude patriotic propaganda.
Before being arrested, but after having been excluded from the Jacobins,
Cloots was still a member of theComité d’instruction publique and managed
to make a speech on 26 December 1793. The comité had to answer a ques-
tion regarding spectacles and public education, and whether they should
be left to the public or private sector.128 Cloots starts answering by stating
that there cannot be any example found in Antiquity or modernity, East
or West, because this republic is unique in having a nation of equal men
with universal principles. However, Cloots notes that ‘aristocratic govern-
ments’ need to have a monopoly on education and entertainment in order
to maintain their domination on the population, in the countries ‘où les
gouvernements sont tout et les gouvernés rien’— winking to Sieyès.129 Clo-
ots uses the word ‘instruction’ rather than ‘education’, and his vision of in-
struction for the people is minimalistic, in an echo to Rousseau’s view: ‘Lire,
écrire, chiffrer, voilà pour l’instruction ; la joie et un violon, voilà pour les
spectacles’.130 It is up to the government to provide a minimal education
so that everyone can read, write, and count, and also some entertainment,
the rest should be left to the private sector with the understanding that ‘le
gouvernement doit simplement veiller à ce qu’on n’empoisonne ni le corps
ni l’esprit, à ce que l’on débite une nourriture saine’.131 The rule of thumb is
that something must benefit the whole nation in order to be paid for by the
nation, for instance a school for engineers should be national, but a theatre
should be left to the private sector under surveillance of magistrates.132 More
importantly, regarding this instruction, it should not amount to mere pro-
paganda:
La propagande des droits de l’homme doit se présenter pure et
sans tâches à l’univers étonné. Ce n’est pas en apportant à nos
voisins des dieux étrangers que nous faciliterons leur conver-
sion ; ce n’est pas en élevant autel contre autel que nous relè-
verons leurs fronts prosternés.133
Cloots uses the word ‘propaganda’ here, but it does not mean propaganda
in the modern sense, but diffusion or communication, in the ecclesiastical
sense that the Gospel was propagated.134 Even in France, Cloots preaches
tolerance rather than imposition, regarding republican education. Cloots
believes instead in nature and reason, and suggests to present a ‘table rase’
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so that everyone may combine their own ‘régime spirituel’, until ‘truth tri-
umphs’ in the end when reason leads everyone to understand that nature,
rather than any god, is the only ‘supreme being’, and ‘providence’ — nat-
ure’s word on earth, as opposed to divine providence— is a society of free
and equal human beings.135
Moreover, just like the nature of government as we will see in the next
chapter, education and entertainment should be decided by the people
rather than imposed by an ‘aristocratic’ government.136 In the end, Clo-
ots suggests a decree to open military, music, horse riding, naval, and med-
ical schools, as well as public libraries, laboratories for chemistry and phys-
ics, and botanical gardens. But then again, Cloots is a physiocrat and be-
lieves that this decree would only be temporary until ‘wealthy families’ and
‘free individuals’ provide for these needs because ‘[l]’éducation doit circuler
comme toute autre marchandise …’.137 Cloots has faith in the liberty of nat-
ure (or the market in modern terms) and that education will be provided for
locally by tutors and families, under the scrutiny of parents and the public;
even taking care of orphans.138
Cloots mentions vaguely that already people learn to read in places where
the alphabet was unknown before the revolution.139 However, as Doyle
notes, the educational enthusiasm of the revolutionaries was curbed by dif-
ficulties to implement these principles, and the existing educational system
provided by the Church collapsed; as a result the number of pupils in the
collèges fell from 50.000 in 1789 to 12.000 or 14.000 in 1799 in the écoles cre-
ated, whilst the literacy fell from 37% in 1789 to 30% in 1815.140 The lack of
time and money resulted in a failure to replace the education service and
materials provided by the Church, with the example of Clermont-Ferrand
having 128 pupils for a population of 20.000 in 1794.141 This was not a re-
publican education that would ‘regenerate’ the sans-culottes in the popula-
tion.
nation du genre humain
Together with the idea of unity of the human race, Cloots suggested the
concept of ‘nation of the human race’. This sounds antithetical to con-
temporary ears and must therefore be explained contextually with the vari-
ous understandings of nation. Cheneval notes rightly that when Cloots
135. Cloots, Ecrits révolutionnaires, 640.
136. Ibid., 643.
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presents the idea of ‘nation du genre humain’, it was during a context when
the concept of ‘nation’ was not yet nationalised and instead could serve as
part of a revolutionary cosmopolitan ideal rather than a homogeneous na-
tion-state.142
Individual
Baker emphasises the apparition of both society and the individual together
during the eighteenth century: ‘To speak of collective human existence as
société is to speak of it as an association of individuals. In this sense, the
term is essentially voluntaristic’.143 Individualism is a distinct feature of
Western society, and, for Baker, the Enlightenment conception of society
was instituted in response to epistemological, ethical, religious, and polit-
ical crises: epistemologically, society became the consolation for the accept-
ance of the limitations to understanding; ethically, sociability and civility
became the substitutes to Christian morality; religiously and politically, so-
ciety emerged as a consolation against the despair of a world in which God is
hidden, and became a domain with stability, an autonomous ground where
authority and absolute power dissolved.144
Viguier notes that the ‘individual’ ‘entered politics’ with the change of
socio-political vocabulary during the eighteenth century in France: first by a
passage from religious metaphysical discourse to the civic and secular one of
nature, in which the individual is opposed to the species; secondly, from nat-
ural law with natural rights bestowed on individuals.145 From 1770 to 1780,
the ‘individual’ was not yet a term designating a political concept, but a so-
cial term in Nature.146 The term enters the socio-political discourse through
the association between nature and society.147 The individual becomes the
minimal unit in political arithmetic, from being nothing in nature to some-
thing in law: from 1770 to 1785 the ‘individual’ is used in demographical
studies by Turgot and the physiocrats; from 1789 to 1792 the individual be-
comes important in counting ballots, it is the political unit as human be-
ing.148 1789 also marked the correlation of liberty and equality united within
the individual, with the difference that liberty is already there, whilst equal-
142. Cheneval, ‘Der kosmopolitische Republikanismus’, 383.
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ity is to be built since society must preserve natural rights.149 On the other
hand, this also means that one individual can be replaced by another, since
all are equal, and that it is justifiable to kill 10.000 individuals if it means
saving 100.000, as the Terror showed.150 Propriety is a fundamental right,
together with liberty and equality, in that it enables the emergence of the
individual and is inalienable to the individual.151
Cloots has made the individual the core of his political theory, and the
centre of any political and moral theory. The universal republic is not an ag-
glomeration of nations, or states, or any other collective polity, but a ‘con-
federation of united individuals’. To Cloots, the individual is sovereign, or,
as he puts it, ‘[c]haque individu est un royaume’, and thus all source of
sovereignty stems from the individual.152 All societies are ultimately built
by individuals who are the prime units from the natural world in the social
world, according to Cloots. As seen in the chapter on nature, Cloots rejects a
transition from nature to society, therefore natural rights and social rights
are the same. Liberty and equality are the fundamental rights of the indi-
vidual. As such, each individual is sovereign. But, upon meeting another
sovereign individual, their sovereignty merges. This amalgamation contin-
ues until there is ultimately only the human race as legitimate sovereign. As
a consequence, there cannot be any other sovereign:
Il n’y a pas plus de raison d’ériger un département en souve-
rain, qu’un district, un canton, une municipalité, une famille,
un individu. Chaque homme, si vous le voulez, est un sou-
verain, bien entendu que sa souveraineté n’empiète pas sur
la souveraineté individuelle des autres hommes…. Une frac-
tion de la grande famille ne saurait s’emparer de la faculté sou-
veraine, de la faculté de vouloir absolument, irrésistiblement,
sans un démenti formel au genre humain.153
As such the expansion of the French revolution is not comparable with
past empires for Cloots; if there is an empire, it is the ‘empire of reason’.
Consequently, the annexion of neighbouring Savoy is but a reunion of in-
dividuals into the confederation of men:
Nous n’aurons jamais la guerre avec la Savoie, car elle ne s’est
pas unie à la France par juxtaposition ; mais ces deux contrées
ont formé un amalgame, une confédération d’individus qui
ne laisse plus aucune trace de la ci-devant Savoie….154
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In Mallet’s article ‘Confédération’ in theEncyclopédie (3:847), it is an ‘alli-
ance’ or ‘league’ of states or princes; so a union between persons, families, or
states. In Cloots’s political thought, it is instead the individuals who form
this union or alliance. A country is nothing else than a union of free and
equal individuals who want to remain free and equal, and therefore agree
on a constitution and representatives to produce laws.
If the basis of a political system is to be the individual, it is the same basis
that must be taken into consideration for the world political system.
La félicité de l’espèce est aussi incompatible avec les corps na-
tionaux, que les corps particuliers sont nuisibles à une nation ;
et cela, par le grand principe, que tous les intérêts découlent
de l’intérêt personnel. L’alliance des Nations, la fédération des
peuples, est un lien éphémère dont se joue l’immorale poli-
tique. Il n’y a que la confédération des individus qui puisse
pacifier les hommes.155
Political philosophy does not distinguish between internal and external
politics. For Cloots, as for the philosophes, the same way religion had to be
universally valid by being understandable to every individual, so does polit-
ics. The individual is the basis for religious theory, and it is equally the basis
for political theory.
It is therefore equally crucial to understand the nature of individuals in
order to find the best constitution that will frame their liberty and maintain
their equality. Human nature shows that individuals are selfish and want to
expand this selfishness through conquests and enslaving others. The consti-
tution must set limits to individuals in order to preserve society (the same
way one’s liberty is defined as being limited by other individuals’ liberty).
Through law all these selfish individual wills form the public interest:
Circonscrivez les individus dans de justes bornes, afin qu’ils ne
nuisent point à la sphère sociale ; car la nature nous pousse en
avant, notre instinct est de tout envahir, de tout asservir, de
renverser tous les obstacles. Chaque individu est un royaume :
chacun dit que charité bien ordonnée commence par soi-mê-
me. Les soldats heureux et les prêtres habiles ne sont devenus
rois que parce que les peuples ont ignoré les secrets de la nature
humaine. On ne saurait trop se presser de faire connaître ces
secrets importants. La guerre naturelle des individus a cessé,
dès que la loi positive a parlé ; et dès lors, les usurpations et les
massacres ont fait place à la lutte et à l’émulation. Maintenez
la loi, et l’égoïsme ne sera qu’un jeu utile, un véhicule néces-
saire. C’est la collection de tous les égoïsmes épars qui forme
155. Cloots, ‘L’Orateur du genre humain’, 158.
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l’intérêt public. Vouloir extirper l’égoïsme, c’est vouloir arra-
cher le cœur, c’est ôter à la république son principal ressort.
Une constitution ne saurait être bonne, si elle n’est bâtie sur
toute les passions humaines.156
Cloots was in favour of extensive individual rights, notably the right to
vote to be extended to women, blacks, and servants. This was also a posi-
tion shared by Condorcet.157 It is this alliance between free and equal indi-
viduals that form the nation of the human race. However, the evolution of
the concept of nation must first be understood in order to understand how
Cloots could envision the whole human race as constituting one.
Cloots’s conception of the individual and the society formed by individu-
als falls within the conceptual framework set by Baker. It is a voluntaristic
association, and ultimately it leads to a universal society, which replaces as
‘cosmos’ the previous ‘théos’, as seen in the previous chapter on nature: epi-
stemologically, the limits of the understanding of nature and the universe
is replaced by the consolation of living in society in accordance with nat-
ure; ethically, human nature is limited by the law in order to maintain a
civil and well functioning society, whilst the achievement of peace in soci-
ety will increase knowledge; religiously, nature as the social state is replacing
progressively through reason the need for religion; politically, all human ex-
istence will be submitted to laws and elections so no order will be imposed
from above.
Nation
As Koselleck has shown, nationalism is the process of politicisation of the
two concepts of people and nation, previously distinct and separate, and
their unification and ideologisation.158 According to Koselleck, this happen-
ed particularly during the Sattelzeit— the transitional period between the
early modern and modern age, 1750–1870 — when concepts acquired the
meanings they now have.159 Before that, the concept of nation was first un-
derstood in the feudal context: nations are peoples on a particular territory,
as in German Volk. In the seventeenth century a dictionary defined nation
to be: ‘un grand peuple habitant une même étendue de terre renfermée en
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certaines limites ou même sous une certaine domination’.160 At the turn of
the century, the Dictionnaire de l’Académie (1694), added a political and
cultural dimension with the elements of language and common laws: ‘La
nation est constituée par tous les habitants d’un même État, d’un même
pays, qui vivent sous les mêmes lois et usent le même langage’.161 The same
meaning continued during the eighteenth century, as the Dictionnaire Tré-
voux shows: ‘un nom collectif, qui se dit d’un grand peuple habitant une
certaine étende de terre, renfermée en certaines limites sous une même do-
mination’.162 The 1771 edition added several elements:
NATION. s. f. Nom collectif, qui se dit d’un grand peuple
habitant une certaine étendue de terre, renfermée en certaines
limites, & sous une même domination. Nation, gens, populus.
Alexandre a conquis, a dompté plusieurs nations, plusieurs
peuples…
On le dit aussi des habitants d’un même pays, quoiqu’il soit
partagé en divers états, & en différens gouvernemens. Ainsi
l’on dit la nation allemande, la nation italienne.
Ce terme dans sa signification primitive désigne un nombre
de familles sorties d’une même tige, ou nées dans un même
pays. On s’en est servi pour désigner un grand peuple gou-
verné par les mêmes lois. Quelquefois la nation se divise en
Tribus, comme la nation juive ; en Cantons, comme la nation
helvétique ; en Royaumes, comme la nation espagnole ; en di-
vers peuples, comme l’ancienne Gaule, où le mot nation est ex-
primé par celui de civitas, qui comprenoit sous lui des peuples
particuliers. Plusieurs peuples sont une seule nation. Les Bour-
guignons, les Champenois, les Picards, les Normans, les Bre-
tons, &c. sont autant de peuples qui forment la nation Fran-
çoise.163
The first part of the definition takes the current legal definition of a nation-
state in international law, at least in its first three components: a population,
a defined territory, and a government; the element of capacity to act in inter-
national relations is missing. It also notes that the original meaning of the
term was ethnic: ‘families stemming for an identical stalk’. It also notes that
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several people can form a nation, notably ancient Gaul in which there were
several people, each forming a civitas. As for this civitas, it is understood as
cité in the Dictionnaire de Trévoux:
CITÉ, quand il s’agit de l’antiquité, signifie un Etat, un peuple
avec toute ses dépendances, une République particulière, com-
me sont encore plusieurs villes Suisses. Civitas.164
The word nation is more related to the concept of political community
that people constitute. A single language forms the bond of this community,
but also common law. However, in this understanding there is no ‘French
nation’ since France was at the time divided into several regions with dif-
ferent laws, tax systems, and languages. Instead, the concept of sovereignty
over the territory as exercised by the king is what unites the kingdom.
According to Dann, the Enlightenment, which opposed absolutist mon-
archism, separated the conception of monarchism from nation: ‘La nation
est le corps des citoyens, le peuple est l’ensemble des regnicoles’.165 It is a
very republican understanding of the nation that separates the king from
the citizens. However, it is probably the absence of any model of republic
as large as France that explains the revolutionary reticence to dispose of the
king, even so after his flight to Varennes. If the king is the common element
that binds together the French nation, how could this nation survive as a
single political community without him? But that was not yet a concern
in the eighteenth century, which focused on the issue of absolutism. With
ideas stemming from natural law, the concept of nation designated a polit-
ical community of free and equal individuals as the article ‘Représentants’
in the Encyclopédie defined the characteristic of despotism where there is
in fact no nation: ‘Dans un état despotique, le chef de la nation est tout, la
nation n’est rien ; la volonté d’un seul fait la loi, la société n’est point repré-
sentée’.166
In this sense, the nation only exists if its head of state, the king, is not a
despot. This does not necessarily entail the end of monarchism, but implies
a representative body of this ‘nation’, which deliberates on laws rather than
a monarch legislating arbitrarily. Sieyès theorised the concept of the ‘civil
society nation’ with the idea of the ‘Third estate’ as forming a complete na-
tion. Moreover, he defined a nation by ‘associates’ living under a ‘common
law’ and represented by the same legislative assembly: ‘Qu’est-ce qu’une Na-
tion? un corps d’Associés vivant sous une loi commune, & représentés par
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la même législature’.167 According to Fehrenbach, Sieyès’s concept of nation
had three elements: it is an organised and unified community, it has a sov-
ereign national representation of equal citizens, and it is the only source of
law except for a superior natural law.168 After the revolution, the article 3 of
the Declaration of the Rights of Man could state that ‘le principe de toute
souveraineté réside essentiellement dans la Nation. Nul corps, nul individu
ne peut exercer d’autorité qui n’en émane expressément’. The nation took
power and became the sovereign. In the early years of the revolution, the
nation was this civitas, this abstract political community of free and equal
men deciding and obeying their own laws, a very republican concept that
implies active citizen participation.
It is exactly this meaning of nation that Cloots uses in his ‘nation of
the human race’. It is the abstract concept of a political group of free and
equal men, commoners and workers— (sans-culottes, Cloots will specify in
1792–1793)—and not a conception of a particular people,Volk, or rather the
whole of the human race under the 1789 Declaration as a particular people.
Cloots states this explicitly:
Un peuple est aristocrate à l’égard d’un autre peuple : le genre
humain est essentiellement bon, car son égoïsme despotique
n’est en opposition avec aucun égoïsme étranger. La Répu-
blique du genre humain n’aura jamais de dispute avec person-
ne, car il n’y a point de pont de communication entre les pla-
nètes.169
By ‘despotic egoism’, Cloots means the self-interest that is at the base of
the concept of ‘general will’. To him, the problem with a world of multiple
sovereigns is that it is a world of multiple ‘general wills’ or ‘despotic egoisms’
that cannot be reconciled under another general will; but, this is possible in
a particular republic in order to avoid that individual wills— self-interested
‘despotic egoisms’— triumph.
To Cloots, and to many other thinkers who shared his views, such as Vol-
ney, Condorcet, or Thomas Paine, if the various peoples of the French king-
dom were able to unite under one republic, one constitution, one rule of
law, one nation, there is no reason it should not be possible to regroup all
the populations of the world under the same nation. Cloots has long been
a partisan of the name ‘Gaul’ instead of France, because he had in mind the
thèse nobiliaire of the Franks who took over this gallic nation or ‘civitas’ re-
grouping several free populations, as described in the Dictionnaire Trévoux.
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This will be explained in further detail in the chapter on republicanism, as
well as how this nation of the human race was highly decentralised and left
many policy decisions to local citizens and their local representatives, thus
allowing active citizenship worldwide. The concept of nation is first and
foremost a concept of republican equality and freedom under a common
law. Therefore, why not have a nation of the human race to put an end to
wars and all the miseries they entail?
Cloots’s idea of political organisation was modelled around how France
was organised between 1789 and 1793, where any form of authority had to
be elected by citizens. Finally, the ‘nation of the human race’ is also a sort of
tiers état du genre humain. This ‘nation of the human race’ is explicitly the
one of the oppressed peoples (oppressed by any religious and monarchical
authority, or any aristocrat). In this view of the nation, matters of identity
matter less than matters of liberty, a little bit as in the Marxist theory of
classes in which two proletarian from different countries would have more
in common than a bourgeois and a proletarian from the same country. This
is especially the case in Cloots’s view of the people as ‘sans-culottes’ without
frontiers. As Cloots writes: ‘… rien ne ressemble plus à un Sans-Culottes du
Nord qu’un Sans-Culottes du Midi ; rien ne ressemble plus à un aristocrate
de l’Orient qu’un aristocrate de l’Occident’.170 It is also for this same reason
that Cloots insisted that the French Republic be called ‘German’, in order to
emphasise its non-nationalistic (in the sense of national identity) character,
and the idea of fraternity among human beings.
However, Cloots’s conception of ‘nation of the human race’, like the re-
volutionaries and their conception of ‘French nation’, would be challenged
by the question of the king after the flight to Varennes. The absence of re-
publican model on a large territory, and the long tradition of a king as unit-
ing a diverse and divided country will make them doubt whether to dispose
of Louis XVI, despite his obvious treason. But the nation is no longer the
king, it is the body of citizens, and therefore Cloots and the revolutionaries
will look for alternative solutions. This will be the object of the next chapter.
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7 R E P U B L I C A N I S M
Je préfère la république
européenne à la république
française, et la république
universelle à celle de l’Europe,
parce que je suis homme parce
que le meilleur m’est assez bon.
Cloots, 17931
Studies on Cloots’s political thought refer to his system, explicitly or im-plicitly, as a ‘cosmopolitan republicanism’.2 I do not discuss here the
cosmopolitan part of the expression, which I considered in the introduc-
tion. I will discuss here republicanism in Cloots’s thought and in reference
to the context of his time. As we have seen in the previous chapters, Cloots
was educated in classical republicanism, and used several classical republican
references in his revolutionary writings. For Pocock, classical republicanism
is characterised by several major traits: the reference to Roman constitution
as model of respublica mixta, seeing trade as a source of corruption, the pre-
valence of law, and the prevalence of positive political liberty over negative
political liberty. This distinction on liberty stems from Berlin — negative
liberty being attributed to individuals as the absence of obstacles, and pos-
itive liberty attributed to collective organisations as the possibility of acting
upon one’s life.3 Pettit later refined this conception of liberty as non-domin-
ation.4 With the example of Mably, Wright identified three chronological
phases in the formation of classical republicanism in eighteenth-century
France: the first, from the last decades of the reign of Louis XIV; the second,
from the High Enlightenment to the eve of the revolution; the third, during
the decade of the revolution.5 It is useful here to follow this chronological
classification.
In the chapter on rhetoric a quote from Mercier’s Tableau de Paris dem-
onstrated the extent of the education future revolutionaries received on Ro-
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man republicanism. The following quote from the same book shows the
confusion Mercier felt as a pupil after finishing his education: leaving his
study bench and exiting through the collège’s gates to realise that he is indeed
in Paris and not in Rome. It was equally a state of confusion to ‘forget’ all
this republican knowledge and remember than he lives in an absolute mon-
archy, despite the fact that this absolute monarch paid for the professors
inculcating this republican stories and ideas:
Il est sûr qu’on rapporte de l’étude de la langue Latine un cer-
tain goût pour les Républiques, & qu’on voudroit pouvoir
ressusciter celle dont on lit la grande & vaste histoire. Il est sûr
qu’entendant parler du Sénat, de la liberté, de la majesté du
peuple Romain, de ses victoires, de la juste mort de César, du
poignard de Caton qui ne put survivre à la destruction des loix,
il en coûte pour sortir de Rome, & pour se retrouver bour-
geois de la rue des Noyers.
C’est cependant dans une Monarchie que l’on entretient per-
pétuellement les jeunes gens de ces idées étrangères, qu’ils doi-
vent perdre & oublier bien vite, pour leur sûreté, pour leur
avancement & pour leur bonheur ; & c’est un Roi absolu, qui
paye les Professeurs pour vous expliquer gravement toutes les
éloquentes déclamations lancées contre le pouvoir des Rois :
de force qu’un éleve de l’Université, quand il se trouve à Ver-
sailles, & qu’il a un peu de bon sens, songe, malgré lui, à Tar-
quin, à Brutus, à tous les fiers ennemis de la Royauté. Alors sa
pauvre tête ne sait plus où elle en est. Il est un sot & un esclave
né, ou il lui faut du temps pour se familiariser avec un pays qui
n’a ni Tribuns, ni Décemvirs, ni Sénateurs, ni Consuls.6
It is certain that revolutionaries were well versed in Roman republican-
ism, but even after the flight of the king arrested in Varennes on 21 June
1791, revolutionaries did not make the transition directly to republicanism
and the king was re-instated. Cloots showed similarly the same hesitation
and even tried to use Roman and Greek republican examples to advocate
a ‘monarchy without king’ or a republic with a powerless and non-royal
monarch, or elected monarch without heredity at the head of the executive
branch.
The chapters on rhetoric and on truth and science have already shown
how Cloots received an education focusing on classical republicans. Cloots
called himself ‘orator’ in this classical republican fashion, with the view of
spreading a scientia civilis. In this chapter, I shall focus on Cloots’s repub-
lican thought proper and I shall answer two questions: firstly, what is Clo-
6. Mercier, Tableau de Paris, 149–150.
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ots’s republican thought; secondly, how is it situated in the context of its
time?
In order to answer these questions it is first necessary to explain what
is understood by republicanism. The vast ensemble of rules, principles,
laws, concepts that are constitutive of or involved in the organisation of
a republican system of government or a republican state constitute what is
referred to as republicanism. There is no clear definition of what republic-
anism is, and scholars take various stances, but central to republicanism
is the concept of liberty. Western historians and political theorists have
grouped a number of political texts and authors under the denomination
of republicanism due to their common rhetoric and ideas inspired by Ro-
man and Greek antiquity. Such authors range from Renaissance Italy with
Machiavelli, to Englishmen such as Milton or Blackstone, Frenchmen with
Montesquieu or Mably, and American founding fathers with Jefferson and
Madison for the most well-known of them. The interpretation of these au-
thors, their inclusion in the list and their significance is subject to contro-
versy.7 The concept of republicanism as a tool for interpreting and under-
standing the history of political thought has a particular history in English
historiography, and its success in the second half of the twentieth century
is no academic fashion but constitutes a paradigm in a Khunian sense.8
There are two sorts of studies on republicanism, besides the many his-
toriographical controversies inside each tradition.9 Firstly, historical works
interpreting and situating republican thought, especially since the Italian
Renaissance with Machiavelli. These are labelled as ‘classical republicanism’.
Secondly, philosophical works relating these historical works to contempor-
ary republican philosophy — mainly Anglo-American — or ‘neo-republic-
anism’. Berlin gave a definition of liberty that influenced many of the sub-
sequent discussions on neo-republicanism during an inaugural lecture at
the University of Oxford on 31 October 1958, ‘Two Concepts of Liberty’,
subsequently published in 1969.10 Berlin identified two concepts of liberty:
a negative liberty understood as non-interference, and a positive liberty, un-
derstood as being able to exercise self-control, self-mastery. With this dicho-
tomy, Berlin was influential in associating liberalism, in the context of the
Cold War, with the only true liberty— negative liberty— as opposed to the
7. Frank Lovett, ‘Republicanism’, in The Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy, Spring
2016, ed. Edward N. Zalta (2016), accessed 17 August 2016, http://plato.stanford.edu/
archives/spr2016/entries/republicanism/.
8. Daniel T. Rodgers, ‘Republicanism: the Career of a Concept’,The Journal of Amer-
ican History 79, no. 1 (June 1992): 11–38.
9. Lovett, ‘Republicanism’.
10. Berlin, Liberty.
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fake liberty— positive liberty— thus effectively framing the debates on re-
publicanism around liberalism in this dualist sense.11
Against this dualism, and perceived distortion of republicanism by a he-
gemonic liberalism, a ‘neo-republicanism’ rose as Pocock, Skinner, and Pet-
tit proposed a different understanding of republicanism, anchored in a his-
torical interpretation. Among this ‘neo-republicanism’, the historical work
of Pocock represents a reference of ‘civic humanism’ even if it is a dense
and complex argument.12 It provided an interpretation of classical repub-
licanism that has been influential on historians and philosophers ever since.
Pocock analysed a revival of Roman republicanism in Florentine political
thought in the era of Machiavelli, and linked it to the ‘Atlantic republican
tradition’ in Puritan England and revolutionary America. Skinner develo-
ped the same theme interpreting Machiavelli as the proponent of a neo-
Roman conception of liberty, understood as non-domination, that influ-
enced England, and chiefly Hobbes.13 The Roman conception of liberty
was that of personal freedom marking the difference between slaves and
free individuals as the absence of arbitrary power from anyone else. Sev-
eral authors have studied along Skinner’s line of thought, forming a tradi-
tion called ‘civic republicanism’. Pettit has been particularly influential in
developing a theory of liberty as non-domination, when domination over
someone is understood as an arbitrary and uncontrolled power over one’s
affairs.14
Concerning French republicanism, the Anglophone and the French liter-
ature on republicanism depart in their interpretation of pre-revolutionary
eighteenth-century French political thought. French literature, with a few
exceptions, emphasises the absence of any republican thought prior to the
French Revolution, or even until the flight of the King to Varennes, which
sets the milestones for republican thought.15 Anglophone literature, how-
ever, has contested this view that amounts to an inexplicable and sudden
switch from monarchism to republicanism. They identify a French ‘classical
republicanism’ with philosophers building on Montesquieu’s paradigmatic
differentiation between three forms of government— despotic, monarchic,
11. Nadia Urbinati, ‘Due modelli di repubblicanesimo (e di liberalismo)’, Filosoﬁa e
questioni pubbliche – Philosophy and Public Issues 5, no. 1 (2000): 81–92; Nadia Urbinati,
‘Republicanism after the French Revolution: The Case of Sismonde de Sismondi’, Journal
of the History of Ideas 73, no. 1 (January 2012): 95–109.
12. Pocock, The Machiavellian Moment. On ‘civic humanism’, see James Hankins, ed.,
Renaissance Civic Humanism: Reappraisals and Reﬂections (Cambridge: Cambridge Uni-
versity Press, 2000).
13. Quentin Skinner,The Foundations of Modern Political Thought, vol. 1. The Renais-
sance (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1978); Skinner, Liberty before liberalism;
Quentin Skinner, Hobbes and Republican Liberty (Cambridge: Cambridge University
Press, 2008).
14. Pettit, Republicanism: A Theory of Freedom and Government.
15. See the first section for a literature review.
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republican. Such philosophers are: Rousseau, Mably, Saige, and Condorcet.
The disagreement stems from a different understanding of the term ‘re-
publicanism’, that the works in English understand as a theory of liberty,
either liberty as non-domination or liberty as non-interference, when Fre-
nch historians have focused on finding anti-monarchical movements. In
this chapter, I understand republicanism more widely as a theory of liberty.
The first section presents ‘classical republicanism’ in eighteenth-century
French political thought. The successive sections will attempt to place where
Cloots stands in this intellectual context. Republicanism subsumes many
themes and concepts, and it is impossible to elaborate on all of them here.
I chose to focus on some of them here, which I deem more important for
the overall argument of cosmopolitan republicanism: the question of mon-
archy and royalty, the reference to classical republicanism, and the modern-
isation of republicanism with the question of size.
republicanism in eighteenth-century france
French historians have made the case against a ‘républicanisme des Lumiè-
res’.16 The fact that a republic was created at all is characterised as a ‘divine
surprise’.17 For Goulemot, several arguments plead for this position: the fact
that there was no republican party; the absence of the experience of a repub-
lic; Voltaire’s severe condemnation of the republic in England; and the belief
in a historical paradigm opposed to the formation of a republic.18 This view,
according to which the term ‘république’ and the ideology of republican-
ism is not yet fully fledged before the revolution, is also shared by Dumont
and Nicolet. According to Dumont, the term ‘république’ was used to des-
ignate any type of state, also monarchical ones, or a regime in opposition to
a monarchy.19 For Nicolet, the importance of, for instance, Condorcet and
Rousseau for republican theory is a construction of nineteenth-century his-
torians and republicans. It is the need to anchor deeply the Third Republic
in a philological tradition in the 1890s that led to a retelling and re-discov-
ering of— until then minimised— ‘republican authors’.20 Vovelle equally
denies any republicanism before the revolution, as well as any external influ-
16. Jean-Marie Goulemot, ‘Du républicanisme et de l’idée républicaine au XVIIIe siècle’,
in Le siècle de l’avènement républicain, ed. François Furet and Mona Ozouf, Bibliothèque
des histoires (Paris: Gallimard, 1993), 25.
17. Ibid., 26.
18. Ibid., 32–33.
19. Jean-Christian Dumont, ‘Le spectre de la république romaine’, in Révolution et
République : L’exception française, ed. Michel Vovelle (Paris: Kimé, 1994), 14–26.
20. Claude Nicolet, L’idée républicaine en France : Essai d’histoire critique (Paris: Galli-
mard, 1995), 80–85.
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ence on what he considers to be ‘l’exception française’.21 Maintenant equally
limits republicanism before 1789 to Montesquieu’s discussion of antiquity
and Rousseau’s discussion of a small republic like Geneva, noting that the
cahiers de doléances did not demand the abolition of monarchy, but only
reforms regarding abuses.22 According to Maintenant, only a handful of re-
volutionaries proposed a republican form of government between 1789 and
1792: Brissot, Desmoulins, Condorcet, Anthoine, and Lavicomterie.23
On the other hand, Spitz refutes this version that he calls a ‘caricature’
of republican thought.24 According to him, this view benefited from the
influence of Furet’s work.25 Spitz rejects not only the idea that republican-
ism is a strictly post-revolutionary serendipity, but that there is a particular
‘exception française’ of it, thereby anchoring the study of French republican-
ism in the Euro-Atlantic republican tradition as described below. Against
the view that ‘French republicanism’ stems from Jacobinism and a concep-
tion of positive liberty, Spitz argues that the central role of the state was to
guarantee equality and liberty as non-domination.26 Monnier understands
equally republicanism as discussions on theories of liberty with Montes-
quieu, Mably, and Rousseau in particular, and is interested in investigat-
ing how these theories were expounded and received after the flight of the
king in 1791.27 The capture of the king in Varennes opened the space for
this debate of republicanism as anti-monarchism to become a reality. How-
ever, the word ‘république’ itself did not yet have the meaning it later took
during the nineteenth century to designate a form of representative gov-
ernment.28 Another French historian who rejects the narrative of divine
surprise, Gojosso describes a polysemic evolution of the concept of repub-
lic in the sixteenth and seventeenth century as, positively, ‘chose publique’
and, negatively, a regime opposed to monarchy, whilst focusing on Mon-
tesquieu, Voltaire, and Rousseau for the eighteenth century.29 A collective
21. Michel Vovelle, ed., Révolution et République : L’exception française (Paris: Kimé,
1994).
22. Gérard Maintenant, ‘République (mai 1789–septembre 1792)’, in Dictionnaire des
usages socio-politiques (1770–1815), Collection « Saint-Cloud » (Paris: Klincksieck, 1987),
99.
23. Ibid., 101.
24. Jean-Fabien Spitz, Le moment républicain en France (Paris: Gallimard, 2005).
25. Cf. François Furet and Mona Ozouf, eds., Le siècle de l’avènement républicain, Bib-
liothèque des histoires (Paris: Gallimard, 1993).
26. Spitz, Le moment républicain en France, 40.
27. Raymonde Monnier, ‘Républicanisme et Révolution française’, French Historical
Studies 26, no. 1 (2003): 87–118; Monnier, Républicanisme, patriotisme et Révolution
française; Raymonde Monnier, ‘Montesquieu et le langage républicain : l’argumentaire
de l’“Esprit des lois”’, La Révolution française, no. 5 (2013), accessed 17 October 2016, http:
//lrf.revues.org/1036.
28. Monnier, ‘Républicanisme et Révolution française’, 89.
29. Éric Gojosso, Le concept de république en France (XVIe–XVIIIe siècle) (Aix-en-
Provence: Presses Universitaires d’Aix-Marseille, 1998).
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of French historians calledCollectif l’Esprit des Lumières et de la Révolution
published the proceedings of their conference adding the dimension played
by natural law in France to this line of studies on Atlantic republicanism.30
Another collective of French historians dedicated an issue of the journal La
Révolution française to the influence of English republicanism on the Fre-
nch revolution, anchoring their research to the ones initiated with Pocock
and Skinner.31 However, as the editors note, these studies include the con-
nection between natural law and republicanism, which Pocock considered
as opposed.32
If this link from the French revolution to the Euro-Atlantic republican
tradition is new to French historians, it has inspired anglophone histori-
ans in their research for several decades. This tradition, or ‘paradigm’ in a
Khunian sense according to Pocock, started with his seminal workTheMa-
chiavellian Moment, which sought to understand how classical republican
thought migrated from Renaissance Italy to seventeenth-century England
and eighteenth-century North America.33 A collection of essays analyses
this tradition in several European countries—the Netherlands, Italy, Spain,
France, England, Germany, and Poland.34 In the French case, Spitz argues
that d’Holbach had his own ‘modern’ conception of liberty, different from
non-interference or independence, but as achieving happiness without pre-
judice, in a general criticism of selfish patriotic virtue of classical republican-
ism that ought, instead, to be defined in contrast to self-interest.35 Wright
tentatively sketchs a ‘pre-history’ of French republicanism, with Boulainvil-
liers invoking the liberty of the ancients in the thèse nobiliaire against abso-
lutism, Montesquieu, who gave republicanism great publicity, Mably, who
draws attention on the constitution of the ancients, and Rousseau, who
provides a theory of sovereignty based on the general will.36 Shklar argues
30. Marc Belissa, Yannick Bosc and Florence Gauthier, eds., Républicanismes et droit
naturel. Des humanistes aux révolutions des droits de l’homme et du citoyen, L’esprit des
Lumières et de la Révolution (Paris: Kimé, 2009).
31. François Quastana and Pierre Serna, eds., La Révolution française, no. 5: Le répub-
licanisme anglais dans la France des Lumières et de la Révolution (2013).
32. François Quastana and Pierre Serna, ‘Le républicanisme anglais dans la France des
Lumières et de la Révolution : mesure d’une présence’, La Révolution française, no. 5
(2013).
33. Pocock, The Machiavellian Moment.
34. Martin van Gelderen and Quentin Skinner, eds., Republicanism: A Shared
European Heritage, 2 vols. (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2002).
35. Jean-Fabien Spitz, ‘From Civism to Civility: D’Holbach’s Critique of Republican
Virtue’, chap. 6 in Republicanism: A Shared European Heritage, ed. Martin van Gelderen
and Quentin Skinner, vol. 2, The Values of Republicanism in Early Modern Europe (Cam-
bridge: Cambridge University Press, 2002), 107–122.
36. Johnson Kent Wright, ‘The Idea of a Republican Constitution in Old Régime Fra-
nce’, chap. 14 in Republicanism: A Shared European Heritage, ed. Martin van Gelderen
and Quentin Skinner, vol. 1. Republicanism and Constitutionalism in Early Modern
Europe (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2002), 289–306.
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that Montesquieu was, in a way, the Machiavelli of eighteenth-century Fre-
nch political thought in that he framed the way republicanism was to be de-
bated throughout the century (obviously a very different republicanism).37
Venturi argues that the translation into French of Shaftesbury’sPrincipes
de la philosophie morale in 1745 by Diderot started the discussions on repub-
licanism.38 Venturi finds his proof of ‘existence of a republican ferment in
France between 1745 and 1754’ in ‘the diaries of one of the most lucid and
independent witnesses of that age, the marquis d’Argenson’.39 In 1758, De-
leyre published in the Journal encyclopédique his ‘Pensées d’un républicain
sur les mœurs de ce siècle’, which constituted a veritable republican mani-
festo. It stated that the revolt against tyrants was legitimate because kings
were necessarily asocial beings.40 Venturi paved the way for future stud-
ies on the English influence in French political thought during this period.
Hammersley suggests that English republican works and ideas were more
important than ancient or American examples and texts.41 Hammersley also
establishes a different classification of republicanisms, between ‘ancient re-
publicanism’, and ‘early-modern republicanism’. According to Hammers-
ley, English republican texts provided answers to the fundamental ques-
tion for early modern republicans: how republican institutions and prac-
tices (securing liberty) could be made workable in the context of a large na-
tion state?42 In particular, the English political theorist James Harrington
(1611–1677) and his ideas of democracy developed in The Commonwealth of
Oceana (1656) had an influence on the Cordeliers Club.43
Wright identified Mably as a ‘classical republican’ for declaring that sover-
eign power belonged to the people, who bestowed it to the magistrates and
could always revoke it, and for admiring the Ancient Republics of Athens
and Sparta.44 The surveillance of the governing bodies by its people con-
stitutes the central element of what Baker calls ‘classical republicanism’.45
37. Judith N. Shklar, ‘Montesquieu and the New Republicanism’, chap. 13 in Ma-
chiavelli and Republicanism, ed. Gisela Bock, Quentin Skinner and Maurizio Viroli, Ideas
in Context 18 (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1991), 265–280.
38. Franco Venturi, Utopia and Reform in the Enlightenment (Cambridge: Cambridge
University Press, 1971), 71.
39. Ibid., 73.
40. Ibid., 80–81.
41. Rachel Hammersley,The English Republican Tradition and Eighteenth-century Fra-
nce: Between the Ancients and the Moderns (Manchester: Manchester University Press,
2010).
42. Ibid., 6.
43. Rachel Hammersley, ‘Harringtonian Republicanism, Democracy and the French
Revolution’, La Révolution française, no. 5 (2013), accessed 18 October 2016, http : / / lrf .
revues.org/1047.
44. Wright, A Classical Republican in Eighteenth-Century France, 76.
45. Keith Michael Baker, ‘Transformations of Classical Republicanism in Eighteenth-
Century France’, The Journal of Modern History 73, no. 1 (March 2001): 33.
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As a ‘language of opposition’ rather than a ‘belief’, Baker defines classical
republicanism as such:
As a discourse of political will, rather than as a mere prefer-
ence for the republican form of government, classical republic-
anism found recurrent expression in prerevolutionary France,
not in the form of bookish nostalgia or cultural fantasy but as
a language of opposition to the claims of absolute monarchy,
to the governmental practices of a modernizing administrat-
ive state, and to the corrupting seductions of an expanding
commercial economy.46
Indeed, the opposition between ancients and moderns was one of the es-
sential dyads of the Enlightenment, as philosophers had a deep historical
consciousness of the modernity of their time.47 Viroli has situated Rous-
seau as a representative of classical and modern republicanism because of
the influence of Cicero and Machiavelli. In particular, Viroli argues that the
republican constitution in Rousseau is similar to the vivere libero and the
repubblica ordinata bene in Machiavelli.48 In a similar fashion, Spitz has ana-
lysed Rousseau’s conception of individual liberty as ‘republican liberty’.49
Whatmore considers that it is wrong to talk of a revival of classical repub-
licanism because it was inconceivable to recreate ancient republicanism at
the level of a large modern state.50 Instead, Whatmore suggests distinguish-
ing between small state republicanism (discussions in the United Provinces,
the Swiss Cantons, and Rousseau’s discussions of Corsica and Poland) on
the one hand, and large state republicanism, on the other.51 Large state re-
publicanism is a looser category that regroups different texts around the
common theme of complaining against the backdrop of classical repub-
licanism about the loss of virtue and patriotism, and the corrupting nat-
ure of luxury.52 In particular, Whatmore identifies Mably, Helvétius, and
d’Holbach in this large state republicanism, although they never advocated
46. Ibid., 36.
47. Keith Michael Baker, ‘Enlightenment Idioms, Old Regime Discourses, and Revolu-
tionary Improvisation’, chap. 5 in From Deﬁcit to Deluge: The Origins of the French Re-
volution, ed. Thomas E. Kaiser and Dale K. Van Kley (Stanford, CA: Stanford University
Press, 2011), 176–179.
48. Morizio Viroli, La théorie de la société bien ordonnée chez Jean-Jacques Rousseau,
European University Institute - Series C 11 (Berlin; New York, NY: De Gruyter, 1988);
Morizio Viroli, ‘La théorie du contrat social et le concept de République chez Jean-Jacques
Rousseau’, Archiv für Rechts- und Sozialphilosophie / Archives for Philosophy of Law and
Social Philosophy 73, no. 2 (1987): 195–215.
49. Jean-Fabien Spitz,La liberté politique : Essai de généalogie conceptuelle (Paris: Presses
Universitaires de France, 1995).
50. Richard Whatmore, Republicanism and the French Revolution: An Intellectual His-
tory of Jean-Baptiste Say’s Political Economy (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2000), 23.
51. Ibid.
52. Ibid.
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any revolutionary overturn of monarchy for a republic, but rather wrote
lessons for monarchs.53 In the period immediately preceding the revolu-
tion, 1776–1789, Whatmore characterises a specific large state republicanism
in France, different from English republicanism, based on a consideration
of physiocracy as a political thought and not only as an economic theory:
‘… there was … a distinctive kind of republicanism before the Revolution,
bitterly opposed to the British constitution and entailing the sovereignty
of philosophers, merchants, and farmers’.54 Prominent names among this
‘neo-physiocracy’ are Turgot, Dupont, Condorcet, Quesnay, Sieyès, Rœ-
derer, Mirabeau, Say, and Clavière.55
Albertone argues that this position, together with Israel’s study on the
Dutch republic and Urbinati’s on Condorcet,56 shows the existence of a
‘democratic republicanism’, distinct from ‘classical republicanism’.57 For
Albertone, this ‘democratic republicanism’ is characterised by: a focus on
the concept of ‘civil society’; a focus on economy that leads to an egalitari-
anism opposed to the privileges of the ancien régime; and a focus on the
individual rather than the state.58
Finally, Edelstein writes a ‘secret history’ of ‘natural republicanism’ bet-
ween 1699 and 1791, characterised by mixing views of nature — especially
a ‘golden age’ — and natural rights with ‘imaginary republics’ in Fénelon,
Montaigne, Montesquieu, and classical republicans Mably and Rousseau.59
But it is especially with the physiocrats that Edelstein sees a significant con-
tribution that influenced the Jacobins in amalgamating the state of nature
with the state of society, and in which natural rights alone are responsible
for civil legislation.60
These various understandings of republicanism are directly relevant to
the study of Cloots’s vision of a republic encompassing the whole globe.
Was his republicanism inspired by English works? Was he a classical repub-
lican, an early-modern republican, a modern republican, a democratic re-
publican? What was his position before the revolution? It is again difficult
to ascertain his influences because of his namedropping some authors, and
not naming others. Shaftesbury, Harrington, Deleyre, are not mentioned
53. Whatmore, Republicanism and the French Revolution, 24–28.
54. Ibid., 78.
55. Ibid., 61–84.
56. Jonathan I. Israel, ‘The Intellectual Origins of Modern Democratic Republicanism
(1660–1720)’, European Journal of Political Theory 3, no. 1 (January 2004): 7–36; Nadia
Urbinati, ‘Condorcet’s Democratic Theory of Representative Government’, European
Journal of Political Theory 3, no. 1 (January 2004): 53–75.
57. Manuela Albertone, ‘Democratic Republicanism. Historical Reflections on the Idea
of Republic in the 18th Century’, History of European Ideas 33, no. 1 (March 2007): 108–
130.
58. Ibid., 117.
59. Edelstein, The Terror of Natural Right, 45–86.
60. Ibid., 101–124.
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in Cloots’s writings, but d’Holbach, Montesquieu, Helvétius, Mably, Rou-
sseau, Locke, Cicero, and Machiavelli are frequently referred to.
cloots and republicanism before the revolution
Before the revolution, Cloots is very much in line with the ideas of the En-
lightenment, favouring Enlightened monarchism. Just like he was a theist
before becoming an atheist, Cloots was in favour of enlightened monarch-
ism before becoming a republican. In Les vœux d’un gallophile (1786), Clo-
ots makes the case for the ‘Philosopher King’. Nonetheless, he also makes
the case for educating the people. Government and administration is a com-
plex science that requires a well-read people.61 Cloots is therefore, as many
philosophes of the time, both in favour of a government of a few elite led by
a philosopher king, but governing a well-educated people capable of under-
standing their policies.62
In particular, Cloots admires and praises Frederick the Great. He presents
him to other monarchs as an example to follow, because he has managed
to double the population under the direction of Hertzberg: ‘Ce grand mi-
nistre d’un grand roi n’y fait pas moins admirer son érudition & sa logique,
que dans les Ouvrages sortis de sa plume…’.63 Or again in Lettres sur les
juifs, Cloots takes as a time of reference ‘le siècle d’Alexandre jusqu’au siècle
de Frédéric’. In the footnote, Cloots explains what he means:
Mon roi est philosophe et nous vivons dans un Siecle Philo-
sophe. L’Histoire ne montre que six époques honorables à
l’esprit humain : les siecles d’Alexandre, d’Auguste, d’Aaron-
al-Raschid, deMedicis, deLouis le grand, de Frédéric le grand.
Ce dernier siècle est le mieux caractérisé. Il unit au mérite des
autres tous les avantages de la plus saine philosophie. Ma déno-
mination lui convient absolument ; car Frédéric en occupe le
commencement, le milieu & la fin. Frédéric a lui-même puis-
samment contribué aux progrès des lumières, par sa plume,
son influence & ses libéralités. Il a opéré une heureuse révolu-
tion dans le monde par son Code & sa Tactique, par sa Prose,
ses Vers & ses Victoires, par son Génie & son Sceptre, par son
Héroïsme universel. Le culte de ce Dieu est si bien établi par-
tout, que les autres Princes s’attirent des éloges en l’admirant
& en témoignant quelque envie de l’imiter. On ne m’accusera
pas de vouloir faire ma cour à mon Souverain, car je suis ici le
61. Cloots, Vœux d’un gallophile, 23.
62. Hamish M. Scott, Enlightened Absolutism: Reform and Reformers in Later
Eighteenth-Century Europe (London: MacMillan, 1990).
63. Cloots, Vœux d’un gallophile, 10.
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Sécrétaire de tous les Sages & personne n’ignore que Frédéric
déteste les courtisans.64
Cloots’s support for the education of the people so that they understand
the policies of their rulers is noteworthy; what sort of participation does it
entail? Even if Cloots does not write it explicitly, a well-educated people can
no longer be considered an idle group, easy to manipulate, but a counter-
power with the potential to revolt when liberties or other fundamental prin-
ciples are disregarded. Following Wright and Baker’s understanding of what
constitutes ‘classical republicanism’, one could argue that Cloots was a ‘clas-
sical republican’ before the revolution. Cloots not only expressed that the
people should be educated, but that it should understand the policies of its
government. In any case, the people has no obligation to obey those it does
not see fit for the task. Cloots writes:
Le peuple n’est tenu de suivre que ceux qu’il juge avoir mission
de le conduire ; or si les preuves de cette mission ne sont pas à sa
portée, il ne peut rien juger dans cette matière, & il est le maître
de prendre tel parti que sa conscience lui suggère ; car il n’en
est pas de la religion comme du gouvernement civil : l’une est
l’objet de la persuasion, l’autre est l’objet des convenances65.66
Cloots uses the same argument for civil government as the argument he
used against religion: anyone should be able to understand the ‘mission’ of
the government, otherwise there is no possibility to evaluate this mission,
just like everyone should be able to understand the message of God. There-
fore Cloots seems to suggest, in this parallel, that there is a theism, so to
speak, for civil government, just as there is a religious theism: the true reli-
gion should be accessible to everyone, or it is not God’s words; by the same
token, the true principle of government must equally be accessible to all, or
it is not valid. Moreover, one could stretch his argument to a logical conclu-
sion: there is only one true type of government, which can be discovered by
looking at nature. Just as there is only one true God for all, and all religions
are wrong, there is one true government for all, and all other political gov-
ernments are wrong. This argument, Cloots does not formulate quite yet,
but it is already there in gestation.
However, if Cloots agrees on opposing absolute monarchy and on hav-
ing an educated people, he disagrees on the ‘the corrupting seductions of
an expanding commercial economy’, as Baker puts it. On the contrary, Clo-
ots sees a correlation between luxury and the advancement of science in
the example of the Dutch Republic, and for that reason he downplays the
64. Cloots, Lettre sur les juifs, 2–3.
65. Convenance here means that there is a link and conformity between the people and
the government. See Dictionnaire de l’Académie française, 4th Edition (1762).
66. Cloots, Vœux d’un gallophile, 103.
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‘frivolités’ that luxury entails as minor side effects. Cloots mentions the
Dutch republic in Vœux d’un gallophile at several occasions as a positive ex-
ample of luxury. He congratulates France for having established economic
ties with Holland and being an allied to this ‘opulent republic’.67 In a letter
to the abbé Brizard written in Amsterdam in 1786, Cloots praises the Dutch
republic for its wealth, and even its luxury, which seems to contradict the
argument of those who wrote against luxury such as Rousseau, or Helvé-
tius.68 Cloots walks on the harbour and describes the burgeoning commer-
cial activities, and the international trade that makes Amsterdam, and Hol-
land, so wealthy. But what Cloots praises in this wealth, above all else, is
that it is well distributed among the different levels of society: peasants and
bourgeois are well-off and better-off than their forefathers, whilst manual
workers and day labourers have the means to live decently. This stimulates
Cloots to consider luxury closely: it may seem frivolous at first glance, but
it also leads to a greater interest in sciences and arts among the population,
who is no longer solely focused on one’s own business and home. In fact,
Cloots observes that the same can be said about Paris where luxury has
brought frivolity in the form of an extravagant amount of wigmakers, but
has also brought a great advance in science, art, and philosophy.69 In this
description, Cloots is closer to Montesquieu’s view of luxury, or Melon’s
criticism of Rousseau’s.70
Cloots gives an indirect definition of what the characteristics of a republic
are when describing the Musée, of which he is a member, as a ‘republic’. In
his speech made at the Musée on 20 December 1781, Cloots explains:
Ce musée, oui Messieurs, est une république ; car il jouit du
privilège d’exister sans protection aulique ; car la tolérance y
appelle jusqu’aux livrées de l’intolérance ; car le bénitier, le
prépuce & le turban n’y sont comptés pour rien ; car le mu-
sée tient à tout l’univers & par ses ouvrages & par ses corres-
pondances : l’univers sera donc instruit d’abord du résultat de
nos opérations, des conquêtes de la vérité, de l’humiliation de
l’erreur.71
One can see in this way of characterising the Musée as a republic a sort
of definition of the main attributes of a republic: negative liberty as non-
67. Ibid., 46.
68. Ibid., 253–254.
69. Ibid., 255–256.
70. See Jeremy Jennings, ‘The Debate about Luxury in Eighteenth- and Nineteenth-
Century French Political Thought’, Journal of the History of Ideas 68, no. 1 (January 2007):
79–105. See also for other publications on luxury Audrey Provost, ‘Le luxe publié au dix-
huitième siècle : questions de formes’, L’Atelier du Centre de recherches historiques, no. 8
(2011), accessed 17 August 2016, https://acrh.revues.org/3829.
71. Cloots, Vœux d’un gallophile, 83.
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domination; tolerance; positive liberty with freedom of expression and re-
ligion; philanthropic purpose in spreading knowledge and truth. The first
characteristic that Cloots attributes to a republic is the ‘privilege of exist-
ing without the protection of a prince’s court’, so, in other words, an inde-
pendence from external power, or ‘non-domination’. It is interesting also
to note the choice of words here. ‘Privilège’ comes from Latin privilegum,
from ‘private’ and ‘law’, designating someone or a group being set aside
from someone else’s law. Here it is the law from ‘the prince’s court’, aulicus,
‘princely’. The second characteristic is tolerance in a wide sense, as tolerating
even intolerant opinions. The third characteristic is liberty, as freedom of
speech (without which the Musée would not be able to spread knowledge
to the universe) and freedom of religion. Finally, Cloots seems to equate a
republic with the spread of knowledge and instruction to the whole human-
kind. Perhaps, that is a consequence of the understanding of republic by the
‘republic of letters’. This view of what a republic is, seems very close to his
subsequent revolutionary view of the ‘universal republic’. However, the res
publica in question, the truth, is discovered and disseminated through the
institution of philosophers as many ministers of this republic, whose goal it
is to get rid of the worst atrocities and injustices committed in the name of
religion. Through philosophy, enlightenment, Cloots hopes that theMusée
will contribute to put an end to the darkness that religion casts on humanity
and its history. This is the public good that the Musée shall engage in.
Although the Dutch Republic is considered as an example by Cloots,
some of the authors that are considered important in the political thought
of the Dutch respublica mixta, such as Spinoza or Pufendorf, did not seem
to play a major influence on Cloots’s political thought.72 Cloots only men-
tioned Pufendorf through Barbeyrac’s preface to his translation, as seen in
the chapter on natural law. Although, one should note that Bodin’s concep-
tion of sovereignty as indivisible and unique, which permeated the German
and Dutch discourses of respublica mixta according to Bödecker, did have
an influence on Cloots as well as the rest of the Jacobins. It may be that Clo-
ots admired France and French philosophy much more than anything else,
and more than the Dutch republican model. Cloots followed the general
ideas of the French philosophes, even though he blended different positions,
such as non-domination, free choice of government for the people, and free
72. On Dutch and German republican thought, see Martin van Gelderen, ‘Aristoteli-
ans, Monarchomachs and Republicans: Sovereignty and respublica mixta in Dutch and
German Political Thought, 1580–1650’, chap. 10 in Republicanism: A Shared European
Heritage, ed. Martin van Gelderen and Quentin Skinner, vol. 1, Republicanism and Con-
stitutionalism in Early Modern Europe (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2005),
195–217; Hans Erich Bödecker, ‘Debating the respublica mixta: German and Dutch Polit-
ical Discourses Around 1700’, chap. 11 in Republicanism: A Shared European Heritage, ed.
Martin van Gelderen and Quentin Skinner, vol. 1, Republicanism and Constitutionalism
in Early Modern Europe (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2005), 219–246.
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trade and the accumulation of wealth. It may also be that Cloots still iden-
tified himself as Prussian at that time, rather than Dutch or ‘Batave’, as he
would sometimes call himself after the revolution. After all, he had been
educated at the Académie militaire de Berlin in order to become a high-
ranking official in the growing Prussian bureaucratic state.73
cloots and republicanism during the revolution
Monnier notes that, with the exception of Brissot who understood repub-
licanism as a form of government, most revolutionaries — such as Paine,
Rutlidge, Bonneville, Robespierre, and Desmoulins— understood repub-
licanism as the theory of free state or commonwealth.74 The question of the
organisation of powers and democratic procedures were only one aspect.75
The central problem for the concept of republicanism during the revolu-
tion was how to conciliate free will and obedience to the law, which took
the form of classical opposition between freedom and slavery, or freedom
and tyranny.76 The flight of the king radicalised the anti-tyrannical rhetoric
in the republican language.77 Whatmore has identified Jean-Baptiste Say
(1767–1832) as a figure of republicanism, who developed his political eco-
nomy in a republican fashion, marrying commerce with virtue in a mix of
themes taken by philosophes on various subjects. According to Whatmore,
this position was shared by several revolutionaries, such as Sieyès, Rœderer,
Paine, and Brissot, who all convinced Condorcet to join it in 1791.78
One should note, that it is first in the antiquity, and Greece before Rome
and Cicero, that the concepts of liberty and equality were formulated, and
these concepts were taken and developed by the revolutionaries — partic-
ularly, when it comes to the rhetoric liberty/tyranny.79 The adjective libre
appeared first in Greek, eleutheros, and was used for Greek freedom as op-
posed to barbarian tyranny, or being enslaved by a foreign power.80 Liberté,
eleutheria, appeared later when foreign tyrannies disappeared.81 Liberty
was used as a term opposed to being subjected to the power of one per-
son, not royalty, but monarchy— the power of one person— considered as
tyranny.82 The Roman libertas, however, is considered as menaced by roy-
73. On the growth of bureaucracy in the state, see for instance Christopher Storrs, ed.,
The Fiscal Military State in Eighteenth-Century Europe (Farnham, England; Burlington,
VT: Ashgate, 2009).
74. Monnier, ‘Républicanisme et Révolution française’, 104–105.
75. Ibid., 106.
76. Ibid., 107.
77. Ibid., 109–118.
78. Whatmore, Republicanism and the French Revolution, xii.
79. Mossé, L’antiquité dans la Révolution française, 13.
80. Ibid., 14.
81. Ibid.
82. Ibid., 17–18.
276 republicanism
alty rather than monarchy.83 Liberty was defined as opposed to slavery, as
the capacity of being a citizen both civically and militarily, and the image
of the land-owner turned soldier to defend the homeland was a widespread
idealistic trope.84
Cloots had already an anti-tyrannical rhetoric and was already anti-mon-
archist before the Varennes crisis. Moreover, a quick look at all his Écrits
révolutionnaires shows an impressive use of the word liberté, found on al-
most every page. Often, the word liberty is opposed to slavery, which is also
found on almost every page. Cloots is born a ‘slave’ in Gnadenthal.85 Clo-
ots was thinking about liberty when the French people was still ‘enslaved’
before the revolution.86 ‘L’Europe esclave’ as opposed to ‘la France libre’
after the revolution.87 Tyranny and tyrants are also expressions often used
both for absolute monarchs and for members of the church: ‘… nos tyrans
spirituels et temporels…’.88 There are many examples of antiquity in Clo-
ots’s writings. Figures and events from Rome and Athens are frequently
evoked to illustrate current affairs during the revolution. These Attic and
Roman references become even more frequent when the question of the
king comes to the fore after the Varennes crisis, and they turn into compar-
isons with current affairs or serve to show they cannot apply to modern
times.
Anti-Monarchism
Cloots is not immediately against the king and monarchism. Revolutionar-
ies in general had an intellectual qualm about republicanism, even Robespi-
erre.89 In ‘motion d’un membre du club des Jacobins, Société des Amis de la
Constitution’, 18 March 1790, Cloots declares that it is good for patriotism
that the king is back in Paris, and that it should minimise the possibility of
uprise in the capital— the king having moved back to Paris from Versailles
after the Women’s March on Versailles on 5 October 1789.90 However, in
order to protect theAssemblée nationale, Cloots suggests to vote an amend-
ment into the constitution that would take away the title of commander
in chief from the king. Cloots fears the possibility that the king’s army may
be turned against the revolution within an alliance with other kings.91 Clo-
83. Mossé, L’antiquité dans la Révolution française, 22.
84. Ibid., 23.
85. Cloots, ‘L’Orateur du genre humain’, 112.
86. Cloots, Ecrits révolutionnaires, 137.
87. Ibid., 77.
88. Cloots, ‘L’Orateur du genre humain’, 166.
89. Peter McPhee, Robespierre: A Revolutionary Life (New Haven, CT; London: Yale
University Press, 2012), 123.
90. Cloots, Ecrits révolutionnaires, 12.
91. Ibid., 13.
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ots gives the example of the Republic of Genoa and the republic of Venice,
where the doge is held hostage during his mandate by the citizens. In any
case, Cloots argues that the liberty of movement of the king should be re-
stricted. And to people arguing that it would be stripping the king of his li-
berty, Cloots answers that no person exercising a public mandate, not even
the king, is free; as a matter of fact, the liberty of the king would mean the
end of the liberty of the people.92 This limitation is not only for the present,
but for the future, as the possibility of a charismatic warrior-king would
turn the revolution back to absolutism:
Comme il s’agit de créer des lois pour tous les siècles et toutes
les générations, notre constitution sera aussi fragile que vici-
euse, si nous avons à redouter les vertus de nos rois. En ef-
fet, un monarque bienfaisant, actif, populaire, préparerait un
trône absolu à lui-même ou à son héritier, si ce roi joint les
vertus guerrières aux vertus civiles. Comment une nation lé-
gère, une multitude irréfléchie tiendrait-elle contre les pres-
tiges charmants d’un monarque jeune, beau, éloquent, mar-
tial, généreux et victorieux ? Un roi capitaine, toujours gra-
cieux, galant, aimable, jamais inaccessible, jamais dur ni capri-
cieux ? C’est le dieu des armées, dirait le soldat ; c’est le dieu de
la France, ajouterait la nation entière. Ce nouveau soleil éclip-
serait le pouvoir législatif, dont les membres clairvoyants et in-
corruptibles élèveraient vainement une voix républicaine dans
cet enivrement universel, et le ridicule ne serait pas le moindre
fléau qui saperait les fondements de la liberté.93
Cloots equates here the executive power with the king, so, since the legislat-
ive power, representing the people, is the guarantee for liberty, the executive
power is more a threat to liberty, or at best, an issue that has no philosoph-
ical solution yet.
In Adresse d’un Prussien à un Anglais, Cloots speaks of a ‘peuple-roi’
when relating his embassy at the first celebration of Bastille day.94 Cloots
calls himself ‘ambassadeur des souverains opprimés’, who are the people liv-
ing under a monarchical regime, as opposed to the ‘souverain triomphant’,
the French ‘people-king’. Cloots tells them that they are born ‘slaves’, but
that they only have to want liberty to be freed, leaving some ambiguity
as to what that would entail precisely. The same image is taken again in
Anacharsis à Paris: ‘Nous verrons arriver la grande époque où … « les
souverains, détrônés par les rois », reprendront leur couronne et leur toute-
92. Ibid., 15.
93. Ibid., 16.
94. Cloots, ‘Adresse d’un Prussien à un Anglais’, 56.
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puissance’.95 The expression quoted, Cloots notes, is from the poet Le Brun.
The message is clear, the real sovereign is the people overthrown by the king.
In another article, ‘Ne regrettons pas les vingt-cinq ou trente millions…’
(allusion to the total population in France) published inChronique de Paris
on 1 September 1790, Cloots dehumanises the king as a person after having
limited his powers, liberty, and called the people the true sovereign king, by
suggesting the use of the term ‘crown’ instead, as the discussion is about
an ‘abstract being’, the ‘throne’, not the person of the king himself.96 The
discussion focused on the cost of the ‘crown’ to the people, a discussion
taken up again later together with the cost of the church in Anacharsis à
Paris. In this pamphlet, written on 6 October 1790, Cloots wrote again in
favour of a king as head of state, but with even more limited powers.
Il ne s’agit plus de dissimuler, répondons franchement aux mé-
contents, avouons hautement que le roi n’est pas libre, parce
qu’il est à son poste, parce que « la liberté du prince est l’escla-
vage du peuple », et que la liberté du peuple est l’esclavage du
prince.97
Cloots uses the rhetoric freedom/slavery, and inverts the freedom of the
prince and the slavery of the people: when the people are free the prince is
not free to do whatever he wishes, and when the prince is free the people
are not free to do whatever they wish. Cloots is still a theist religiously and
politically: ‘Dieu est immuable, il nous faut un roi immuable’.98 The king
is at the moment a necessity for representing the state, but if a king wished
to travel he would be free to abdicate his throne. However, there is still
the issue of public money spent on ‘God’ and the king in this system. Clo-
ots presents a sceptical view regarding the maintenance of the king and the
church:
On nous a légué un Dieu qui coûte cent millions, et un roi qui
en coûte trente. J’applaudis à l’adoption du prince considéré
comme instrument nécessaire, mais vous conviendrez avec moi
que le ciel serait plus satisfait, si, concentrant son culte dans
nos cœurs ou dans des clubs, nous faisions en sorte d’être
riches pour prendre des mesures avec l’Angleterre, afin d’ef-
fectuer la manumission de nos colons esclaves.99
‘Manumission’ is the act of freeing a slave by a slave owner, and Cloots sug-
gests that the now free French people gives the now ‘enslaved’ king back
95. Cloots, ‘Anacharsis à Paris’, 79.
96. Cloots, Ecrits révolutionnaires, 61.
97. Cloots, ‘Anacharsis à Paris’, 81.
98. Ibid.
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his liberty — gets rid of him. However, this is a mere suggestion, and the
king is still the king even if the title changed from ‘roi de France’ to ‘roi des
Français’, a change of title that will continue to fuel the battle between par-
tisans of a constitutional monarchy and partisans of a republican regime in
the nineteenth century.100
In ‘Roi des Français à tous les Rois de la terre’, published inChronique de
Paris on 2 March 1791, Cloots impersonates the king writing to all the kings
of the world, urging them to follow his example by letting their people be
free and join the ‘regeneration’ that the revolution started in France for the
whole of the ‘human race’.101
On the so-called Day of Daggers, 28 February 1791, a confrontation took
place between the national guard and a group of nobles armed with daggers
who wanted to organise the king’s escape. Cloots wrote a derisive account of
the events inLe Courrier des 83 départements on 9 March 1791, calling them
‘Signori Poignardini’ as some sort of villains from the Florentine republic.
But Cloots assures that the king is in fact safer with the national guard than
with those ‘Signori’, and gives the example of the assassination of Henry IV
in front of his courtisans, or of Romulus, who was not killed by the people,
but whose blood quenched the thirst of the nobles.102
Later on this same month of March 1791, before the flight to Varennes,
20–21 June, Cloots publishes L’orateur du genre humain, ou dépêche du
prussien Cloots au prussien Hertzberg, a pamphlet that marks a decisive turn
against Frederick the Great, Hertzberg, and ‘absolutism’, Enlightened or
not. This time, the king’s manumission by the free people is not a mere
suggestion any more. Cloots declares himself republican, as opposed to ab-
solutism, and urges France to strip the king of all power, and of all ministers
in favour of a representative assembly of the people:
Honneur et gloire à l’Assemblée nationale ! malheur et honte
aux prôneurs des tyrans ! c’était une erreur, avant la révolu-
tion, de préférer un gouvernement absolu à un gouvernement
républicain, une représentation vicieuse à une représentation
populaire : mais c’est un forfait odieux, aujourd’hui que nous
avons le premier modèle d’un grand peuple véritablement li-
bre, où un roi ambulant devenu prince immuable occupe une
place éminente, chère aux amis de la liberté, inaccessible aux
démagogues, et funeste aux séditieux.103
The king, however, should be kept. Cloots takes the example of ancient
Athens, which, he argues, did not get rid of the royalty but of the tyranny
100. Cloots, Ecrits révolutionnaires, 90.
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of royalty, keeping a sort of puppet king in place. The argument is twofold:
first, there is a need for a transition from a state of absolutist tyranny to a
state of republican liberty. That requires maintaining a royal head of state;
second, maintaining this royal head of state preserves the republic from oth-
ers claiming the place, such as powerful ministers of the king. Cloots writes:
On nous répète que l’Attique abrogea la dignité royale, en se
rendant libre. Erreur. Les Athéniens ne firent qu’abolir la ty-
rannie royale ; ils sentirent l’importance de conserver le titre
de roi, basileus, à un des gardiens, des conservateurs de la loi,
et sa femme s’appelait reine, basilissa. Ce roi siégeait pompeu-
sement sur un trône dans le portique royal. Si une nation peu
étendue, si le plus ingénieux des peuples, si le plus démocrate
des gouvernements a eu recours à cet artifice, comment une
grande nation qui sort tout entière d’un long esclavage, et qui
ne sortira que successivement d’une profonde ignorance, com-
ment pourrait-elle se passer d’un roi légal, ou se garantir d’un
ambitieux qui voudrait être illégalement roi ?104
This also includes other institutions in charge in the absolutist state such
as the Parlements, which Cloots considers as the magistrates applying the
law of the despot, and not, as they argue, a counter-power such as the Areo-
pagus of ancient Athens. Cloots then adds:
Je hais moins les rois que les ministres qui affectent un tendre
amour pour leurs maîtres absolus. Voici le secret de l’Église et
des cabinets : les royaumes libres sont des républiques, tout
despotisme est aristocratique, et toute aristocratie est tyran-
nie.105
Cloots calls for a universal republic, but still with the king as its head of
state. When Cloots was not yet anti-monarchist, he considered the liberty
of the people as the reason for the executive power, which the king exer-
cised. In order to make it even clearer that the king is only at the service
of the free people, Cloots calls him a ‘magistrate’: ‘… la liberté, qui décerne
la magistrature unique …’.106 According to the Dictionnaire de l’Académie
française, 4th Edition (1762) and Jean-François Féraud’sDictionaire critique
de la langue française (1787–1788), the definition of ‘Magistrat’ is ‘Officier
établi pour rendre la justice ou pour maintenir la police’; it is an officer in
charge of a function under a higher power (normally the king). Here the
higher power is the free people. However, Cloots probably does not mean
that the king shall render justice or maintain order with a police force. As
104. Cloots, ‘L’Orateur du genre humain’, 140–141.
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argued above, it is a king without power or function other than ceremonial
that Cloots considers here.
The flight of the king on 20–21 June 1791 provoked a shockwave among
the French population. It was reported that on the king’s way back, the
people refused to take off their hat to salute him in Paris, and were even
more aggressive when he crossed the suburbs to avoid working-class neigh-
bourhoods.107 The next day, Cloots delivers a speech at the Jacobins Club,
proclaiming that ‘Nous ne sommes véritablement libres que depuis hier 21
juin’.108 Cloots then suggests changing the name of the king to ‘chief of ex-
ecutive power’ without altering the constitution and to abolish the name
of French monarchy for a French Republic:
Il s’agit actuellement de guérir radicalement la nation de l’ido-
lâtrie royale ; et sans rien changer à notre sublime constitution,
je propose simplement de nommer chaque chose par son nom,
et d’abolir le titre odieux de roi, en laissant au premier magis-
trat les fonctions et le nom de chef du pouvoir exécutif. Le mot
de monarchie française est une dérision : on dit la république
de Pologne, et pourquoi ne dirions-nous pas la république de
France ? Il est important, messieurs, de fixer les idées du peuple
par la justesse des mots, car c’est souvent avec les mots qu’on
obtient les choses ; et certainement le roi fugitif échouera plu-
tôt contre une république, que contre un royaume.109
Cloots wonders what the attitude of the king will be and does not believe
that he will ever agree to a republican regime; even worse, Cloots fears that
the king may feign to accept it in order to plot a coup with the aristocrats,
the ‘ennemies of the human race’.110 What follows is a vehement attack on
monarchy and the king, which should be replaced by the law, but Cloots
is still not getting rid of him, and he suggests the name of a monarchical
republic rather than republican monarchy:
Ma république-monarchique est bâtie sur les notions du bons
sens, sur le maintien de la liberté ; au lieu que la monarchie-
république actuelle est un monstre auquel nous ne saurions
trop nous préparer à couper les vivres.111
But Cloots hopes that the people will one day finally reject not only the
church but the king. In the meanwhile, it is important to respect the law in
order to avoid an open civil war between monarchists and republicans.112
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Next, Cloots puts forward the argument of the high cost of a king and
a court; the millions necessary to maintain the ‘majesty of the king’ would
better serve the ‘majesty of the people’ by investing it into improving agri-
culture and fishing.113 What Cloots qualifies as ‘hors-d’œuvre royal’—hors-
d’œuvre meaning ‘des choses dont un ouvrage peut se passer’, according to
the Dictionnaire de l’Académie française, 5th Edition (1798)— is character-
ised as necessarily interested by its function in corruption, troubles, and
‘exalter le fanatisme des ignorants contre l’autorité légale’.114 Cloots argues
here against those who want, yet again, to give the benefit of the doubt to
the king who argued— falsely, as history shows— that he fled only because
his advisers urged him to do so as they felt that Paris was unsafe for him and
his family, and that he never meant to escape the country to reach foreign
armies but to be safe close to the border.115 The solution is then to eliminate
royalty, but not monarchy:
La constitution républicaine des Français, combinée avec son
gouvernement monarchique, sera le chef-d’œuvre de l’esprit
humain, lorsque nos monarques ne seront plus ni rois, ni hé-
réditaires.116
At this point, Cloots seems to be closer to the Roman libertas rather than
the Greek eleutheria. But Cloots concludes by suggesting maintaining the
status quo ante for the time being and to let ideas be freely expressed through
the press:
Quoi qu’il en soit, ne changeons rien à l’organisation actuelle
par des moyens violents et illégaux ; laissons mûrir les esprits
dans les serres chaudes de la typographie.117
And if everyone should bring something to the table, ‘Conseillons au roi
des Français de favoriser la propagation de nos principes constitutionnels
dans le reste de l’Europe’; royalty should not be on the menu, but served
as hors-d’œuvre: ‘Le véritable moyen de rendre la royauté supportable, c’est
de prouver à tout le monde qu’elle est un hors-d’œuvre’.118 What Cloots
suggests is that the French king convinces all other kings to do as Cloots
hopes he will: re-establish liberty to the people by abdicating. Monarchs,
writes Cloots, benefits from the ‘ignorance’ of the people in equating mon-
archy with royalty, heredity, and feudality.119 As mentioned before, Cloots
knows his classics, and he knows that Roman republicanism was opposed
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to royalty, and that Greek republicanism was opposed to any real power to
a monarch, a single person governing. What Cloots suggests is a monarch
without powers and without heredity, and since liberty should spread only
without menace from neighbours, neighbour populations should also ra-
tionally adhere to this plan, this French model of constitution, and elect a
‘European king’: ‘Un roi des Européens ne causera aucune alarme aux vrais
amis de la constitution’.120
Waiting for the debates to ripen in the minds of the people, Cloots makes
the distinction between a constitutional king and ‘unconstitutional king’.121
Implicit to the term of ‘unconstitutional king’ is the idea that the king was
not chosen by the people, the true sovereign, to represent it as head of the
executive. Cloots reiterates Boulainvilliers’s thesis, without naming him, on
the origins of French nobility with the Francs.122 According to Boulainvilli-
ers, the Franks invaded Gaul after the fall of the Roman empire and came
from Germany, while the Gauls represented the third estate, and they es-
tablished a king as primus inter pares.123 Cloots equates the end of Frank-
ish nobility with the revolution, changing Boulainvilliers’s thèse nobiliaire
that argued for nobility as a counter power to the king. Nobility is against
equality and liberty as declared by natural law, and if it was up to Cloots,
the name of France would be changed to Gaul, or even German as seen pre-
viously, but not a reference to the Franks, and he even contests its original
meaning:
L’empire des Francs s’est écroulé avec la Bastille, et la nation
aurait repris son ancien nom avec son ancienne liberté, si elle
avait su que le mot franc est synonymie du mot allemand vran-
ck, féroce. Mais les vaincus le rendirent synonyme du mot
libre, par les privilèges attachés au nom des vainqueurs, des
vrancks.124
Actually, the etymology of the word ‘Frank’ is uncertain beyond its German
origin, meaning at times ‘the fierce ones’ or ‘the free ones’.125 Cloots’s con-
clusion is unequivocal in any case: ‘Il résulte de là une apologie complète du
gouvernement républicain’.126 A republican government, if possible univer-
sal, and because for the time being it is unavoidable, with a monarch albeit
without royalty and power.
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In Annales patriotiques et littéraires, 23 July 1782, Cloots calls for the
French nation to get rid of royalty, which no longer makes sense with the
Déclaration des droits de l’homme: ‘Otez la royauté de l’acte constitution-
nel…’.127
In a follow-up article, Cloots hammered home the same point in ‘Mon-
archie sans roi’ published in Annales patriotiques et littéraires on 27 July
1792.128 Cloots proposes a monarch at the head of the executive power, sep-
arated from the legislative power, elected for five years like in Washington.
This way the monarch’s veto would be under the control of the nation. Clo-
ots then praises the system of a republic where the people is the only sover-
eign because this ‘grandeur nationale’ has the virtue of reducing the stature
of an individual politician, and the larger the people the greater the nation
and the harder it becomes for a single politician to amass too much power.
The war had been declared by the Assembly on 20 April 1792. This po-
larised the positions between republicans and monarchists (or more rightly
between absolute monarchists and constitutional monarchists tending to-
wards republicanism) as Austria and Prussia were perceived as aggressors
and wanting to crush the revolution and re-instate monarchy— or so was
the hope of counter-revolutionaries. The defeats of the French armies cre-
ated not only anxiety and fear among the revolutionaries and the Parisian
population, but also added to the anger present against the royal family,
seen as complicit to the defeats. On 10 July, the Assembly declared ‘la patrie
en danger’ and asked for support and sacrifice. The commander-in-chief of
the Prussian armies, the Duke of Brunswick, issued a threatening ultima-
tum, promising revenge, execution, and destruction. This prompted the
Parisian population to organise itself into a Commune and send 20.000
sans-culottes to join the national guard. Cloots thus celebrated the sans-cu-
lottes in ‘Vive les Sans-Culottes !’, published on 31 July 1792 in Annales pat-
riotiques et littéraires.129 Cloots praises Jérôme Pétion de Villeneuve (1756–
1794), then mayor of Paris, whose bust should be placed between Phocion
and Aristides, whilst the one of Gilbert du Motier, Marquis de Lafayette
(1757–1834), should be thrust on the ground. Pétion had displayed repub-
lican sympathies by being accused by the king of facilitating a crowd of
Parisians to invade the Tuileries palace on 20 June, and was subsequently
suspended. But the Parisians celebrated him and asked for his return on 14
July. He was reinstated on 3 August.
Lafayette, on the other hand, was a known royalist, and Cloots writes
how he knew him at collège du Pléssis-Sorbonne, where he already displayed
the prejudice of an aristocrat persuaded of being of higher birth and super-
ior blood. One has to note that this was a common belief among nobles,
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and it is a possibility that Cloots could have been mocked by Lafayette for
his family being recently ennobled. Nobles, if they received an education
at the collège like many of the revolutionaries of the Third-Estate, did not
continue their education at university, but went to a military school where
the emphasis was not on classical republican authors. There was thus a dif-
ference in the education of the nobles from the commoners. Cloots did go
to the Berlin Académie des nobles, but he hated it, and chose afterwards to
isolate himself in his studies for five years. To mock Lafayette and continue
with the classical republican example, Cloots calls him ‘Gilles-César’, play-
ing with his first name Gilbert, and Jules César, in French.130 That is a more
high-brow play of words on names than what was otherwise common prac-
tice during the revolution; for instance, Pétion was called ‘Pet-hion’ (Don-
key fart) by his pro-monarchist detractors.131 Cloots notes that liberty and
equality were foreign concepts to Lafayette, who was therefore not at the
service of the revolution, but of the king.
In ‘Adresse aux Français’ in the same newspaper, published on 6 August,
Cloots continues to praise the sans-culottes as the real sovereign people, and
call them to replace the executive power:
Français ! Nous sommes calomniés et trahis par la cour. Sup-
pléons à l’inertie du roi par notre propre activité ; que l’As-
semblée nationale, que chaque municipalité, chaque individu
agisse par lui-même comme si le ministère royal était suspendu,
et nous vaincrons tous les obstacles. Notre zèle, notre union,
notre loyauté, notre législature tiendront lieu de pouvoir exé-
cutif.132
The Parisian sans-culottes joined by fédérés from the province attacked
the Tuileries palace on 10 August, forcing the king to take refuge in the
Assembly, defended by Swiss guards, 600 of whom perished in the attack.
This marked a ‘second revolution’, effectively deposing the king.133 He ex-
pressed regret at his ineligibility for nomination to the Convention in a let-
ter to his friend Rousiès on 20 August, but consoling himself that he occu-
pied another function as orator of the human race, Cloots was nonetheless
granted French citizenship, bought some lands and a farm, and was elected
to the Convention. After the discovery of inculpating papers in the armoire
de fer (iron cabinet) in the Tuileries, the trial of the king was hastened and
started on 11 December 1792. In a speech to the Convention on 2 January
1793, Cloots urges to hasten the trial and calls on the exemples of England
and especially Rome to decide on the execution of the king: ‘non pas au
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poignard des assassins, mais à la hache des licteurs’.134 A lictor was a Roman
bodyguard who protected the magistrates, and the fasces with the blade of
an ax was their symbol, re-cycled in the revolutionary imagery, most fam-
ously in Le Barbier’s painting of the Déclaration des droits de l’homme in
the musée Carnavalet.135 Cloots perceives executing the king as a republican
duty and a duty in the name of humankind: ‘… les droits de l’homme sacri-
fiés aux droits d’une couronne sacrilège…’.136
The king is in Cloots’s eyes an enemy of the human race, even if he does
not use the term in this speech. The king must be executed for the crimes
committed by him and all the other French kings before him. He is not a
god and the people should not hesitate the sacrifice him at a time when he
represents instability for France. There are dangers and uncertainties that
accompany the lack of decision, when England and Spain are menacing out-
side, and inside the revolutionaries are tempted by dividing the country into
a federation. The country is tense and on the verge of multiple divisions,
which is not only against the unity of the republic, but the unity of Clo-
ots’s universal republic. To Cloots, Paris must be strong and lead the way
for all the other French cities fearing economic competition among each
other, and for all other countries.137 This is the reason why Cloots, and other
deputies such as Robespierre, changed their mind when they were initially
opposed to the death penalty and decided on it against the king. Cloots
concludes then this speech calling for unity and indivisibility with the in-
strumental role of the king’s death: ‘Je conclus à la mort de l’ex-roi et de
tous les rois qui seront amenés sur le sol de la terre libre’.138 Cloots voted for
his death without conditional terms, together with 360 other deputies. Of
course, not all deputies at the Convention were in favour of the king’s death,
and parts of the French population was opposed to it; even in Paris where
a deputy was assassinated by a royalist. Girondins tried to organise an ap-
peal to the people regarding the king’s punishment, but as Napoléon later
remarked, if they had wanted to save the king they would have asked for
his extradition.139 Not everyone was in favour of the death of the king, but
the Girondins’ scheme of appealing to the people led to so much potential
insecurity that it was like asking for a vote for or against the revolution, and
it failed.140 Of the 721 deputies present for the vote, 361 was the single major-
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ity, and 361 voted for death without conditions, 319 for imprisonment, and
the rest for death with various conditions.141 Louis XVI was guillotined on
21 January 1793.
Size and Federalism
Subsequent to the flight of the king, the question of a republic without
king had become topical, and together with this question the fear that such
a system would lead to a partition of such a republic into a federative sys-
tem. Some considered that it was safer to stay with a unifying monarchical
regime rather than risk splitting the nation into federative powers. France
was, after all, the most populous country in Western Europe with 28 mil-
lion people — by comparison, Britain had a population of 7.3 million.142
Also, despite the rationalisation of the country into 83 départements, the re-
volution had just started to unify a country with many cultures, languages,
and traditions. As Woloch’s study of ‘the new regime’ shows, even though
the Assembly in Paris hoped to have local authorities as delegates to apply
its laws, those retained a lot of power especially because they were locally
elected and the populations regarded them as the surrogates of the state.143
In order to avoid a federative solution, one needs to convince others that
such a large territory and population, and as diverse as France in the 1780s
was, could indeed be a single republic. The reality of local power, even with-
out a federal solution, was that ‘[w]hile asserting the primacy of national
law, the Assembly still left a large grey area for the competing imperatives
of centralization and local autonomy’.144
The pre-revolutionary and early-revolutionary debates on the impossib-
ility of a republic on such a large territory as France is simply brushed off in
L’orateur du genre humain:
Des adages nous détournaient de la conquête de notre bien : la
souveraineté imprescriptible. Une nation corrompue, disait-
on, est incapable de secouer le joug. Une terre de ving-sept
mille lieues carrées ne saurait exister libre. Ces lieux communs
sont plus nuisibles que les contagions pestilentielles. Il a fallu
les hasards de l’occasion, les prodiges du courage, les lumières
de la philosophie, pour constater que la corruption n’est sou-
vent qu’un mot vague au moral comme au physique, et que
l’étendue territoriale est plutôt favorable que préjudiciable à
l’organisation républicaine. Il était permis de fluctuer sur ces
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matières avant 1789 ; mais aujourd’hui, ce n’est plus errer, c’est
blasphémer, c’est étayer sciemment les dictatures usurpées.145
And later in the text Cloots calls for a universal republic, based on the
Déclaration:
Une tête d’homme, trouvée sous les fondements du Capitole,
fut, pour les Romains, le signal de leur grandeur future : les
droits de l’homme, trouvés sous les fondements de la consti-
tution française, seront pour les humains, le signal de la répu-
blique universelle.146
Edelstein notes the ‘sacralisation’ of the 1789 Déclaration by the Jacobins in
their ‘natural republicanism’; the Déclaration is the founding document of
natural law, and is also the only needed document for a constitution for the
republic, it is a ‘natural constitution’ that renders any other constitution re-
dundant.147 Cloots shares this ‘natural republicanism’ of the Jacobins with
the foundational aspect of the Déclaration. But this universal republic is
still led by the French king. Cloots calls on him and his heir to look at the
future and embrace a ‘universal republic’ with representatives from all over
the world at the national assembly in Paris.148
In La république universelle, written after the king took flight, Cloots re-
peats the neologism ‘loyaume’ (from loi, law, and royaume, kingdom), cre-
ated by François-Urbain Domergue (1745–1810), in order to argue against
the monarchist claim that monarchy is a better form of government than a
republic because the latter would create anarchy and disunion. Domergue
gave this definition of ‘loyaume’: ‘Nous nommons royaume un pays régi
souverainement par un roi ; le pays où la loi seule commande, je le nom-
merai loyaume’.149 So it is a country where the law is the governing power
as opposed to the realm of the king, with a little play of words. Cloots argues
that the fear of disunion and anarchy is precisely what makes the ‘loyaume’
so strong. The bigger the population and territory, the bigger the fear of
disunion, and therefore the stronger the republic:
La force nationale augmente en raison de la multiplication des
citoyens, et la force individuelle diminue, sous le régime de la
liberté, en raison de l’accroissement de la masse commune. Par
conséquent, plus la république sera vaste et peuplée, et moins
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on aura besoin d’un roi, si toutefois ce besoin ait jamais été réel
nulle part.150
As Cloots argues, one needs only look at the American example to under-
stand that the size of a country and of a population is an advantage rather
than an inconvenience for a republic. However, Cloots criticises the Amer-
ican choice of a federation over a single union. An argument he elaborates
on in another article. It is ‘la loi unique’, which will rule once the universal
republic is established.151 Therefore this ‘single law’ forms a universal loy-
aume where no one is a foreigner, and no one wages war for a family or a
familial territory.
The example of classical republicanism is rejected because of the modern-
ism of the French Enlightenment that founded human nature:
Un César trouvait dans Rome tous les matériaux de la tyran-
nie, parce que Rome conquérante régnait en tyran sur la terre
conquise ; parce que Rome n’était pas homogène ; parce que
la république romaine se concentrait aristocratiquement dans
les murs de Rome. Un citoyen romain était un homme pri-
vilégié : et la foule des externes s’attachait naturellement à la
fortune d’un Jules, d’un Auguste, d’un Tibère. Nous nous é-
tonnons de l’avilissement des Romains sous les empereurs, et
nous ne voyons pas que la majorité des esclaves et des étran-
gers fut l’ivraie qui étouffa le peuple-roi. Que de comparai-
sons insignifiantes on s’épargnerait en France si les yeux de
l’entendement étaient moins rares ! Les Romains et les Grecs,
avec leur système hétérogène et tyrannique, devaient périr en
s’agrandissant ; les Français, avec leur nivellement admirable,
s’assureront une durée éternelle, en s’agrandissant. Les Français
ont fondé l’empire de la nature humaine : la république des
hommes s’étendra et prospérera partout où il y aura des hom-
mes.152
In other words, the empire of human nature is universal as opposed to the
Roman empire founded on Roman nature. The question of identity is re-
jected in the French version of the republic because it is based on the ‘science
of man’, the laws of human nature universally true and valid. As seen in the
chapter on humanity, this does not mean that Cloots does not recognise
differences as part of human nature, but, to him, the most important and
unifying law of human nature is the universal desire for freedom: ‘la liberté
… est une plante qui s’acclimate partout’.153 The universal restoration of li-
berty through a republican regime will put an end to all wars, ‘l’âge de la
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paix remplacera l’âge de la guerre’.154 Even the rivalry between Oxford and
Cambridge: ‘Les heureuses rivalités d’Oxford et de Cambridge s’épureront
et s’étendront partout avec la liberté et l’union du genre humain’.155
It is also thanks to the principle of representation that a large republic
is possible, even as large as the whole globe with the whole human race:
‘L’assemblée des comices à Rome était composée de 400 000 votants, et
l’univers n’exigerait que 10 000 députés pour sa représentation !’156 How-
ever, this is quite an elevated amount of representatives. Probably Cloots
considered that if each country the size of France had 83 departments, and
considered that the National Assembly had 645 deputies, there would be
around 10.000 deputies for the world. Later Cloots lowered the number to
‘1500 or 2000’.157
What also makes a large republic possible, even a universal one, is that
unlike a kingdom, it is not ruled top-down, but bottom-up:
Quand l’action d’un gouvernement part du sommet, l’étendue
du territoire est nuisible, c’est le cas des royaumes ; mais un
gouvernement qui tire son énergie de la base, plus vous élargi-
rez cette base, et plus le gouvernement sera vigoureux ; c’est
le cas de la République universelle. Les droits de l’homme
partent de la racine, et par conséquent la plus petite munici-
palité fait partie du gouvernement populaire.158
However, Cloots is not very clear— but he also claimed he would not be, as
he is only laying down general principles— about the actual details of this
sort of grassroot democracy. Cloots’s general philosophical point is that a re-
publican government— although it really is governance that Cloots writes
about, since his view of the executive branch is minimalistic— based on the
Declaration of the Rights of Man is necessarily organised by its constitutive
unit, the individual, whose liberty and sovereignty is delegated to the repub-
lic. In the organisation of a kingdom, the king decides from the top without
any regards for the individual, whose rights are not recognised, according
to Cloots. Cloots’s view of ‘gouvernment’ is closer to today’s governance in
that individuals are governing themselves at the level that seems best fit. Clo-
ots writes for instance: ‘Notre République ne sera jamais trop vaste, car le
gouvernement s’étendra avec elle’.159
Modern wars are another reason why so much more money is wasted
than in Ancient Greece. And here Cloots’s argument seems to be in want
of reviving pre-1763 European hopes of seeing a republic of states due to
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the increasing control of the state of wars, which became so costly and ef-
ficient through public credit and standing armies.160 Cloots writes clearly
about the difference between the anciens and modernes: ‘C’est que la guerre
des modernes est plus dispendieuse que celle des anciens’.161 Unity is what
brings peace, as Cloots notes, and two cities under one law do not wage war
against one another, but two sovereign cities do. Before the issue of feder-
alism and its specific context came to the fore in 1793, Cloots had already
expressed his philosophical view for unity; it was not only based on the ob-
servation of unity in nature, but also on the historical example of corpor-
ations in France, and how they prevented necessary reforms. The idea of a
separation into different bodies, or polities, is the scourge of humankind,
for Cloots:
Les préjugés jettent de si profondes racines, que personne ne
s’était pas même avisé de demander : « Pourquoi y a-t-il plus
d’une nation ? » J’ai eu la hardiesse de présenter et de résoudre
le problème, en accusant l’ignorance barbare de nos pères. La
nature abhorre ce morcellement dont nous sommes punis avec
rigueur ; elle semble n’avoir donné à l’homme l’esprit de pro-
sélytisme que pour rompre les barrières qui nous séparent.162
There is thus an idea that humankind is a unified body, and should form
one single polity. There are two main ideas to explain this argument. One is
that ignorance and barbarism have collided against living in harmony on a
single planet. Ignorance according to the 1762 dictionary of French academy
defines a lack of knowledge, while barbarism is defined as cruelty and inhu-
manity, or as lack of politeness. Cruelty and inhumanity and a lack of know-
ledge result in divisions into rival corporations. The word corporation ac-
tually does not appear in the 1762 dictionary of the French academy, but
appears in Jean-François Féraud’sDictionaire critique de la langue française
(1787–1788):
CORPORATION, s. f. Mot emprunté des Anglais, pour si-
gnifier les Communautés municipales. « Ces Villages, dit M.
Moreau, formoient eux-mêmes des corporations. » Les Seign-
eurs, dans les Traités même avec quelques Villes, supposent
des corporations encore existantes. Id.— L’Acad. ne met pas
ce mot ; le Rich. Port. ne s’en sert qu’en parlant des Anglais.163
Corps provinciaux and corps nationaux are equated with corporations—
name taken from English to designate town communities. Anacharsis Clo-
ots tries to show how local national communities still remain, whereas the
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French revolution managed to gather all these ‘provinces’ under one ‘na-
tion’. However, this is still not enough. We all live on one single planet.
Whereas ignorance leads to division into rival corporations, knowledge dic-
tates unity of humankind on earth. As a result, Cloots predicts the end of
wars since a single political community does not make war within itself. Dis-
putes are only breaking out in the form of civil procedures. As such Italians,
divided as they are, make war among themselves, while the French only have
procedures: ‘Nous n’aurions jamais aucun démêlé sanglant avec Londres et
La Haye, si la France s’étendait aussi loin au nord de Paris qu’au midi de
Paris’.164 This sentence could sound imperialist, but it is not meant this way.
‘France’ is not meant here to be a ‘French’ entity but the universal republic,
which Cloots offered to change the name (see below). At other times, Cloots
tries to find a new name for what he perceives as the country of regenerated
people, free and equal, the beacon for universal freedom and peace, and
the only true political system. Or as Cloots calls it, a ‘philanthropic system’;
philanthropy understood as love for humankind.165
In an article entitled ‘L’auteur de la République universelle à l’Auteur du
Courrier des départements, salut’ published on 8 October 1792 in Le Cour-
rier des départements, Cloots answers Antoine Joseph Gorsas (1752–1793).
Gorsas was a publicist who was elected at the Convention and first sat with
the montagnards before changing to the Girondins. Le Courrier des 83 dé-
partements was his newspaper. Cloots states, in the context of debates in
1792 in favour of a federative system as argued by the Gironde, that Rous-
seau was wrong and would change his mind if he had lived today:
Quant aux erreurs de Mably, de Montesquieu, et de Rous-
seau, vraisemblablement ces grands hommes se rétracteraient
s’ils vivaient aujourd’hui. Je ne demande que du bon sens pour
décider entre l’empire des individus unis qui plient nécessai-
rement sous la loi, et l’empire des corporations unies, qui ré-
sistent arbitrairement à la loi.166
The mistakes in questions are the way these authors considered a plurality
of sovereign entities rather than a unity: Mably and the plurality of sover-
eign peoples; Montesquieu and the different spirits of law forming differ-
ent societies; Rousseau and the necessity of having a myriad of small repub-
lics. However, Cloots also agrees and builds on them. Cloots shares Mably’s
criticism of all natural law theorists as if they were the same, and the neces-
sity to protect the natural state in society with positive laws. Cloots shares
Montesquieu’s view of the universality and consistency of laws governing
nature and human beings. Cloots shares Rousseau’s criticism of natural law
164. Cloots, ‘La République universelle’, 245.
165. Ibid., 247.
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theories used to trick the sovereign peoples into a fake social contract, and
his conception of general will (as seen in the chapter on nature and natural
law). In this article, Cloots refers to the newly published translation of The
Federalist Papers by Alexander Hamilton, James Madison, and John Jay.167
Without naming it, Cloots quotes a passage from one of the chapters that
is supposed to support his own view against federalism and in favour of a
single sovereign. Cloots quotes a French translation from paper 20, written
by Madison. A relevant part of the quotation, here in the original version,
is:
Experience is the oracle of truth; and where its responses are
unequivocal, they ought to be conclusive and sacred. The im-
portant truth, which it unequivocally pronounces in the pre-
sent case, is that a sovereignty over sovereigns, a government
over governments, a legislation for communities, as contradis-
tinguished from individuals, as it is a solecism in theory, so in
practice it is subversive of the order and ends of civil polity, by
substituting violence in place of law, or the destructive coertion
of the sword in place of the mild and salutary coertion of the
magistracy.168
It is confusing today to read Cloots and this text because what Cloots
calls ‘federalism’ is actually what we, today, call confederalism when talk-
ing about French departments, and what Cloots equally called ‘federalism’
when talking about foreign countries joining the French republic is just an
international system with sovereign entities. By contrast, what Cloots actu-
ally proposes as a universal republic respecting the principles of unity and
indivisibility is more what we today indeed would call federalism. The his-
torical context is crucial to understanding this, as I develop below. In an-
other speech, ‘Anacharsis Cloots aux assemblées du Hainaut, du Brabant,
de la Flandre, etc.’, on 23 November 1792, Cloots writes:
… je vous conjure … de vous procurer un ouvrage nouvelle-
ment traduit de l’anglais, intitulé, je ne sais trop pourquoi :Le
Fédéraliste. Cet excellent livre est le bréviaire des unitaires, et
tout homme qui se dira publiciste, et qui n’aura pas goûté la
partie élémentaire de ce livre, faites-le descendre de la tribune ;
c’est un sot ou un coquin.169
As Palmer notes, federalism in France meant ‘the opposite of what it meant
in the United States at the same time’.170 Cloots’s incomprehension with
167. Alexander Hamilton, James Madison and John Jay, The Federalist: A Collection of
Essays, Written in Favour of the New Constitution, As Agreed upon by the Federal Con-
vention, September 17, 1787, 2 vols. (New York: J. / A. McLean, 1788).
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the title of the book is simply linked to the revolutionary vocabulary and
the context of the time: the federalists are opposed to the principle of unity
and indivisibility of the French republic, and want to organise a confeder-
ation of sovereign republics based on ancien régime regions; or so is the
claim of Cloots and the Mountain. In reality, the Gironde was just as com-
mitted to the unity and indivisibility of the republic, but they had a vision
of its organisation more oriented towards decentralisation, and they had no
nostalgia about the provinces of the old regime.171 ‘Federalism’ had become
another accusative epithet of being a counter-revolutionary during the Fre-
nch revolution, which not only had nothing to do with actual federalism,
but was also misconstrued and false. Since republicanism had only been
thought for small republics, there was a fear of complete disintegration of
the republic in 1792–1793, now that monarchy was abolished. The bloody
civil war in Vendée was omnipresent in the minds of the revolutionaries, as
well as threats from Bordeaux, Caen, Marseilles, Toulon, and Lyon to go
their separate ways. However, rather than federalism, the Girondins defen-
ded more autonomy for the departments, a sort of ‘departmentalism’; by
contrast, the Jacobins had a more centralising vision of government, ‘Paris-
centric’, which was exactly what some departments were fighting against as
they feared Parisian radicalisation.172 Notwithstanding, Cloots considered
Le Fédéraliste as providing a political theory against the ‘fédéralistes’. But
his view of government, was paradoxically less centralising than his fellow
Montagnards.
Interestingly, in Ni Marat, ni Roland, Cloots tells the story of one of
his encounters with Jean Marie Roland (1737–1793) — minister of the in-
terior until the king’s execution and one of the leading Girondists — dur-
ing which he suggested the reading of an English book, which principles,
he claims, where to be found in the last American convention.173 Unfortu-
nately, it is unclear which book and what author he is referring too. It seems
doubtful that it was a book from a well-known author such as John Locke,
since Cloots claims Roland did not know the book. Roland contributed to
the Encyclopédie, and as an economist he must have known about Locke.
Some possibilities are Harrington’sThe Commonwealth of Oceana, or John
Trenchard and Thomas Gordon’sCato’s Letters. However, it is also possible
that ‘ce livre anglais’ was a reference to the language and not the country of
171. Jacqueline Chaumié, ‘Girondins’, chap. 1 in Girondins et montagnards. Colloque en
Sorbonne (14 décembre 1975), ed. Albert Soboul, Bibliothèque d’Histoire révolutionnaire
(Paris: Société des études robespierristes, 2012 [1980]), 43–44.
172. Albert Soboul, ‘Introduction’, in Girondins et montagnards. Colloque en Sorbonne
(14 décembre 1975), ed. Albert Soboul, Bibliothèque d’Histoire révolutionnaire (Paris: So-
ciété des études robespierristes, 2012 [1980]), 15. See also on federalism in the departments:
Henri Wallon, La Révolution du 31 mai et le fédéralisme en 1793, 2 vols. (Paris: Hachette,
1886).
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the book; it could thus be The Federalist Papers, of which Cloots talked
about previously, which had recently been translated into French. In the
same speech, Cloots tells another anecdotic evening encounter with Pétion,
Dumouriez, Brissot, and Paine. According to Cloots, Brissot argued against
his universal republic because France was already too big, to which Paine
interjected that, unlike a monarchy that can be too large to be governed,
a republic based on human rights could cover the whole world.174 Cloots
concluded that Brissot wanted several isolated republics and was thus worse
than a fédéraliste, he was an ‘isoliste’.
Does Cloots want unity for the universal republic as an all-controlling
state? I think it would be a mistake to understand it as such. Yes, Cloots
is against what he calls ‘corporations’ of any kind, including ‘national cor-
porations’, but he is also against despotism understood as the negation of
human rights such as liberty and equality, and popular participation in gov-
ernment. The concept of ‘sovereignty of the human race’ is meant as a philo-
sophical way of imposing peace and legal settlement in conflicts arising bet-
ween different populations:
Frères et amis, retenez, méditez la maxime de l’Orateur du
genre humain : « Deux familles se battraient pour un mur
mitoyen, si une force majeure, une loi commune ne civilisait
pas leur procès. »175
What matters is the submission of all under a common law, and a law can
only be common if it is decided by all, which points to a republic with
elected representatives for the one thousand departments of the world, ac-
cording to Cloots. It is best to understand Cloots’s ‘system’ of universal re-
public as an extension of how France was organised before 1793 rather than
after 1793 when democracy and liberty were paradoxically reduced, and ulti-
mately ended in the Terror. The question is how much Cloots can be held
responsible and representative for that as a member of the Convention. It
is the Convention after all that reconducted monthly the Comité de Salut
Public, the de facto executive branch in lieu of the king, and voted for its
extraordinary executive powers.
However, this was not the case at the time Cloots wrote. Cloots con-
sidered the principles of the French republic as universal. His optimism of
the French Enlightenment and the revolution is very apparent in that Clo-
ots justifies how being French or being part of France actually means less
being French but being oneself and being independent:
Appartenir à la France, c’est appartenir à soi-même ; se gouver-
ner à la française, c’est avoir une municipalité de son choix, une
174. Ibid., 430.
175. Ibid., 434.
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assemblée représentative de son choix, une administration de
son choix.176
The fundamental principle of the French republic is after all to respect in-
dividual liberty and equality, and thus to give the possibility to elect any
official with authoritative power. During this time, there was actually an ex-
plosion of elections, as Woloch notes, since article 3 of theDeclaration states
that ‘no body and no individual may exercise authority that does not eman-
ate from the nation expressly’. As a result, enfranchised citizens were called
to elect any position of authority: mayors, municipal officers, municipal
councils, sometimes national guard officers, and justices of the peace. Cit-
izens also participated in large cities to assemblies of the neighbourhood sec-
tions, designating section officials and committees, ‘convened in primary
assemblies to choose electors to fill a host of other elective positions’, and
even the bishops and priests had to be selected by electors.177 This French
government was therefore a highly grassroot-based and participative one,
even if abstentions were high particularly for less local elections. This was
what Cloots had in mind with his ‘se gouverner à la française’, and why he
thought that it was not only unproblematic for a large republic, but even its
strength — the larger, the stronger. Moreover, all these representatives are
supposed to be working within a rigourous legal framework that would pre-
vent any individual of becoming too important, or more important that the
function occupied. But even so, the principle of an open and free exchange
of ideas should put in check this individual in front of the sovereign— the
electors.178
With the execution of the king and the new republic without monarchy,
Cloots begins to refer more intensively to the principles of unity and indivis-
ibility, together with the theme of universality. Cloots starts to add the ‘year
of liberty’ (meaning the year the Assembly proclaimed itself national) and
the ‘year of equality’ (meaning the year the king was removed from power)
to his writings. Then he states the birth year of the republic. Cloots also
starts at this moment to accentuate the place, Paris, as ‘cosmopole’ or ‘chef-
lieu du globe’. Cloots’s view is that Paris is not only the capital city of the
French republic, but of the coming universal republic. This is a period of
profound unrest with wars at the borders and enemies already on French
soil, almost a civil war within the borders, still a financial crisis inherited
from the ancien régime, and no executive branch. In order to palliate the
absence of executive, the Comité de Salut Public was instated on 9 April
1793 with nine members; extended to twelve after Robespierre’s election on
27 July.
176. Cloots, ‘Bases constitutionnelles’, 493.
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However, the political context of 1793 is not of significance for Cloots’s
general view, except that he utters his last book,Bases constitutionnelles, with
the vocabulary of anti-federalism and the mention of struggles between
Girondins and Montagnards. But the principle of unity of the human race
and sovereignty of the human race based on the universal principles of li-
berty and equality had already been mentioned in his previous writings.
Bases constitutionnelles was published at the occasion of the debates on a
new constitution, but Cloots had already written most of it before, as he
mentions on 23 November 1792 in a letter ‘aux assemblées primaires du Hai-
naut, du Brabant, de la Flandre, etc.’.179 In Bases constitutionnelles, Cloots
does mention these countries towards the end of his speech and how and
why he would integrate them in the republic.180 Moreover, this published
speech as pamphlet is not a proposition for a constitution, but a proposi-
tion for a decree that the Convention should take in order to incorporate
automatically any country who would recognise the principle of the sover-
eignty of the human race.
Bases constitutionnellespresents Cloots’s suggestions to the constitutional
debates, and a summary of his political thinking within the context of 1793
and the question of federalism. The same principle of a single universal re-
public as explained before:
Les corps provinciaux et les corps nationaux sont les plus gr-
ands fléaux du genre humain. Quelle ignorance, quelle barba-
rie de nous parquer en différentes corporations rivales, pen-
dant que nous avons l’avantage d’habiter une des moindres
planètes de la sphere céleste ! Nous multiplions nos jalousies,
nos querelles, en divisant l’intérêt commun, la force commune.
Un corps ne se fait pas la guerre à lui-même, et le genre humain
vivra en paix, lorsqu’il ne formera qu’un seul corps, la nation
unique.181
Cloots’s republicanism is based on the principle of liberty, a liberty un-
derstood as non-domination. This liberty as non-domination is the source
of the sovereignty of the human race and the universal republic of the united
individuals. The reasoning, philosophically, is simple: nature is universal,
and from nature comes natural rights, which are equally universal. Liberty
is a natural right, universal to all individual human beings. Because of this
very fact, an individual cannot be free on her own, meeting another free
179. ‘Je n’entrerai pas ici dans le fond de la question, car je monterai incessamment à la
tribune de la Convention nationale, sans l’intermédiaire d’aucun comité quelconque, pour
appuyer la demande judicieuse des habitants de Nice, de la Savoie, de Porrentruy, de Sipre,
de Mayence, de Sarrebruck, et d’autres pays environnants. Mon travail vous parviendra :
mais en attendant, ne précipitez rien’. In Cloots, Ecrits révolutionnaires, 432.
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298 republicanism
individual human being leads to the necessary domination of one over an-
other. As a result, two individuals form a group in which they decide to
delegate their sovereignty to protect their liberty over someone else’s dom-
ination. This group is thus sovereign, but upon meeting another group,
equally sovereign according to the same natural principle, they have to com-
bine in order to preserve the liberty of all. This is in the interest of peace
and harmony for humankind. From this it results that, since only the hu-
man race inhabits the earth, only the human race can be sovereign in order
to protect liberty for every individual on earth. Cloots does not trust that
even independent republics would not seek domination over one another,
as history has shown with the Italian republics.
Federalism—understood as a confederation of sovereign states—is a sys-
tem to avoid because it is contrary to nature and against reason, according to
Cloots. However, this does not mean that the system should be imposed on
free populations; kings should be fought, but populations should be con-
vinced. A free people will think about the principle and see the advantages
that it brings— peace and independence.182 Moreover, this universal repub-
lic based on the sovereignty of the human race leaves local populations free
to decide how to spend public money, once taxes have been collected and
redistributed worldwide:
Il n’y a pas d’autorité plus tutélaire que celle du genre humain ;
il donne la plus grande latitude à chaque section de l’Empire :
tous les individus, sous son gouvernement, jouiront d’une é-
gale portion de liberté. … Qu’importe à la société, pourvu que
l’impôt rentre, et que les députés arrivent en raison de la ré-
partition universelle ; chacun fera le déboursé de ses fantaisies
particulières. La différence des costumes, des cultures et des
cultes ne troublera point l’harmonie sociale. Pas d’autre règle
à cet égard que la convenance topographique.183
Cloots makes it clear that it is not a centralised government that he has in
mind, even if he sees Paris as the centre of everything. Local populations
have got freedom to choose over matters that impact their lives in matters
of politics, education, justice, industry and agriculture. Moreover, Cloots
argues that this will enable greater solidarity when a region in the world is
devastated by a natural disaster or plagued by famine.184
The executive branch will ultimately become redundant once the univer-
sal republic is established.185 In this universal republic, according to Cloots
there will be no more use for an executive branch since there will be no need
182. Cloots, ‘Bases constitutionnelles’, 477.
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for foreign affairs, an army, a fleet, or stock market speculation in a universal
republic.186 Only the ministry of Interior and the ministry of Justice will still
be needed, under the control of the deputies, whose other only job will be
‘la surveillance générale’ and liaising with the ‘arrondissements administrat-
ifs’.187 The ministry of Interior, however, will no longer have to deal with
obstacles due to wars, supplying the armies, dealing with obstacles to im-
portations and exportations, debt, loan, or the stagnation of employment,
since all barrieres to trade and exchange will disappear.188 For Cloots all eco-
nomic ills stemmed from wars and international instability. By the same
token, justice will hardly be needed as there will be ‘le calme de l’harmonie
universelle’.189
But until then, Cloots laid out the plans for the organisation of the cur-
rent executive committee. What Cloots calls the ‘executive duty’— in order
to emphasise that power resides in the sovereign human race— should con-
sist of a committee of seven ministers nominated among members of the
‘legislative duty’. At the time Cloots was writing, there were six ministers
for the Convention: foreign affairs, war, justice, interior, finance, navy and
colonies. Cloots suggests adding a seventh minister, who would be in charge
of ‘arts, sciences, agriculture, manufactures, and trade’.190 This composition
of ministers stemming from the assembly aims at avoiding that the execut-
ive branch be elected directly, which would beget conflicts as it would create
a de facto a second chamber even worse than bicameral proposals.191 This is
thus a revision of his earlier proposal to elect a European king inRépublique
universelle.
It is therefore a very reduced kind of state that Cloots proposes. The uni-
versal republic will not even possess anything, as property will solely be
private and not public. Here Cloots has infinite faith in the workings of
economics without the need for any external intervention, except regula-
tions for avoiding theft and other unfair competition. It is however unclear
if this is plain wishful thinking considering the contemporary food short-
ages and economic difficulties, but Cloots states optimistically: ‘La paix per-
pétuelle maintiendra un niveau perpétuel entre la consommation et les con-
sommateurs, entre l’ouvrage et les ouvriers’.192 Again, this is a thought very
similar to that of the physiocrates, as described in the chapter on natural law.
By the same token, and with a sort of reverse argument, Cloots rejects an-
other opinion in France about forming ‘sister republics’ or buffer repub-
lics at the borders of the French republic. Cloots observes that republics are
186. Ibid., 487.
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more prone to trade than kingdoms, and since trade is the major source of
disagreement among individuals, it would be best to have only one republic
rather than several republics who could potentially go to war for economic
reasons.193
Liberty, Virtue, Patriotism
Throughout Cloots’s writings, liberty appears in the singular as ‘la liberté’.
However, there are several understandings of liberty behind this single label
‘la liberté’, as seen above. Cloots’s understanding of liberty is the absence of
domination over the individual’s life, as well as the absence of the threat of
domination over the individual’s life. Liberty is often expressed as a feeling.
This is the reason why Cloots considers liberty sufficient to form a com-
munity as humankind
There are several examples of liberty expressed as a sentiment naturel (nat-
ural feeling) throughout Cloots’s revolutionary writings: ‘Comme si le ciel
et la terre et le cœur humain n’étaient pas empreints des emblèmes de la
liberté’.194 Being a materialist, Cloots obviously does not believe that the
soul is the source of this natural feeling towards liberty. It is to be found
in the heart as an organ, just like the lungs enables one to breathe, the
heart enables to love liberty: ‘Tant que l’homme aura des poumons il res-
pirera l’air, et tant qu’il aura un cœur, il aimera la liberté’.195 And since it
is a feeling, more than a rational and abstract thought, it leads equally to
emotional actions: ‘L’amour de la liberté a son bandeau, et ses fureurs’.196
This is also why Cloots excuses several acts of violence, and even atrocities,
committed by Parisian crowds, as seen previously. But the most important
motor of this feeling is that it drives individuals, and populations to revolt
against slavery or any other attack on liberty: ‘L’enthousiasme de la liberté
l’emporterait sur le fanatisme de l’esclavage’.197 Had Cloots lived longer, per-
haps he would have developed this idea into a philosophy of history. This
cannot be known, but it is certain that liberty, for Cloots, has, as a natural
feeling, the value of a law of nature in the ‘science of man’.
It must therefore be taken into consideration when deciding on human
institutions in a constitution since it forms the basis of virtue and thereby
morality. It is certain, however, that Cloots theorised liberty as a moving
factor in history because, in a Machiavellian way, it makes citizens better
and more effective soldiers when they passionately defend their liberty:
193. Cloots, ‘Bases constitutionnelles’, 483.
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La liberté se fonde sur la force des citoyens ; le despotisme se
fonde sur la faiblesse des sujets. Assemblez-vous, éclairez-vous,
armez-vous: voilà le cri d’un gouvernement libre ; dispersez-
vous, n’ayez ni lumières, ni armes ; voilà le cri d’un gouver-
nement arbitraire. Avec ces données, il est facile de prévoir la
chute prochaine des tyrans. Qu’est-ce qu’un citoyen français ?
C’est un homme libre, plus un fusil. Qu’est-ce qu’un habitant
de l’Autriche ? C’est un homme dégradé et désarmé. Comme
le fusil est un ingrédient essentiel pour la recette de la liberté,
tâchons de le rendre aussi formidable que possible.198
Republican patriotism is therefore stronger than royal patriotism, and that
is why French soldiers ought to be victorious against Austrian soldiers. Li-
berty is what unites the ‘citizens’ of a republic, and universal liberty is what
unites the citizens of the world: ‘La liberté unit les citoyens du monde ; et
les despotes se disputent la dépouille de Darius’.199 Darius (c. 550–486 BCE)
was king of the Persian Achaemenid Empire and he is probably mentioned
here by Cloots because he invaded Greece before a Greek revolt, supported
by Greek city-states, defeated his armies at the Battle of Marathon in 490
BCE. Cloots perceives this episode as the victory of republican Athens and
the city-states over the Persian kingdom.
With this understanding of liberty it can be said that it is spontaneous
and universal to all men. Questions of the colour of the skin do not matter:
‘Mon système de la libération générale n’admet ni colonies, ni métropoles,
ni différence de couleurs, ni différence de nations’.200 Nor do questions of
climate and geography, as seen previously: ‘la liberté, quoi qu’en dise Mon-
tesquieu, est une plante qui s’acclimate partout’.201 Furthermore, given Clo-
ots’s conception of humankind as truly universal, it can be said that liberty
is a feeling shared by every single human being on earth. This is how and
why it enables one to constitute a moral and sentimental community, the
community of the human race. Moreover, since liberty is also the source of
sovereignty, this entails that sovereignty is also felt, and if liberty is the sole
source for a moral community of mankind, sovereignty is also something
to be felt by mankind.
Ne laissons pas échapper un principe que je voudrais graver
dans le cœur de tous les citoyens de l’univers ; c’est que les dif-
férents peuples ne sont que des fractions du souverain unique,
des portions morcelées, languissantes, imparfaites, de la na-
tion du genre humain.202
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The principle of the sovereignty of the human race, and thus of the nation
of the human race, is not an abstract idea to be pondered by philosophers;
it is a feeling to be ‘carved in the hearts of the citizens of the universe’. This
way, in a universal republic, everyone being free, there would be no reason
to fight anymore, since previous reasons leading to wars were kings’ capri-
cious and insatiable will to conquer, or economic rivalries between compet-
ing republics. Patriotism, as the love of liberty, the love of laws, the love of
the republic, is universal, and there is no one to fight wars against.
In considering liberty as a natural feeling, Cloots is close to Rousseau
in Discours sur l’inégalité and Émile, Smith in The Theory of Moral Senti-
ments, and Hume inATreatise of HumanNature on moral sentimentalism
explaining the capacity of man, and therefore of humankind, to recognise
good and evil. However, if liberty is a natural feeling and leads to a natural
moral, it does not for Cloots entail that man is naturally good:
L’homme n’est ni bon ni méchant : il est ce qu’il doit être dans
les circonstances qui le meuvent. Un confesseur expérimenté
disait à ses pénitents : Dites-moi votre état, votre profession, et
je vous dirai vos péchés. La connaissance du cœur humain est
d’une importance majeure dans une république, et la liberté
court moins de risques en croyant les hommes méchants que
de leur attribuer une bonté chimérique. N’ayons pas la manie
de vouloir être meilleurs que la nature : je suis bon comme elle
et mauvais comme elle.203
It is best to take as a starting point that man is hypothetically evil rather
than good in order to decide how to establish a constitution, the legal frame-
work which organises social, political, and economic life. Good and evil are
equally present in nature and in man, it is therefore preferable to observe
this consideration from nature rather than as an abstract notion of human-
kind as inherently good, in order to draft a constitution.
But when it comes to a constitution for a universal republic, it becomes
then necessary to make a difference between universal virtue and local vir-
tue. ‘O tempora o mores’, seems to say Cloots with Cicero, when he writes
that virtue and vice should be defined as what is beneficial or detrimental to
society as decided by its members. There is no mention of Jeremy Bentham
(1748–1832) in Cloots’s work, but it sounds very close to his utilitarian prin-
ciples developed in A Fragment on Government (1776). With this defini-
tion, Cloots argues, it is possible to distinguish between ‘universal virtues’
and ‘local virtues’.204 Cloots recognises that laws and ideas differ from one
society to another based on diversity of needs explained by history, culture,
or geography. Therefore, these discussions are left out of the constitution
203. Cloots, ‘L’Orateur du genre humain’, 169.
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of the universal republic to local self-determination. What matters most,
perhaps, as a universal virtue is the freedom of expression and opinion: ‘…
comme si la république pouvait exister six mois, sans l’indépendance des
écrivains…’.205 But the freedom left to local self-determination considering
virtues and vices is quite large, since Cloots considers that Chinese laws al-
lowing infanticide, or Plato’s advice on pederasty will be left to local determ-
ination.206 What matters in Cloots’s system is that laws protect the social
sphere from natural individual instincts to conquer, destroy, and domin-
ate.207 So, what will determine these laws according to this system is their
social utility as considered by its members; as Cloots puts it, the better a
law the more powerful.208 Self-interest, self-love, lead to common interest
and the love of the patrie, meaning the country where liberty is protected,
the republic:‘la liberté civile est une force coercive qui enchaîne tous les des-
potismes individuels sous le despotisme de la loi’.209 One thing is certain,
liberty in a republic is more likely to lead human nature towards virtue, and
slavery in a monarchy is more likely to lead to vice and Cloots compares it
to Dante’s depiction of Hell: ‘Lasciate ogni speranza, voi ch’entrate’.210
As to equality, for it is also the laws of the republic that must take into
account natural inequalities in order to protect the weakest against the
strongest, and to reward individuals according to talent and virtue (as previ-
ously defined as civism, what benefits society). Natural law provides equal-
ity in rights by birth, but the law of nature provides inequality by birth. It
is therefore the task of a republic to make sure that the equality of rights is
maintained so that natural inequalities do not negate them.211
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Following the above analysis, it can therefore be said that Cloots’s thought
is part of the language of republicanism with the following characteristics:
reference to Roman constitution, liberty as non-domination, prevalence
of law. What is missing from the language of republicanism in Cloots’s
thought is the reference to trade and corruption, when Cloots considers
trade as a positive part of a republic, and luxury even being source of many
good side effects such as a higher interest in arts and sciences, provided that
wealth is equally redistributed and that no one is left in poverty. Classical
republicanism is omnipresent in Cloots’s writings, as well as Machiavellian
themes of republicanism. There is in Cloots a clear influence of English re-
205. Ibid., 125.
206. Ibid., 123.
207. Ibid., 127.
208. Ibid., 129.
209. Ibid., 127.
210. Cloots, ‘La République universelle’, 256.
211. Cloots, ‘L’Orateur du genre humain’, 138.
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publican authors, such as Locke, Hume, and the authors of The Federalist
Papers. To these characteristics, one could add other ones in Cloots’s repub-
licanism such as: the rejection of theology and ideology, republicanism as an
alternative in political thought (although first with a discussion of the role
of monarchy and royalty in a republic), the importance of social science for
the functionning of of the republic, of education of citizens in general, and
a neo-Roman Ciceronian rhetoric.
But natural republicanism with Cloots is also a republic that takes into
consideration the ‘science of man’, the observation of human nature, in or-
der to insure that the equality in rights is respected among individuals when
natural inequality may lead to the domination of one individual over an-
other weaker individual. Regarding the prevalence of law, it is above all the
law of nature that primes for Cloots in that the Declaration of the Rights of
Man and the Citizen is the first law and constitution of the universal repub-
lic. And in that, and also because Cloots rejects the state of nature unless it
is the same as the social state, Cloots’s republicanism can be said to be akin
to ‘natural republicanism’. Cloots rejects the idea of a social contract; he
writes about a ‘primitive contract’, by which he means the agreement made
when a free human being meets another free human being and they need
to decide of laws to maintain their independence (i.e. their liberty without
domination by the other). But what is different in Cloots is that this natural
republicanism is considered universal, and it must now be analysed for its
universality. This is the object of the concluding chapter that considers cos-
mopolitanism historically and argues that Cloots’s ‘natural republicanism’
is a cosmopolitan republicanism.
C O N C L U S I O N :
C O S M O P O L I TA N
R E P U B L I C A N I S M
La révolution française n’a pas
eu de territoire propre ; … elle a
formé, au-dessus de toutes les
nationalités particulières une
patrie intellectuelle commune….
Tocqueville, 18561
Cloots, as the previous chapters argued, developed a classical repub-lican rhetoric and self-fashioned himself as ‘orator’ of a single and
united human race with the mission of discovering the laws of the ‘science
of man’ in politics based on the observation of nature. This led him to pro-
claim the ‘universal republic’ of the ‘sovereign nation of the human race’. I
have argued that Cloots’s ‘system’ was a part of what Edelstein has identi-
fied as ‘natural republicanism’ among the Jacobins. Natural republicanism
is characterised by: the absence of a transition from a natural state to a so-
cial state, or considering that the social state is the natural state; hence, the
absence of a social contract; a minimalistic constitution, since nature is the
only guide with its laws, starting with the rights of man. But there is more
to Cloots’s view than that — it is a universal republic, not only a natural
republic. The universalism of the French revolution and the universalism
of the French republic were not Cloots’s own and isolated views. Palmer
notes the widespread ideological affinity of the French republic all across
Europe, and cites Fichte who found it ‘“evident” in 1799 that “only the Fre-
nch republic can be considered by the just man as his true country”’.2 What
Palmer seeks to show is the appeal of ‘democracy’ in Europe and America—
‘democracy’ understood as an ideal of equality or discomfort with ancient
forms of social rank.3
So, how should one characterise Cloots’s universal natural republican-
ism? Imperial universalism because it seeks to expand universally the re-
1. Alexis de Tocqueville, L’ancien régime et la Révolution, ed. J.-P. Mayer, Folio/His-
toire (Paris: Gallimard, 1967 [1856]), 68.
2. Robert Roswell Palmer, The Age of the Democratic Revolution: A Political History
of Europe andAmerica, 1760–1800, with a foreword by David Armitage, Princeton Classics
(Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press, 2014 [1959, 1964]), 7.
3. Ibid., 6.
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volutionary principles, through war if necessary? But what about Cloots’s
writings of convincing public opinions rather than waging wars? Cloots
did change his mind and supported the wars of ‘liberation’, but then what
about the concept of local self-determination for tax revenues in the univer-
sal republic? Universal republicanism? But what about his concept of ‘cos-
mopolitan reason’ as a limit to universal principles? Cosmopolitan republic-
anism? This is how other scholars have qualified Cloots’s political thought,
but the study of the concept of cosmopolitanism and cosmopolitan in the
eighteenth century shows the quasi inexistence of the former, and the unre-
lated meaning of the latter, as this chapter will argue. Moreover, how should
one interpret Cloots’s concept of ‘nation of the human race’? Or ‘patrie of
the human race’? Aren’t the concepts of nation and patrie opposed to a
cosmopolitan ideal?
Cloots’s system, as fleshed out and explained in its context during the
previous chapters, constitutes a cosmopolitan republicanism understood as
a variant of what Edelstein has called ‘natural republicanism’ among the
Jacobins. Other students of Cloots’s thought have explicitly or implicitly
labelled Cloots’s thought as ‘cosmopolitan republicanism’. They have em-
phasised many of the key elements in Cloots’s system, which this thesis has
expounded, but they have not defined exactly what should be understood
as ‘cosmopolitan’ in Cloots’s thought, in eighteenth-century French polit-
ical thought, and among the revolutionaries.
I suggested in the introduction to consider Remi’s ‘cosmopolisme’ as the
starting point for an understanding of late eighteenth-century cosmopoli-
tanism. Remi identified humanity as the ‘first feelings of social man’, with
the need to speak ‘the language of nature’. Humanity was also associated
with the work of the Encyclopédie, hence relating it to reason and the pro-
duction of knowledge about humankind. Rémi also mentioned a repub-
lican work with Fénelon and republican virtues. Reason, science, nature,
humanity, republicanism, those were the themes of the chapters of this
thesis that illustrated Cloots’s political thought after explaining his rhetoric
and self-fashioning as ‘orator of the human race’.
Sentiment and reason were two important sides of classical rhetoric in
that a good orator was supposed to convince an audience of a philosophical
truth by appealing to feelings. This constituted an important part of the re-
volutionaries’ education, put into practice in their childhood realisation of
republican ideals at the national assembly. For the part based on reason, re-
volutionaries and Cloots followed the conception of science as taken in the
Encyclopédie with a view to developing a ‘science of man’ in a Newtonian
paradigm. This science was thus universal and based on the observation of
nature, the nature of man. However, Cloots limited this universal reason
to possible contestations, also reasonably argued. He used the expression of
‘cosmopolitan reason’ in order to express this. As such, Cloots considered
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that there were some virtues that were universal, and others that were local,
and that the determination of what was good or bad for society, civism, was
let to local determination.
What are universal principles for humankind, however, are liberty and
equality in rights by birth, and for each individual of the human race irre-
spective of culture, colour of skin, sex, geography, or any other determinant.
The understandings of the unity of the human race, and of the individual as
its prime unit, stem equally from the ‘science of man’ as contained in theEn-
cyclopédie. Liberty and equality were also feelings, felt in the heart of every
human being. And as such they are sufficient to form a communal bond in
that all human beings want universally to be free and equal, and thus want
a political system that would protect and maintain their liberty and equal-
ity. This system is the ‘sovereignty of the human race’. The only rational—
until proven otherwise by ‘cosmopolitan reason’— system to warranty the
protection of liberty and equality is republicanism. And the only way to
warranty liberty and equality for individuals everywhere on earth is a ‘uni-
versal republic’.
Cosmopolitan republicanism considers sovereignty as single and indivi-
sible. It is based on individual human beings, free and equal according to
natural law, who, upon meeting, delegate their freedom and equality to a
superior entity in charge of protecting and maintaining this state of liberty
and equality. However, it is not based on contract theory, in that it considers
the social state as the natural state. A republic is the only way individuals
can organise their government as participative and deciding of the laws to
frame their lives. Therefore, since sovereignty only belongs to the human
race, the republic is the republic of the human race, or republic of united
individuals.
However, this universal republic is highly decentralised and only com-
posed of a capital (in Cloots’s case Paris) where the deputies representing
all the rationally divided departments of the world decide of legislations
deemed universal, and controlling the application of laws. The executive
branch is reduced to a minimum, and all matters that are deemed local are
decided locally by elected local representative.
For Cloots, republicanism was a feasible solution for a large nation, even
as large as the whole human race, because of the modern science of man.
Cloots considered the French revolution as a re-birth of political and social
organisation, a republican Renaissance after the Middle Ages of monarch-
ism. The re-discovery of Roman and Attic concepts such as republicanism
was merged with modern concepts of the science of man such as the gen-
eral will, reason, and natural law, all re-defined. Modern science combined
with a view of a golden age of antiquity enabled to reinterpret republican-
ism within universal and rational principles. This Modern Antiquity led
to cosmopolitan republicanism; the science of man shows the universal law
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of liberty and equality among individuals, the unity of the human species,
the absence of borders and the need to unite the human race as one sover-
eign. Only under a common law determined by the general will could the
human race end wars and start to prosper. The larger the general will the
stronger the republic, because it would weaken the possibility of particular
wills gaining to much power, unlike what Rousseau believed.
Cosmopolitan republicanism in the French revolution has not been stud-
ied as such by scholars. Given the distinction between universal and local
principles and needs, and given the highly decentralised and grass-root based
government, it is best to describe Cloots’s republicanism as cosmopolitan
rather than simply universal. Cloots demonstrated throughout his works
a philosophical commitment to develop a universally valid social science
that would find universal principles equally applicable in the world, whilst
leaving particular principles to be decided locally. Contrary to what Haber-
mas and other followers have argued, reason was not solely conceived as
universal and therefore a rigid base for thinking cosmopolitanism. As Clo-
ots’s case shows, there was already an understanding of the need to confront
various rational views, to maintain a communication among world popula-
tions, what Cloots called ‘cosmopolitan reason’, very akin to Habermas’s
‘Kommunikative Rationalität’.4 Cosmopolitan republicanism is therefore
not only of interest to students of republicanism, and students of the Fre-
nch revolution, but also for a general understanding of the epistemology of
social sciences and political theory in a globalised world.
It must be noted that the present study focused on Cloots, but that other
figures also shared similar views of cosmopolitan republicanism and deserve
further study. The most important and closest figures are Thomas Paine,
Volney, and Condorcet, whose political thoughts in the French revolution
should also be studied within the framework of cosmopolitan republican-
ism in order to have a more accurate picture of all its variants. Volney has
been studied for his general view regarding empire and the false superiority
of Europeans.5 Condorcet’s views on the global spread of republicanism has
also been studied.6 Paine’s thought is perhaps better known to anglophone
4. Jürgen Habermas, Theorie des kommunikativen Handelns, 2 vols. (Berlin:
Suhrkamp, 1981).
5. Antoine Lilti, ‘« Et la civilisation deviendra générale » : L’Europe de Volney ou
l’orientalisme à l’épreuve de la Révolution’, La Révolution française. Cahiers de l’Institut
d’histoire de la Révolution française, no. 4: Dire et faire l’Europe à la fin du XVIIIe siècle
(June 2011); Alexander Cook, ‘“The Great Society of the Human Species”: Volney and the
Global Politics of Revolutionary France’, Intellectual History Review 23, no. 3 (2013): 309–
328.
6. Yves Bénot, ‘Condorcet et la république universelle’, in Condorcet : homme des Lu-
mières et de la Révolution, ed. Anne-Marie Chouillet and Pierre Crépel (Fontenay Saint-
Cloud: ENS éditions, 1997), 251–262; Anne-Marie Chouillet and Pierre Crépel, eds., Con-
dorcet : homme des Lumières et de la Révolution (Fontenay Saint-Cloud: ENS éditions,
1997).
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scholars, and he has been studied from the point of view of international re-
lations theory, but also for his constitutional thought in historical context.7
7. Robert Lamb, ‘The Liberal Cosmopolitanism of Thomas Paine’, The Journal of
Politics 76, no. 3 (July 2014): 636–648; Thomas C. Walker, ‘The Forgotten Prophet: Tom
Paine’s Cosmopolitanism and International Relations’, International Studies Quarterly44,
no. 1 (March 2000): 51–72; Richard Whatmore, ‘Thomas Paine’, chap. 19 in Constitutions
and the Classics: Patterns of Constitutional Thought from Fortescue to Bentham, ed. Denis
Galligan (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2014), 414–437.

E P I L O G U E
„Ich bin Clootsianer“
Joseph Beuys, 19781
January 1978, the German happening artist Joseph Beuys (1921–1986) isat Gnadenthal palace, near Cleves, to visit Cloots’s birthplace. He meets
with a descendant of the Cloots family:
„Ich kannte ihn schon als Kind“ sagt Beuys, „Anacharsis Clo-
ots, wie er sich nannte, war der erste, der eine wirkliche Theo-
rie der Demokratie entwickelte.“ Beuys zieht einen langen blau-
en Mantel an, wie ihn Schweizer Sanitäter tragen und wie er
ihn schon 1972 bei der Besetzung der Düsseldorfer Akademie
trug, den „Theatermantel aus meiner Kampfzeit“. Verwun-
dert sieht Baron von Hövell, jetziger Schlossherr und Nach-
fahre des Anarchisten Cloots, das seltsame Gebaren. „Ich bin
Clootsianer“, stellt Beuys sich vor, „Sie führen die Blutslinie
fort, ich die Ideenlinie.“ — „Aber hier“, sagt der Baron und
zeigt auf die Schlossparkidylle, „muss einer doch keine revolu-
tionären Ideen entwickeln!“—„Doch, gerade hier“ sagt Beuys
und beginnt seine Aktion. Ein Buch mit Texten von Cloots in
der Hand, geht Beuys um das Haus des toten Anarchisten.2
Anarchist, Cloots was not; he was only Anacharsis. It is not exactly clear
in what way Cloots can be considered an ‘anarchist’, as this story tells us.
Perhaps it is a reference for his minimalistic view of the state since follow-
ing the laws of nature should suffice to ensure peace, happiness, and order.3
It is interesting to see how Cloots’s political thought managed to influence
at least one person in the twentieth century. However, Beuys only knew
of Cloots because he grew up in Cleves. Had he grown up elsewhere, he
may not have come across this locally famous Cloots. There is no reason
why Cloots should remain an obscure figure of political thought. Cloots
pondered the problematisation that modern political thought is still strug-
gling with, and formulated what he thought was a universal solution, not
unlike Kant. Perhaps, the vehicle of pamphlets rather than scholarly written
1. Peter Sager, Unterwegs zu Künstlern und Bildern: Reportagen und Porträts (Köln:
DuMont, 1988), 21.
2. Ibid.
3. As Bevilacqua also argues: Bevilacqua, ‘Conceiving the Republic of Mankind’.
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treatises, and the rather short life-span that prevented him from developing
his philosophical ideas into more atemporal works cost Cloots the price of
intellectual legacy. He is nonetheless the frontman of a widespread revolu-
tionary view regarding both universal reason, a metaphysics of nature, the
view of a united humankind, and the universality of individual rights. Clo-
ots lost the political battle on widening the concept of nation — already
abstract and encompassing many different political entities with their own
language, culture, laws, and taxations— to the logical extreme of the whole
humankind. The idea of French nation, is still a concept that has roots in
this abstract notion of naturally free and equal individuals as recognised by
theDeclaration. The best example of this is the electoral law that grants any
French national world-wide the right to vote for the presidential election,
because the president of the French republic represents the ‘nation’. On
the other hand, the general elections for the representatives of the national
assembly are reserved to nationals with a residency in France as they, para-
doxically, do not represent the ‘nation’ as an abstract community, but the
nation as the concrete community divided into circonscriptions through-
out the territory. Much of this distinction within the concept of nation as
an abstract entity opposed to aristocracy, and as an ‘ethnic’ entity has been
lost in favour of the opposition between the principle of ‘national’ sover-
eignty, and ‘popular’ sovereignty.
It is therefore appropriate to compare and oppose Kant’s solution to Clo-
ots’s, as Kleingeld did, although with a more contextualised and historically
accurate view of Cloots’s thought. They both came with two different solu-
tions that stem from a universal conception of individual rights. Cloots’s
solution was based on the individual having sovereignty over herself and
transferring her sovereignty to the only political entity that is the nation of
the human race. Kant’s solution, on the other hand, was based on the na-
tion-state, an international system of states in which a minimal law of world
citizenship is recognised for the individual. In an international system, only
sovereign nation-states are recognised, and the individual is not.
It is an intellectual shame that Cloots’s life was terminated at 39. At the
same age, Kant had not yet published his Perpetual Peace, his Universal
History, or, for that matter, any of the works he is today most famous for.
If known at all, given one more year, it would be for his 1764 Beobachtun-
gen über das Gefühl des Schönen und Erhabenen, which displays a blatantly
racist view of the perceived inferiority of Africans and Indians, and superior-
ity of Europeans. One can only dream of an alternate universe where Cloots
would have escaped death and could have pursued his career as an intellec-
tual. He may have written more and elaborated on his ideas, away from
the stress, urgency, and extremely demanding psychological conditions of
the revolution; perhaps in the peace and quiet of his bucolic home in Gna-
denthal. But in our present universe, hopefully, this thesis would have con-
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vinced the reader to consider at least the alternative between declaring ‘I am
Kantian’ and ‘I am Clootsian’ when thinking about cosmopolitan republic-
anism.4
4. For this formulation, I am grateful for the informal comment made half in jest and
half in earnest by Andrew Vincent after the presentation of my paper on Cloots at the
conference ‘Cosmopolitanism in a Wider Context — Conceptualizing Past and Present’,
organised by the Centre for Baltic and East European Studies (CBEES) at Södertörn Uni-
versity, in cooperation with the Nobel Museum, 24–26 November 2011.

A P P E N D I X : L I B R A RY
C ATA L O G U E G N A D E N T H A L
Digitised copy of the library catalogue of Schloss Gnadenthal (ca. 1800)
from the Historisch Centrum Overijssel (HCO) vestiging Zwolle, Nether-
lands:
NL-ZIHCO, Historisch Centrum Overijssel, archive number 0568.1, Fam-
iliearchief Van Hoevell, Haus Gnadenthal, Akten, inventory number 172.
315
316 appendix: libr ary catalogue gnadenthal
appendix: libr ary catalogue gnadenthal 317
318 appendix: libr ary catalogue gnadenthal
appendix: libr ary catalogue gnadenthal 319
320 appendix: libr ary catalogue gnadenthal
appendix: libr ary catalogue gnadenthal 321
322 appendix: libr ary catalogue gnadenthal
appendix: libr ary catalogue gnadenthal 323
324 appendix: libr ary catalogue gnadenthal
appendix: libr ary catalogue gnadenthal 325
326 appendix: libr ary catalogue gnadenthal
appendix: libr ary catalogue gnadenthal 327
328 appendix: libr ary catalogue gnadenthal
appendix: libr ary catalogue gnadenthal 329
330 appendix: libr ary catalogue gnadenthal
appendix: libr ary catalogue gnadenthal 331
332 appendix: libr ary catalogue gnadenthal
B I B L I O G R A P H Y
printed sources
Adolphus, John. Biographical Memoirs of the French Revolution. Vol. 1.
London: T. Cadell, Jun. & W. Davis, in the strand, 1799.
Anonymous.Les chevaux au manège, ouvrage trouvé dans le porte-feuille de
monseigneur le prince de Lambesc, grand-écuyer de France. Paris: s.n.,
1789.
Baculard d’Arnaud, François Thomas Marie de. Délassemens de l’homme
sensible, ou Anecdotes diverses. Vol. 2. Paris: Chez Buisson, 1786.
Barruel, Augustin. Mémoires pour servir à l’histoire du jacobinisme. Vol. 4.
Hambourg: Chez P. Fauche, 1799.
Barthélemy, Jean-Jacques. Voyage du jeune Anacharsis en Grèce, dans le mi-
lieu du quatrième siècle avant l’ère vulgaire. 4 vols. Paris: Chez De Bure
l’aı̂ né, 1788.
Bastide, Bernard-Louis Verlac de La. Lettre d’un cosmopolite à l’ombre de
Calas. s.l.: s.n., 1765.
Bayle, Pierre. Dictionnaire historique et critique. 1st ed. 2 vols. Rotterdam:
Chez Reinier Leers, 1697.
.Dictionnaire historique et critique. 3rd ed. Vol. 3: N–Z. Rotterdam
(Genève): s.n., 1715.
. Extrait du dictionnaire historique et critique. 2 vols. Berlin: Chez
Chrétien Frédéric Voss, 1765.
Beauzée, Nicolas. ‘Primitif’. In Encyclopédie, ou Dictionnaire raisonné des
sciences, des arts et des métiers, edited by Denis Diderot and Jean le
Rond d’Alembert, 13:369. Paris: Briasson, 1751–1772.
Bentham, Jeremy. An Introduction to the Principles of Morals and Legisla-
tion. London: T. Payne & Son, 1789.
. Sur le nouvel ordre judiciaire en France, ou extraits des dissertations
de M. Bentham adressées par l’auteur à l’Assemblée Nationale. Trans-
lated by Etienne Dumont. Paris: Imprimerie du « Patriote français »,
1790.
333
334 bibliogr aphy
Bergier, Nicolas-Sylvestre. Le déisme réfuté par lui-même, ou Examen des
principes d’incrédulité répandus dans les divers ouvrages de M. Rous-
seau, en forme de lettres. Paris: Chez Humblot, 1765.
.La certitude des preuves du christianisme, ou Réfutation de l’« Exa-
men critique des apologistes de la religion chrétienne ». Paris: chez
Humblot, 1767.
. Apologie de la religion chrétienne contre l’auteur du Christianime
dévoilé, & contre quelques autres critiques. 2 vols. Paris: Chez Hum-
blot, 1769.
. ‘Suite de l’apologie de la religion chrétienne, ou Réfutation des
principaux Articles du Dictionnaire Philosophique’. In Apologie de
la religion chrétienne, 2nd ed., 2:298–576. Paris: Chez Humblot, 1770.
. Examen du matérialisme, ou Réfutation du système de la nature.
2 vols. Paris: Chez Humblot, 1771.
. Traité historique et dogmatique de la vraie religion, avec la réfuta-
tion des erreurs qui lui ont été opposées dans les différens siècles. 12 vols.
Paris: Chez Moutard, 1780.
.Dictionnaire de théologie. 8 vols. Liège: La Société Typographique,
1789.
Bernier, François. Histoire de la dernière révolution des Estats du Grand
Mogol. 2 vols. Paris: Chez Claude Barbin, 1670.
.Suite desMémoires du Sieur Bernier sur l’Empire duGrandMogol.
2 vols. Paris: Chez Claude Barbin, 1671.
Beschreibung der Königlichen Residenzstädte Berlin und Potsdam, aller da-
selbst beﬁndlicher Merkwürdigkeiten, und der umliegenden Gegend:
2 Beschreibung der Königlichen Residenzstädte Berlin und Potsdam,
aller daselbst beﬁndlicher Merkwürdigkeiten, und der umliegenden
Gegend. 3rd ed. Vol. 2. Berlin: bei Friedrich Nicolai, 1786.
Boaton, Pierre-François de. Épitre sur l’obéissance. A messieurs les éleves
de l’Académie royale militaire des nobles. Par un ancien Capitaine
d’Infanterie, Gouverneur dans cette Académie. Berlin: George Jacques
Decker, 1777.
Bonaparte, Lucien. Mémoires de Lucien Bonaparte, Prince de Canino,
écrits par lui-même. Vol. 1. Paris: Librairie de Charles Gosselin et Cie,
1836.
PRINTED SOURCES 335
Bordeu, Théophile de, Antoine de Bordeu and François de Bordeu. Re-
cherches sur les maladies chroniques, leurs rapports avec les maladies
aiguës, leurs périodes, leur nature, et sur la manière dont on les traite
aux eaux minérales de Barèges et des autres sources de l’Aquitaine. Vol. 1,
Contenant la théorie générale des maladies et l’analyse médicinale du
sang. Paris: Ruault, 1775.
Boulainvilliers, Henri de. Histoire de l’ancien gouvernement de la France :
avec XIV lettres historiques sur les parlemens ou états-généraux. 3 vols.
La Haye, Amsterdam: Aux dépends de la Compagnie, 1727.
. Essais sur la noblesse de France, contenans une dissertation sur son
origine & son abaissement. Amsterdam: s.n., 1732.
Boulanger, Nicolas-Antoine. Recherches sur l’origine du despotisme orien-
tal : ouvrage posthume de Mr. B.I.D.P.E.C. s.l.: s.n., 1761.
. Recherches sur l’origine du despotisme oriental. Edition critique
annotée. Edited by Paul Sadrin. Centre de Recherches Jacques Petit
(vol. 52). Paris: Annales Littéraires de l’Université de Besançon, Les
Belles Lettres, 1988 [1761].
Brissot (de Warville), Jacques Pierre. Examen critique des voyages dans
l’Amérique septentrionale, de M. le Marquis de Chatellux ; ou
Lettre à M. le Marquis de Chatellux, Dans laquelle on réfute
principalement ses opinions sur les Quakers, sur les Negres, sur le
Peuple, & sur l’Homme. London: s.n., 1786.
Buffon, Georges-Louis Leclerc Comte de. Histoire naturelle, générale et
particulière. Avec la description du cabinet du roi. 36 vols. Paris: De
l’imprimerie royale, 1749–1788.
. ‘Histoire naturelle des animaux’. Chap. Discours sur la nature
des animaux in Œuvres, edited by Stéphane Schmitt, 431–495.
Bibliothèque de la Pléiade. Paris: Gallimard, 2007 [1753].
. ‘Histoire naturelle de l’homme’. In Œuvres, edited by Stéphane
Schmitt, 179–407. Bibliothèque de la Pléiade. Paris: Gallimard, 2007
[1749].
Burke, Edmund. Reﬂections on the Revolution in France: And on the Pro-
ceedings in Certain Societies in London Relative to that Event. In a
Letter Intended to Have Been Sent to a Gentleman in Paris. 2nd ed.
London: J. Dodsley, 1790.
. The Correspondence of Edmund Burke. Edited by Alfred Cobban
and Robert A. Smith. Vol. 6: July 1789–December 1791. Cambridge:
Cambridge University Press, 1967.
336 bibliogr aphy
Burke, Edmund. Select Works of Edmund Burke. Edited by Francis Cana-
van. Vol. 3: Letters on a Regicide Peace. A New Imprint of the Payne
Edition. Indianapolis: Liberty Fund, 1999.
Burlamaqui, Jean-Jacques. Principes du droit naturel. Genève et Coppen-
hague: Chez Cl. & Ant. Philibert, 1756.
Butot. Cours de morale, fondée sur la nature de l’homme. Par M. P**, pas-
teur de **. Vol. 1. London: s.n., 1789.
Casanova, Giacomo. Histoire de ma vie. Vol. 3. Paris: Robert Laffon, 2002.
Castillon, Frédéric de. ‘Éloge historique de Pierre François de Boaton’. In
Mémoires de l’Académie Royale des Sciences et Belles-Lettres, 1796:22–
36. Berlin: Chez George Decker, Imp. du Roi, 1799.
Castillon, Johann von.Discours sur l’origine de l’inegalité parmi les hommes :
Pour servir de réponse auDiscours queM. Rousseau, citoyen de Géneve,
a pub. sur le même sujet. Amsterdam: Chez J. F. Jolly, 1756.
Cerceau, Jean-Antoine du. Histoire de Thamas Koulikan, Sophi de Perse.
Amsterdam: Chez Arkstee, 1740.
Challamel, Augustin, and Désiré Lacroix. Album du centenaire : grands
hommes et grands faits de la Révolution française (1789–1804). 5th ed.
Paris: Librairie Furne : Jouvet, 1889.
Chronique de Paris. Vol. 3 (1790–1791). Paris: s.n., 1790–1793.
Cicero, Marcus Tullius. On the Orator: Books 1–2. Translated by E.W. Sut-
ton and H. Rackham. Loeb Classical Library 348. Cambridge, MA:
Harvard University Press, 1942.
Cloots, Anacharsis. La certitude des preuves du Mahométisme: ou, Réfuta-
tion de l’examen critique des apologistes de la religion Mahométane.
London: s.n., 1780.
.Lettre sur les juifs, à un écclésiastique demes amis, lue dans la séance
publique du musée de Paris, le XXI novembre 1782. Berlin: s.n., 1783.
. Vœux d’un gallophile : Suivis de mêlanges ; & d’anecdotes sur
Stiépan-Annibal, soi-disant prince d’Albanie, ou supplément au livre
des Liaisons dangereuses ; & d’un drame sur la mort de Voltaire.
Amsterdam: s.n., 1786.
. L’orateur du genre-humain, ou, Dépêche du Prussien Cloots, au
Prussien Hertzberg. Paris: Desenne, 1791.
.La république universelle; ou, Adresse aux tyrannicides. Paris: Chez
les marchands de nouveautés, 1792.
PRINTED SOURCES 337
.NiMarat, ni Roland. Opinion d’Anacharsis Cloots. Paris: Desenne,
1792.
. Procès de Louis le dernier. Harangue d’Anacharsis Cloots, député
du département de l’Oise à la Convention nationale. Paris: Imprimerie
nationale, 1792.
. Bases constitutionnelles de la république du genre humain. Paris:
De l’imprimerie nationale, 1793.
. Écrits révolutionnaires, 1790–1794. Paris: Editions Champ libre,
1979.
. Œuvres. Edited by Albert Soboul. Vol. 3. München; Paris: Kraus
Reprint; EDHIS, 1980.
. ‘Adresse d’un Prussien à un Anglais’. In Ecrits révolutionnaires,
1790–1794, 44–60. Paris: Champ Libre, 1979 [1790].
. ‘Anacharsis à Paris, ou lettre de Jean-Baptiste Cloots à un prince
d’Allemagne’. In Ecrits révolutionnaires, 1790–1794, 72–84. Paris:
Champ Libre, 1979 [1790].
. ‘Discours prononcé à la barre de l’Assemblée nationale, par M. de
Cloots, du Val-de-Grâce, Orateur du Comité des étrangers, à la séance
du 19 juin 1790’. InEcrits révolutionnaires, 1790–1794, 28–29. Paris: Edi-
tions Champ libre, 1979 [1790].
. ‘L’Orateur du genre humain, ou, Dépêche du Prussien Cloots au
Prussien Hertzberg’. In Ecrits révolutionnaires, 1790–1794, 101–170.
Paris: Editions Champ libre, 1979 [1791].
. ‘La République universelle ou adresse aux tyrannicides’. In Ecrits
révolutionnaires, 1790–1794, 243–318. Paris: Editions Champ libre, 1979
[1792].
. ‘Appel au genre humain’. In Écrits révolutionnaires, 1790–1794,
627–644. Paris: Editions Champ libre, 1979 [1793].
. ‘Bases constitutionnelles de la république du genre humain’. In
Écrits révolutionnaires, 1790–1794, 473–502. Editions Champ libre,
1979 [1793].
. ‘Résumé historique de la révolution française’. InÉcrits révolution-
naires, 1790–1794, 520–607. Paris: Editions Champ libre, 1979 [1793].
Collins, Anthony. Discours sur la liberté de penser écrit à l’occasion d’une
nouvelle secte d’esprits forts, ou de gens qui pensent librement. Traduit
de l’anglais et augmenté d’une lettre d’un médecin arabe. London: s.n.,
1714.
338 bibliogr aphy
Collins, Anthony. Examen des prophéties qui servent de fondement à la reli-
gion chrétienne. Avec un Essai de critique sur les prophêtes et les prophé-
ties en général. Translated by Paul Henri Dietrich baron d’Holbach.
London: s.n., 1768.
Condorcet, Jean-Antoine-Nicolas de Caritat marquis de. Rapport et projet
de décret sur l’organisation générale de l’instruction publique : présentés
à l’Assemblée nationale, les 20 et 21 avril 1792. Paris: de l’Imprimerie
nationale, 1792.
. ‘De la nature des pouvoirs politiques dans une nation libre’. In
Œuvres, edited by Arthur Condorcet-O’Connor and François Arago,
vol. 10. Paris: Firmin Didot frères, imprimeurs de l’Institut, 1847
[1792].
Costume de cérémonie de Messieurs les deputés des 3 ordres aux États géné-
raux : Clergé, Noblesse, Tiers-Etat. Paris: Print, 1789.
Cubières-Palmézeaux, Michel (de). Les États-Généraux du Parnasse, de
l’Europe, de l’Église et de Cythère ; ou les Quatre Poèmes politiques,
lus au Lycée du Palais-Royal et suivis de plusieurs autres poèmes. Paris:
De l’Imprimerie, 1791.
d’Alembert, Jean le Rond. ‘Discours préliminaire des éditeurs’. In Encyclo-
pédie, ou Dictionnaire raisonné des sciences, des arts et des métiers, edi-
ted by Denis Diderot and Jean le Rond d’Alembert, 1:i–lii. Paris: Brias-
son, 1751.
. ‘Découverte (Philosophie)’. In Encyclopédie, ou Dictionnaire rai-
sonné des sciences, des arts et des métiers, edited by Denis Diderot and
Jean le Rond d’Alembert, 4:705–706. Paris: Briasson, 1751–1772.
d’Argens [?], Jean-Baptiste de Boyer marquis. Thérèse philosophe, ou mé-
moires pour servir à l’histoire du Père Dirrag et de Mademoiselle Éra-
dice. La Haye: s.n., 1748.
d’Argens, Jean-Baptiste de Boyer marquis.Lettres juives, ou Correspondance
philosophique, historique et critique, entre un juif voyageur à Paris &
ses correspondans en divers endroits. La Haye: Chez Paul Gautier, 1736.
d’Holbach, Paul Henri Thiry baron. De la cruauté religieuse. London: s.n.,
1769.
. Système de la nature ; ou, Les loix dumonde physique,& dumonde
moral. 2 vols. London: s.n., 1770.
. La politique naturelle ; ou, Discours sur les vrais principes du gou-
vernement, par un ancien magistrat. Vol. 1. Londres [i.e. Amsterdam]:
s.n., 1773.
PRINTED SOURCES 339
. La morale universelle, ou Les devoirs de l’homme fondés sur sa na-
ture. Vol. 1: Théorie de la morale. Amsterdam: Chez Marc-Michel Rey,
1776.
. ‘Représentans’. In Encyclopédie, ou Dictionnaire raisonné
des sciences, des arts et des métiers, edited by Denis Diderot and
Jean le Rond d’Alembert, 14:143–46. Paris: Briasson, 1751–1772.
Dazès, Abbé. L’esprit des magistrats philosophes : ou, Lettres ultramontaines,
d’un docteur de la sapience à la Faculté de droit de l’Université de Paris.
Tivoli: Chés l’auteur, 1765.
Delmas, Bernard. ‘Les Physiocrates, Turgot et « le grand secret de la science
fiscale »’. Revue d’histoire moderne et contemporaine 56, no. 2 (April
2009): 79–103.
Des Champs, Jean. Cours abrégé de philosophie Wolﬃenne, en forme de
lettres. 3 vols. Amsterdam: Arkstée et Merkus, 1743–1747.
Desmoulins, Camille. La France libre. Paris: Ébrard, 1834 [1789].
Dictionnaire de l’Académie Française. 4th ed. Paris: Chez la Veuve B. Brunet,
1762.
Dictionnaire universel françois et latin. Vol. 4. Trévoux: Florentin Delaulne,
Hilaire Foucault, Michel Clousier, Jean-Geoffroy Nyon, Estienne Ga-
neau, Nicolas Gosselin, 1721.
Dictionnaire universel françois et latin. Vol. 2, Coma–Fyonie. Paris: Floren-
tin Delaulne, Hilaire Foucault, Michel Clousier, Jean-Geoffroy Nyon,
Estienne Ganeau, Nicolas Gosselin, 1721.
Dictionnaire universel françois et latin, vulgairement appelé dictionnaire de
Trévoux. 6th ed. Vol. 2. Paris: Compagnie des libraires associés, 1771.
Dictionnaire universel françois et latin, vulgairement appelé dictionnaire de
Trévoux. 6th ed. Vol. 6. Paris: Compagnie des libraires associés, 1771.
Diderot, Denis. ‘Droit naturel’. In Encyclopédie, ou Dictionnaire raisonné
des sciences, des arts et des métiers, edited by Denis Diderot and Jean
le Rond d’Alembert, 5:115–116. Paris: Briasson, 1751–1772.
Dubos, Jean Baptiste. Histoire critique de l’etablissement de la monarchie
francoise. 4 vols. Amsterdam: Chez François Changuion, 1734.
Fardeau, Abbé. Lettre d’un cosmopolite sur le réquisitoire de M. Joly de
Fleury et sur l’Arrêt du parlement de Paris, du 2 [21] janvier 1764, qui
condamne au feu l’Instruction pastorale deM. l’archevêque de Paris du
28 octobre 1763. Paris: chez Romain Constant, à l’image de S.-Athanase,
1765.
340 bibliogr aphy
Fénelon, François de Salignac de La Mothe-. Les avantures de Télémaque,
ﬁls d’Ulysse. 1st ed. 2 vols. Paris: Chez Jacques Estienne, 1717.
Féraud, Jean-François. Dictionnaire critique de la langue française. Vol. 1,
A-D. Marseille: Chez Jean Mossy, 1787.
Ferguson, Adam. An Essay on the History of Civil Society. Dublin: Boulter
Grierson, 1767.
Fougeret de Montbron, Jean-Louis.Le cosmopolite, ou Le citoyen dumonde.
London: [s.n.], 1753.
Fraser, James. The History of Nadir Shah, formerly called Thamas Kuli
Khan, the Present Emperor of Persia. London: W. Strahan, 1742.
Frédéric II de Prusse. Œuvres de Frédéric le Grand. Edited by Johann D. E.
Preuss. Vol. 18. Berlin: Rudolph Ludwig Decker, 1851.
. ‘Instruction pour la direction de l’académie des nobles à Berlin’. In
Œuvres de Frédéric le Grand, edited by Johann D. E. Preuss, 9:87–98.
Berlin: Rudolph Ludwig Decker, 1848 [1765].
Fréret, Nicolas, and Paul Henri Thiry baron (auteur présumé) d’Holbach.
Œuvres philosophiques. London: s.n., 1776.
Gargas, Pierre-André. Conciliateur de toutes les nations d’Europe ou Projet
de paix perpétuelle entre tous les souverains de l’Europe, et leurs voisins.
s.l.: s.n., 1782.
Gebhard, Johann George. Über den Einﬂuß Friedrichs des Zweiten auf die
Aufklärung und Ausbildung seines Jahrhunderts. Berlin: bei Friedrich
Maurer, 1801.
Gessner, Salomon. La mort d’Abel. Poëme en cinq chants. Translated by
Pierre-François Boaton. Hamburg: Pierre François Fauche, 1791.
Girardin, René-Louis de. Promenade ou Itinéraire des jardins
d’Ermenonville, Auquel on a joint vingt-cinq de leurs principales vues,
dessinées & gravées par Mérigot ﬁls. Paris: Chez Mérigot, Gattey,
Guyot, 1788.
Gudin de La Brenellerie, Paul-Philippe. Supplément au Contrat social. Paris:
Chez Maradan et Perlet, 1791.
Hamilton, Alexander, James Madison and John Jay. The Federalist: A
Collection of Essays, Written in Favour of the New Constitution, As
Agreed upon by the Federal Convention, September 17, 1787. 2 vols.
New York: J. / A. McLean, 1788.
Helvétius, Claude-Adrien. De l’esprit. Paris: Chez Durand, 1758.
PRINTED SOURCES 341
Hertzberg, Ewald Friedrich Graf von. Mémoire Sur La Troisième Année
Du Règne De Frédéric Guillaume II, Roi De Prusse, & pour prouver
que le Gouvernement Prussien n’est pas despotique. s.l.: Académie des
Sciences, 1789.
. Mémoire Sur La Quatrième Année Du Règne De Frédéric
Guillaume II, Roi De Prusse, & sur la Noblesse héréditaire. s.l.:
Académie des Sciences, 1790.
.Mémoire sur les révolutions des états, externes, internes et réligieuses,
lu dans l’affemblée publique de l’académie des Sciences de Berlin, le 6,
Octobre 1791: pour célébrer le Jour de Naissance de Frédéric Guillaum
II, Roi de Prusse, et la cinquième année de son règne. s.l.: Académie
des Sciences, 1791.
. Recueil des déductions, mémoires, déclarations, lettres, traités, et
autres actes et écrits publics, qui ont été rédigés et publiés pour la cour
de Prusse par le ministre d’État Comte de Hertzberg, dans les années
1789 et 1790. Vol. 3. Berlin: Chez J. F. Unger, 1795.
Hume, David. Histoire naturelle de la religion. Amsterdam: Chez J. H.
Schneider, 1759.
. Œuvres de M. Hume. Vol. 1. Amsterdam: Chez J. H. Schneider,
1764.
. Dialogues Concerning Natural Religion. 2nd ed. London: s.n.,
1779.
Jaucourt, Chevalier Louis de. ‘Perses, empire des’. In Encyclopédie, ou Dic-
tionnaire raisonné des sciences, des arts et des métiers, edited by De-
nis Diderot and Jean le Rond d’Alembert, 12:417–420. Paris: Briasson,
1765.
Jaucourt, Chevalier Louis de. ‘Sciences (connaissances humaines)’. In Ency-
clopédie, ou Dictionnaire raisonné des sciences, des arts et des métiers,
edited by Denis Diderot and Jean le Rond d’Alembert, 14:788–789.
Paris: Briasson, 1751–1772.
Kant, Immanuel. Kritik der reinen Vernunft. Riga: verlegts Johann Fried-
rich Hartknoch, 1781.
. Zum ewigen Frieden. Ein philosophischer Entwurf. Königsberg:
bey Friedrich Nicolovius, 1795.
La Madelaine, Louis Philipon de. Petite encyclopédie poétique, ou choix de
poésies dans tous les genres, par une société de gens de lettres. Mélanges.
Vol. 12. Paris: Capelle et Renand, libraires Commissionnaires, 1805.
342 bibliogr aphy
Lachappelle, J. Considérations philosophiques sur la Révolution Française.
Paris: Chez l’Auteur. Et chez Fuchs, Benoist, Deroi, Paris, Belin, 1797.
Lamy, Bernard. La rhétorique, ou L’art de parler. 3rd ed. Paris: Chez André
Pralard, 1688.
Lavicomterie de Saint-Samson, Louis. Les crimes des rois de France, depuis
Clovis jusqu’à Louis XVI. Nouvelle édition. Paris: bureau des révolu-
tions de Paris, 1792 [1791].
Lavoisier, Antoine-Laurent de.Traité élémentaire de chimie : présenté dans
un ordre nouveau et d’après les découvertes modernes. Vol. 1. Paris: Chez
Cuchet, 1789.
Leibniz, Gottfried Wilhelm. Essais De Théodicée Sur La Bonté De Dieu,
La Liberté De L’Homme, Et L’Origine Du Mal. Amsterdam: Chez
Isaac Troyel, 1710.
Locke, John.Essai philosophique concernant l’entendement humain, où l’on
montre quelle est l’étendue de nos connoissances certaines, et la manière
dont nous y parvenons. 3rd ed. Translated by Pierre Coste. Amsterdam:
Chez Pierre Mortier, 1735.
Lovencrone, Christian. Lettre d’un Danois impartial au Chevalier Méan-
well à Yorke. En forme de replique à un libelle infame, intitulé Mé-
moires d’une reine infortunée. Bréda: chez Pierre Telltruth, 1776.
Mably, Gabriel Bonnot de. Des droits et des devoirs du citoyen. Kell: [s.n.],
1789.
Mallet du Pan, Jacques. Mercure britannique; ou, Notices historiques et cri-
tiques sur les affaires du tems. Vol. 4. 25–31. London: W. et C. Spilsbury,
1799.
Mavidal, M. J., and M. E. Laurent, eds. Archives Parlementaires de 1787 à
1860. Recueil complet des débats législatifs et politiques des chambres
françaises. 2nd ed. Première série (1787 à 1799). Paris: Librairie admi-
nistrative de Paul Dupont, 1879.
Mercier, Louis-Sébastien. Tableau de Paris. Nouvelle édition. Vol. 1. Am-
sterdam: s.n., 1783.
. Néologie ou vocabulaire de mots nouveaux, à renouveler, ou pris
dans des acceptions nouvelles. Vol. 1. Paris: Moussard ; Maradan, 1801.
Mirabeau (comte de), Honoré Gabriel Riqueti.LeDespotisme de la maison
d’Orange, prouvé par l’histoire. Hollande: s.n., 1788.
Mirabeau (marquis de), Victor Riqueti. L’ami des hommes, ou Traité de la
population. 3 vols. Avignon: s.n., 1756–1760.
PRINTED SOURCES 343
Montesquieu, Charles-Louis de Secondat baron de La Brède et de. De
l’Esprit des loix, ou du Rapport que les loix doivent avoir avec la
constitution de chaque gouvernement, les moeurs, le climat, la religion,
le commerce, &c. 2 vols. Genève: Chez Barillot, & fils, 1748–1750.
Mosheim, Joahnn Lorenz von. Histoire ecclésiastique ancienne et moderne,
depuis la naissance de Jésus-Christ jusqu’au commencement du XVIIIe
siècle. Translated by Archibald Maclaine. 6 vols. Maestricht: Chez Jean-
Edme Dufour & Philippe Roux, 1776.
Otter, Johan. Voyage en Turquie et en Perse. Avec une Relation des expé-
ditions de Tahmas Kouli-Khan. 2 vols. Paris: Chez les Freres Guerin,
1748.
Paine, Thomas.The Age of Reason: Being an Investigation of True and Fab-
ulous Theology. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2013 [1794].
Pauw, Cornelius de. Recherches philosophiques sur les Américains, ou Mé-
moires intéressants pour servir à l’histoire de l’espèce humaine: avec une
Dissertation sur l’Amérique & les Américains par Don Pernety et la
Défense de l’auteur des Recherches contre cette Dissertation. Vol. 1. Ber-
lin: Chez George Jacques Decker, Imp. du Roi, 1770.
Pellissery, Roch Antoine de. La caffé politique d’Amsterdam: ou Entretiens
familiers d’un François, d’un Anglois, d’un Hollandois, et d’un cosmo-
polite, sur les divers intérêts économiques & politiques de la France, de
l’Espagne, & de l’Angleterre. s.l.: s.n., 1778.
Piattoli, Scipione. Épitre du vieux cosmopolite Syrach à la convention natio-
nale de France. Sarmatie: s.n., 1795.
Plan détaillé d’enseignement pour l’académie royale des gentilshommes fait
d’après l’instruction générale du Roi par ordre de son excellence Mr.
de Buddenbrock lieutenant général d’infanterie des armées du roi &c.
Berlin: George Jacques Decker, 1779.
Pufendorf, Samuel. On the Duty of Man and Citizen According to Nat-
ural Law. Edited by James Tully. Cambridge Texts in the History of
Political Thought. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1991.
Reﬂexions d’un cosmopolite. s.l.: s.n., ca. 1750.
Réimpression de l’ancien Moniteur. Vol. 13: Assemblée législative. Paris:
Henri Plon, 1862.
Rémi, Joseph-Honoré. Le cosmopolisme, publié à Londres à l’occasion du
mariage de Louis-Auguste, Dauphin de France. Amsterdam, Paris:
Chez Valade, 1770.
344 bibliogr aphy
Resnier de Goué, André Guillaume.République universelle, ou L’humanité
ailée réunie sous l’empire de la Raison. Genève: s.n., 1788.
Riouffé, Honoré.Mémoires d’un détenu, pour servir à l’histoire de la tyran-
nie de Robespierre. 2nd ed. Paris: Louvet, Anjubault, B. Mathé, 1795.
Robespierre, Maximilien de. Le défenseur de la constitution. 1. Paris: P.-J.
Duplain, 1792.
. ‘Discours de Robespierre à la Société des Jacobins, séance extra-
ordinaire du 22 frimaire an II’. Chap. Annexe in Anacharsis Cloots :
Écrits révolutionnaires, 1790–1794, 653–55. Paris: Editions Champ libre,
1979 [1793].
Robison, John. Preuves de conspirations contre toutes les religions et tous les
gouvernements de l’Europe, ourdies dans les assemblées secrètes des Illu-
minés, des francs-maçons et des sociétés de lecture. Vol. 2. London: J.
Cadell & Davies, 1799.
Rousseau, Jean-Jacques.Discours sur l’origine et les fondemens de l’inegalité
parmi les hommes. Dresde: Chez Marc-Michel Rey, 1755.
. Discours sur l’origine et les fondemens de l’inégalité parmi les
hommes. Amsterdam: Chez Marc-Michel Rey, 1755.
. Lettres de deux amans, Habitans d’une petite Ville au pied des
Alpes. 1st ed. Amsterdam: Marc Michel Rey, 1761.
. Considérations sur le gouvernement de Pologne et sur sa réforma-
tion projettée. Londres: s.n., 1782.
. ‘Extrait du projet de paix perpétuelle de monsieur l’abbé de Saint-
Pierre’. In Rousseau : Œuvres complètes, 3:563–589. Paris: Gallimard,
1964 [1761].
. ‘Du contrat social ou principes de droit politique’. In Rousseau :
Œuvres complètes, 3:347–470. Gallimard, 1964 [1762].
. ‘Discours sur l’économie politique’. In Rousseau : Œuvres com-
plètes, 3:239–278. Paris: Gallimard, 1964 [1755].
. ‘Jugement sur le projet de paix perpétuelle’. In Rousseau : Œuvres
complètes, 3:591–600. Paris: Gallimard, 1964 [1782].
. ‘Du contrat social ou essai sur la forme de la république (première
version, manuscrit de Genève)’. InRousseau : Œuvres complètes, 3:279–
346. Paris: Gallimard, 1964 [1887].
PRINTED SOURCES 345
. ‘Émile’. In Œuvres complètes de Jean-Jacques Rousseau, vol. 2: La
Nouvelle Héloı̈ se, Émile, 393–722. Paris: Houssiaux, A., 1852–1853
[1762].
s.n.Encyclopédie méthodique. Jurisprudence. Vol. 1. Paris: Chez Panckoucke,
1782.
. Journal de la Cour et de la Ville, no. 60 (Lundi 29 Août 1791):
475–482.
. ‘Les Jacobins toujours Jacobins’. Journal de la Cour et de la Ville
Supplément, no. 56 (Jeudi 25 Août 1791): 1–4.
Saint-Pierre, Charles-Irénée Castel de.Projet pour rendre la paix perpétuelle
en Europe. Utrecht: Antoine Schouten, 1713.
Schmidt. ‘Aux Auteurs du Journal’. Journal de Paris Supplément au nu-
méro 248, no. 96 (Lundi 5 Septembre 1791): i–ii.
Sieyès, Emmanuel-Joseph. Qu’est-ce que le Tiers-Etat ? s.l.: s.n., 1789.
Sully, Maximilien de Béthune de. Mémoires ou œconomies royales d’estat
domestiques, politiques et militaires de Henry le Grand. Vol. 4. Paris:
Chez Augustin Courbé, 1662.
Sulzer, Johann Georg. ‘Kurzer Begriff aller Wißenschaften und andern
Theile der Gelehrsamkeit, worin jeder nach seinem Inhalt, Nuzen
und Vollkommenheit kürzlich beschrieben wird’. In Johann Georg
Sulzer, Gesammelte Schriften: Kommentierte Ausgabe, edited by
Hans Adler and Elisabeth Décultot, vol. 1: Kurzer Begriff Aller
Wissenschaften, Erste (1745) und Zweite (1759) Auflage, 49–186.
Basel: Schwabe, 2014 [1759].
. Pädagogische Schriften. Edited by Willibald Klinke. Langensalza:
Beyer & Mann, 1922 [1746].
Tallien, Jean-Lambert. Déclaration d’une partie de l’Assemblée nationale,
sur le décret rendu le 13 avril 1790, concernant la religion. Paris: De
l’Imprimerie de Vezard & Le Normant, 1790.
Thiébault, Dieudonné. Mes souvenirs de vingt ans de séjour a Berlin.
Vol. 5, Frédéric, son Académie, ses écoles et ses amis littérateurs et
philosophes. Paris: Buisson, 1805.
Thiéry, Luc-Vincent. Almanach du voyageur à Paris, et dans les lieux les
plus remarquables du royaume. Paris: Chez Hardouin, Gattey, 1785.
Tissot, François-Auguste. L’onanisme. Dissertation sur les maladies
produites par la masturbation. Lausanne: François Grasset, 1760.
346 bibliogr aphy
Toussaint, Dieudonné. Discours sur le fruit des bonnes études. Prononcé à
l’Académie des nobles, le 2. mars 1771. Berlin: George Jacques Decker,
1771.
Unknown. ‘Science (Logique et Métaphysique)’. In Encyclopédie, ou Dic-
tionnaire raisonné des sciences, des arts et des métiers, edited by De-
nis Diderot and Jean le Rond d’Alembert, 14:787–788. Paris: Briasson,
1751–1772.
Villette, Charles. Lettres choisies de Charles Villette, Sur les principaux Évè-
nemens de la Révolution. Paris: chez les Marchands de Nouveautés,
1792.
Voltaire. La raison par l’alphabet. 6th ed. 2 vols. s.l.: Chez Cramer, 1769.
. ‘Discours historique et critique sur la tragédie de Don Pèdre’. In
Oeuvres complètes de Voltaire, 6:105–112. s.l.: Imprimerie de la Société
littéraire-typographique, 1785.
.Œuvres complètes de Voltaire. Vol. 59. Paris: chez Thomine et Fortic,
1822.
. ‘Rescrit de l’empereur de Chine à l’occasion du projet de paix per-
pétuelle’. In Voltaire : Mélanges, edited by Jacques van den Heuvel,
157–202. Bibliothèque de la Pléiade. Gallimard, 1961 [1761].
. ‘Discours préliminaire sur le Poème de Fontenoy’. In Mélanges,
edited by Jacques van den Heuvel, 123–124. Bibliothèque de la Pléiade.
Paris: Gallimard, 1961 [1745].
. Essai sur les moeurs et l’esprit des nations et sur les principaux faits
de l’histoire depuis Charlemagne jusqu’à Louis XIII. Edited by René
Pomeau. 2 vols. Classiques Garnier. Paris: Bordas, 1990 [1756].
. ‘Discours en vers sur l’homme’. In Mélanges, edited by Jacques
van den Heuvel, 211–240. Bibliothèque de la Pléiade. Paris: Gallimard,
1961 [1740–1745].
. ‘Traité de Métaphysique’. In Mélanges, edited by Jacques van den
Heuvel, 157–202. Bibliothèque de la Pléiade. Paris: Gallimard, 1961
[1734–1738].
Wieland, Christoph Martin. Oberon. Poëme en quatorze chants. Translated
by Pierre-François Boaton. Berlin: Chez Chrétien Sigismond Spener,
1784.
Wolff, Christian. Vernünfftige Gedancken von Gott, der Welt und der Seele
des Menschen, auch allen Dingen überhaupt. Halle: Renger, 1720.
SECONDARY WORKS 347
. Philosophia rationalis sive Logica, methodo scientiﬁca pertractata,
et ad usum scientiarum. atque vitae aptata. Praemittitur discursus prae-
liminaris de philosophia in genere. Frankfurt: Premlin, 1728.
. Logique, ou réﬂexions sur les forces de l’entendement humain, et
sur leur légitime usage, dans la connoissance de la vérité. Berlin: Chés
A. Haude, 1736.
. Jus gentium. Methodo scientiﬁca pertractatum, in quo jus gentium
naturale ab eo, quod voluntarii, pactitii et consuetudinarii est, accurate
distinguitur. Halae Magdeburgicae: Renger, 1749.
. ‘De differentia intellectus systematici & non systematici /
Über den Unterschied zwischen dem systematischen und dem
nicht-systematischen Verstand’. In Thema: Die natürliche Theologie
bei Christian Wolff, edited by Michael Albrecht, 23:229–301.
Aufklärung: Interdisziplinäres Jahrbuch zur Erforschung des 18.
Jahrhunderts und seiner Wirkungsgeschichte. Hamburg: Meiner,
2011.
Yvon, Claude.Histoire philosophique de la religion. Vol. 1. Liege: Chez Plom-
teux, 1779.
Zanović, Stjepan. Œuvres choisies du prince Castriotto d’Albanie contenant
Le portrait caractéristique du Prince héréditaire de Prusse (Frédéric-
Guillaum)..., une lette au Congrès de l’Amérique... Avec le portrait de
l’auteur. Auxquelles on a joint Le fragment d’un nouveau chapitre du
Diable boiteux, envoyé de l’autre monde par M. le Sage... The Hague:
s.n., 1782.
secondary works
Adler, Hans. ‘Einleitung: J. G. Sulzers Kurzer Begriff aller Wissenschaften
von 1745 und 1759’. In Johann Georg Sulzer, Gesammelte Schriften:
Kommentierte Ausgabe, edited by Hans Adler and Elisabeth Décultot,
vol. 1: Kurzer Begriff Aller Wissenschaften, Erste (1745) und Zweite
(1759) Auflage, LVII–LXXIII. Basel: Schwabe, 2014.
Agulhon, Maurice. Marianne au combat. L’imagerie et la symbolique
républicaines de 1789 à 1880. Paris: Flammarion, 1979.
Albertan-Coppola, Sylviane. ‘L’apologétique catholique française à l’âge
des Lumières’. Revue de l’histoire des religions 205, no. 2 (1988):
151–180.
348 bibliogr aphy
Albertan-Coppola, Sylviane. L’Abbé Nicolas-Sylvestre Bergier (1718–1790).
DesMonts-Jura à Versailles, le parcours d’un apologiste du XVIIIe siècle.
« Les dix-huitièmes siècles » 128. Paris: Honoré Champion, 2010.
Albertone, Manuela. ‘Physiocracy’. In Encyclopedia of the Enlightenment,
edited by Alan Charles Kors. 4 vols. Oxford: Oxford University Press,
2002.
. ‘Democratic Republicanism. Historical Reflections on the Idea
of Republic in the 18th Century’. History of European Ideas 33, no.
1 (March 2007): 108–130.
Albrecht, Andrea. Kosmopolitismus. Weltbürgerdiskurse in Literatur, Phi-
losophie und Publizistik um 1800. Berlin: Walter de Gruyter, 2005.
Allen, Danielle. ‘Burning The Fable of the Bees: The Incendiary Authority
of Nature’. Chap. 3 in TheMoral Authority of Nature, edited by Lor-
raine Daston and Fernando Vidal, 74–100. Chicago, IL: University of
Chicago Press, 2003.
Antognazza, Maria Rosa. ‘Reason, Revelation, and Arguments for the De-
ity’. Chap. 5 in The Routledge Companion to Eighteenth Century Phi-
losophy, edited by Aaron Garrett, 145–166. London, New York, NY:
Routledge, 2014.
Archibugi, Daniele.The Global Commonwealth of Citizens: Toward Cosmo-
politan Democracy. Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press, 2008.
Avenel, Georges.Anacharsis Cloots. L’orateur du genre humain. Vol. 1. Paris:
Librairie internationale, 1865.
. Anacharsis Cloots, l’orateur du genre humain. Paris: Ivrea, 1977
[1865].
Bach, Reinhard. ‘Les physiocrates et la science politique de leur temps’. Re-
vue Française d’Histoire des Idées Politiques, no. 20 (February 2004):
229–259.
Baczko, Bronisław. ‘Il cosmopolitismo illuminista e le sue frontiere’. In La
frontiera da stato a nazione: il caso Piemonte, edited by Carki Ossola,
Claude Raffestin and Mario Ricciardi, 358–69. Roma: Bulzoni, 1987.
Bailey, Charles R. ‘An Eighteenth-Century French Board of Education’.
History of Education Quarterly 10, no. 2 (Summer 1970): 189–202.
. ‘French Secondary Education, 1763–1790: The Secularization of
Ex-Jesuit Collèges’.Transactions of the American Philosophical Society
68, no. 6 (1978): 1–124.
SECONDARY WORKS 349
Baker, Keith Michael. Inventing the French Revolution: Essays on French
Political Culture in the Eighteenth Century. Cambridge: Cambridge
University Press, 1990.
. ‘The Idea of a Declaration of Rights’. Chap. 4 in The French Idea
of Freedom: The Old Regime and The Declaration of Rights of 1789,
edited by Dale Van Kley, 154–196. The Making of Modern Freedom.
Stanford, CA: Stanford University Press, 1994.
. ‘Enlightenment and the Institution of Society: Notes for a Con-
ceptual History’. Chap. 5 in Civil Society: History and Possibilities, ed-
ited by Sudipta Kaviraj and Sunil Khilnani, 84–104. Cambridge: Cam-
bridge University Press, 2001.
. ‘Transformations of Classical Republicanism in Eighteenth-
Century France’. The Journal of Modern History 73, no. 1 (March
2001): 32–53.
. ‘Enlightenment Idioms, Old Regime Discourses, and Revolution-
ary Improvisation’. Chap. 5 in From Deﬁcit to Deluge: The Origins of
the French Revolution, edited by Thomas E. Kaiser and Dale K. Van
Kley, 165–197. Stanford, CA: Stanford University Press, 2011.
Barbey d’Aurevilly, Jules-Amédée. Portraits politiques et littéraires. Paris: A.
Lemerre, 1897.
Barbier, Antoine Alexandre. Dictionnaire des ouvrages anonymes et pseudo-
nymes, composés, traduits ou publiés en français et en latin: avec les noms
des auteurs, traducteurs et éditeurs, accompagné de notes historiques et
critiques. Vol. 2. Paris: Barrois l’ainé, 1823.
Bartelson, Jens. Visions of World Community. Cambridge: Cambridge Uni-
versity Press, 2009.
Bax, Ernest Belfort. ‘The Orator of the Human Race’. Chap. 1 in Outlooks
From the New Standpoint, 1–37. London: S. Sonnenschein & co., 1891.
Beck, Ulrich. Cosmopolitan Vision. London: Polity, 2006.
. Power in the Global Age: A New Global Political Economy. Lon-
don: Polity, 2006.
Belissa, Marc. Fraternité universelle et intérêt national (1713–1795) : les cos-
mopolitiques du droit des gens. Paris: Kimé, 1998.
Belissa, Marc, Yannick Bosc and Florence Gauthier, eds. Républicanismes et
droit naturel. Des humanistes aux révolutions des droits de l’homme
et du citoyen. L’esprit des Lumières et de la Révolution. Paris: Kimé,
2009.
350 bibliogr aphy
Bell, David Avrom. The Cult of the Nation in France: Inventing National-
ism, 1680–1800. Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press, 2001.
Bénot, Yves. ‘Condorcet et la république universelle’. InCondorcet : homme
des Lumières et de la Révolution, edited by Anne-Marie Chouillet and
Pierre Crépel, 251–262. Fontenay Saint-Cloud: ENS éditions, 1997.
Berlin, Isaiah. Liberty. Edited by Henry Hardy. Oxford: Oxford University
Press, 2002.
Bevilacqua, Alexander. ‘Conceiving the Republic of Mankind: The Polit-
ical Thought of Anacharsis Cloots’. History of European Ideas 38, no.
4 (December 2012): 550–569.
Biondi, Carminella. Mon frère, tu es mon esclave ! Teorie schiaviste e dibat-
titi antropologico-razziali nel Settecento francese. Studi e Testi 41. Pisa:
Editrice Libreria Goliardica, 1973.
Biré, Edmond. Journal d’un bourgeois de Paris pendant la Terreur. Vol. 4.
Paris: Perrin, 1897–1899.
Blum, Carol.Rousseau and the Republic of Virtue: The Language of Politics
in the French Revolution. Ithaca, NY: Cornell University Press, 1986.
Bödecker, Hans Erich. ‘Menschheit, Humanität, Humanismus’.
In Geschichtliche Grundbegriffe. Historisches Lexikon zur
politisch-sozialen Sprache in Deutschland, edited by Otto Brunner,
Werner Conze and Reinhard Koselleck, 3:1079–1083. Stuttgart:
Klett–Cotta, 1982.
. ‘Debating the respublica mixta: German and Dutch Political Dis-
courses Around 1700’. Chap. 11 inRepublicanism: A Shared European
Heritage, edited by Martin van Gelderen and Quentin Skinner, vol. 1,
Republicanism and Constitutionalism in Early Modern Europe, 219–
246. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2005.
Bohman, James. ‘Cosmopolitan Republicanism: Citizenship, Freedom,
and Global Political Authority’. Monist 84, no. 1 (January 2001):
3–21.
. ‘Cosmopolitan Republicanism and the Rule of Law’. Chap. 2 in
Legal Republicanism: National and International Perspectives, edited
by Samantha Besson and José Luis Martı́, 60–77. Oxford: Oxford Uni-
versity Press, 2009.
Bourke, Richard. Empire and Revolution: The Political Life of Edmund
Burke. Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press, 2015.
SECONDARY WORKS 351
Bowden, Brett. ‘Nationalism and cosmopolitanism: irreconcilable differ-
ences or possible bedfellows?’ National Identities 5, no. 3 (November
2003): 235–249.
Brockliss, L. W. B. French Higher Education in the Seventeenth and Eight-
eenth Centuries: A Cultural History. Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1987.
Brooke, Christopher. ‘Rousseau’s Political Philosophy: Stoic and
Augustinian Origins’. Chap. 5 in The Cambridge Companion to
Rousseau, edited by Patrick Riley, 94–123. Cambridge: Cambridge
University Press, 2001.
Brown, Howard G. Ending the French Revolution: Violence, Justice, and
Repression from the Terror to Napoleon. Charlottesville and London:
University of Virginia Press, 2006.
Burrows, Simon. ‘Books, Philosophy, Enlightenment’. In The Oxford
Handbook of the French Revolution, edited by David Andress, 74–91.
Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2015.
Burt, Stephen. ‘Two Poems by Randall Jarrell’. The New York Review of
Books, December 2002.
Busse, Winfried, and Françoise Dougnac. François-Urbain Domergue : le
grammairien patriote (1745–1810). Lingua et Traditio: Beiträge zur
Geschichte der Sprachwissenschaft, Band 10. Tübingen: Gunter Narr
Verlag, 1992.
Byron, George Gordon. Childe Harold’s Pilgrimage, a Romaunt: and
Other Poems. 5th ed. London: John Murray, 1812.
Cabantous, Alain. ‘Bergier, Nicolas-Sylvestre’. In Encyclopedia
of the Enlightenment, edited by Alan Charles Kors, vol. 1:
Abbadie–Enlightenment Studies, 139–140. Oxford ; New York, NY:
Oxford University Press, 2003.
Caron, Pierre.Les massacres de septembre. Paris: La maison du livre français,
1935.
Casabianca, Denis de. ‘Comment les régimes peuvent-ils être despotiques ?
Montesquieu et Boulanger’. Revue Française d’Histoire des Idées Poli-
tiques, no. 35, Débats et polémiques autour de L’Esprit des lois (Janu-
ary 2012): 37–50.
352 bibliogr aphy
Cataldi Madonna, Luigi. ‘Die Vernunft als Grundlage des Glaubens. Zu
Christian Wolffs Kritischer Theologie’. In Thema: Die natürliche
Theologie bei Christian Wolff, edited by Michael Albrecht, 23:41–55.
Aufklärung: Interdisziplinäres Jahrbuch zur Erforschung des 18.
Jahrhunderts und seiner Wirkungsgeschichte. Hamburg: Meiner,
2011.
Cavallar, Georg. Imperfect Cosmopolis: Studies in the History of Interna-
tional Legal Theory and Cosmopolitan Ideas. Cardiff: University of
Wales Press, 2011.
. Kant’s Embedded Cosmopolitanism: History, Philosophy, and
Education for World Citizens. Boston, MA: De Gruyter, 2015.
Charles, Sébastien, and J. Smith Plı́nio, eds. Scepticism in the Eighteenth
Century: Enlightenment, Lumières, Aufklärung. International
Archives of the History of Ideas, 210. Dordrecht; New York, NY:
Springer, 2013.
Chartier, Roger, Dominique Julia and Marie-Madeleine Compère.
L’éducation en France du XVIe au XVIIIe siècle. Paris: Société
d’édition d’enseignement supérieur, 1976.
Chaumié, Jacqueline. ‘Girondins’. Chap. 1 in Girondins et montagnards.
Colloque en Sorbonne (14 décembre 1975), edited by Albert Soboul, 19–
60. Bibliothèque d’Histoire révolutionnaire. Paris: Société des études
robespierristes, 2012 [1980].
Cheneval, Francis.Philosophie in weltbürgerlicher Bedeutung. Über die Ent-
stehung und die philosophischen Grundlagen des supranationalen und
kosmopolitischen Denkens der Moderne. Basel: Schwabe, 2002.
. ‘Der kosmopolitische Republikanismus: Erläutert am Beispiel
Anacharsis Cloots’. Zeitschrift für philosophische Forschung 58, no. 3
(2004): 373–396.
. La Cité des peuples : Mémoires de cosmopolitismes. Paris: Cerf,
2005.
Chevalier, Jean-Claude. ‘La pédagogie des collèges jésuites’. Littérature 7,
no. 3 (October 1972): 120–128.
Chisick, Harvey.Historical Dictionary of the Enlightenment. Lanham, MD:
The Scarecrow Press, 2005.
Chouillet, Anne-Marie, and Pierre Crépel, eds. Condorcet : homme des Lu-
mières et de la Révolution. Fontenay Saint-Cloud: ENS éditions, 1997.
SECONDARY WORKS 353
Church, Henry Ward. ‘Corneille De Pauw, and the Controversy over His
Recherches Philosophiques Sur Les Américains’. Publications of the
Modern Language Association 51, no. 1 (March 1936): 178–206.
Citton, Yves. ‘L’école physiocratique au cœur ou dans les marges des Lu-
mières ?’ In Les Marges des Lumières, edited by Didier Masseau, 99–
112. Geneva: Droz, 2004.
Coittant, Philippe-Edme.Tableau des prisons de Paris, sous le regne de Robes-
pierre: pour faire suite à l’Almanach des prisons, contenant différentes
anecdotes sur plusieurs prisonniers, avec les couplets, pièces de vers, lettres
et testamens qu’ils ont faits. Vol. 1–4. Paris: Chez Michel, rue Haute,
1794–95.
Coller, Ian. ‘The Revolutionary Mediterranean’. InA companion to the Fre-
nch Revolution, edited by Peter McPhee, 419–434. Chichester: Wiley-
Blackwell, 2013.
Compère, Marie-Madeleine. Les Collèges français : 16e–18e siècles. Paris: In-
stitut National de Recherche Pédagogique, 2002.
Connor, Walker. Ethnonationalism: The Quest for Understanding. Prin-
ceton, N.J.: Princeton University Press, 1994.
Conversi, Daniele. ‘Cosmopolitanism and Nationalism’. In Encyclopaedia
of Nationalism, edited by Athena Leoussi and Anthony D. Smith, 34–
39. Oxford: Transaction Books, 2000.
, ed.Ethnonationalism in the ContemporaryWorld: Walker Connor
and the Study of Nationalism. London: Routledge, 2002.
Cook, Alexander. ‘“The Great Society of the Human Species”: Volney and
the Global Politics of Revolutionary France’. Intellectual History Re-
view 23, no. 3 (2013): 309–328.
Cottret, Monique. Jansénismes et Lumières. Pour un autre XVIIIe siècle.
Bibliothèque Albin Michel histoire. Paris: Albin Michel, 1998.
Coulmas, Peter. Weltbürger. Geschichte einer Menschheitssehnsucht. Rein-
bek: Rowohlt, 1990.
Craig, William Lane. The Cosmological Argument from Plato to Leibniz.
London: MacMillan, 1980.
Cuche, François-Xavier. Le Télémaque de Fénelon entre père et mer. Paris:
Honoré Champion, 1994.
Dabdab Trabulsi, José Antonio. ‘8. Liberté, Égalité, Antiquité : la Révolu-
tion française et le monde classique’. Collection « ISTA » (Besançon)
1135, no. 1 (2009): 207–248.
354 bibliogr aphy
Dann, Otto. ‘Nation’. In Dictionnaire européen des Lumières, edited by
Michel Delon, 761–65. Paris: Presses Universitaires de France, 1997.
Daston, Lorraine. ‘Attention and the Values of Nature in the Enlighten-
ment’. Chap. 4 in The Moral Authority of Nature, edited by Lor-
raine Daston and Fernando Vidal, 100–126. Chicago, IL: University
of Chicago Press, 2003.
Daston, Lorraine, and Michael Stolleis, eds.Natural Law and Laws of Nat-
ure in Early Modern Europe: Jurisprudence, Theology, Moral and
Natural Philosophy. Farnham: Ashgate, 2008.
De Baecque, Antoine. Le Corps de l’histoire. Métaphores et politique (1770–
1800). Paris: Calmann-Lévy, 1993.
Décultot, Elisabeth. ‘Johann Georg Sulzer – Leben und Werk’. In Johann
Georg Sulzer, Gesammelte Schriften: Kommentierte Ausgabe, edited
by Hans Adler and Elisabeth Décultot, vol. 1: Kurzer Begriff Aller Wis-
senschaften, Erste (1745) und Zweite (1759) Auflage, XIII–LV. Basel:
Schwabe, 2014.
Dédéyan, Charles.Le cosmopolitisme européen sous la Révolution et l’Empire.
Paris: Société d’édition d’enseignement supérieur, 1976.
. Télémaque ou la liberté de l’esprit. Paris: Nizet, 1991.
Deguergue, Maryse. ‘La conception de la volonté générale chez Diderot’.
Revue d’histoire des Facultés de droit et de la science juridique, no. 12
(1991): 107–126.
Delon, Michel. ‘Nation’. In Nouvelle histoire des idées politiques, edited by
Pascal Ory, 127–135. Paris: Hachette, 1987.
. ‘Anacharsis Cloots : identité et légitimité révolutionnaire’. Revue
de littérature comparée 63, no. 4 (October 1989): 449–62.
Deprun, Jean. ‘Les Anti-Lumières’. In Histoire de la philosophie, edited
by Yvon Belaval, vol. II: La Renaissance, l’Âge classique, Le Siècle
des Lumières, La Révolution kantienne, 717–727. Encyclopédie de la
Pléiade 36. Paris: Gallimard, 1973.
Desan, Suzanne, Lynn Hunt and William Max Nelson, eds.The French Re-
volution in Global Perspective. Ithaca: Cornell University Press, 2013.
Döring, Detlef. Pufendorf-Studien: Beiträge zur Biographie Samuel von
Pufendorfs und zu seiner Entwicklung als Historiker und theologis-
cher Schriftsteller. Historische Forschungen 49. Berlin: Duncker &
Humblot, 1992.
SECONDARY WORKS 355
Douglass, Robin. ‘Rousseau’s Debt to Burlamaqui: The Ideal of Nature
and the Nature of Things’. Journal of the History of Ideas 72, no. 2
(April 2011): 209–230.
Doyle, William. The Oxford History of the French Revolution. Oxford: Ox-
ford University Press, 1989.
. The Oxford History of the French Revolution. 2nd ed. Oxford: Ox-
ford University Press, 2002.
. France and the Age of Revolution: Regimes Old and New from
Louis XIV to Napoleon Bonaparte. London, New York, NY: I.B.
Tauris, 2013.
Droysen, Hans. ‘Die Marquise du Châtelet, Voltaire und der Philosoph
Christian Wolff’. Zeitschrift für französische Sprache und Literatur 35
(1909): 226–248.
Dubuisson, Michel. ‘La Révolution française et l’Antiquité’. Cahiers de
Clio, no. 100 (hiver 1989): 29–42.
Dumazedier, Joffre, ed. La leçon de Condorcet. Paris: L’Harmattan, 1994.
Dumont, Jean-Christian. ‘Le spectre de la république romaine’. In Révolu-
tion et République : L’exception française, edited by Michel Vovelle,
14–26. Paris: Kimé, 1994.
Dunn, Susan. The Deaths of Louis XVI: Regicide and the French Political
Imagination. Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press, 2008.
Duranton, Henri. ‘Humanité’. In Handbuch politisch-sozialer
Grundbegriffe in Frankreich 1680–1820, edited by Rolf Reichardt and
Hans-Jürgen Lüsebrink, 19/20:9–51. München: Oldenbourg, 2000.
Duvergier, Jean Baptiste. Collection complète des lois, décrets d’intérêe géné-
ral, traités internationaux, arrêtés, circulaires, instructions, etc. Paris:
Recueil Sirey, 1834.
Dybikowski, James. ‘David Williams and the Margaret Street Chapel’.Man
and Nature 8, no. hors série (1989): 99–106.
Edelstein, Dan. ‘War and Terror: The Law of Nations from Grotius to the
French Revolution’. French Historical Studies 31, no. 2 (Spring 2008):
229–262.
. The Terror of Natural Right: Republicanism, the Cult of Nature,
and the French Revolution. Chicago, IL: University of Chicago Press,
2009.
356 bibliogr aphy
Edelstein, Dan. ‘Enlightenment Rights Talk’. The Journal of Modern His-
tory 86, no. 3 (September 2014): 530–565.
Ehrard, Jean. L’idée de Nature en France à l’aube des lumières. Paris: Flam-
marion, 1970.
Émond, Gustave. Histoire du collège de Louis-le-Grand, ancien collège des
jésuites à Paris, depuis sa fondation jusqu’en 1830. Paris: Durand, Loisel,
1845.
Erlich, Horst. Die Kadettenanstalten. Strukturen und Ausgestaltung
militärischer Pädagogik im Kurfürstentum Bayern im späteren 18.
Jahrhundert. München: Herbert Utz, 2007.
Fehrenbach, Elisabeth. ‘Nation’. In Handbuch politisch-sozialer Grundbe-
griffe in Frankreich 1680–1820, edited by Rolf Reichardt Höfer Anette
and Elisabeth Fehrenbach, vol. 7 Honnête homme, Honnêteté, Hon-
nêtes gens, Nation, 75–107. Berlin, Boston: Oldenbourg, 1986.
Fink, Gonthier Louis. ‘Cosmopolitisme’. In Dictionnaire européen des Lu-
mières, edited by Michel Delon, 320–323. Quadrige. Paris: Presses Uni-
versitaires de France, 2007.
Forman-Barzilai, Fonna. Adam Smith and the Circles of Sympathy: Cosmo-
politanism and Moral Theory. Ideas in Context 96. Cambridge: Cam-
bridge University Press, 2010.
Fornara, Charles William. The Nature of History in Ancient Greece and
Rome. Berkeley and Los Angeles, CA: University of California Press,
1983.
Fox-Genovese, Elizabeth. The origins of physiocracy, economic revolution
and social order in eighteenth-century France. Ithaca, NY: Cornell Uni-
versity Press, 1976.
France, Peter. Rhetoric and Truth in France: Descartes to Diderot. Oxford:
Clarendon Press, 1972.
Friedländer, Gottlieb.Die Königliche Allgemeine Kriegs-Schule und das hö-
here Militair-Bildungswesen 1765–1813. Berlin: E.S. Mittler & Sohn,
1854.
Frijhoff, Willem. ‘Cosmopolitismo’. In L’Illuminismo: Dizionario storico,
edited by Vincenzo Ferrone and Daniel Roche, 21–30. Manuali
Laterza 248. Bari–Roma: Editori Laterza, 2007 [1997].
Fumaroli, Marc. L’âge de l’éloquence. Rhétorique et « res literaria » de la
Renaissance au seuil de l’époque classique. Hautes études médiévales
et modernes 43. Geneva: Librairie Droz, 1980.
SECONDARY WORKS 357
Furet, François. La Révolution : De Turgot à Jules Ferry (1770–1880). His-
toire de France Hachette. Paris: Hachette, 1988.
. La Révolution française. Paris: Gallimard, 2007.
Furet, François, and Ran Halévi, eds. Orateurs de la Révolution française.
Vol. 1: Les Constituants. Bibliothèque de la Pléiade. Paris: Gallimard,
1989.
Furet, François, and Mona Ozouf. ‘Deux légitimations historiques de la
société française au XVIIIe siècle : Mably et Boulainvilliers’. Annales.
Économies, Sociétés, Civilisations 34, no. 3 (1979): 438–450. Accessed
27 June 2016. http://www.persee.fr/web/revues/home/prescript/
article/ahess_0395-2649_1979_num_34_3_294060.
, eds. Dictionnaire critique de la Révolution française. Paris: Flam-
marion, 1992.
, eds. Le siècle de l’avènement républicain. Bibliothèque des
histoires. Paris: Gallimard, 1993.
Gallois, Léonard. Histoire des journaux et des journalistes de la révolution
française (1789–1796). Paris: Bureau de la Société de l’industrie frater-
nelle, 1845.
Garrioch, David. The Making of Revolutionary Paris. Berkeley and Los
Angeles, CA: University of California Press, 2002.
Gaskell, Philip. A New Introduction to Bibliography. Winchester: St Paul’s
Bibliographies, 1995.
Gauthier, Florence. Triomphe et mort du droit naturel en Révolution 1789-
1795-1802. Paris: Presses Universitaires de France, 1998.
Gay, Peter. ‘Rhetoric and Politics in the French Revolution’.The American
Historical Review 66, no. 3 (April 1961): 664–676.
Geffroy, Annie. ‘Sans-culotte(s) (novembre 1790–juin 1792)’. In
Dictionnaire des usages socio-politiques (1770–1815), vol. 1 Désignants
socio-politiques, 159–186. Collection « Saint-Cloud ». Paris:
Klincksieck, 1985.
. ‘Citoyen/Citoyenne (1753–1829)’. In Dictionnaire des usages
socio-politiques (1770–1815), vol. 4: Désignants socio-politiques, 2,
63–86. Collection « Saint-Cloud ». Paris: Klincksieck, 1989.
358 bibliogr aphy
Gelderen, Martin van. ‘Aristotelians, Monarchomachs and Republicans:
Sovereignty and respublica mixta in Dutch and German Political
Thought, 1580–1650’. Chap. 10 inRepublicanism: A Shared European
Heritage, edited by Martin van Gelderen and Quentin Skinner, vol. 1,
Republicanism and Constitutionalism in Early Modern Europe,
195–217. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2005.
Gelderen, Martin van, and Quentin Skinner, eds.Republicanism: A Shared
European Heritage. 2 vols. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press,
2002.
Ginzburg, Carlo. Il ﬁlo e le tracce: vero, falso, ﬁnto. Campi del sapere. Mil-
ano: Feltrinelli, 2006.
Glenn, H. Patrick. The Cosmopolitan State. Oxford Constitutional Theory.
Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2013.
Godechot, Jacques.Les révolutions (1770–1799). 3rd ed. L’histoire et ses prob-
lemes : 36. Paris: Presses Universitaires de France, 1970.
Godechot, Jacques, and Hervé Faupin.LesConstitutions de la France depuis
1789. Paris: Flammarion, 2006.
Gojosso, Éric.Le concept de république en France (XVIe–XVIIIe siècle). Aix-
en-Provence: Presses Universitaires d’Aix-Marseille, 1998.
Goldie, Mark, and Robert Wokler, eds. The Cambridge History of
Eighteenth-Century Political Thought. Cambridge: Cambridge
University Press, 2006.
Goulemot, Jean-Marie. ‘Du républicanisme et de l’idée républicaine au
XVIIIe siècle’. In Le siècle de l’avènement républicain, edited by
François Furet and Mona Ozouf, 25–56. Bibliothèque des histoires.
Paris: Gallimard, 1993.
Greenblatt, Stephen Jay. Renaissance Self-Fashioning: From More to
Shakespeare. Chicago, IL: University of Chicago Press, 1980.
Grunert, Frank. ‘Kurzer Begriff statt langer Geschichte. Sulzers Kurzer Be-
griff aller Wissenschaft im Kontext der Historia literaria des 18. Jahr-
hunderts’. In Johann Georg Sulzer (1720–1779). Aufklärung zwischen
Christian Wolff und David Hume, edited by Frank Grunert and Gi-
deon Stiening, 227–244. Berlin: Akademie Verlag, 2011.
Guénot, Hervé. ‘Musées et lycées parisiens (1780–1830)’. Dix-huitième
Siècle 18, no. 1 (1986): 249–267.
SECONDARY WORKS 359
Gumbrecht, Hans Ulrich. Funktionen parlamentarischer Rhetorik in
der Französischen Revolution. Vorstudien zur Entwicklung einer
historischen Textpragmatik. München: Wilhelm Fink, 1978.
Haakonssen, Knud. ‘Protestant Natural Law Theory: A General Interpret-
ation’. Chap. 4 in New Essays on the History of Autonomy: A Collec-
tion Honoring J.B. Schneewind, edited by Natalie Brender and Larry
Krasnoff, 92–109. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2004.
, ed. Cambridge History of Eighteenth-Century Philosophy. Cam-
bridge: Cambridge University Press, 2006.
. ‘German Natural Law’. Chap. 9 in The Cambridge History
of Eighteenth-Century Political Thought, edited by Mark Goldie
and Robert Wokler, 251–290. The Cambridge History of Political
Thought. Cambridge University Press, 2006.
Haakonssen, Knud, and Michael Seidler. ‘Natural Law: Law, Rights and
Duties’. Chap. 27 in A Companion to Intellectual History, 1st ed., ed-
ited by Richard Whatmore and Brian Young, 377–401. Wiley Black-
well Companions to World History. Chichester: John Wiley & Sons,
2016.
Habermas, Jürgen. Theorie des kommunikativen Handelns. 2 vols. Berlin:
Suhrkamp, 1981.
Hammersley, Rachel. The English Republican Tradition and Eighteenth-
century France: Between the Ancients and the Moderns. Manchester:
Manchester University Press, 2010.
. ‘Harringtonian Republicanism, Democracy and the French Re-
volution’. La Révolution française, no. 5 (2013). Accessed 18 October
2016. http://lrf.revues.org/1047.
Hampsher-Monk, Iain. ‘Jean-Jacques Rousseau’. Chap. 4 in A History of
Modern Political Thought: Major Political Thinkers from Hobbes to
Marx, 153–195. Oxford; Cambridge, MA: Blackwell, 1992.
Hankins, James, ed. Renaissance Civic Humanism: Reappraisals and Reﬂec-
tions. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2000.
Hankins, Thomas L. Science and the Enlightenment. Cambridge:
Cambridge University Press, 1985.
Hartog, François. ‘La Révolution française et l’Antiquité : Avenir d’une il-
lusion ou cheminement d’un quiproquo?’ La pensée politique, no. 1
(1993): 30–61.
360 bibliogr aphy
Hartung, Gerald. Die Naturrechtsdebatte. Geschichte der Obligation vom
17. bis 20. Jahrhundert. Studienausgabe. Alber Praktische Philosophie
56. Freiburg im Breisgau: Verlag Karl Alber, 1999.
Hasquin, Hervé. ‘La Révolution française, la Belgique et l’Europe’.
In Révolution et population. Aspects démographiques des grandes
révolutions politiques, edited by Éric Vilquin, 21–34. Chaire Quetelet
1989. Louvain-la-Neuve: Academia, 1990.
Hazard, Pierre. ‘Cosmopolite’. In Mélanges d’histoire littéraire générale et
comparée offerts à Fernand Baldensperger. Paris: Librairie ancienne
Honoré Champion, 1930.
Hazel, John. Who’s Who in the Greek World. 2nd ed. London: Routledge,
2002.
Hermon-Belot, Rita. ‘L’abbé Fauchet’. In La Gironde et les Girondins, ed-
ited by François Furet and Mona Ozouf, 329–349. Bibliothèque his-
torique Payot. Librairie du bicentenaire de la Révolution française.
Paris: Payot, 1991.
Hettche, Matt. ‘Christian Wolff’. In The Stanford Encyclopedia of Philoso-
phy, Winter 2016, edited by Edward N. Zalta. 2016. Accessed 9 June
2017. https://plato.stanford.edu/archives/win2016/entries/wolff-
christian/.
Heuvel, Gerd van den, Rolf Reichardt and Eberhard Schmitt. ‘Cosmopol-
ite, Cosmopoli(ti)sme’. In Handbuch politisch-sozialer Grundbegriffe
in Frankreich 1680–1820, 6:41–55. München: Oldenbourg, 1986.
Hochstrasser, Tim J. ‘Conscience and Reason: the Natural Law Theory of
Jean Barbeyrac’. The Historical Journal 36, no. 02 (June 1993): 289–
308.
. Natural Law Theories in the Early Enlightenment. Cambridge:
Cambridge University Press, 2000.
. ‘Physiocracy and the politics of laissez-faire’. Chap. 19 in The
Cambridge History of Eighteenth-Century Political Thought, edited
by Mark Goldie and Robert Wokler, 419–442. The Cambridge
History of Political Thought. Cambridge University Press, 2006.
Holmyard, Eric John.Alchemy. Reprint. Mineola, NY: Dover Publications,
2012 [1957].
Horn Melton, James van. ‘From Enlightenment to Revolution: Hertzberg,
Schlözer, and the Problem of Despotism in the Late Aufklärung’.
Central European History 12, no. 2 (June 1979): 103–123.
SECONDARY WORKS 361
.The Rise of the Public in Enlightenment Europe. Cambridge: Cam-
bridge University Press, 2001.
Hornblower, Simon, Antony Spawforth and Esther Eidinow, eds. The Ox-
ford Classical Dictionary. 4th ed. Oxford: Oxford University Press,
2012.
Howatson, M. C., ed.The Oxford Companion to Classical Literature. 3rd ed.
Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2011.
Hunt, Lynn. Politics, Culture, and Class in the French Revolution. Berkeley
and Los Angeles, CA: University of California Press, 1984.
. Inventing Human Rights: A History. New York, NY: W. W.
Norton, 2008.
Hunter, Ian. ‘The Recovery of Natural Law: Hochstrasser’s History of
Morality’. Economy and Society 30, no. 3 (2001): 354–367.
Hutchinson, John, and Anthony D. Smith, eds.Ethnicity. Oxford Readers.
Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1996.
Ikni, Guy-Robert. ‘Cloots, Jean-Baptiste, dit Anacharsis Cloots’. In
Dictionnaire historique de la Révolution française, edited by
Albert Soboul, 233–234. Paris: Presses universitaires de France, 1989.
Ingram, James D. Radical Cosmopolitics: The Ethics and Politics of Democ-
ratic Universalism. New Directions in Critical Theory. New York, NY:
Columbia University Press, 2013.
Israel, Jonathan I. Radical Enlightenment: Philosophy and the Making of
Modernity 1650–1750. Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2001.
. ‘The Intellectual Origins of Modern Democratic Republicanism
(1660–1720)’. European Journal of Political Theory 3, no. 1 (January
2004): 7–36.
. Enlightenment Contested: Philosophy, Modernity, and the Eman-
cipation of Man 1670–1752. Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2006.
. Democratic Enlightenment: Philosophy, Revolution, and Human
Rights 1750–1790. Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2011.
Jacob, Margaret C. Strangers Nowhere in the World: The Rise of Cosmo-
politanism in Early Modern Europe. Philadelphia, PA: University of
Pennsylvania Press, 2006.
Jan, Eduard von. ‘Humanité’. Zeitschrift für französische Sprache und Lit-
eratur 55 (1932): 1–66.
362 bibliogr aphy
Jaurès, Jean. Histoire socialiste : 1789–1900. Edited by Jean Jaurès. Vol. 3: La
convention nationale. Paris: Jules Rouff, 1901.
.Histoire socialiste : 1789–1900. Edited by Jean Jaurès. Vol. 4: La Con-
vention II, 1793–1794 (9 Thermidor). Paris: Jules Rouff, 1901.
. Histoire socialiste de la Révolution française. Edited by
Albert Mathiez. Vol. 5: La révolution en Europe. Paris: Librairie de
l’Humanité, 1922.
. Histoire socialiste de la Révolution française. Edited by
Albert Soboul. Vol. 6. Paris: Éditions sociales, 1972.
Jennings, Jeremy. ‘The Debate about Luxury in Eighteenth- and
Nineteenth-Century French Political Thought’. Journal of the
History of Ideas 68, no. 1 (January 2007): 79–105.
Jones, Colin. The Longman companion to the French Revolution. London:
Longman, 1988.
Jordan, David Peter. The King’s Trial: Louis XVI vs. the French Revolu-
tion. Twenty-fifth Anniversary Edition. Berkeley and Los Angeles, CA:
University of California Press, 2004 [1979].
Jourdan, Annie.La Révolution, une exception française? Paris: Flammarion,
2004.
Jouvancy, Joseph de.L’élève de rhétorique (Candidatus rhetoricae) au collège
Louis-le-Grand de la Société de Jésus au XVIIIe siècle. Paris: Hachette,
1892.
Kates, Gary. The Cercle Social, the Girondins and the French Revolution.
Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press, 1985.
Kelley, Wyn. A companion to Herman Melville. Oxford: Blackwell, 2006.
Kennedy, Emmet. A Cultural History of the French Revolution. New
Haven, CT: Yale University Press, 1989.
Kindstrand, Jan Fredrik. Anacharsis: The Legend and the Apophthegmata.
Studia Graeca Upsaliensia, 16. Uppsala: Uppsala Universitet, 1981.
Kleingeld, Pauline. ‘Six Varieties of Cosmopolitanism in Late Eighteenth-
Century Germany’. Journal of the History of Ideas 60, no. 3 (1999):
505–524.
. Kant and Cosmopolitanism: The Philosophical Ideal of World Cit-
izenship. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2012.
Kors, Alan Charles, ed. Encyclopedia of the Enlightenment. Vol. 4 Sade-
Zoology. Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2003.
SECONDARY WORKS 363
Koselleck, Reinhart. ‘Einleitung’. In Geschichtliche Grundbegriffe. Histori-
sches Lexikon zur politisch-sozialen Sprache in Deutschland, edited by
Reinhart Koselleck, Werner Conze and Otto Brunner, 1:XIII–XXVII.
Stuttgart: Klett–Cotta, 1972.
. ‘Volk, Nation, Nationalismus, Masse’. In Geschichtliche
Grundbegriffe. Historisches Lexikon zur politisch-sozialen Sprache
in Deutschland, edited by Reinhart Koselleck Otto Brunner
Werner Conze, 7:141–431. Stuttgart: Klett–Cotta, 1992.
Kuehn, Manfred. ‘Reason and Understanding’. Chap. 6 in The Routledge
Companion to Eighteenth Century Philosophy, edited by Aaron Gar-
rett, 167–187. London, New York, NY: Routledge, 2014.
Kymlicka, Will. ‘From Enlightenment Cosmopolitanism to Liberal Nation-
alism’. Chap. 10 in Politics in the Vernacular: Nationalism, Multicul-
turalism, and Citizenship, 203–220. Oxford: Oxford University Press,
2001.
Labbé, François. Anacharsis Cloots, le Prussien francophile. Paris:
L’Harmattan, 1999.
Laborde, Cécile. ‘Republicanism and Global Justice’. European Journal of
Political Theory 9, no. 1 (2010): 48–69.
Laërtius, Diogenes. Lives of Eminent Philosophers. Edited by Tiziano
Dorandi. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2013.
Lamb, Robert. ‘The Liberal Cosmopolitanism of Thomas Paine’. The
Journal of Politics 76, no. 3 (July 2014): 636–648.
Laplanche, François.LaBible en France entremythe et critique (XVIe–XIXe
siècle). Collection « L’évolution de l’humanité ». Paris: Albin Michel,
1994.
Larrère, Catherine.L’invention de l’économie au XVIIIe siècle. Paris: Presses
Universitaires de France, 1992.
Laurent, François. Histoire du droit des gens et des relations internationales.
Vol. 15: L’Empire. Paris: Librairie Internationale, 1869.
. Histoire du droit des gens et des relations internationales. Vol. 18:
La philosophie de l’histoire. Paris: Librairie Internationale, 1870.
Leung, Gilbert. ‘A Critical History of Cosmopolitanism’.Law, Culture and
the Humanities 5, no. 3 (September 2009): 370–390.
364 bibliogr aphy
Lilti, Antoine. ‘« Et la civilisation deviendra générale » : L’Europe de Vol-
ney ou l’orientalisme à l’épreuve de la Révolution’.La Révolution fran-
çaise. Cahiers de l’Institut d’histoire de la Révolution française, no. 4:
Dire et faire l’Europe à la fin du XVIIIe siècle (June 2011).
Lovett, Frank. ‘Republicanism’. In The Stanford En-
cyclopedia of Philosophy, Spring 2016, edited by
Edward N. Zalta. 2016. Accessed 17 August 2016.
http://plato.stanford.edu/archives/spr2016/entries/republicanism/.
Lucas, Colin, ed. Rewriting the French Revolution. Oxford: Oxford Univer-
sity Press, 1991.
Machiavelli, Niccolò. ‘Il Principe’. In Opere, edited by Corrado Vivanti,
vol. 1 I Primi Scritti Politici. Biblioteca della Pléiade. Torino: Einaudi -
Gallimard, 1997.
Maintenant, Gérard. ‘République (mai 1789–septembre 1792)’. In Diction-
naire des usages socio-politiques (1770–1815), 99–126. Collection « Saint-
Cloud ». Paris: Klincksieck, 1987.
Maliks, Reidar.Kant’s Politics in Context. Oxford: Oxford University Press,
2014.
Manceron, Claude, and Anne Manceron. La Révolution française : diction-
naire biographique. Paris: Renaudot, 1989.
Masseau, Didier.Les ennemis des philosophes. L’antiphilosophie au temps des
Lumières. Paris: Albin Michel, 2001.
Mathiez, Albert. La Révolution et les étrangers. Paris: La Renaissance du
livre, 1918.
Matytsin, Anton M.The Specter of Skepticism in the Age of Enlightenment.
Baltimore, MD: Johns Hopkins University Press, 2016.
Maxwell, Richard. The Historical Novel in Europe, 1650–1950. Cambridge:
Cambridge University Press, 2012.
McPhee, Peter. The French Revolution, 1789–1799. Oxford: Oxford Univer-
sity Press, 2002.
.Robespierre: A Revolutionary Life. New Haven, CT; London: Yale
University Press, 2012.
, ed. A companion to the French Revolution. Chichester; Malden,
MA: John Wiley & Sons, 2013.
. The French Revolution. E-Book. Melbourne: Melbourne Univer-
sity Press, 2015.
SECONDARY WORKS 365
. Liberty or Death: The French Revolution. New Haven, CT: Yale
University Press, 2016.
Meinecke, Friedrich. Cosmopolitanism and the National State.
Weltbürgertum und Nationalstaat: Studien zur Genesis des
deutschen Nationalstaates. Translated by Robert B. Kimber.
Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press, 1970 [1908].
Melville, Herman. Moby-Dick; or, The Wale. New York, NY: Harper &
Brothers, 1851.
Mercier-Faivre, Anne-Marie. Un supplément à « L’Encyclopédie » : Le
« Monde primitif » d’Antoine Court de Gébelin. Collection « Les
Dix-Huitièmes Siècles ». Paris: Honoré Champion, 1999.
Méricam-Bourdet, Myrtille. ‘Voltaire contre Montesquieu ? L’apport des
œuvres historiques dans la controverse’.Revue Française d’Histoire des
Idées Politiques, no. 35, Débats et polémiques autour de L’Esprit des
lois (2012): 25–36.
Merrick, Jeffrey. ‘Sodomical Inclinations in Early Eighteenth-Century Paris’.
Eighteenth-Century Studies 30, no. 3 (Spring 1997): 289–293.
Monnier, Raymonde. ‘Républicanisme et Révolution française’. French
Historical Studies 26, no. 1 (2003): 87–118.
. ‘Évolution d’un thème républicain en révolution : les expressions
du tyrannicide dans la crise de Varennes’. InLa voix & le geste: une ap-
proche culturelle de la violence socio-politique, edited by Philippe Bour-
din, Mathias Bernard and Jean-Claude Caron, 29–47. Collection His-
toires croisées. Clermont-Ferrand: Presses universitaires Blaise Pascal,
2005.
. Républicanisme, patriotisme et Révolution française. Paris:
L’Harmattan, 2005.
. ‘Montesquieu et le langage républicain : l’argumentaire de l’“Es-
prit des lois”’. La Révolution française, no. 5 (2013). Accessed 17 Octo-
ber 2016. http://lrf.revues.org/1036.
Mortier, Roland. Anacharsis Cloots, ou, L’utopie foudroyée. Paris: Stock,
1995.
. Le « Prince d’Albanie » : un aventurier au Siècle des Lumières.
Paris: Honoré Champion, 2000.
Mossé, Claude. L’antiquité dans la Révolution française. L’aventure
humaine. Paris: Albin Michel, 1989.
366 bibliogr aphy
Moyn, Samuel.Human Rights and the Uses of History. London, New York,
NY: Verso, 2014.
Murray, Alexander Callander, ed. From Roman to Merovingian Gaul: A
Reader. Toronto: University of Toronto Press, 2008.
Nicolet, Claude. L’idée républicaine en France : Essai d’histoire critique.
Paris: Gallimard, 1995.
. La Fabrique d’une nation : la France entre Rome et les Germains.
Paris: Perrin, 2003.
Nussbaum, Martha. ‘Patriotism and Cosmopolitanism’. Boston Review 19,
no. 5 (October 1994).
O’Brien, Karen. Narratives of Enlightenment: Cosmopolitan History from
Voltaire to Gibbon. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1997.
Onuf, Nicholas Greenwood. ‘Civitas Maxima: Wolff, Vattel and the Fate
of Republicanism’. The American Journal of International Law 88,
no. 2 (April 1994): 280–303.
Outram, Dorinda. The Enlightenment. 3rd ed. New Approaches to
European History. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2013.
Ozouf, Mona.La fête révolutionnaire 1789–1799. Bibliothèque des histoires.
Paris: NRF Gallimard, 1976.
. L’Homme régénéré. Essais sur la Révolution française. Collection
Bibliothèque des Histoires. Paris: Gallimard, 1989.
Pagden, Anthony. The Enlightenment: And Why it Still Matters. Oxford:
Oxford University Press, 2013.
Palmer, Robert Roswell.The School of the French Revolution: ADocument-
ary History of the College of Louis-le-Grand and its Director, Jean-
Francois Champagne, 1762-1814. Boston, MA: De Gruyter, 2015.
. Twelve Who Ruled: The Year of the Terror in the French Revolu-
tion. Princeton Classic. With a foreword by Isser Woloch. Princeton,
NJ: Princeton University Press, 2005 [1941].
. The Age of the Democratic Revolution: A Political History
of Europe and America, 1760–1800. With a foreword by David
Armitage. Princeton Classics. Princeton, NJ: Princeton University
Press, 2014 [1959, 1964].
Parker, Harold Talbot.The Cult of Antiquity and the French Revolutionar-
ies: A Study in the Development of the Revolutionary Spirit. Chicago,
IL: University of Chicago Press, 1937.
SECONDARY WORKS 367
Pastorello, Thierry. ‘L’abolition du crime de sodomie en 1791 : un long pro-
cessus social, répressif et pénal’. Cahiers d’histoire. Revue d’histoire cri-
tique, nos. 112–113 (2010): 197–208.
Pettit, Philip. Republicanism: A Theory of Freedom and Government. Ox-
ford: Clarendon Press, 1997.
Pocock, J. G. A. The Machiavellian Moment: Florentine Political Thought
and the Atlantic Republican Tradition. With a foreword by Richard
Whatmore. Princeton Classics. Princeton, NJ: Princeton University
Press, 2016 [1975].
Poliakov, Léon. Histoire de l’antisémitisme. De Voltaire à Wagner. Vol. 3.
Liberté de l’esprit. Paris: Calmann-Lévy, 1968.
Poulsen, Frank Ejby. ‘Anacharsis Cloots and the Birth of Modern Cosmo-
politanism’. In Critique of Cosmopolitan Reason: Timing and Spacing
the Concept ofWorld Citizenship, edited by Rebecka Lettevall and Kris-
tian Petrov, 87–117. New Visions of the Cosmopolitan. Vol. 2. Oxford:
Peter Lang, 2014.
Proust, Jacques. Diderot et l’encyclopédie. Paris: Armand Colin, 1962.
Provost, Audrey. ‘Le luxe publié au dix-huitième siècle : questions de
formes’. L’Atelier du Centre de recherches historiques, no. 8 (2011).
Accessed 17 August 2016. https://acrh.revues.org/3829.
Quastana, François, and Pierre Serna, eds. La Révolution française, no. 5:
Le républicanisme anglais dans la France des Lumières et de la Révolu-
tion (2013).
. ‘Le républicanisme anglais dans la France des Lumières et de la
Révolution : mesure d’une présence’. La Révolution française, no. 5
(2013).
Ratzsch, Del, and Jeffrey Koperski. ‘Teleological Arguments for God’s Exist-
ence’. In The Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy, edited by Edward
N. Zalta. 2016. Accessed 13 June 2016. http : / / plato . stanford . edu /
archives/spr2016/entries/teleological-arguments/.
Rebérioux, Madeleine. ‘Anacharsis Cloots, l’autre citoyen du monde’. In
Thomas Paine, citoyen du monde, edited by Georges Kantin and la
Ligue des Droits de l’Homme, 31–44. Paris: Creaphis, 1990.
Reichenbach, Bruce. ‘Cosmological Argument’. In The Stanford Encyclo-
pedia of Philosophy, Spring 2013, edited by Edward N. Zalta. 2013. Ac-
cessed 12 June 2016. http : / / plato . stanford . edu / archives / spr2013 /
entries/cosmological-argument/.
368 bibliogr aphy
Rétat, Pierre. Le dictionnaire de Bayle et la lutte philosophique au XVIIIe
siècle. Bibliothèque de la faculté de lettres de Lyon, XXVIII. Paris: So-
ciété d’édition “les belles lettres”, 1971.
Reulos, Michel. ‘L’Université et les Collèges’. Bulletin de l’Association Guil-
laume Budé 1, no. 2 (June 1953): 33–42.
Rey, Michel. ‘Police et sodomie à Paris au XVIIIe siècle : du péché au
désordre’. Revue d’histoire moderne et contemporaine 29, no. 1 (1982):
113–124.
Rials, Stéphane. La déclaration des droits de l’homme et du citoyen. Pluriel.
Paris: Hachette, 1988.
Richter, Karl. Anacharsis Clootz. Berlin: Julius Springer, 1865.
Riley, Patrick.The GeneralWill Before Rousseau: The Transformation of the
Divine into the Civic. Studies in Moral, Political, and Legal Philosophy.
Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press, 1986.
. ‘Rousseau’s General Will’. Chap. 6 in The Cambridge Companion
to Rousseau, edited by Patrick Riley, 124–153. Cambridge: Cambridge
University Press, 2001.
. ‘Fénelon’s “Republican” Monarchism in Telemachus’. Chap. 4 in
Monarchism in the Age of Enlightenment: Liberty, Patriotism, and
the Common Good, edited by John Christian Laursen Hans Blom
and Luisa Simonutti, 78–100. Toronto: University of Toronto Press,
2007.
Rodgers, Daniel T. ‘Republicanism: the Career of a Concept’. The Journal
of American History 79, no. 1 (June 1992): 11–38.
Rosanvallon, Pierre. ‘Physiocrates’. In Dictionnaire critique de la Révolu-
tion française, edited by François Furet and Mona Ozouf, 2:359–371.
Paris: Flammarion, 1988.
. La démocratie inachevée : Histoire de la souveraineté du peuple en
France. Paris: Gallimard, 2000.
Rosenblatt, Helena. Rousseau and Geneva: From the First Discourse to The
Social Contract, 1749–1762. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press,
2007.
Rosenfeld, Sophia. ‘Citizens of Nowhere in Particular: Cosmopolitanism,
Writing, and Political Engagement in Eighteenth-Century Europe’.
National Identities 4, no. 1 (2002): 25–43.
SECONDARY WORKS 369
Roth, Udo. ‘»Kinder zu ziehen ist ein Werk eines Philosophen«.
Johann Georg Sulzers Konzeption von Erziehung im Kontext
der Aufklärungspädagogik’. In Johann Georg Sulzer (1720–1779).
Aufklärung zwischen Christian Wolff und David Hume, edited by
Frank Grunert and Gideon Stiening, 247–283. Berlin: Akademie
Verlag, 2011.
Rotschild, Emma. Economic Sentiments: Adam Smith, Condorcet, and the
Enlightenment. Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press, 2001.
Ryan, Todd. ‘Bayle et la controverse sur l’éternité du monde’. Kriterion:
Revista de Filosoﬁa 50, no. 120 (December 2009): 335–348.
Sadrin, Paul.Nicolas-Antoine Boulanger (1722–1759) ou avant nous le déluge.
Studies on Voltaire, vol. 240. Oxford: The Voltaire Foundation, 1986.
Sager, Peter.Unterwegs zu Künstlern und Bildern: Reportagen und Porträts.
Köln: DuMont, 1988.
Saussure, Ferdinand (de). Cours de linguistique générale. Paris: Payot, 1972.
Sauvage, Thomas, Michel-Nicolas Balisson de Rougemont and Gabriel de
Lurieu. Athènes à Paris, ou le Nouvel Anacharsis, comédie-vaudeville
en 1 acte [Paris, Variétés, 1er décembre 1821.] Paris: Pollet, 1821.
Schalk, Fritz. ‘Humanitas im Romanischen’. InExempla romanischerWort-
geschichte, 255–294. Frankfurt am Main: Vittorio Klostermann, 1966.
Schama, Simon. Patriots and Liberators: Revolution in the Netherlands,
1780–1813. London: Collins, 1977.
. Citizens: A Chronicle of the French Revolution. New York, NY:
Vintage Books, 1989.
Schlereth, Thomas J. The Cosmopolitan Ideal in Enlightenment Thought,
Its Form and Function in the Ideas of Franklin, Hume, and Voltaire,
1694–1790. Notre Dame, IN: University of Notre Dame Press, 1977.
Schminnes, Bernd, ed. Anacharsis Cloots: der Redner des
Menschengeschlechts. Kleve: Boss, 1988.
Scott, Hamish M.Enlightened Absolutism: Reform and Reformers in Later
Eighteenth-Century Europe. London: MacMillan, 1990.
Scrivener, Michael. The Cosmopolitan Ideal in the Age of Revolution and
Reaction, 1776–1832. London: Pickering / Chatto, 2007.
Sebastiani, Silvia.The Scottish Enlighenment: Race, Gender, and the Limits
of Progress. Palgrave Studies in Cultural and Intellectual History. New
York, NY: Palgrave Macmillan, 2013.
370 bibliogr aphy
Seidler, Michael. ‘Pufendorf’s Moral and Political Philosophy’. InThe Stan-
ford Encyclopedia of Philosophy, Winter 2015, edited by Edward N. Za-
lta. 2015. Accessed 26 April 2016. http://plato.stanford.edu/archives/
win2015/entries/pufendorf-moral/.
Seresse, Volker. Politische Normen in Kleve–Mark während
des 17. Jahrhunderts. Argumentationsgeschichtliche und
herrschaftstheoretische Zugänge zur politischen Kultur der frühen
Neuzeit. Frühneuzeit-Forschungen, 12. Epfendorf/Neckar:
Bibliotheca Academica, 2005.
Shank, J. B. The Newton Wars and the Beginning of the French Enlighten-
ment. Chicago, IL: The University of Chicago Press, 2008.
Shklar, Judith N. ‘Montesquieu and the New Republicanism’. Chap. 13 in
Machiavelli and Republicanism, edited by Gisela Bock, Quentin Skin-
ner and Maurizio Viroli, 265–280. Ideas in Context 18. Cambridge:
Cambridge University Press, 1991.
Sikora, Michael. Disziplin und Desertion. Historische Forschungen 57.
Duncker & Humblot, 1996.
Silvestrini, Gabriella. ‘Justice, War and Inequality. The Unjust Aggressor
and the Enemy of the Human Race in Vattel’s Theory of the Law of
Nations’. Grotiana 31 (2010): 44–68.
Skinner, Quentin. The Foundations of Modern Political Thought. Vol. 1.
The Renaissance. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1978.
. Reason and Rhetoric in the Philosophy of Hobbes. Cambridge:
Cambridge University Press, 1996.
.Liberty before liberalism. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press,
1998.
. Visions of Politics. Vol. 1: Regarding Method. Cambridge: Cam-
bridge University Press, 2002.
. Hobbes and Republican Liberty. Cambridge: Cambridge Univer-
sity Press, 2008.
. ‘Belief, Truth, and Interpretation’. In Ideengeschichte.
Traditionen und Perspektiven. Bochum: Ruhr-University Bochum,
November 2014.
Smets, Joseph. ‘Le Rhin, frontière naturelle de la France’. Annales histo-
riques de la Révolution française 314, no. 1 (1998): 675–698.
Smith, Anthony D.The Ethnic Origins of Nations. Oxford: Blackwell, 1998
[1986].
SECONDARY WORKS 371
Snyders, Georges. La pédagogie en France au XVIIe et XVIIIe siècles. Paris:
Presses Universitaires de France, 1964.
Soboul, Albert. Portraits de révolutionnaires. Paris: Messidor, Editions so-
ciales, 1986.
. Dictionnaire historique de la Révolution française. Paris: Presses
universitaires de France, 1989.
. ‘Introduction’. In Girondins et montagnards. Colloque en
Sorbonne (14 décembre 1975), edited by Albert Soboul, 1–18.
Bibliothèque d’Histoire révolutionnaire. Paris: Société des études
robespierristes, 2012 [1980].
Sonenscher, Michael. Work and Wages: Natural Law, Politics and
the Eighteenth-Century French Trades. Cambridge: Cambridge
University Press, 1989.
. ‘Review Article—Physiocracy as a Theodicy’. History of Political
Thought 23, no. 2 (February 2002): 326–339.
. Sans-Culottes: An Eighteenth-Century Emblem in the French Rev-
olution. Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press, 2008.
. Before the Deluge: Public Debt, Inequality, and the Intellectual
Origins of the French Revolution. Princeton, NJ: Princeton University
Press, 2009.
Souleyman, Elizabeth V. The Vision of World Peace in Seventeenth and
Eighteenth-Century France. New York, NY: Putnam’s Sons, 1941.
Spitz, Jean-Fabien. La liberté politique : Essai de généalogie conceptuelle.
Paris: Presses Universitaires de France, 1995.
. ‘From Civism to Civility: D’Holbach’s Critique of Republican Vir-
tue’. Chap. 6 in Republicanism: A Shared European Heritage, edited
by Martin van Gelderen and Quentin Skinner, vol. 2, The Values of
Republicanism in Early Modern Europe, 107–122. Cambridge: Cam-
bridge University Press, 2002.
. Le moment républicain en France. Paris: Gallimard, 2005.
Steiner, Philippe, ed.Revue Française d’Histoire des Idées Politiques. 20, Les
Physiocrates et la Révolution française. L’Harmattan, February 2004.
Stern, Selma. Anacharsis Cloots der Redner des Menschengeschlechts: ein
Beitrag zur Geschichte der Deutschen in der französischen Revolution.
Berlin: Emil Ebering, 1914.
372 bibliogr aphy
Stevens, John Christopher. ‘Anacharsis Cloots and French Cosmopolitan-
ism: The Death of an Idea’. PhD diss., University of Arkansas, 1954.
Stone, Bailey. Reinterpreting the French Revolution: A Global-Historical
Perspective. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2002.
Storrs, Christopher, ed. The Fiscal Military State in Eighteenth-Century
Europe. Farnham, England; Burlington, VT: Ashgate, 2009.
Strub, Christian. ‘II. System und Systemkritik in der Neuzeit’. In Histori-
sches Wörterbuch der Philosophie, edited by Karlfried Ritter Joachim;
Gründer, vol. 10: St–T, 825–856. Basel: Schwabe & Co. AG, 1998.
Sulzer, Johann Georg. Lebensbeschreibung. Berlin: Stettin, 1809.
Suratteau, Jean-René. ‘Cosmopolitisme et patriotisme au siècle des
Lumières’. Annales historiques de la Révolution française 253, no. 1
(1983): 364–389.
Sutherland, Donald. The French Revolution and Empire: The Quest For A
Civic Order. Oxford: Blackwell, 2003.
Tackett, Timothy. Priest and Parish in Eighteenth-Century France: A So-
cial and Political Study of the Curés in a Diocese of Dauphiné, 1750–
1791. Princeton Legacy Library. Princeton, NJ: Princeton University
Press, 1977.
.Religion, Revolution, and Regional Culture in Eighteenth-Century
France: The Ecclesiastical Oath of 1791. Princeton, NJ: Princeton Uni-
versity Press, 1986.
. When the King Took Flight. Cambridge, MA: Harvard University
Press, 2003.
. ‘The French Revolution and religion to 1794’. Chap. 27 in Cam-
bridge History of Christianity, vol. 7: Enlightenment, Reawakening
and Revolution 1660-1815, 536–555. Cambridge: Cambridge Univer-
sity Press, 2006.
. The Coming of the Terror in the French Revolution. Cambridge,
MA: Belknap Press of Harvard University Press, 2015.
Taylor, Charles. Sources of the Self: The Making of the Modern Identity.
Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1989.
Thielking, Sigrid. Weltbürgertum: kosmopolitische Ideen in Literatur und
politischer Publizistik seit dem achtzehnten Jahrhundert. München:
Fink, 2000.
SECONDARY WORKS 373
Thiers, Adolphe.Histoire de la révolution française. 7th ed. Vol. 3. Bruxelles:
Société typographique belge, Adolphe Warlen et compagnie, 1838.
Thomson, Ann. Materialism and Society in the Mid-Eighteenth Century:
La Mettrie’s Discours préliminaire. Geneva: Librairie Droz, 1981.
. ‘Issues at Stake in Eighteenth-Century Racial Classification’. Cro-
mohs – Cyber Review of Modern Historiography, no. 8 (2003): 1–20.
Accessed 25 October 2016. http : / / www . fupress . net / index . php /
cromohs/article/view/15684.
. Bodies of Thought: Science, Religion, and the Soul in the Early
Enlightenment. Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2008.
. L’âme des lumières. Le débat sur l’être humain entre religion et
science, Angleterre-France (1690–1760). Collection Époques. Paris:
Champ Vallon, 2013.
. ‘French Eighteenth-Century Materialists and Natural Law’. His-
tory of European Ideas 42, no. 2 (2016): 243–255.
Tocqueville, Alexis de. L’ancien régime et la Révolution. Edited by
J.-P. Mayer. Folio/Histoire. Paris: Gallimard, 1967 [1856].
Todorov, Tzvetan. Nous et les autres. Paris: Seuil, 1992.
Toulmin, Stephen Edelston. Cosmopolis: The Hidden Agenda of Modern-
ity. Chicago, IL: University of Chicago Press, 1992.
Tulard, Jean, Jean-François Fayard and Alfred Fierro. Histoire et diction-
naire de la Révolution française: 1789–1799. Bouquins. Paris: Robert
Laffont, 1998.
Turchetti, Mario. Tyrannie et tyrannicide de l’Antiquité à nos jours. Fonde-
ments de la politique. Essais. Paris: Presses Universitaires de France,
2001.
Urbinati, Nadia. ‘Due modelli di repubblicanesimo (e di liberalismo)’. Filo-
soﬁa e questioni pubbliche – Philosophy and Public Issues 5, no. 1 (2000):
81–92.
. ‘Condorcet’s Democratic Theory of Representative Government’.
European Journal of Political Theory 3, no. 1 (January 2004): 53–75.
. ‘Republicanism after the French Revolution: The Case of
Sismonde de Sismondi’. Journal of the History of Ideas 73, no. 1
(January 2012): 95–109.
Vardi, Liana. The Physiocrats and the World of the Enlightenment. Cam-
bridge: Cambridge University Press, 2012.
374 bibliogr aphy
Velema, Wyger R.E. Republicans: Essays on Eighteenth–Century Dutch
Political Thought. Brill’s Studies in Intellectual History, Volume 155.
Boston, MA: Brill Academic Publishers, 2006.
Venturi, Franco. Utopia and Reform in the Enlightenment. Cambridge:
Cambridge University Press, 1971.
Vernière, Paul. ‘L’idée d’humanité au XVIIIe siècle’. Studium Generale, 15.
Jahrgang 3 (1962): 171–179.
Viguier, Anne. ‘Individu (1770–1830) : Un processus de politisation
du vocabulaire’. In Dictionnaire des usages socio-politiques
(1770–1815), vol. 4: Désignants socio-politiques, 2, 111–143. Collection
« Saint-Cloud ». Paris: Klincksieck, 1989.
Viroli, Morizio. ‘La théorie du contrat social et le concept de République
chez Jean-Jacques Rousseau’.Archiv für Rechts- und Sozialphilosophie
/ Archives for Philosophy of Law and Social Philosophy 73, no. 2 (1987):
195–215.
. La théorie de la société bien ordonnée chez Jean-Jacques Rousseau.
European University Institute - Series C 11. Berlin; New York, NY: De
Gruyter, 1988.
Vovelle, Michel, ed. Révolution et République : L’exception française. Paris:
Kimé, 1994.
. 1793, La Révolution contre l’Eglise : de la Raison à l’être suprême.
Paris: Editions Complexe, 2002.
Wade, Ira O. The Intellectual Development of Voltaire. Princeton Legacy
Library. Princeton, N.J.: Princeton University Press, 1969.
Wahrman, Dror. Making of the Modern Self: Identity and Culture in
Eighteenth-Century England. New Haven, CT: Yale University Press,
2004.
Walker, Thomas C. ‘The Forgotten Prophet: Tom Paine’s Cosmopolitan-
ism and International Relations’. International Studies Quarterly 44,
no. 1 (March 2000): 51–72.
Wallon, Henri. La Révolution du 31 mai et le fédéralisme en 1793. 2 vols.
Paris: Hachette, 1886.
Weulersse, Georges.Lemouvement physiocratique en France (de 1756 à 1770).
2 vols. Paris: Félix Alcan, 1910.
. La physiocratie sous les ministères de Turgot et de Necker (1774–
1781). Paris: Presses Universitaires de France, 1950.
SECONDARY WORKS 375
. La physiocratie à la ﬁn du règne de Louis XV (1770–1774). Paris:
Presses Universitaires de France, 1959.
. La physiocratie à l’aube de la Révolution (1781–1792). Edited by
Corinne Beutler. Paris: Editions de l’Ecole des Hautes Etudes en Sci-
ences Sociales, 1985.
Whatmore, Richard. Republicanism and the French Revolution: An Intel-
lectual History of Jean-Baptiste Say’s Political Economy. Oxford: Ox-
ford University Press, 2000.
.AgainstWar and Empire. Geneva, Britain and France in the Eight-
eenth Century. New Haven, CT; London: Yale University Press, 2012.
. ‘Thomas Paine’. Chap. 19 in Constitutions and the Classics: Pat-
terns of Constitutional Thought from Fortescue to Bentham, edited by
Denis Galligan, 414–437. Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2014.
Wokler, Robert. ‘Rousseau and His Critics on the Fanciful Liberties We
Have Lost’. Chap. 9 in Rousseau and Liberty, edited by Robert Wok-
ler, 189–212. Manchester: Manchester University Press, 1995.
. Rousseau, the Age of Enlightenment, and Their Legacies. Edited
by Bryan Garsten. Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press, 2012.
Woloch, Isser.TheNew Regime: Transformations of the French Civic Order,
1789–1820s. New York, NY: W. W. Norton, 1994.
Wright, Johnson Kent. ‘National Sovereignty and the General Will: The
Political Program of the Declaration of Rights’. Chap. 5 in The Fre-
nch Idea of Freedom: The Old Regime and The Declaration of Rights
of 1789, edited by Dale Van Kley, 199–233. The Making of Modern
Freedom. Stanford, CA: Stanford University Press, 1994.
. A Classical Republican in Eighteenth-Century France: The Politi-
cal Thought of Mably. Stanford, CA: Stanford University Press, 1997.
. ‘The Idea of a Republican Constitution in Old Régime France’.
Chap. 14 in Republicanism: A Shared European Heritage, edited by
Martin van Gelderen and Quentin Skinner, vol. 1. Republicanism
and Constitutionalism in Early Modern Europe, 289–306.
Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2002.
Zurbuchen, Simone. ‘Samuel Pufendorf and the Foundation of Modern
Natural Law: An Account of the State of Research and Editions’.
Central European History 31, no. 4 (1998): 413–428.

